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35080

31 JUL 1914

Telegram to Berlin & Paris

I still think that situation is not dicticable  
 but in view of prospect of mobilization it ~~is~~ in  
 Germany it becomes essential to H. R. Govt. in  
 view of existing Treaties to ask whether {French} {German}  
 Govt. is prepared to engage ~~that not to~~ <sup>respect</sup> ~~violate~~  
 neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power  
~~does so~~ violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to {French} {German}  
 Govt. It is important to have an early answer ~~as the time~~  
~~is fast passing~~ E.g.

D  
585  
.G68



# British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914

Edited by G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt. and  
HAROLD TEMPERLEY, Litt.D.

Vol. XI

LONDON :

1926

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Vol. XI

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Foreign Office Documents  
June 28th–August 4th  
1914

Collected and Arranged with  
Introduction and Notes by

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY, M.A., C.B.E.

Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office

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## Foreword by the Editors.

THE decision to publish the British Documents dealing with the Origins of the War was announced in a letter of the 28th November, 1924 (published in the "Times" on the 3rd December), addressed to Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson, and signed by the Right Honourable Austen Chamberlain (now Sir Austen Chamberlain), His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

A few extracts from the Secretary of State's letter are here given :—

"The published letters in which you (Dr. Seton-Watson) and Sir Sidney Lee drew attention to the difficulties created for the historian anxious to present a full and fair account of recent events by the traditional rules governing the publication of our national records, immediately attracted my attention and commanded my sympathy. I found, on making inquiry, that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had already given instructions which, in substance, meet the suggestions contained in your letter of the 25th November, and that it only remained for me to confirm them . . . .

"As regards the publication of the official documents bearing on the general European situation out of which the War arose, a collection of these documents will be edited for the Foreign Office by Mr. G. P. Gooch and Mr. H. W. V. Temperley, who will, I hope, be in a position to begin serious work at a very early date . . . ."

On inquiry at the Foreign Office the Editors learnt that Mr. Headlam-Morley, the Historical Adviser of the Foreign Office, had already made a very full collection of the relevant British documents between the date of the assassination of the Archduke on the 28th June and the British declaration of war on Germany on the 4th August, 1914. They, therefore, requested him to complete this collection and to issue it as the concluding volume of their series. This he kindly consented to do, and has added a valuable introduction.

The Editors do not make themselves responsible for the introduction or notes of Mr. Headlam-Morley. They have limited their responsibility to examining the papers printed by him and to comparing them with the original documents and files. They have in one or two instances authorised the omission of certain documents affecting the internal affairs of neutral States, which have no direct bearing on the outbreak or origins of the war; but they believe that no important or essential document in the Foreign Office Archives has been omitted, and that publication of the official State papers has been in no way restricted. In addition to the official records, it has been found possible to print a number of the more important minutes, together with some extracts from the private letters of Sir Edward Grey, of Lord Carnock (Sir Arthur Nicolson in 1914) and of other diplomatic personages. The Editors desire to acknowledge their debt to Mr. Headlam-Morley for lightening an onerous task. They have also to acknowledge the help kindly afforded to them by Mr. S. Gaselee, the Librarian and Keeper of the Papers of the Foreign Office.

The publication by the Editors of the remainder of the volumes will follow as speedily as possible. The first two will cover the years 1898-1904, necessarily in a somewhat summary fashion. The remaining eight volumes will deal with the years from 1904 onwards in more detail.

G. P. GOOCH.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

## Introduction.

On the 6th August, 1914, two days after the declaration of war on Germany, there was laid on the table of the House of Commons a White Paper<sup>(1)</sup> containing the diplomatic correspondence which had taken place from the 22nd July to the 4th August. The immediate object was to inform Parliament as to the events which had brought about the war and the part taken in them by the British Government, for application had to be made to the House of Commons for a vote of supply. Owing to the nature of its contents, this collection of documents aroused very remarkable interest; it was at that time the only full official record available from any country, for the German White Paper, which had been presented to the Reichstag on the 4th August, obviously contained only a very small and partial selection, and, in particular, inevitably omitted any record of the negotiations with the British Government. In response to numerous requests, reprints were issued in a more popular form, and during the following months translations were prepared and circulated in the languages of all the more important countries. As a result it attained a circulation probably greater than that enjoyed by any similar publication; over a million copies were issued.

Since the war demands have been repeatedly made that this collection should be supplemented by a fuller publication. It has been pointed out that what was necessarily an incomplete collection of documents could not be fully satisfactory to those who were investigating the causes and origins of the war. This demand was strengthened when first the Austrian and then the German Government issued a very full publication, including not only the correspondence with foreign countries, but also other very confidential documents.

The suggestion has also been made that important documents or passages from documents were omitted, and that others were altered with the object of suppressing evidence that might appear to be unfavourable to the cause of the British Government and its Allies. These suspicions were absolutely unfounded. The view held by Sir Edward Grey and those who were working with him in the Foreign Office was that throughout the critical days at the end of July and the beginning of August they had done everything in their power to avert the outbreak of war; they believed that this had also been the desire of their Allies—France and Russia; there was, therefore, in their view nothing to hide; they desired that the publication should be as full and open as possible.

It was, however, necessary to use discretion in making the selection. According to an established rule of courtesy, which the British Government has always strictly observed, no document which includes a record of conversations with the Ambassadors and Ministers of other friendly Powers, or information confidentially conveyed by them, should be published without the consent of the Government concerned. On this occasion there was no time for reference to be made direct to them, for Parliament had to be informed immediately. All that was possible was to submit the printed proofs to the French, Russian and Italian Ambassadors. This threw on those preparing the work for publication at the Foreign Office additional responsibility. It was obviously not their duty to put forward for publication documents regarding negotiations between other countries in which the British Government had taken no part, but which had been communicated to them confidentially. The publication of such papers was for the Governments immediately concerned. This explains why, for example, there was omitted from Sir George Buchanan's telegram of the 24th July

<sup>(1)</sup> Cmd. 7467 Misc. No. 6 (1914). It may be convenient to explain here that there does not seem to be any difference between a "White Paper" and a "Blue Book." Both are popular expressions used to describe papers officially published by the British Government. All papers which are officially laid on the table of the House by the Foreign Office and other offices presided over by a Secretary of State are designated as Command papers.



(No. 101) that portion which recounts the results of the conversations between M. Poincaré and M. Sazonof. The authoritative publication of this must be made, if at all, by the French and Russian Governments in agreement. More matter of this nature was, however, included than under ordinary circumstances we should have expected. Never had there been a disclosure of negotiations, so immediate, so full and so frank. No objection seems to have been raised by any of the Ambassadors, and there is no record that they requested the alteration or omission of any document or passage.

Quite apart from this, it was of course only possible to publish a selection from the relevant documents. Everything had to be omitted which was not of real importance, for otherwise the course of events would have been obscured by the mass of material. The work of selection was entrusted to officials of the Foreign Office. It was only referred at the final stage to Sir Edward Grey, who decided that one document, and only one, should be omitted (see No. 132, with the editorial note). In addition to their other work, they had thrown upon them the arduous and responsible task of making paraphrases of all cypher telegrams; this had to be carried out under the greatest urgency; they had, in fact, to work almost without intermission day and night.

In this new edition the reader has before him the complete text of all the despatches contained in the earlier edition and all the telegrams in their original and unparaphrased form: he is, therefore, in a position to form an opinion as to the integrity and skill which were shown in preparing the original White Paper. In order to facilitate comparison, a reference is attached to every document which was included in the original.

When it had been determined that a new edition should be issued, the question had to be considered on what principle this should be prepared. It would have been possible simply to publish in its original and unparaphrased form the complete text of the documents already published, inserting those passages which had been omitted and adding to them such documents of obvious political importance as had not been included. This would not have been satisfactory. It certainly would not have satisfied the criticisms and stilled the suspicions which had been aroused. The only thing to do was to publish the whole correspondence, including every telegram and despatch, however unimportant and incorrect, in any way relating to the origins of the war. This is the course which has been pursued, and the reader has before him in this edition everything, within the specified dates, contained in the Foreign Office records which appeared to have a bearing on the origin and outbreak of the war. He is in possession of all the documentary material which the Secretary of State and his advisers had before them at the time.

This volume contains also much material which was not available in 1914 and which could not have been used then. In addition to the official despatches and telegrams, it includes all relevant extracts from the private correspondence of Sir Edward Grey, which he has left in the Foreign Office. Permission has also been received to print certain minutes made at the time on the papers, not only by the Secretary of State, but by the higher officials. These are comparatively few and brief, for it was not the practice to write frequent or lengthy comments. They are, however, of great importance; they were written on the spur of the moment with full confidence that they would under no circumstances be published, at any rate until very many years had elapsed. They therefore show better than anything else could the impression made at the time on those whose duty it was to advise the Secretary of State. From them we can see how the confidence that this crisis would be surmounted, as so many other crises had been in the last few years, gradually gave way to concern and apprehension.

Among these minutes none will attract more attention than those written by the late Sir Eyre Crowe. A study of them will give to the reader some conception of the qualities which made him one of the most distinguished public servants of

the time; the remarkable faculty of seeing and stating the essential points in a highly complex and difficult situation, the quickness and sureness of judgment and expression, the power of bringing his exceptional knowledge and experience to bear upon the particular problem with which he had to deal, and, above all, the intense feeling of responsibility and the single-minded devotion to the honour of his country. The personal memorandum addressed to Sir Edward Grey on the 31st July (No. 369) is especially remarkable. It was written under the stress of intense emotion; he believed that decisions were being made which would hazard the whole future of the country and a policy was being considered which would irreparably destroy its reputation. Recognition is due to the readiness with which Lord Grey has now consented to its publication, but we also know, from his own Memoirs, that he was himself in substantial agreement with it, though at the moment it was impossible for him, because of the very serious division of opinion in the Cabinet and the country, to act in accordance with this advice, or even to explain and justify the course he followed.

Since the volume was in type, Lord Carnock (formerly Sir Arthur Nicolson) has, with high public spirit, deposited in the Foreign Office the correspondence which he, as Permanent Under-Secretary of State, conducted with Ambassadors and Ministers abroad. Many of these documents, which are of great historical importance, are now included. It may be explained that it was by the wish of Sir Edward Grey that the private correspondence, which is essential to the work of the office, should be chiefly undertaken by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. It was understood that British Representatives abroad always had the right, if they so desired, of addressing the Secretary of State direct, but he wished to be freed from the additional burden which a large correspondence would have thrown upon him. The letters from abroad, which often contained very valuable information, in many cases unsuitable for embodiment in an official despatch, were usually submitted to the Secretary of State and, when of special importance, were circulated to the Prime Minister and, perhaps, other members of the Cabinet. They are, therefore, part of the information which was before the office and the Government.

The letters of the Under-Secretary have a different character; they have no official authority; they do not claim to give instructions, or indeed even suggestions. The chief object with which they were written was to keep the Ambassadors and Ministers, especially those in more remote posts, in touch with the thought and opinion at home: a large part is occupied with passing on information from other Missions. Sir Arthur Nicolson would, for example, send to Sir Maurice de Bunsen at Vienna news and information which he had himself received from St. Petersburg and Berlin. It will also be noted that the private letters are exempt from the rule by which each official despatch is strictly confined to one subject; they pass freely from one subject to another; political and private matters succeed one another; and, for this reason, they are in this volume quoted in extracts.

In another way the scope of this work is wider than that of the original White Paper. It begins not with the presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia of the 23rd July, but with the assassination of the Archduke on the 28th June. This seemed desirable for many reasons, and particularly because the German official publication starts from this date. In addition, there has been printed in a preliminary section a very brief selection of despatches, which it is hoped may be useful as an illustration of the diplomatic situation before the crisis began.

Although the volume contains a complete collection of all papers bearing on the origin of the war belonging to the month of July 1914, this does not imply that it includes all the political despatches and telegrams during that period. Down to the very end of the month there was a continuance of the normal diplomatic correspondence dealing with the ordinary current affairs. This, so far as it is worth publishing at all, will be included in the final volume of the series to be published by Dr. Gooch and Dr. Temperley. The task of discriminating between the two



categories of documents presented less difficulty than was anticipated. Towards the end of June there was a considerable cessation of political activity. To some extent this was no doubt seasonal: as the summer advances Parliaments adjourn, statesmen and diplomatists begin to take their holidays, and matters which a few weeks before seemed full of difficulty and anxiety assume a different aspect. We do not mean by this that there was any real modification in the profound anxiety with which every responsible person regarded the future of Europe; the danger of the clash between the two rival systems was obviously increasing with every addition to the armaments on both sides, but there seemed no indication that a crisis was approaching, and nothing to suggest that, whatever their ultimate designs might be, any of the Great Powers proposed to force the issue during the summer of 1914. There was a marked contrast between 1914 and the three previous years, in each of which during July Europe had been confronted with a serious and urgent crisis.

Moreover, some of the problems which had caused the gravest concern during the previous months had shown an improvement. The really serious danger throughout the spring and early summer of 1914 had been that of war between Greece and Turkey; such a conflict would almost inevitably have brought in Bulgaria on the side of the Turks, and there would have resulted a general Balkan war between those who wished to maintain and those who wished to overthrow the Treaty of Bucharest. From such a war it would have been very difficult for Austria and Russia to remain aloof. The crisis continued to the end of June when, for some reason which is not very apparent, informal negotiations which were being carried on with Dr. Dillon, the well-known journalist, as mediator, took a favourable turn, and it was arranged that M. Veniselos and the Grand Vizier, should meet at Brussels at the end of July, to come to a formal agreement. We have then a number of telegrams, which it has not been considered necessary to publish, recording the arrangements made for this meeting.

The other matter of immediate concern in the Balkans was Albania. Here again it has not been considered necessary to print the numerous telegrams giving an account of affairs in Albania during the month of July: the only event of importance was that an arrangement had been made by which Roumanian troops should be used to give to the Albanian Government that physical support of which they were so greatly in need. But it might be hoped that, even if some incident occurred on the Albanian frontier, it would be settled locally. All reports from Belgrade, Vienna, Berlin and other capitals were to the effect that the Serbian Government had no intention of creating any unnecessary difficulty. There was general agreement that the one thing the Serbian Government desired, at any rate for the next year or so, was peace; the first thing they had to do, after the recent large accessions of territory, was to make provision for the organisation and government of the new districts; they were occupied in negotiations for a concordat with the Vatican, and, moreover, the army, after two wars, required reorganisation and re-equipment. All this would make it extremely inconvenient to embark at this moment upon a new war. There were, of course, as was frankly acknowledged by the Serbians themselves, hot-heads who would shrink at nothing, but there was no evidence that they were likely to get the upper hand.

One thing which should perhaps be mentioned was the struggle which was going on at Sofia with regard to the provision of a loan to the Bulgarian Government; this had assumed a political aspect: the Dual and the Triple Alliances were both anxious to win over Bulgaria, and the granting of a loan would probably be the first step towards a closer political agreement. The problem was finally settled when a German loan was accepted on the 16th July.

If this was the condition of things in the Balkans, in the rest of Europe there was a marked absence of diplomatic controversy. The newspaper controversy between Russia and Germany on the subject of armaments, which had begun in March and continued spasmodically ever since, seemed at last to have died a natural death.

The relations between England and Germany are sufficiently indicated in the despatches printed at the beginning of the volume. It may be mentioned that the Baghdad Agreement, which had been the subject of negotiations for some months, had been initialled at the end of May and was ready for signature subject to the adjustment of certain supplementary points; the negotiations on this matter, which do not fall within the scope of this volume, continued as late as the 22nd July.

Relations with France were normal; there were no important political questions at issue between the two Governments, and, as will be seen, there were no despatches from the Embassy in Paris during the month of July dealing with French political affairs, whether internal or external, *e.g.*, nothing referring to the visit of the President of the Republic to Russia, and nothing giving an account of the attitude either of the French Government or the French press with regard to the assassination of the Archduke and its possible consequences, or the debate in the Chamber on the condition of the army. Sir F. Bertie doubtless considered that these topics, and French opinion on them, were being treated with sufficient detail and accuracy by the English press, and therefore thought that he could add little by reporting on them officially; but from one point of view this is unfortunate, because it resulted that the only information forwarded from Paris was two or three articles published in the *Matin* and the *Temps*. These articles, if read by those who have no intimate knowledge of the tendencies of French policy and French public opinion during June and July 1914, may easily produce an unfortunate and misleading impression. Quite frankly, their publication alone, as they stand, is very unfair to France, for they do not represent, and scarcely claim to represent, we will not say French public opinion, but any fraction of French public opinion; but the whole principle on which this volume is produced rendered it impossible to omit them. Their inspiration, as Lord Granville points out, is Russian, but we cannot even say that they represent general Russian opinion or that of the Russian Government as a whole, which could scarcely have committed itself to the approval of articles the political effect of which must be so unfavourable. The only party which would profit by them would be the German Government, which would find just the support they desired for appealing to the German nation for continued increase in armaments.

There was, from the point of view of the British Government, one problem by which they were seriously exercised and which seemed to require immediate treatment, namely, the relations with Russia. Grave difficulties had arisen in Asia: the Russians were very dissatisfied with what appeared to them to be the undue advantages which the British Government had gained from their control of the oil-fields in Mesopotamia. On the other hand, the British Government had for long serious grounds for complaint at the action of the Russian Consuls in Persia. There were, moreover, grave apprehensions, felt largely by the Government of India, concerning the situation in Afghanistan. One party among the Russians was gravely dissatisfied with the results of the Agreement of 1907. It appeared to them that the British Government had succeeded in obtaining advantages under the agreement greater than those which had fallen to Russia, and, in particular, they were annoyed at seeing the mineral wealth of the neutral zone absorbed by British companies. On both sides a feeling of distrust was arising: without mutual confidence there could be no real friendship, and undoubtedly mutual confidence was not present. This might quite conceivably have had very serious consequences. The position of M. Sazonof was not secure. There were constant rumours that he would not long be able to maintain himself, and if he fell from power, no one could foresee by whom he would be succeeded. There was always at the Court, and to a large extent in the army, a strong German party; the growing danger of revolution would almost inevitably have had the effect of causing the Russian Government to turn for support to Germany and of reviving the old understanding between the two nations for the maintenance of monarchical institutions against the forces of disorder. Anything of this kind would have had the gravest effect; at once the whole settlement in Asia



would have been in jeopardy. Under these circumstances, the Government were concerned in bringing about a better understanding in regard to the various points at issue, and this is the subject of constant telegrams, despatches and private letters, which continued as late as the 22nd July. All this falls outside the scope of this volume, for it had no immediate connection with the outbreak of the war. Reference to it is made in Nos. 49 and 75, from which it appears that M. Poincaré had, on his own initiative, made it the subject of personal representations to the Tsar and M. Sazonof.

There is, however, one point which cannot be passed over. On the 9th July, Sir George Buchanan, in a private letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson, said:—

“Sazonof is always reproaching me with the inveterate suspicion with which Russia is regarded in India and in certain circles in England. He is apparently ready to do almost anything to allay it, and seems even to have suggested to the Emperor that Russia should guarantee India against attack. In speaking to me on the subject two days ago, he remarked that it might be offensive to us as a Great Power to be offered such a guarantee without giving some equivalent guarantee in return, and he suggested that a formula might be found under which we might mutually guarantee the inviolability of each other's Asiatic possessions. On my replying that our Allies, the Japanese, might regard such a guarantee on our part as directed against themselves, Sazonof said that there was no reason why they should not be brought in also. They would be very flattered by such a proposal, and the guarantee would then have a triple instead of a dual character. I do not know whether he is seriously thinking of putting forward such a proposal officially.”

To this Sir Arthur Nicolson, in a private letter to Sir George Buchanan, while expressing in a general way his personal interest in the suggestion, said that of course it was quite impossible for him to give any opinion until he had had time to talk it over with Sir Edward Grey. On the 19th July the following private and secret telegram was received by Sir Edward Grey from Sir George Buchanan:—

“In conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired whether I had informed you of what he had said in regard to a triple guarantee of our respective Asiatic possessions. I replied that I had done so in a private letter to Sir A. Nicolson, which you no doubt would already have seen, but that, as it was a question on which you would have to consult your colleagues in the Cabinet, you had not had time to communicate to me the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject. I then asked him whether he wished us to consider what he had said as a serious proposal as, if so, I thought it would be better to (group undecypherable) put it forward in a more concrete form. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had spoken in all seriousness. While the two Governments had confidence in each other's good intentions, public opinion in England regarded Russia with suspicion and he had made this suggestion with the object of allaying that suspicion once and for all. He would accept almost any formula that would in our opinion achieve this result.

“I thought it best not to pursue the conversation further, but I gathered that, should the idea of such a triple guarantee commend itself to His Majesty's Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs will leave it to them to suggest what form it should take.”

To this, the next day, Sir Edward Grey answered:—

“I am personally attracted by idea of triple guarantee, and am very glad that Minister for Foreign Affairs has made it a serious proposal. I will consult Prime Minister and, if he approves, the Cabinet, as soon as the Parliamentary and Irish situation gives them time.”

This was the end of the matter, but in general the programme was that Sir George Buchanan should, during the autumn, settle down to a formal and thorough discussion of all these questions, with the hope of putting the relations of the two countries on a more satisfactory footing. During August Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, was also to visit St. Petersburg in connection with the technical Anglo-Russian naval conversations to which Sir Edward Grey had given his consent.

In accordance with the rules of international courtesy referred to above, the documents in the present volume especially concerning each Allied and Neutral country have been communicated to the Governments for their agreement. It is a matter of the highest satisfaction that in every case this has been given without reservation, and (except in one or two personal references to living people of no political importance) no omissions of any kind have been necessary; modifications of the text would under no circumstances have been considered. In particular, the warmest recognition is due to the readiness with which the French Government, who, of course, are peculiarly interested in this volume, have completely accepted and identified themselves with the principle of full publication. It was indeed inevitable that a completely uncensored publication of this kind must include telegrams and other documents which, often on secondhand evidence, contain statements which are clearly incorrect or misleading. For instance, the private letter (No. 320 (b)) contains two statements. The first of these is merely a secondhand statement of something which the President of the Republic is reported to have said. It is obviously of no importance and is in contradiction with the language used by him to Sir F. Bertie on the same day (see No. 373). The unsupported statement of a foreign diplomatist as to the state of French military preparations is also clearly of no real evidential value. The whole thing does not seem to have been worth reporting. And again, the record of a private conversation between a British representative abroad and a foreign diplomatist may be so worded as to produce an incorrect impression of the policy of the Government which the latter represents. Representations have been made, not only by belligerents, pointing out instances of this kind. In some cases it has been possible to add a brief note indicating the points on which the report of the observations made might be misleading. We may, for example, refer to the remark made by M. Grouitch to Mr. Crackanthorpe (No. 61), that should Austria force on a war, "Serbia would not stand alone. Russia would not stand by and see Serbia wantonly attacked, and Bulgaria would be immobilised by Roumania." This was in no way an intimation, either official or unofficial, that there was any kind of definite agreement between Russia and Serbia: it is merely an interpretation of the situation which will be found in almost every conversation which took place. It is nothing more than what M. Schebeko said to Sir Maurice de Bunsen (No. 56) when he observed that if there was a proposal for the condign punishment of Serbia, Russia would inevitably be drawn in. It was, in fact, a mere commonplace.

Or, again, there is the observation attributed to M. Paléologue (No. 125) that the French Government would wish to know whether the British Government would maintain her engagements under the naval arrangements. In referring to this point he was not acting under instructions; it was out of the question that the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg should have been instructed to raise a matter of this kind: he was only, with characteristic impulsiveness, giving expression to his own personal view.

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The arrangement of the documents is strictly chronological, the date of incoming communications being not that of despatch, but that on which they were received



in the Foreign Office. The documents for each day are placed in the following order :—

- (1.) Incoming despatches;
- (2.) Telegrams received and despatched, so far as possible in chronological sequence, according to the hour at which they were despatched from the Foreign Office to the Post Office or received in the Foreign Office. The hour of receipt in the Foreign Office appears to indicate not the time when the telegram was received from the Post Office, but the time when the decyphering clerk began work on it;
- (3.) All outgoing despatches are grouped together at the end of the day;
- (4.) Papers originating in the Foreign Office, and communications from foreign representatives in London, are generally placed together in the early afternoon, unless they contain some definite indication as to the hour of despatch or receipt.

The documents are in every case printed from the official copy preserved in the archives. Of outgoing despatches and telegrams, this is the final draft as approved by the Secretary of State or the Head of the Department. The more important political documents, including particularly the records of his conversations with foreign Ambassadors, were always drafted by Sir Edward Grey; sometimes apparently dictated to a shorthand-writer, but in the majority of cases in his own handwriting. Incoming despatches are printed from the original as received in the Office. For incoming cypher telegrams, the only original is the copy prepared by the decyphering clerk; it was the custom of the Office that this should be at once duplicated, first in typescript and afterwards, for all important telegrams, in print; when this was done the original MS. was not kept.

As regards the spelling of proper names, no attempt has been made to establish uniformity. In outgoing despatches and telegrams and minutes, the form most generally in use at the time has been adopted; in incoming despatches the form used in the original has been preserved, though in some instances obvious errors have been corrected. This will explain the inconsistencies which will doubtless be noticed; we have, for instance, several ways of spelling names such as "Serajevo," "Sazonof," etc.

The words *En clair* are placed at the head of all telegrams which were not in code or cypher.

References have been inserted, not only as stated above, to the original White Paper, but also to any other place in which the document, if not included in the White Paper, has been published. In order to facilitate the use of the volume, cross references have been put in and, in addition, references to the official publications of other Governments are given. A few editorial notes have been added. These are, however, confined to cases in which some question has been or might be raised regarding the completeness or authenticity of the text; no attempt has been made to deal with the subject matter of the correspondence. The responsibility for these notes attaches entirely to the compiler of this volume, and not to the Foreign Office or to the Editors of the series.

In order to insure uniformity with the other volumes, the Editors undertook the responsibility of supplying the List of Documents and the Indices. In addition, I have to acknowledge the cordial and useful co-operation which they have given me. Grateful recognition is also due to the members of the Foreign Office Library Staff for the readiness and thoroughness with which they have assisted in the search for all relevant documents, and dealt with the numerous enquiries addressed to them.

J. W. H.-M.

## List of Books Referred to and Abbreviations Used.

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- A. ... ... Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914. 3 vols. (Republik Oesterreich, Staatsamt für Aeusseres).
- B. ... ... Belgian Grey Book (Printed in Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War).
- Buchanan ... My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories by Sir George Buchanan. 2 vols. (1923.)
- CDD ... ... Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War. (1914.)
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# FOREIGN OFFICE DOCUMENTS.

## PRELIMINARY.

(28011)

No. 1.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)*

(No. 120.)

Vienna, June 19, 1914.

Sir,

The almost simultaneous visits last week of the German Emperor to the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Konopischt in Bohemia, and of the Emperor of Russia to the King of Roumania at Costantza [*sic*] have occupied a large space in the Vienna press. The former visit, it is true, was generally declared to be of no special importance beyond affording proof, if any were needed, that the Emperor William's political fidelity to his principal ally and personal friendship towards the Archduke has undergone no diminution. But, at a moment when the peace of Europe is again threatened by disturbed conditions in the Balkan peninsula, it is consoling to the Austrian mind to have its reliance on the stability of the alliance with Germany in any way confirmed, the more so that the relations of this country with Italy are being just now so severely strained by events in Albania. Much is therefore made of the affability and cordiality displayed by His Majesty during a visit devoted mainly to the enjoyment of the Archducal rose gardens but not excluding, possibly, conversations on other than horticultural matters. The presence of Admiral von Tirpitz with the Imperial party has of course not passed unnoticed, and it has given rise to the reaffirmation in numerous articles of the unalterable resolve of Austria-Hungary to contribute by the strengthening of her fleet to the development of the naval power of the Triple Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean. The "Militärische Rundschau" indeed has made the Imperial visit the pretext for an alarmist article on the position of Austria-Hungary in Europe. Under the heading of "Foes all round" the writer states that it is an open secret that anxious deliberations took place at Konopischt concerning the general European situation, which has become a very dangerous one for the Powers of Central Europe, including Italy, since the Balkan wars. This is stated to be the result of the machinations of the Triple *Entente* Powers, who have lost no opportunity of completing the circle of enemies which now threatens the Triple Alliance Powers from every side. The "Rundschau" claims to know that important military measures were adopted at Konopischt in amplification of those already sketched out during the recent meeting of the chiefs of the two General Staffs at Carlsbad. The military preparations in Russia, the thirst for vengeance in France, the inclusion of Roumania within the sphere of the *Entente* Powers—all these matters supplied no doubt the material for very earnest deliberations. The rumour was perhaps not true that the King of Sweden met the Emperor incognito at Konopischt, but Sweden now stands side by side with Germany in resisting the advance of Slavism, and she has replaced Roumania as an active adherent of the Triple Alliance. This new combination must now be worked out by the General Staffs of Germany and Austria. Admiral von Tirpitz cannot have failed, moreover, to call attention to the projected increase of the Russian Black Sea fleet by three Dreadnoughts. Thus indeed is the iron ring encircling the central Powers being clenched on the eastern side. In the centre of the hostile naval forces stands the English fleet at Malta. France, now supported by Spain, holds the Western Mediterranean. The arming of Russia denotes clearly the intention to open the question of the passage of the Dardanelles, so that Italy as well as Austria-Hungary may be completely paralysed at sea. Hence

the urgent necessity, insisted on, it is said, by the Emperor William, to strengthen still further the Austro-Hungarian fleet; and hence no doubt the inclusion of Admiral Tirpitz in the Imperial party.

The result will certainly be to hasten the construction of the four new Austrian Dreadnoughts. They will now be available in three years, instead of the five years contemplated in the new naval scheme. "Foes all round, and no hope except in the sharpness of our own sword"—this is the result of all the interviews and fraternisations of European Sovereigns and statesmen.

But if the military organ stands alone in regarding the Konopischt meeting as a symptom of the desperate straits to which the Triple Alliance have been reduced by the result of the Balkan wars, the entire press has joined in a chorus of angry comment on the visit of the Czar to Costantza. It is no longer disputed here that this country has lost in Roumania the position which it formerly held there, but the hope remained that the lost ground might with patience be recovered and that Roumania might see the wisdom of reverting to a close political connection with the Dual Monarchy as affording the safest means of maintaining her national independence. The speech of the Emperor at the Costantza banquet and the courtesies exchanged between the two Sovereigns are treated in the press as dangerous indications that the contrary tendency is to prevail and that Roumania has definitely made up her mind to throw in her lot with Russia in the event of a European conflict. This is a topic on which great nervousness is at present displayed in this country, and the honour conferred at Costantza on Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, only a few days before the Czar's arrival, has not sufficed to dispel the fear that Austria-Hungary can perhaps no longer reckon in future on the military support of Roumania.

The Roumanian Minister at Vienna, M. Mavrocordat, does his best to reassure the Austro-Hungarian Government on this point. He protests that come what may his country will keep herself free from any entangling alliance with a Great Power, and that she will continue to devote all her efforts to the maintenance of a balance in the Balkan peninsula between the forces which rely respectively on the support of Austria-Hungary and Russia. In other words the maintenance of the principles which found expression in the Peace of Bucharest continues to be the principal object of the foreign policy of Roumania as defined by her representative in Vienna.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

(30385)

No. 2.

*Mr. Akers-Douglas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 52.)

Sir,

*Bucharest, June 22, 1914.*

As was to be expected, the visit of the Emperor of Russia to Constanza has made a deep impression upon the people of this country. All classes are naturally flattered by the honour paid to their Sovereign, and by the warm words in which the Emperor spoke of the part played by Roumania last year; and there is, not unnaturally, a feeling that this country now enjoys a considerably increased political importance in Europe.

Of the coldness, not to say antipathy, now observable towards Austria-Hungary there can be no less doubt than of the very friendly feelings for Russia. As to the immediate significance of the Imperial visit it seems doubtful, from all I can gather, whether anything has taken place betokening a change in Roumania's general policy, and it seems reasonable to suppose that she retains her independent attitude towards the grouping of the Powers, without having made, at any rate for the present, any new engagement. No doubt the desire to maintain the Treaty of Bucharest intact and the peace of the Balkans undisturbed has been recognised to be common to the two

Governments, as well as a determination that everything should be done in the interests of their respective trade and shipping to prevent any closing of the Dardanelles.

The joint representations recently made at Constantinople by the Russian Ambassador and the Roumanian Minister have caused some comment in Europe, and in this connection I have the honour to enclose a recent article of the Government journal the "Indépendance roumaine."<sup>(1)</sup> Another journal publishes an article by M. Diamandy, a deputy and a leading member of the Government party, who is the brother of the Roumanian Minister in St. Petersburg. The writer maintains that the "opening of the Dardanelles" is the "first and immediate result of the Czar's visit," and congratulates Roumania on being the first Balkan State to take an important international step in concert with a Great Power. He points out that Roumania is at a disadvantage in comparison with her neighbours with regard to trade, having no outlet to the Mediterranean but through the Straits.

With very few exceptions the local press has warmly welcomed the rapprochement with Russia. A few journals not so favourable to Russia and of German or Austrian sympathies—as, for instance, the "Bukarester Tagblatt"—continue to warn Roumania against being drawn into Russia's orbit, and losing her independence of action. If Roumania, they say, breaks away from Austria and Germany, she will become the tool of Russia, and will pay for it by increased expenditure on armaments and subservience to Russia's Balkan policy. They point also to the fact that the Emperor immediately after his visit to Constantza proceeded to Kishinef, where he spoke of Bessarabia as being attached to Russia for 100 years, and animated by sincere Russian sentiments. Has Roumania, asks one or two writers, forgotten Russia's ingratitude?

The "Viitorul" publishes an interview which its editor claims to have had with M. Sazonof during his visit. His Excellency is reported to have said that, from conversations with the Roumanian Prime Minister, he has gained the conviction that nothing would in future disturb the friendly relations between Russia and Roumania, who were united by common interests and the same policy of peace. Replying to a remark of the interviewer that Bulgarian newspapers had spoken of a revision of the Treaty of Peace and the meeting of a European conference, M. Sazonof is reported to have said there was and could be no question of revision.

I have, &c.

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS.

(1) Not printed.

### No. 3.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

*St. Petersburg, June 25, 1914.*

I am too tired to do more than to repeat to you what Sazonow told me in strict confidence of what had passed at Constantza. He begged me not to tell Paléologue as he was afraid of leakage at the Quai d'Orsay.

There had, he said, been no question of an alliance or of a Convention of any kind, but the results of the visit had been most satisfactory. The King, with whom he had had two long conversations, had expressed his satisfaction at the fact that the Russian Government had not raised the question of the Straits during the two Balkan wars and had thanked Sazonow for the support which he had given Roumania with regard to the Treaty of Bucharest. The principle of the inviolability of that Treaty was, His Majesty said, of vital moment to Roumania. There were two questions—the Black Sea and the *status quo* in the Balkans—which possessed a



common interest for Russia and Roumania. The King then enquired what were the views of the Russian Government with regard to the Straits. Were they restricted to securing free passage at all times for their grain-laden vessels or did they comprise the larger and political side of the question that had reference to the passage of war vessels. On Sazonow assuring the King that the Russian Government only desired the former and had no intention of raising the latter, His Majesty shook him warmly by the hand and said that in that case the two Governments could unite their efforts to secure an object which was of such vital interest to both.

With regard to the Balkans, the King said that Roumania owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for not allowing the Treaty of Bucharest to be revised. Sazonow replied that Russia had been supported by France and England on this question. With regard to the future, the King said that he had no fear of Bulgaria attempting to recover the territory which she had ceded to Roumania. The Bulgarians had been making advances to him, but he distrusted them too much to listen to them. When they had recovered from the effects of the war they would turn their eyes towards Macedonia and would endeavour to wrest from Serbia certain of the districts which had been assigned to the latter by the Treaty of Bucharest. The King thought that it would be impossible to maintain peace for long unless some satisfaction could be given to Bulgaria in this direction. Though he did not indicate where compensation could be found that would induce Serbia to make any cession of territory to Bulgaria, he hinted that it might be possible later on to find some compensation elsewhere that would satisfy Serbia.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ever yours,  
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

(28970)

No. 4.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 197.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1914.*

I saw the German Ambassador to-day, before he went for ten days or so to Germany.

He spoke at some length about my reply in the House of Commons the other day, referring evidently to the reply I had given to a question about an alleged new naval agreement with Russia, though the Ambassador did not mention such an agreement by name. He said that the statement that I had made had given great satisfaction in Berlin, and had had a reassuring effect. There was anxiety in Germany about the warlike intentions of Russia. The Ambassador himself did not share this anxiety, as he did not believe in the hostile intentions of Russia. But there had been an article in the "Novoe Vremya" lately very hostile in tone to Germany. The Pan-Germanic element was really apprehensive, and, though Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not share these views any more than Prince Lichnowsky himself, he did feel that there was danger of a new armaments scare growing up in Germany. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had instructed Prince Lichnowsky to tell me that he hoped, if new developments or emergencies arose in the Balkans, that they would be discussed as frankly between Germany and ourselves as the difficulties that arose during the last Balkan crisis, and that we should be able to keep in as close touch.

I said to Prince Lichnowsky that I felt some difficulty in talking to him about our relations with France and Russia. It was quite easy for me to say, and quite true, that there was no alliance; no agreement committing us to action; and that all the agreements of that character that we had with France and Russia had been published. On the other hand, I did not wish to mislead the Ambassador by making

him think that the relations that we had with France and Russia were less cordial and intimate than they really were. Though we were not bound by engagement as allies, we did from time to time talk as intimately as allies. But this intimacy was not used for aggression against Germany. France, as he knew, was now most peacefully disposed.

The Ambassador cordially endorsed this.

Russia, as he himself had said, was not pursuing an aggressive anti-German policy, or thinking of making war on Germany. It was quite true that Russia was much interested, and often anxious, concerning developments in the Balkan peninsula: but anti-German feeling was not the motive of this anxiety. For instance, when the Emperor of Russia had visited Roumania the other day, the Russian Government had not talked to us about the visit as a matter of policy, or tried in any way to bring us into it as a matter of policy. I most cordially reciprocated what Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had said, that as new developments arose we should talk as frankly as before, and discuss them in the same spirit as we had discussed things during the Balkan crisis. Let us go on as we had left off when that crisis was over. I was most anxious not to lose any of the ground that had been gained then for good relations between us. The British Government belonged to one group of Powers, but did not do so in order to make difficulties greater between the two European groups: on the contrary, we wished to prevent any questions that arose from throwing the groups, as such, into opposition. In the case, for instance, of the German military command in Constantinople, which had caused us some anxiety early this year, we had done all we could to ensure its being discussed between Germany and Russia direct and not made the subject of formal representations in Constantinople by one group, and thereby an occasion for throwing the two groups, as such, into opposition, and making them draw apart.

Prince Lichnowsky cordially agreed. He said that our being in the group we were was a good thing, and he regarded our intimacy with France and Russia without any misgiving, because he was sure that it was used for peace.

I said that he was quite justified in this view. We should never pursue an aggressive policy, and if ever there was a European war, and we took part in it, it would not be on the aggressive side, for public opinion was against that.

Prince Lichnowsky expressed, without qualification, that the view he held of our intentions was the same as the one that I had just explained to him.

In conclusion, he spoke again of the apprehension of his Government lest a new armaments scare should grow up in Germany. He added that he had frankly told Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that there were certain things that would make friendly relations with us impossible.

I presume that he meant by this an addition to the German Naval Law, but I did not press him on the point.

I said that I realised that our being in one group, and on intimate terms with France and Russia, had been used in past years in Germany to work up feeling for expenditure on armaments, and there was always the risk that that might be done again. I sincerely hoped, however, that too much importance need not be attached to articles in the "*Novoe Vremya*," for, just as he had had to read an article of which I had not heard before, an article hostile to Germany, so, as recently as last night, I had had to read an article from the "*Novoe Vremya*" containing a violent attack on us in connection with the Anglo-Persian oil concession.

In the course of conversation I also said, in order to emphasise the point that Russia did not pursue a really anti-German policy, that there were three persons through whom we learnt the disposition of the Russian Government: one was Count Benckendorff, who, I was sure, Prince Lichnowsky would recognise was not anti-German; another was M. Sazonof, who was sometimes anxious, owing to attacks made on him in the Russian press, as to whether the Triple *Entente* was not contrasting unfavourably with the Triple Alliance, and proving to be a less solid force in diplomacy,



but who never showed any indication of desiring to use the Triple *Entente* for aggressive policy against Germany, and who used it solely as an equivoise; the third person was the Emperor of Russia, and, as I was sure Prince Lichnowsky would know, he did not favour an aggressive policy against Germany, or, indeed, against anyone.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in Grey, vol. 1, p. 303.*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 5.*

(29293)

No. 5.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 243.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 25, 1914.*

I observed to Count Benckendorff to-day that immense harm was being done by the persistent reports about a naval agreement between Russia and England. I heard that Germans like Professor Schiemann were receiving information from friends in Paris and St. Petersburg that, in spite of all I had said in the House of Commons, there was a naval agreement, and it was even assumed that it included a bargain about the opening of the Straits. No doubt the information came from unofficial people, who did not know the facts, and assumed them to be other than they were. A question was to be addressed to me in the House of Commons on the subject of the opening of the Straits to ships of war, and I intended to reply that this had not been discussed for the last five years, and that the treaties remained in force, but that from time to time, though not within the last five years, the question of the conditions on which the Straits might be opened to warships had been discussed with us. As Count Benckendorff would remember, we did go into this question with M. Isvolsky when he was in London in 1908. We had not discussed it since then. The persistent reports would do great harm in Germany. They might lead to a new "Novelle" in connection with the German fleet, and they might impair our good relations with Germany, which had improved very much during the last Balkan crisis, and which I wished to maintain. I told Count Benckendorff the gist of my conversation yesterday with Prince Lichnowsky as to our relations with France and Germany.<sup>(1)</sup> I knew that Prince Lichnowsky held the same view as I did about these relations.

Count Benckendorff entirely endorsed what I had told him that I had said to Prince Lichnowsky, and said that he was very glad that I had said it, as Prince Lichnowsky would make excellent use of it.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Count Benckendorff's account of this conversation has been published in Siebert—Diplomatische Aktenstücke, p. 824.*

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 4.

(30321)

No. 6.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 268.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 2, 1914.*

The recent visit of the British squadron to Kiel has passed off successfully. I think it may be said that this result was largely due to the fact that the larger

portion of the Press did not seek to invest that visit with any political significance, but regarded it as what it was, namely, a friendly visit to a German port of a portion of a fleet, other portions of which were visiting the ports of other countries.

As was to be expected, however, certain organs of the press, such, for instance, as the "Hamburger Neueste Nachrichten" and the "Tages Zeitung," published articles contrasting the composition of the British squadrons sent respectively to Cronstadt and to Kiel, and dwelling on the elaborate reception accorded to Admiral Beatty's squadron. As regards these two points, it may be observed that the writers either were ignorant of, or purposely distorted, the facts. The British battleships at Kiel impressed everyone, and the answer to the other criticism is that St. Petersburg is nearer to Cronstadt than Berlin is to Kiel.

The above-mentioned papers fastened on to the speech made by His Majesty's Ambassador at the dinner given by His Excellency in honour of the British squadron on the 25th ultimo.<sup>(1)</sup> They read as much as they wished into that speech and, in particular, drew the conclusion from one passage in it that a formal naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia was imminent, notwithstanding your statement to the contrary in the House of Commons. The "Tages Zeitung" contained a bitter article yesterday on the subject of the visit of the British fleet to Kiel. I am forwarding in a separate despatch a précis by the Naval Attaché of this and other press articles on the subject of this visit.<sup>(2)</sup> Speaking generally, however, the visit to Kiel seems rather to have been used by the hostile organs of the press in order to draw attention to the hostile plans of France and Russia towards Germany.

The utmost good fellowship prevailed between the Officers and men of both nations during the visit of the British squadron to Kiel. In this connection, I venture to report the following: The correspondent of the "Daily Mail" asked one of the British warrant officers what was the state of the feeling between the sailors of the two nations. The officer, not knowing who his interlocutor was, replied: "There is nothing the matter with the feeling if the —— press would only leave it alone."

A humorous incident occurred in the course of last week. Lord Brassey was detained for an hour or so for unwittingly trespassing in the proximity of the Naval dockyard. He was immediately released on establishing his identity, but the incident, much to the annoyance of the Emperor, was soon magnified into an attempt at espionage. Instead of allowing the matter to drop, the official explanation was then put forward, that Lord Brassey had been detained on suspicion of attempting to smuggle.

Nothing could exceed the warmth of the welcome extended to the British officers and men. Unfortunately, the close of the visit was marred by the news of the tragic events at Serajevo, which obliged the Emperor to cut short his visit to Kiel, and caused the abandonment of some of the entertainments. Had not the German press been fully occupied in considering the affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, further articles of interest would, no doubt, have been published on the occasion of the fleet's departure from Kiel.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

<sup>(1)</sup> See *Enclosure to No. 8*. The reference appears to be to a speech delivered on June 24. No report of a speech delivered on June 25 can be found.

<sup>(2)</sup> See *Enclosure to No. 7*.

(30325)

No. 7.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 272.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 3, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from Captain W. Henderson, Naval Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the visit of His Majesty's ships to Kiel.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Captain Henderson to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Confidential.

Sir,

*Berlin, July 3, 1914.*

Visit of British squadron to Kiel.

I have the honour to submit the following report on the visit of our Second Battle Squadron and three light cruisers to Kiel during Kiel Regatta Week :—

From the moment it was known at the Reichs-Marine-Amt that a visit was in contemplation, I was approached by many German naval officers in Berlin, who gave honest expression to the satisfaction with which they looked forward to the occurrence.

His Majesty the German Emperor spoke to me with evident pleasure about it, and I do not doubt that the lavish hospitality which was subsequently shown to our squadron was due largely to His Majesty's desire that we should be well entertained, for before the programme was made out His Majesty remarked jokingly to me : "You'll see we shall have something nice on ice for you at Kiel."

The German press was at first reticent about the approaching visit, and very little was said about it beyond the bare publication of the fact that it was going to take place. Later on, however, some of the leading Conservative organs let themselves go.

The rumour that the First Lord of the Admiralty would be present at Kiel during the visit lent colour to the suggestion that the visit would have political significance, and that Mr. Churchill was expected up to the last moment was shown by the fact that on the official chart of the berths in Kiel harbour a buoy was reserved for the "Enchantress."

A retired German admiral, von Ahlefeld, writing in the "Deutsche Revue" before it was definitely known that Mr. Churchill was not coming to Kiel, laid it down as a primary condition of "conversations" that the German nation should not be asked to "measure its fleet according to British wishes." Given this condition, he goes on to say that much good could result from an interchange of views, especially if this were to lead to a conviction on both sides that their respective interests were not menaced—the greatest good that could result would be the release of both fleets from monotonous and spirit-crushing routine in home waters.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" (Liberal) answered this by saying that it hoped Mr. Churchill's visit would result in an understanding on armaments, as this was the only subject worth talking about.

The "Dresdner Nachrichten" (Conservative) published an unfriendly article, headed "No Illusions," in which it stated that the obvious intention of the simultaneous visit of another of our squadrons to Kronstadt was to take the shine out of the visit to Kiel.

It is said that in spite of Sir Edward Grey's denial of any formal understanding with Russia, his *démenti* was not as exact as it might have been and that in Germany it was still accepted as a fact that a verbal understanding had been arrived at as to



co-operation of the British and Russian fleets against Germany, Russia to contain part of the German fleet in the Baltic while England annihilated the remainder in the North Sea. It warned its readers not to lose their heads over the prospective festivities at Kiel, and ended up by saying that on the German side the motto should be "Watchfulness and holding-back."

The "Deutsche Zeitung" (Conservative) took similar views and regarded the almost simultaneous visits of British squadrons to the Baltic Powers as a piece of ostentation on England's part, designed with a view to impress the world with our ability to produce sufficient squadrons to do this and also to show the world that we do not consider the Baltic as being outside our sphere of influence. This paper also doubted Sir Edward Grey's sincerity and *bona fides* concerning the wording of his denial of an Anglo-Russian naval understanding.

The "Kreuz-Zeitung" (Conservative) regarded the simultaneous visits not only as a smoothing down of Russian feeling in case they should be hurt by the Kiel visit, but also as an attempt to drive a wedge into the recent rapprochement between Germany and Sweden, and a demonstration to the world that England does not regard the Baltic as a *mare clausum*. As long as these points were not lost sight of, the "Kreuz-Zeitung" was prepared to give the British squadron a friendly welcome in Kiel.

As soon as it became known that the First Lord of the Admiralty was not coming to Kiel, the tone of the German press altered, and prominence was given to the statement that, as Mr. Churchill had not accompanied our squadron, the visit would have absolutely no political significance. The papers then published friendly and appreciative articles about our navy, our squadron at Kiel, and its officers and men.

Although careful always to emphasise the non-political character of the visit, practically all papers admitted that it could not fail to have a good effect on Anglo-German feeling. Many papers mentioned the blood-relationship between England and Germany, alluded to the two peoples as the leaders of modern culture, and expressed the view that they ought to lead the world as friendly rivals instead of as enemies.

This more friendly tone of the press, however, received somewhat of a shock about half way through Kiel week, when the ever-ready-to-find-fault-with-England section of it fastened on the after-dinner speech of the British Ambassador in Russia, delivered on the 25th June,<sup>(1)</sup> in which his words were interpreted as corroborating the recently expressed suspicion that at least an unwritten understanding on naval co-operation exists between England and Russia.

The result of this was a long article in the "Hamburger Nachrichten" (Conservative), harking back to the old story of a war plan against Germany, in which England and Russia are to blockade Germany's sea coast, while France operates in the Mediterranean and prevents food and raw material reaching Germany via Italy and Austria. "It was a pity after all" says the paper, "that Mr. Churchill did not come to Kiel, for then he could have been asked point-blank what all these speeches meant and on what grounds he proposed to ask Germany to neglect her fleet."

The peroration to the German press utterances was contributed by an unusually bitter article by Count Reventlow in the "Deutsche Tageszeitung" (Conservative), on the occasion of the departure of our squadron from Kiel, headed "Kiel Gush."

Referring to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender's hearty and non-political speech at the lunch given by Kiel Municipality, Count Reventlow churlishly remarks: "It can be taken for granted that Sir George Warrender was told what he had to say before he left England, and the British press echoed accordingly."

Count Reventlow then gets to work on the speech of our Ambassador at St. Petersburg and only says in different words what has been said before.

(<sup>1</sup>) See footnote (<sup>1</sup>) to No. 6.

The rest of his article complains of the exuberance of the festivities to the British squadron at Kiel, which has only resulted in giving the English an altogether wrong impression of the state of feeling in Germany. According to Count Reventlow an English reader of the newspapers would get the impression that Germany had experienced an exceptional stroke of luck in being honoured by the presence of the British squadron, and would conclude that if this state of feeling could be so cheaply brought about, the experiment ought to be repeated more frequently. He admits many personal sympathies between British and German officers, and that in the past Germany had learnt much from the British Navy; but beyond that the "feeling" did not go. He derides the sentimental "standing shoulder to shoulder" phantasy, and the suggestion that British and German naval officers mutually deplored the "unholy competition in armaments." German officers knew too well the motives which inspire England's policy and the instrument (the British fleet) with which these motives were supported. "The memory of the festivities would evaporate, but the unpleasant impression in German minds of a new, unusual, and politically wrong German "gush" would for the present remain. Later on when the reaction came, German enthusiasts of to-day would look out over the North Sea, vexed and astounded, only to remember that at Kiel they had celebrated a feast of self-deception.

So much for the German press. It must be remembered when reading the above that I have brought into prominence the views of those who distrust us, that is to say, the Conservative view, but it would be wrong to take these articles to which I have given prominence as exemplifying the views of the majority of Germans. They are distinctly the views of the minority, although of an influential minority.

Count Reventlow, who, by the way, was not at Kiel, is quite wrong in accusing his countrymen of "gush." That was the one thing which we naval officers were agreed was conspicuous by its absence. The friendly press was friendly and appreciative without being gushing or sentimental.

The people whom we met (chiefly naval people) were honestly glad to see us. The attitude towards us of the German naval officers was the very opposite of that insincere toadyism and sickly sentimentality which we are not infrequently treated to elsewhere. It was the attitude of strong, healthy men; men imbued with a consciousness of equality with us, and who felt that they lost nothing in dignity or in the respect which they had a right to expect from us by honest and straightforward behaviour towards us.

I talked with many of them, and cannot sum up the feeling of the German naval officers better than by quoting a story told me by one of them:—

"It was only last year the officers of a British and German warship were dining together. The only toast given was a mutual one—'the two "white" nations.'"

It is in the subtle meaning of that word "white" (a meaning which is well understood by German naval officers) that the interpretation of their feeling towards us is to be found.

In fine, it may be said that the Kiel visit was a great success, all the more because of its non-political character. It has achieved more in its non-political garb than it could have in any other disguise, and each individual German naval officer is anxiously looking forward to the return visit in the hope that he may take part in it. They would all welcome a return to the times when our harbours were the first or last ports of call during their cruises in foreign waters. They are all sick to death of the sight of Heligoland, round which all their monotonous naval work centres.

I think it would not be out of place here to call your attention to the striking progress made by the German navy in sports and games.

Two football matches were played at Kiel against German naval teams. The Germans won one match, the British the other. The German winning team was just



the usual team of the cruiser "Colberg," without any introduction of "crack" players.

Speaking generally, our men were entirely outclassed in all the usual sports—running, jumping, &c.—and in the tug-of-war the Germans simply walked away with us, in spite of the fact that one of our teams was an "Olympia" team.

The Germans have systematically invaded what we have hitherto regarded as our national preserve, viz., the realm of sport, and, what is more, they have invaded it admirably, for they have succeeded in instilling into their players the difference between playing for the game's sake and playing for the cup.

Nothing during Kiel week gave our naval hosts of all ranks greater pleasure than our freely expressed admiration of the progress they have made in all sports.

I have, &c.

WILFRED HENDERSON,

*Naval Attaché.*

No. 8.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

I see that the "Times" refers in a leading article to my speech at the Embassy dinner, at which the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Cyril, the Minister of Marine, Sazonoff, the President of the Duma, the Mayor of Petersburg, and many Russian Admirals, &c., were present.

I forgot to send you a copy at the time and do so now that the "Times" has drawn attention to it.

Ever yours,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 8.

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN AT EMBASSY DINNER ON JUNE 24, 1914.

"It had not been my intention to make a speech to-night, but the warm and spontaneous welcome accorded to the First Battle Cruiser Squadron forces me to break silence and to try, however inadequately, to give expression to the feelings of gratitude which fill my heart.

"More than thirty years have elapsed since a British squadron visited Cronstadt and during the intervening period our relations with Russia have undergone a complete transformation. The Agreement of 1907 marked the turning point in those relations and since that date the two countries have gradually been brought into close touch with each other. Only two years ago I had the honour to return thanks in this very room to the Representatives of the Russian Government, of the Imperial Duma and of the Municipality of St. Petersburg for their warm-hearted reception of the British Delegation which visited St. Petersburg and Moscow in the winter of 1912. That visit contributed in no small degree to establish more intimate relations between the two nations, and this visit of Admiral Beatty's will, I am convinced, carry the process a step further. Mutual friendship, mutual sympathy and common interest constitute the firmest bond of union between nations. They enable them to regard with equanimity and to reconcile without tension any passing differences that may arise between them. I have during the past few days witnessed with feelings of grateful emotion the warm—I might almost say the affectionate—manner in which our squadron has been received at Reval, Cronstadt and St. Petersburg and I draw from it a happy augury for the future as well as the conviction that all the conditions of an enduring understanding are now existent. The two nations are getting to know and understand each other better. They are learning to appreciate the value of each other's friendship and I am confident that that friendship has now taken such root that it will be able to weather all the storms that may beat round it in the future."

## I.—June 28–July 23.

(29074)

No. 9.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, June 28, 1914.*

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 4 P.M.

Tel.

According to news received here heir apparent and his consort assassinated this morning by means of an explosive nature.

(29072)

No. 10.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

D. 4.10 P.M.

R. 6 P.M.

Tel. (No. 78.)

Vice-Consul at Serajevo telegraphs Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Hohenberg assassinated this morning at Serajevo by means of explosives. From another source I hear that bomb was first thrown at their carriage on their way to town hall, several persons being injured, and later young Servian student shot them both with a revolver as they were returning to Konak.

(29073)

No. 11.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

D. 6.50 P.M.

R. 9 P.M.

Tel. (No. 79.)

Account given at the end of my immediately preceding telegram<sup>(1)</sup> seems to be substantially correct. Emperor returns to-morrow from Ischl.

German Ambassador tells me privately that he is sure German Emperor will come to the funeral, but that he has not yet heard this officially. Minister for Foreign Affairs returns to-night from the country.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 10.

(29567)

No. 12.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Kiel, June 28, 1914.*

R. 9.23 P.M.

Tel.

In consequence of terrible news from Serajevo Emperor leaves for Berlin to-morrow morning whence he will go to Vienna for funeral. Prince Henry will join His Majesty there. Emperor has requested that no change should be made in the programme of the squadron which will therefore leave on thirtieth as previously arranged.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 6 and 7.

(29078)

No. 13.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, June 29, 1914.*

D. 8.30 A.M.

R. 11 A.M.

Tel. Urgent.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday (Assassination of Archduke Franz).<sup>(1)</sup>

I was told subsequently at Government House that there are probably several accomplices.

Local paper speaks of Anarchist crime, but act was more likely that of Servian irredentists, preconcerted long ago.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 9.

(29072)

No. 14.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, June 29, 1914.*

D. 12.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 119.) *En clair.*

Please convey to Minister for Foreign Affairs the grief with which His Majesty's Government have heard of the terrible event at Serajevo and the expressions of their profound sympathy with the Imperial Family and the Dual Monarchy in the grievous loss which they have suffered. His Majesty's Government wish also to transmit their most sincere and respectful condolences with His Imperial Majesty. I should like you also to express my personal feelings of deep sympathy as I recall the honour which I had of meeting His Imperial Highness last year and of seeing the pleasure given by his visit to the King and to this country.

No. 15.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.*

Private.

Dear Count Mensdorff.

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1914.*

I must add to our official expression of feeling a personal line to you to say how deeply I sympathise in the loss which has befallen Austria-Hungary. The cruel circumstances attending it add to the tragedy. You will know how much we all feel for your Emperor and for the shock and grief which he must suffer.

His life is so bound up with the peace of Europe that I dread anything that must try his strength.

It is less than a year since many of us saw the Archduke and his wife enjoying their visit to Windsor and seeming to be so happy here, and this too quickens our sympathy.

Every feeling political and personal makes me sympathise with you.

Yours, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

## No. 16.

*Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

*Austro-Hungarian Embassy.*

Dear Sir Edward.

18, Belgrave Square, S.W., June 29, 1914.

I am deeply touched by your kind words of sympathy and beg you to accept my sincerest and heartfelt thanks for the friendly feeling expressed in your letter for my Emperor, my country and myself.

The Archduke, who has now fallen a victim to this abominable, brutal and stupid murder, was so happy when he visited England last November!

The personal impression he received here had increased his appreciation of Englishmen and his admiration of England and I rejoiced to see him become more and more a sincere friend of this country.

Yours, &amp;c.

ALBERT MENSITORFF.

(29395)

## No. 17.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, June 29, 1914.*

D. 5 P.M.

R. 5.45 P.M.

Tel. Confidential.

Violent anti-Servian demonstration has taken place on the part of loyal Croats and Moslem population. I have seen some of (? goods) being destroyed, and I hear that many shops and houses have been ransacked. No personal assaults are reported.

I learn on good authority that martial law has been decided on.

(29388)

## No. 18.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, June 29, 1914.*

D. 7.56 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 80.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me and several of my colleagues that Emperor, who returned to Vienna this morning, has expressed hope that no missions of foreign princes will be sent to Archduke's funeral.

I told his Excellency that King had intended to depute Prince Arthur. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Emperor would be gratified to hear this, but begged that I would explain that it is held to be very important to spare Emperor fatigue and to shorten ceremonies as much as possible. For this reason foreign missions are not desired. I asked whether German Emperor was coming. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he did not know, but that if he persisted in coming it would be as the intimate personal friend of the Archduke, with whom he has just been staying, and that it would not affect question of foreign missions. Requiem service will probably be held in Vienna on 3rd July in the Hofburg Chapel or in Capucin Church, in which Imperial family are usually buried. Actual interment will take place subsequently at Dilastetten, near Amstetten, where Archduke has a vault and always intended that he and his consort should be buried. It is hoped to get Emperor back to Ischl early next week.



## No. 19.

*Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir G. Buchanan.*

Private.

*Foreign Office, June 30, 1914.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The tragedy which has recently occurred at Sarajevo will, I hope, not lead to any further complications; though it is already fairly evident that the Austrians are attributing the terrible events to Servian intrigues and machinations. As far as the internal situation of Austria-Hungary is concerned—though it may seem a little brutal to say so—it is possible that the new heir will be more popular than the late Archduke. Of course he is very little more than a mere boy, still he has quite an open mind and is not bound by any hard set prejudices or predilections.

\* \* \* \* \*

(29488)

## No. 20.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, June 30, 1914.*

D. 11.20 A.M.

R. 12.15 P.M.

Tel.

Value of Serb property destroyed by the mob yesterday according to one source amounts to 10,000,000 kronen, but another estimate puts it at 1,500,000 only.

(29794)

## No. 21.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 129.)

Sir,

*Vienna, June 29, 1914.*

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg were both murdered yesterday morning by a Slav nationalist or anarchist at Sarajevo.

His Imperial Highness had left Vienna on Tuesday evening, 23rd June, on his journey to Bosnia. He embarked on Wednesday morning at Trieste on board the battleship "Viribus Unitis," proceeded on Thursday morning on board a smaller vessel up the river Narenta to Metkovitch in Dalmatia, whence he took the train for Mostar, the Herzegovinian capital, and after a drive round the town continued his journey to Ilidze, a small Bosnian watering place near Sarajevo, where the Duchess of Hohenberg was awaiting him. On Friday and Saturday, 26th and 27th June, the Archduke was present at the mountain exercises of portions of the 15th and 16th Army Corps, which took place immediately to the south of Sarajevo. Yesterday, Sunday, 28th June, His Imperial Highness, after attending Mass at Ilidze, proceeded by train, with the Duchess, to Sarajevo, as arranged, for the purpose of making a progress through the town and receiving loyal addresses. On their way from the station to the Town Hall the official account states that a bomb was thrown at them but was warded off by the Archduke, exploding behind the Imperial motor car and wounding slightly the two officers who occupied the next car, and more or less seriously some 20 persons in the crowd of onlookers. At the Town Hall speeches were exchanged between the Bürgermeister and the Archduke, the latter expressing his satisfaction at the cordiality of his reception and alluding to the failure of the dastardly attempt on his life. Undeterred, it is said, by suggestions that it would be wiser to abandon the remainder of the programme, His Imperial Highness and the Duchess proceeded



in the direction of the Town Museum, or as some accounts have it of the hospital to which the wounded had been carried after the bomb outrage. A man ran in from the crowd and fired rapidly several shots from a Browning pistol into the car. The Archduke's jugular vein was severed and he must have died almost instantaneously. The Duchess of Hohenberg was struck in the side and expired immediately after reaching the Konak to which both were carried. The Governor, General Potiorek, who had also conducted the manœuvres and was with them in the car, was unhurt. A few steps from the scene of the murders an unexploded bomb was found. It is presumed that it was thrown away by a third conspirator, on perceiving that the second assault had been successful.

From what has hitherto come to light regarding this atrocious crime it is conjectured that the murdered pair were probably the victims of a carefully prepared plot. The Archduke, it is true, is known to have been a sympathiser with the aspirations of the subject nationalities of the Emperor, in so far as these can be regarded as reasonable and capable of realisation without peril to the unity of the Dual Monarchy. He had been given therefore, according to all accounts, an enthusiastic reception at every stage of his journey through Dalmatia, Herzegovina and Bosnia. Even the opposition Press had accorded him a welcome, with the exception of the "Narod," a Servian irredentist organ, which made no allusion to the Archduke's visit, but published instead, on a sheet bearing the Servian colours, a glowing article in commemoration of the battle of Kossovo, which marked the downfall of the Servian Empire before the Turkish onslaught in the 14th century. A telegram from Agram appears this morning in the official "Fremdenblatt," to the effect that since the intention of the Heir Apparent to attend the Bosnian manœuvres became known a violent Pan-Servian agitation has been raging in the Serbo-Croatian capital. The Archduke is said to have been warned in vain against undertaking his projected journey, and to have himself endeavoured to dissuade the Duchess from meeting him in Bosnia. Her Highness was however determined to share the danger with her husband. The Agram telegram proceeds to state that since 1908 (the year of the annexation) the revolutionary Servian organisation has displayed an ever increasing activity; that Cabrilovitch and Prinzip, the first of whom threw the bomb and the second fired the pistol, are said to be members of the terrorist Great Servian organisation; and that in Agram no one doubts that a carefully prepared plot had been set on foot against the Archduke.

Those who remember the circumstances of the notorious Agram and Dr. Friedjung trials in 1908 and 1909, when the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Government to justify the expected war with Servia by publishing proofs of a widespread irredentist Servian plot so woefully broke down, will hesitate to accept without adequate proof wholesale denunciations of the Servian patriotic societies which may now be expected to be made.

Though Vienna is outwardly very calm, all public performances have been stopped, and at Brünn, the capital of Moravia, where a great "Sokol" or Slav nationalist gathering of gymnasts was being held, and some fears prevailed of a conflict with simultaneous German demonstrations, both sides seem to have agreed to stay further proceedings in sign of mourning.

The news of the murders was broken about midday yesterday to the Emperor at Ischl, where His Majesty had arrived only the day before. His Majesty has thus lived to see his nephew and heir added to the list of his nearest relations who have died violent deaths. His Majesty returned to Vienna to-day. He has made a most happy recovery from his recent severe illness.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

(29864)

No. 22.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 265.)

Sir,

*Berlin, June 30, 1914.*

At his weekly reception to-day the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at once began to speak to me of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort at Serajevo. He had little doubt that this crime was the outcome of a plot hatched by the partisans of a greater Serbia. Herr Zimmermann said that he heard that the feeling in Austria-Hungary against Serbia and the Servians was very bitter and he could make allowances for this in the circumstances.

The Acting Secretary of State added that he had just told the Russian Ambassador that the Servian Government would be well advised, in their own interests, spontaneously to offer to do all they could to help the Bosnian authorities in their investigations into the origin and ramifications of the plot. In this way the Servian Government, who, he was sure, were not to blame, would give a convincing proof that they dissociated themselves from the motives which had led to the perpetration of this dreadful crime.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

(29900)

No. 23.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, July 2, 1914.*

D. 10.40 A.M.

R. 12.35 P.M.

Tel.

Late last night martial law was proclaimed for these two provinces.

(29937)

No. 24.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 2, 1914.*

D. 8.30 P.M.

R. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 80.)

It is officially announced that the Emperor has, owing to a slight indisposition, given up the intention of going to Vienna to attend the funeral of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Great stress is laid in the press announcements on the fact that this decision has in no way been influenced by political considerations or by fear for the safety of the Emperor.

*Cf. Despatch No. 26.**See DD No. 6b.*

(30094)

No. 25.

*Consul Jones to Sir Edward Grey.**Serajevo, July 3, 1914.*

D. July 3, 11 P.M.

R. July 4, 8 A.M.

Tel.

According to information received, a decree has been issued that all Servian subjects must leave Bosnia.

Two more accomplices have been arrested and have confessed their share in plot to murder.

(30322)

No. 26.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 269.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 3, 1914.*

As far as can be judged, the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and of his Consort at Serajevo produced an impression almost amounting to consternation in Germany. The Emperor had only quite recently returned from Konopischt and the intimacy existing between His Majesty and the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent was a matter of common knowledge as well as of great satisfaction to Germans. The measure of the association of the German people with all that concerns their Emperor enables the observer to gauge the horror with which the news was received of the crime which deprived His Majesty of his intimate friend. Added to this was great and universal sympathy for the aged Emperor Francis Joseph, who has lost the support of a Prince to whom he had entrusted the general supervision of the army and whose object it was to create a strong fleet. The foregoing were the considerations which suggested themselves to the German press on first hearing the news, and the possible political results of the crime to Germany's future relations with her ally have been little touched upon.

It may, perhaps, be observed generally that the relations between the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires fall into two parts, viz., the relations of the two Empires and of their Rulers *inter se* and the extent of the military and naval assistance they can give one another in the event of a war. The two questions are, of course, closely connected. In regard to the first point, the intimacy existing between the Emperor and the late Archduke seemed to constitute one certain factor in the future relations between the two Empires. This factor has now disappeared. It is now a matter of academical speculation whether, had the Archduke lived, there would have been found room in the Triple Alliance for two such masterful personalities as the Emperor and the late Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, in other words, whether the intimacy between them would have lasted. Complications might have arisen had any attempt been made to alter the line of succession in Austria-Hungary and these complications would not have left this country indifferent. But as regards this part of the question, such opinion as has found expression in the press is to the effect that nothing will be changed in the relations between the two allies. It is devoutly hoped here that the Austrian Emperor may yet live for several years to come and be able to train up the new Heir Apparent.

You are aware that, since the Balkan wars, doubts have sprung up in Germany as to the extent to which she can reckon on military assistance from her neighbour in the event of a general war. The idea is that Austria-Hungary would be hampered by having to prepare for eventualities on the Servian frontier. This idea has been strengthened by the recent crime at Serajevo. One or two organs of the press at once



pointed out that the aspirations of those working for a greater Serbia constitute a danger to the peace of Europe. One paper says that the question of the Southern Slavs is the one which will determine the destiny of Austria. The attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government at this juncture is therefore being watched with anxious interest, as people here have had little doubt from the first that the plot which led to the death of the Archduke was hatched in Serbia.

On learning the news of the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent the Emperor at once altered his plans and returned to Potsdam on the 29th ultimo. His Majesty expressed his intention of personally attending the funeral of the Archduke, and it was given out that he would be accompanied by Prince Henry. It was announced in the course of yesterday, however, that owing to a sudden indisposition (attributed to lumbago), His Majesty had been obliged to abandon his intention of being present at the funeral. I have learnt privately that the abandonment of His Majesty's journey to Vienna was due to a letter from the Emperor of Austria. It is announced this morning that Prince Henry has likewise given up his intention of attending the funeral.

A memorial service for the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort took place to-day at St. Hedwig's Church in Berlin. The Emperor was represented by Prince Eitel Friedrich and the service was attended by the principal Government officials at present in Berlin as well as by the entire diplomatic corps.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

*Cf. Tel. No. 24.*

(30342)

No. 27.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 120.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 2. 1914.*

I have the honour to report that the news of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort the Duchess of Hohenberg at Sarajevo produced in Belgrade a sensation rather of stupefaction than of regret. The feeling most noticeable, especially among official circles, is one of apprehension lest too severe measures of repression should be exercised against the Serbs in Bosnia and in those parts of the Monarchy where the Serb element is preponderant. Such measures would, it is feared, excite public opinion in Serbia and be made the occasion of anti-Austrian demonstrations which would not fail to bring about a tension in the relations between the two countries, and lead to serious complications.

Last Sunday the day on which the assassination took place happened to be the 525th anniversary of the battle of Kossovo, when the defeat of the Servians by the Turks brought about the downfall of the Servian Empire of Dushan. This anniversary was hitherto kept in Serbia as a day of national mourning, but this year for the first time it was made the occasion of a national fête owing to the defeat of the Turks by the Servian army in 1912 and the reacquisition by Serbia of Old Serbia and Kossovo. The day was therefore celebrated throughout Serbia, and many Servians and Croats from over the border came to Belgrade to participate in the rejoicings which took the form of patriotic processions through the streets of the town. When the news of the assassination were spread in Belgrade (at about 8 p.m.) the Servian Government, fearing lest in the heat of excitement aroused by the patriotic rejoicings which were taking place, the chauvinist element might lend an anti-Austrian colour to the demonstrations, issued an order to the effect that as a sign of mourning all places of entertainment, including cafés, should turn out lights and close at 10 o'clock.



In its issue of the 29th instant the Government organ "Samouprava" published a leading article expressing deep regret for the sad event, condemning the murder of the Archduke, and stating that it could only be the act of some irresponsible maniac. The organ of the principal opposition party (Independent Radicals), in its number of the same date, however, although it made use of expressions of regret, gave utterance to the opinion that it was an error of judgment for the Archduke to attend manœuvres in Bosnia, the palpable object of which was to rehearse the defence of that province against a Serbo-Montenegrin attack, and to hold parades in a centre of Serbism like Sarajevo, just at the moment when patriotic rejoicings were taking place in the Servian capital.

The Secretary-General of the Servian Foreign Office whom I saw this morning, while disclaiming for the Servian Government all responsibility for the crime, used language very similar to this. I am informed in confidence by my Italian colleague that an interview of considerable violence took place between M. Grouitch and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires on the occasion of the latter's visit to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to return thanks for M. Grouitch's call of condolence. It appears that M. de Storcik asked the Secretary-General unofficially whether the Servian Government did not consider it advisable to hold an investigation into the circumstances of the crime in view of the fact that both prisoners had recently been in Belgrade. This was apparently much resented by M. Grouitch as implying responsibility for the crime on the part of the Servian Government. High words ensued, and for the moment relations between the Austrian Legation and the Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs are very strained.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have, &c.

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

(<sup>1</sup>) Cf. DD No. 12.

(30346)

No. 28.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received July 6.)

(No. 132.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 2, 1914.

The mortal remains of the murdered Archduke and his consort were taken by train on the 30th June from Sarajevo to Metkovitch in Dalmatia, and thence in a small steamer to the mouth of the Narenta, where they were embarked on board the Austro-Hungarian dreadnought "Viribus Unitis" for conveyance to Trieste, escorted by a squadron of battleships and smaller vessels. Solemn funeral honours were bestowed along the route, and especially at Trieste, where the coffins were transferred this morning to the train which will deposit them late this evening in Vienna. They will lie in the chapel of the Hofburg Palace till to-morrow evening when they will be conveyed to their last resting-place in the chapel of Artstetten, an old castle, the property of the late Archduke, lying back a little way from the north bank of the Danube some 60 miles west of Vienna. The lying in state and the requiem service will take place to-morrow in the Hofburg chapel.

The horror excited by the peculiar atrocity of Sunday's crime has led unhappily to violent demonstrations of race antagonism in the southern Slav provinces of the Dual Monarchy, that is to say, especially in Bosnia and Croatia. At Sarajevo itself the Roman Catholic Croat population with a strong admixture of Mussulman Slavs proceeded to demolish all the property of the Orthodox Serbs they could lay hands on. Serb hotels, shops, and private houses were ransacked, and their contents thrown into the street. The marauding bands were in some cases preceded by Austrian banners and portraits of the Emperor. The feeble attempts of the police to restore order were set at defiance. The work of destruction was continued on Monday, 29th June, the

day following the murders; similar acts of violence being reported from other parts of the two annexed provinces, martial law was proclaimed on the afternoon of the 29th over Sarajevo and the adjoining district, and on the 1st July over the whole extent of both provinces. Disturbances are also reported from Agram and it seems pretty clear that the working arrangement between Croats and Serbs, the result of the Fiume manifesto of October 1905, by means of which it was hoped to secure greater political independence for the south Slav nationalities, has for the time completely broken down. Nothing in reality divides the two peoples but the difference of religion and the fact that their identic language is written by the Croats in the Latin and by the Serbs in the Cyrillic character. Southern Slav aspirations, therefore, which depend for their realisation on the unification of the different Slavonic races under Austro-Hungarian rule would appear to have experienced a decided set back.

On the other hand, only the future can show whether the dreams of a greater Serbia have or have not been brought nearer realisation by an outrage which must cause the police régime of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be rendered infinitely more severe than it was before.

As regards the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia, it is not unlikely that a period of great tension will now set in. M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister in Vienna, is in despair at the prospect of seeing his efforts to settle the Oriental Railways and other pending questions between the two countries completely frustrated, as he fears they now will be. The Vienna press takes it for granted that the Sarajevo murders were planned at Belgrade, and that the Servian Government, though not directly implicated, is guilty of showing favour to the plans of the political extremists whose aim it is to subvert Austro-Hungarian rule in the neighbouring provinces. Serbia is thus held responsible for having assisted to create the atmosphere in which the hideous crime of Sarajevo was hatched.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

No. 29.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

Vienna, July 3, 1914.

\* \* \* \* \*

Why the German Emperor has not come after all, I do not know. The official reason is that he had an attack of lumbago (Hexenschuss). My own idea was that he had been made to understand that foreign Sovereigns and Princes were not expected. The "Reichspost"—the Archduke's Christian Socialist organ, which inveighs against all the arrangements as unbecoming the dignity of the departed—says the Emperor William evidently wished to show his disgust at the slights which were being heaped on his friend. There is a strong belief among well-informed Press people that the true reason is the discovery of an anarchist or Slav Nationalist plot directed against the Emperor William or some other great person. It is always difficult to verify such rumours.

Every night attempts are made to get at the Servian Legation, or the Servian Church near by, or the Servian Minister's private house. Last night some pretty sharp fighting took place between the crowd and the police. The former made its way in dense masses to the quarter in which these buildings are, all close together, when the funeral procession had passed. The police succeeded in heading them off, upon which they broke into the Austrian National Anthem and the *Wacht am Rhein*, which seems also to have become a kind of second Austrian national anthem. A small excited batch of about 300 got into the Embassy quarter shortly before 1 o'clock.

It was thought they intended demonstrating in a hostile sense before the Russian Embassy—as standing behind the Servians. Anyhow, the police kept them back and they gathered at the end of the Metternichgasse (our street) where it runs into the Rennweg, where I was able plainly to follow the proceedings. All was quite orderly—speeches, and patriotic songs, and cries at the end of *Pfui Serbien*.

The “Reichspost” and some few papers of that colour are inciting strongly to an attack on Serbia and severe suppression of the Southern Slavs within the Dual Monarchy. The official “Fremdenblatt,” however, and most of the more reasonable papers, take the line that it would not be politic to take Serbia as a whole to account for the crimes of a small band of degenerates who draw their inspiration from pan-Serb headquarters at Belgrade. The army, I hear, are very bitter, straining at the leash. I can hardly believe they will be “let slip.” But, of course, a difficult time is in prospect. I must say I think the Servian Press is behaving shamefully. Long extracts are published here from the Servian newspapers, which seem inclined to regard the assassins as martyrs, sacrificed in a holy cause. Insulting expressions are used against this country—“worm-eaten” is the favourite epithet. Ordinary decency would have at least postponed such expressions for a time, and would have made some pretence of offering sympathy and disclaiming the murderers. My friend Jovanovitch, Servian Minister, really a very good fellow, and moderate in his views, is in absolute despair at the collapse of his efforts to bring about better relations with Austria, efforts which in the Oriental Railways question were promising very well. No doubt the Servians were really annoyed at the choice of a date for the Bosnian manœuvres which corresponded with their national celebrations on the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo (14th century). They say the Austrians lose no opportunity of harrowing their legitimate feelings as Servians. Unfortunately, this is in accordance with the anti-Serb policy to which this Government is so obstinately wedded. They will not see that their only chance of resisting the downward pressure of Germany upon them would lie in a broad policy of conciliation towards the Southern Slav elements by which a broad Austro-Slav barrier might be drawn across the southward march of Germany towards Trieste. My Italian colleague, Duc Avarna, who has lately become much more outspoken than he used to be in talking to me, strongly condemns the accepted Austrian anti-Serb policy. It was this that made Austria mobilize in 1912-13 and half ruin herself to keep back Serbia from the Adriatic. Hence the crazy structure of Albania, now crumbling to pieces. One wonders if it is really worth while to patch it up again, even if it should be possible to do so. But what is the alternative? Would it be possible to have the International Commission at Durazzo acting as a kind of link between three sections into which Albania might be cut, the northern Catholic, the centre Mussulman, and the southern Orthodox, each under a Chieftain of its respective religion? Only enough troops would be wanted to protect the Commission against attempts to drive it into the sea! But I think in the end, perhaps years hence, the Servians will have to get to the sea, and intervening arrangements can only be in the nature of stop-gaps. The “Figaro” no doubt is premature in speaking of the coalition of Serbia and Montenegro into one kingdom as imminent; but sooner or later it surely must come about.

\* \* \* \* \*

Yours ever,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

NOTE.—The omitted parts contain a full description of the funeral ceremonies and further observations on Albania.



(30386)

No. 30.

*Mr. Akers-Douglas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 53.)

Sir,

*Bucharest, June 30, 1914.*

The terrible news of the tragedy at Sarajevo has been received here with deep regret and indignation. Among the people of this country, to whom he was specially endeared by the sympathy he was believed to have for the Roumanians in Hungary, the late Archduke was always popular; and while recently there has been a coolness of public feeling towards the neighbouring Empire, it was recognised that the Heir Apparent himself was strongly in favour of intimate relations with this country. The Roumanians in Transylvania claimed in His Imperial Highness a strong sympathiser and looked forward to a sure recognition of their rights to better treatment when he should come to the throne.

In the Chamber and in the Senate yesterday the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of the bonds of sincere friendship which had so long united the two countries and added that Roumanians could never forget the cordial friendship which the late Archduke constantly showed to them. Both houses adjourned as a mark of mourning.

To King Charles the news will have come as a great shock; and the close and intimate friendship which has always existed between the Courts of Vienna and Bucharest will give a special character to the sympathy felt by His Majesty for the aged Emperor. The Roumanian Court goes into four weeks mourning; and it is announced that the Crown Prince will attend the funeral at Vienna.

The Press, in voicing the sincere sympathy of Roumania, remarks that the Archduke would have been a great "protector of minorities and supporter of national aims" within his Empire; that his death is a serious loss to Austria and makes her future still more fraught with danger—a future which needs a strong hand as well as a just and conciliatory policy in view of the possibility of grave developments.

I have, &amp;c.

A. AKERS-DOUGLAS.

(30576)

No. 31.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 6, 1914.*

D. 2.10 P.M.

R. 4 P.M.

Tel. (No. 83.)

The Servian Minister tells me that no official communication has yet been received by the Servian Government from the Austro-Hungarian Government asking for the assistance of the Servian Government in bringing to punishment all persons guilty of complicity in assassinations. He has protested at the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office against the tendency of public opinion and press to involve the Servian Government in responsibility for the crime before even primary investigation has been concluded in Serajevo Court.<sup>(1)</sup> It may be noted that the bombs were procured in Servia where many remain over from the war during which they were used by regular troops but certainly the Servian Government as well as the great body of Servian public opinion have been amongst the first to deplore and condemn a crime striking a heavy blow at Servian aspirations for future. He fears that legal proceedings at Serajevo should be converted from mere investigation of dastardly crime into preparation of an indictment against whole Serb population of the Dual Monarchy and even against the Servian nation in which case serious position may easily arise.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

(1) Cf. S No. 12.



(30742)

No. 32.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin).*

(No. 214.) Secret.

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1914.*

The German Ambassador spoke very warmly to-day of the satisfaction and pleasure which had been given to the Emperor, and generally, by the visit of the British Admiral to Kiel.

I said that I knew that it had given great satisfaction and pleasure on our side.

The Ambassador then went on to speak to me privately, he said, but very seriously, as to the anxiety and pessimism that he had found in Berlin. He explained that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had excited very strong anti-Servian feeling in Austria; and he knew for a fact, though he did not know details, that the Austrians intended to do something and it was not impossible that they would take military action against Servia.

I said that surely they did not think of taking any territory?

The Ambassador replied that they did not wish to take territory, because they would not know what to do with it. He thought their idea was that they must have some compensation in the sense of some humiliation for Servia. The situation was exceedingly difficult for Germany; if she told the Austrians that nothing must be done, she would be accused of always holding them back and not supporting them; on the other hand if she let events take their course there was the possibility of very serious trouble. The Ambassador earnestly hoped that, if trouble came, we would use our influence to mitigate feeling in St. Petersburg.

A second thing which caused anxiety and pessimism in Berlin was the apprehension in Germany about the attitude of Russia, especially in connection with the recent increase of Russian military strength. He was told that Russia now had a peace footing of one million men and the impression in Germany was that Russian feeling towards Germany was very unfavourable.

A third thing was the idea that there was some Naval Convention between Russia and England. He had reported to his Government all that I had said to him recently,<sup>(1)</sup> just before he went to Germany on holiday, about our relations with Russia and France, and he had assured his Government that they could trust every word, and that there was no secret agreement on our part. They accepted the statement that there was nothing between the British and Russian Governments, but they felt that, nevertheless, there might be some understanding between the British and Russian Naval authorities. If there was such an understanding for co-operation directed against Germany, it would strengthen chauvinistic feeling in Russia, it would make pan-German feeling quite irresistible, and lead to an increase of the German Naval law, which otherwise was not intended, and it would also impair good feeling between England and Germany generally. This was what had been impressed upon him very strongly in Berlin.

The Ambassador went so far as to say that there was some feeling in Germany, based more especially upon the second and third things that he had mentioned to me this afternoon, that trouble was bound to come and therefore it would be better not to restrain Austria and let the trouble come now, rather than later. He impressed upon me more than once that he was speaking quite privately and on very delicate matters, but he was anxious to keep in touch with me. Though he did not share the belief of some people in Berlin that Russia was ill-disposed towards Germany, he was so anxious that he felt he must speak to me immediately on his return from Germany. He quoted Herr von Bethmann Hollweg as being pessimistic.

The Ambassador said that he had asserted at Berlin that though England would remain firmly in the group of the triple *entente*, for she must preserve the balance

(<sup>1</sup>) See No. 4.

of power and could not see France annihilated, yet we did not wish to see the groups of Powers draw apart. I cordially confirmed this.

I said that I would look up the record of what I said to him recently before he went to Berlin about our relations with France and Russia and I would show it to him.<sup>(1)</sup> We had had no indication from St. Petersburg, ever since the question of the German command in Constantinople was settled, that the Russians had any feeling of anxiety or irritation or ill-will as regards Germany. I recalled what I had said to him at the time of the German command at Constantinople as to how strongly Russia felt on that point, but since it had been settled I had heard nothing unfavourable from St. Petersburg as regards Germany. I was disturbed by what the Ambassador had told me about the form that anti-Servian feeling might take in Austria. If trouble did come, I would use all the influence I could to mitigate difficulties and smooth them away, and if the clouds arose to prevent the storm from breaking. I was glad that he had spoken to me, and I should like to talk the whole matter of his conversation over with him later on, when I had had time to consider it.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 20.*

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 4.

### No. 33.

*Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

Private.

My dear de Bunsen,

*Foreign Office, July 6, 1914.*

Many thanks for your letter of the 3rd. The crime at Serajevo was certainly a terrible one and shocked everybody here. I trust it will have no serious political consequences, in any case outside of Austria-Hungary. I suppose we must be prepared for a strong campaign against Serbia, but I am glad to see from your letter that the more reasonable journals in Vienna deprecate making a Government and a country responsible for crimes of certain revolutionaries. Your account of the feeling which has been caused among certain circles in Vienna in regard to the funeral ceremonies is interesting, and I see that in the papers this morning this feeling is made known. The disinclination of the Emperor to receive special foreign Princes on the occasion is quite understood here, as it would have entailed a great strain upon him.

The Albanian question is certainly a most perplexing problem, and I am glad that it is not required, or expected, that we should take a very prominent part in attempting to solve the question. Our line is rather to follow the lead of other Powers and to fall in with any steps on which they may all agree. There is one point, however, on which we are firm, and that is we have no intention whatever of compromising the lives of any British soldiers or bluejackets in attempting to restore order in Albania. I think that the departure of the Prince would really ease the situation considerably. It is now pretty evident that there is little chance of his being able to enforce his authority throughout the country. I really believe it would have been better at the beginning not to have endeavoured to create an independent State out of such disunited tribes. I am not sure that perhaps the simplest solution would not have been to let Serbia and Greece divide the country between them. However, this of course is quite out of the question now, and I think we must leave the solution of the question to Vienna and Rome. The idea of three autonomous provinces was mentioned to me by Cambon this afternoon. Otherwise

we have no very urgent and pressing question to preoccupy us in the rest of Europe. There is a momentary *détente* between Turkey and Greece, and the danger of war between those two countries is for the present at any rate postponed. We are therefore now chiefly busying ourselves with endeavouring to arrange matters with Russia in regard to Persia, and, in a secondary degree, Tibet. As you will have seen from the telegrams we have already embarked upon serious conversations with the Russian Government on the subject. We certainly meet with a very conciliatory and friendly disposition on the part of the Emperor and Sazonof.

\* \* \* \* \*

The naval visits both to Russia and to Germany went off wonderfully well, especially the former, and I think it was a very good move having sent our ships to Kronstadt. The Russian press was at the moment becoming a little disagreeable to us over the oil concession in Southern Persia, and the visit of our squadron showed that we in any case were animated with very friendly feelings. The reception accorded to our ships was of the warmest character, and the Emperor was especially civil and gracious to them.

\* \* \* \* \*

(30616)

No. 34.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)*

(No. 135.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 4, 1914.

A great part of the garrison of Vienna lined the course followed last night by the funeral procession from the Hofburg to the Western Railway Station. Thence the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg were conveyed in the dead of night by train to Pöchlarn on the Danube. At daybreak this morning they crossed the Danube by ferry, and proceeded slowly towards their final resting place in the Archduke's family vault at Artstetten.

The Archduke and Duchess had lain in state in the Hofburg Chapel all yesterday morning. At midday I placed before the catafalque, by the King's command, a wreath with an inscription expressive of His Majesty's friendship and affection for the departed. At 4 P.M. a short requiem service was held in the Chapel in the presence of the Emperor and Court. Most of the foreign representatives had been specially charged to represent the Chiefs of their respective States at the funeral. The King having been pleased to bestow this honour likewise upon myself, I was placed with my colleagues of the Holy See, Italy, Germany, France and Russia in the front row of those who were invited to attend the ceremony. The actual service lasted, out of consideration for the Emperor, only a quarter of an hour.

Thus within a week of the occurrence of the detestable crime at Sarajevo the funeral honours ordained for the murdered Archduke and his Consort have been brought to a close. Complaints have made themselves heard that these honours were unduly restricted. It has been said, for instance, that it would have been more seemly to have deputed one or more members of the Imperial Family to accompany the coffins on their last journey from Sarajevo to the Capital; that the night procession on their arrival might have been made more imposing; that a church larger than the Burg Chapel selected for that purpose might have formed the scene of ceremonies more befitting the high position of the departed; that the presence of foreign Princes, as announced from many quarters, need not have been declined and the proceedings thus deprived of a visible sign of the sympathy which is everywhere felt for this country in her sorrow.

The Christian Socialist newspaper, the "*Reichspost*," often regarded as the special mouthpiece of the Archduke himself, has made itself the most conspicuous organ of these embittered criticisms, and in this morning's issue it welcomes the



participation of the Vienna garrison in last night's proceedings as a sign that at the eleventh hour it was realised that something more must be done to mark the solemnity of the occasion than what took place on the previous night, when no special military display had been arranged. At the last moment a large contingent of notables, who had not been honoured with invitations to take part in the ceremonies, contrived to attach themselves last night to the tail of the funeral procession. Amongst them were included many members of the Vienna aristocracy.

It is difficult to believe that there could have been any intention to conduct the proceedings in a manner unbefitting the exalted rank of the victims. If the ceremonies were cut short, this was no doubt owing to the desire that the Emperor, whose enforced return from Ischl must have been very upsetting to His Majesty, should not be exposed to any avoidable fatigue. I am informed that the ceremonies followed closely the traditional "Spanish" rites of the Imperial Court.

The violence of the popular outburst of feeling against Serbia, and the entire Serb race, is as yet unabated. During the last few nights the house of the Servian Minister has been with difficulty shielded by a large force of police against the onslaught of surging crowds. Demonstrations against the Russian Embassy have been happily prevented, but the district containing the Russian, German and British Embassies is closely guarded, so as to forestall inconvenient displays of aversion or favour by the mob.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina martial law prevails. I forward a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Jones at Sarajevo. I gather from a private communication from Mr. Jones that the local authorities must have been very remiss in not repressing the anti-Serb riots sooner than they did. Now they have gone into the opposite extreme of applying martial law, which makes many almost trivial offences punishable with death. It does not appear that the destruction of Serb property was accompanied by bodily violence against the Serbs.

The Vienna Press publishes at length Servian Press comments on the murders, which unfortunately contain some expressions amounting almost to condonation, and even approval of the dastardly outrage.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

*Cf. Mr. Max Müller's despatch No. 70.*

Enclosure in No. 34.

*Consul Jones to Sir Maurice de Bunsen.*

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Sarajevo, July 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that last night these two provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, were placed under martial law.

To-day's issue of the "Sarajevoer Tagblatt" mentions as the reason for the adoption of this measure the fact that excesses have occurred in so many places.

In a former number the same paper in its account of the riots of Monday last endeavours to excuse the failure of the authorities to prevent those excesses on the ground that the demonstrators' manifest loyalty rendered the military forces powerless, but in the next column admits that the establishment of martial law soon restored order, and it is difficult to avoid the inference that had that step been taken some hours earlier the troops would with no greater effort have succeeded in at once suppressing the disorders and thereby have prevented the infliction of suffering upon many innocent people.

I have, &c.

J. FRANCIS JONES.



(30750)

No. 35.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 121.)

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 4, 1914.*

With reference to my despatch No. 120 of the 2nd instant<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to report that in its number of the 3rd instant the Government Organ "Samouprava" published a leading article which is of interest as embodying the views held by the Servian Government with regard to the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the consequences of the crime. The following are the main points of the article:—

1. That the Servian Government deeply regret and condemn the perpetration of the crime.

2. That they condemn and deplore the persecutions of the Serbs now daily taking place in Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

3. That the crime is all the more regrettable in that it was detrimental to the interests of Serbia who is now convinced that it is to her interest to be on friendly terms with Austria-Hungary, and who sincerely desires the establishment of good relations with the Dual Monarchy.

4. That it is regrettable that the Austrian Press is, although in a veiled manner, inclined to implicate the Servian Government in the assassination of the Archduke.

The article concludes by emphasising the wish of the Servian Government that a normal state of affairs may be shortly resumed in Bosnia; and that the real criminals may alone be made answerable for the crime. The conviction is expressed that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which have of late taken a healthy direction, will not and cannot ultimately suffer from the unjustifiable suspicions cast upon Serbia by certain organs of the foreign Press.

I have, &amp;c.

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 27.

No. 36.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

*Rome, July 7, 1914.*

\* \* \* \* \*

It has been curious to study here the effect of that abominable assassination at Serajevo. While ostensibly the authorities and the press have been loud in their denunciations of the crime and full of sympathy with the Emperor, it is obvious that people generally have regarded the elimination of the late Archduke as almost providential. I heard from two bankers here that at Trieste when the news was received Hungarian stock rose from 72 to 80. He was almost as much disliked it seems in Hungary as in Italy.

\* \* \* \* \*

*The remainder of the letter deals with other matters, chiefly non-political.*

(30754)

No. 37.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 138.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 5, 1914.

With a touching letter of thanks to his subjects of all nationalities for their loyal expressions as called forth by the death of the heir to the throne, the Emperor Francis Joseph brings to a close the first week following upon the assassinations at Sarajevo. His Majesty says in this letter that, if any consolation is possible in the midst of his bitter sorrow, he derives it from the innumerable proofs of warm affection and sincere sympathy which have reached him from all classes of the population. A criminal hand has robbed him of his "dear relative and trusty fellow-worker," and reft from innocent children all that was dear to them on earth. But the madness of a small group of misguided persons cannot loosen the sacred ties attaching him to his people or impair the feelings of heartfelt love towards himself and his family to which such touching expression has been given. During six and a half decades His Majesty recalls that he has shared with his people their sorrows and their joys, mindful even in the darkest hours of his high duties and of his responsibilities to the Almighty for the fate of millions. This new trial, dispensed by the inscrutable will of God, will only strengthen his determination to persevere till his last breath on the path best designed to promote the welfare of his people. If he can pass on their love to his successor he will be richly rewarded. In conclusion the Emperor commands the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary, to whom his letter is addressed, to convey his deep-felt thanks to all those who through this sorrowful time have clustered faithfully and devotedly around his throne.

A letter in similar terms is addressed by His Majesty to Herr von Bilinski, joint Minister of Finance, and side by side with these letters is published a general order to the Army and Navy. In the latter His Majesty recalls the fact that the Archduke died in the performance of his duties, and that his last commands were addressed to the brave troops of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If his place in the Army was an exalted one, so was his sense of the duties attached to it. His loss to his Sovereign and to the armed forces of the Monarchy involves a heavy sacrifice. His Majesty however still holds firm to his hopes for the future in which the Archduke's activity would bear fruit, feeling well assured that, through all the storm and stress which may be in store for it, "the Monarchy will find its sure support in the fearless devotion of the faithful and indomitable Army (*Wehrmacht*) of Austria-Hungary."

The widespread complaints of the insufficiency of the funeral honours bestowed upon the remains of the Archduke and Duchess on their way through Vienna, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 135 of yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> are met this morning by an official communication to the press, pointing out that in the case both of the late Empress Elizabeth and the late Archduke Rudolph, their remains were received in Vienna by special trains arriving at night time. The military display made when the Archduke Rudolph was conveyed from the Palace Chapel to the Capucin Church is said to have been not more considerable than in the present case. Moreover the entire arrangements were dominated by the fact that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had himself provided in his will that he should be laid to rest at Artstetten and not in the Capucin Church. The ancient ceremonial was of course maintained in general, but that it was not slavishly observed, in contempt of the ordinary feelings of humanity, was made clear by the participation throughout of the Duchess of Hohenberg in the honours given to her husband.

I am, &amp;c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 34.

(31416)

No. 38.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 451.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1914.*

I spoke to M. Cambon to-day of my apprehension that Austria might be forced by her public opinion into some *démarche* against Serbia owing to the feeling aroused by the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand; and I said that, in such an event, we must do all we could to encourage patience in St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon cordially concurred in this sentiment.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

(31417)

No. 39.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 264.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1914.*

Speaking to Count Benckendorff quite unofficially to-day, I expressed the apprehension that the Austrian Government might be forced by the strength of public opinion in Austria to make some *démarche* with regard to Serbia, as Austrian public opinion had been very strongly roused against Serbia by the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The circumstances were such that the position of Count Berchtold was weak, and the Austrian Government might be swept off their feet.

Count Benckendorff said that he was aware of the strong feeling in Austria, but he did not see on what a *démarche* against Serbia could be founded.

I said that I did not know what was contemplated. I could only suppose that some discovery made during the trial of those implicated in the murder of the Archduke—for instance, that the bombs had been obtained in Belgrade—might, in the eyes of the Austrian Government, be foundation for a charge of negligence against the Servian Government. But this was only imagination and guess on my part.

Count Benckendorff said that he hoped that Germany would restrain Austria. He could not think that Germany would wish a quarrel to be precipitated.

I said that my information was that the authorities in Berlin were very uncomfortable and apprehensive. They had got into their minds that Russian feeling was very adverse to Germany. They had obtained information somehow from Paris or St. Petersburg, founded upon the conversations between the Russian and British naval authorities, and they no doubt imagined that there was much more in these conversations than actually existed. All this might lead the German authorities to think that some *coup* was being prepared against Germany, to be executed at a favourable moment. Of course, there was no foundation for such a thought. I told Count Benckendorff what I had said to reassure Prince Lichnowsky.<sup>(1)</sup>

Count Benckendorff confirmed emphatically that, since the question of the German military command in Constantinople had been settled, he had had no indication whatever from St. Petersburg of ill-will towards Germany. But he added that the increase in the Russian army and the greater Russian preparedness for war were undoubted facts which might possibly make some spirits in Germany think that it would be better to have a conflict now, before the situation was more to the German disadvantage. He could not, however, believe that the German Emperor and the German Government would really take this line.

I said that it would be very desirable that, in whatever way the Russian Government could best do it, they should do all in their power to reassure Germany,

(<sup>1</sup>) See No. 32.



and convince her that no *coup* was being prepared against her. I often thought, in these matters, that things would be better if the whole truth were known. The difficulty was to tell people the truth, and make them believe that they really knew the whole truth. They were apt to think that there was a great deal more than they had been told.

Count Benckendorff said that he would write to M. Sazonof. He expressed himself quite conscious of the apprehension felt in Berlin; of the danger that lay in it, especially at this moment, when Austria was excited against Serbia, and of the desirability of preventing the horrible situation of having the Servian question forced open.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

(30991)

No. 40

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)*

(No. 137.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Vienna, July 5, 1914.*

I had some conversation to-day with M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, concerning the feeling of bitterness which exists here against Serbia and its possible consequences. M. Schebeko doubts if the animosity penetrates deep down among the Austrian people though it certainly pervades upper society circles. He cannot believe that the country will allow itself to be rushed into war, for an isolated combat with Serbia would be impossible and Russia would be compelled to take up arms in defence of Serbia. Of this there could be no question. A Servian war meant a general European war. Austria felt still, too painfully, the economic effects of her mobilisation in 1913 to embark lightly on the much greater efforts which would be necessary if she were to become involved in actual warfare. M. Schebeko said Austria could not expect to find a friendly Servian population across the frontier. At every stage of the Balkan conflict she had thwarted Servian hopes. By driving the Servians back from the Adriatic, by insisting on the exclusion of Scutari from Montenegro, by taking up an anti-Servian attitude over every frontier question, she had assumed a position which compelled every Servian to regard her as an enemy. She was now quite unjustly accusing Serbia of having indirectly favoured by her apathy, if she had not actually promoted, the plot to which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim at Sarajevo. This was regarded in Russia as very unfair. No nation could abhor more than the Russian the hand of an assassin, for Russia had greatly suffered from political murders. But to make the country in which a plot was prepared responsible for its execution was a new doctrine, and he did not think the Austrian Government would be induced by a few violent articles in the press to act upon it. He told me, however, that M. Jovanovitch, Servian Minister, had spoken strongly to Baron Macchio, acting as Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the danger of arousing too far the national sentiment of Serbia, by allowing it to appear that the Government shared the suspicions entertained in some popular quarters against the Servian Government.

M. Schebeko deplored the difficulty which he, in common with most of his colleagues, including myself, finds in extracting from Count Berchtold, for whom we all have a great personal regard, anything like an explicit statement of his views on international affairs. We are left to conjecture what is the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office from a few vague remarks made by Count Berchtold, from newspaper articles, and from conversations with other persons more or less intimately connected with public affairs.



Such indications as have reached me on this subject point certainly to the existence, even in the Ballplatz, of a very angry sentiment against Serbia, and I cannot at present share M. Schebeko's inclination to believe that the commercial, and generally the middle classes of this country are indifferent to the question. I fear there is ground to regard almost all sections of the population as being just now blindly incensed against the Servians, and I have heard on good authority that many persons holding usually quite moderate and sensible views on foreign affairs are expressing themselves now in the sense that Austria will at last be compelled to give evidence of her strength by settling once and for all her long-standing accounts with Serbia, and by striking such a blow as will reduce that country to impotence for the future. In military circles these views certainly prevail, and it would perhaps not be wise to exclude altogether the possibility that the popular indignation at the terrible crime of the 28th June may force the Government to take up an attitude from which it would not be easy to withdraw.

Meanwhile great police precautions are taken daily to protect the Servian Ministry and Servian churches and other buildings from assault. M. Jovanovitch was induced by the prayers of his landlord, who fears the destruction of his property, to take in his national flag while the other embassies and legations were still flying theirs at half-mast in sign of mourning.

M. Dumaine, my French colleague, is full of serious apprehension. His country is known to be in sympathy with Servian aspirations and he is in a position to know what is being said and done by Servians in Vienna. He has repeatedly spoken to me during the past week on the dangers of the situation, which he fears may develop rapidly into complications from which war might easily arise.

I expressed to my German colleague, on hearing of the assassinations, my fear that the relations between Austria and Serbia would now become more difficult than ever. Herr von Tschirsky said emphatically that those relations must be bad, and that nothing could mend them. He added that he had tried in vain to convince Berlin of this fundamental truth. Some people in Germany still persisted in believing in the efficacy of a conciliatory policy on the part of Austria towards Serbia. He himself knew better. I do not know if his Excellency alluded by these words to the opinions of his Sovereign, but I have heard it said by Austrians who have had opportunities of hearing the Emperor William speak on this subject that His Majesty has remained from the first unconvinced of the wisdom of the policy adopted by this country of excluding Serbia from the Adriatic, and does not conceal his belief that it would have done better to allow the normal expansion of Serbia to the sea to accomplish itself as the result of the first Balkan war.

M. Schebeko said to me to-day that in his opinion the Dual Monarchy would show great political wisdom if it would make up its mind to act in a conciliatory way towards the southern Slavs within the limits of the Monarchy. Such a course would disarm the extremists in Russia and facilitate more than anything else the maintenance of friendly relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Duc d'Avarna, my Italian colleague, has also more than once expressed these views to me, but I must confess that I meet few Austrians who hold them, and it would no doubt be very difficult for Count Berchtold, who is so much identified with the policy of restricting Serbia within the narrowest limits, to adopt now a different course.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

#### MINUTES.

Last Paragraph. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna seems to hold the same view as to the wisdom of recent anti-Servian policy, as we have reason to believe is held by Signor Martino and indeed by the Italian Ministry generally.—*E. P. July 9.*

But the unwisdom of a blindly anti-Servian policy is not at all appreciated in Austria, and that is the real point in a rather threatening situation. M. Schebeko underestimates the extent of

anti-Servian feeling in Austria: it is not confined to the people with sixteen quarterings, as he seems to infer optimistically.—*R. G. V. July 9.*

I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over. M. Schebeko is a shrewd man and I attach weight to any opinion he expresses.—*A. N.*

(31980)

No.41.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold (Berlin).*

(No. 223.) Secret.

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1914.*

I had a further talk with the German Ambassador to-day on the subject of his conversation with me last Monday (6th instant).<sup>(1)</sup> I said that I was speaking quite privately, in the same way as he had spoken, for he himself had said that the matters of which he spoke were too delicate to be treated other than privately.

Prince Lichnowsky repeated what he had said about the apprehension in Germany of an Anglo-Russian Naval Convention directed against Germany; and said that he would not have referred to it, if it had not been for the statement that I had made in Parliament, as regards which he had been instructed by his Government to express satisfaction.

I said, with reference to what he had said to me the other day, that I must not be taken as meaning that no conversations had taken place between the Military and Naval authorities of France and Russia and ourselves. There had been some conversations from time to time: they began in 1906. But everything had been on the footing that the hands of the Governments were quite free. Indeed, if such conversations took place, it was not necessary for me to know what passed. The thing which concerned the Government and myself, and which it was necessary for me to keep in our hands, was whether we should or should not participate if a war arose. If we made any Agreement that entailed obligations upon us, it would not be a secret Agreement. I was pledged to Parliament not to make a secret Agreement of this kind and any such Agreement that was made would be laid before Parliament. It was also true to say that never had there been anything in the nature of preparing an attack upon Germany. During the Morocco crisis in 1906, for instance, and again at the Agadir time, there had been apprehension that Germany might send an ultimatum to France: but to contemplate that was a different thing from preparing an attack against Germany. I then gave the Ambassador to read the record that I had made of my conversation with him on the 24th June last.<sup>(2)</sup> I said that every word of that held good.

I told the Ambassador that, since I saw him last Monday, I had expressed to Count Benckendorff the apprehension that the Austrian Government might be forced by public opinion to make some *démarche* with regard to Servia. I had told Count Benckendorff what I had said to Prince Lichnowsky about Russian feeling with regard to Germany. Count Benckendorff had told me that, since the question of the German Military Command in Constantinople had been settled, he also had had no indication whatever from St. Petersburg of irritation or ill-will in Russia with regard to Germany.<sup>(3)</sup>

Prince Lichnowsky expressed himself as hopeful, though he had no information, that the German Government might have succeeded in smoothing the Austrian intentions with regard to Servia. He hoped that, under any circumstances, if England and Germany kept in touch, we might be able to keep things right.

I said that, if Austrian action with regard to Servia kept within certain bounds, it would of course be comparatively easy to encourage patience at St. Petersburg;

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 32.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 4.<sup>(3)</sup> No. 39.

but there were some things that Austria might do that would make the Russian Government say that the Slav feeling in Russia was so strong that they must send an ultimatum or something of that sort. I assured Prince Lichnowsky that I would continue the same policy as I had pursued through the Balkan crisis, and do my utmost to prevent the outbreak of war between the Great Powers. The greater the risk of war, the more closely would I adhere to that policy. He could assure his Government that I not only did not wish to disturb the peace, but would also do my utmost to preserve it. If there was war between the Great Powers it would mean the failure to secure the great object for which all of us, who had been in the London Conference during the Balkan crisis, had worked.

In the course of conversation, I happened to remark that I supposed that Germany had her own Naval and Military arrangements with the other members of the Triple Alliance.

Prince Lichnowsky assured me, on this, that the Alliance remained as it was in Prince Bismarck's time: it was purely defensive and it did not include any Naval Agreement with regard to the Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 30.*

(31150)

No. 42.

*Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 339.)

Sir,

Paris, July 9, 1914.

The "Matin" of to-day's date informs its readers that a small volume is about to appear in Paris entitled "La Politique allemande" and written by Prince Bulow. This volume has, so the "Matin" states, been translated by M. Maurice Herbet (of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and a preface to the translated edition has been written by M. de Selves, Ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. Herbet was Private Secretary to M. de Selves during the period when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, namely, June 1911 to January 1912, a period which included the Agadir affair and the signature of the Franco-German Treaty respecting Morocco and French Equatorial Africa. . . .

The "Matin" follows up its announcement of the forthcoming publication of the volume above-mentioned by reproducing one of its chapters headed "La France irréconciliable." The gist of this chapter is contained in the last sentence where Prince Bulow quotes some words used by a French Diplomatist to an English Minister to the effect that so long as Alsace-Lorraine was in the hands of Germany the French people would never cease to look upon the latter country as their "permanent adversary," and would only consider another nation as their "accidental enemy." The "Matin" publishes in a parallel column the preface written by M. de Selves. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Matin" containing the chapter by Prince Bulow and M. de Selves' preface.<sup>(1)</sup>

The "Temps" of yesterday evening also had an article in which Franco-German affairs were mentioned. The article begins with a criticism of M. Jaurès who had spoken in the Chamber against M. Poincaré's forthcoming journey to Russia (a platonic manifestation which the Socialist party are in the habit of making when occasion offers, against the autocratic régime of France's ally) and goes on to suggest that the Socialists had a threefold campaign in view—against the Three Years' Service; against the Russian Alliance and in favour of a rapprochement with Germany.

(<sup>1</sup>) Not printed.



The article in the "Temps" lays great stress on the fact that France, not having made war on Germany to recover her lost provinces, was bound to endeavour to regain her diplomatic position in Europe. She did so by creating a group of Powers who were independent of German influence. If M. Jaurès' suggestion for an *élargissement* of the French system of alliances and *ententes* were listened to, it would, so the "Temps" declares, amount to the destruction of the system built up by France. "Une entente politique avec l'Allemagne," it continues, "annulant l'effort de quarante ans et désertant les voies où notre diplomatie a retrouvé la sécurité et la liberté, aucun Français conscient ne saurait y souscrire."

The article concludes by an emphatic assertion that France has no alliances nor friendships upon which to fall back ("alliances et amitiés de rechange") should she abandon her present ones.

I am, &c.

GRANVILLE.

No. 43.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

*British Legation, Sofia, July 6, 1914.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The late Archduke and King Ferdinand were, as you probably know, at daggers drawn. They had known each other from their youth up, and, it appears, they were always mutually antipathetic.

\* \* \* \* \*

On the whole the outlook is not bright. I have refrained entirely from being alarmist, both in my despatches and letters. If the ball is started, it will be by Turkey, about October or so, after she has received her new super-Dreadnought. Bulgaria will not join in until she has made some definite arrangement with Turkey as to dividing the spoils.

As I wrote to you in a previous letter, I do not believe that Serbia will pass the Albanian frontier unless she has previously arranged for Russian support, "le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle," as she will put Europe against her by any such action.

I am inclined to believe that Austria will also keep quiet as long as the Emperor lives, although the feeling against the Servians will be at fever heat for some time. If, however, Turkey and Greece go to war, and the troops of the former cross the Bulgarian frontier, Serbia will most certainly go to the assistance of Greece, and Roumania will again end by getting a portion of the spoils. This time she will take Shumla and Varna if she gets the chance.

It looks as if the first loan would go to Germany, but it will be inadequate, and goodness knows where they will turn for the next one.

Yours sincerely,

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.



(31544)

No. 44.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 288.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Berlin, July 11, 1914.*

I have had the honour to receive your Despatch No. 214, Secret, of the 6th instant,<sup>(1)</sup> recording the observations made to you privately by the German Ambassador in respect, amongst other matters, of the situation arising for Germany out of the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

The remarks made by Prince Lichnowsky on this head are, as far as I can judge, fully borne out by the reserved attitude of the German Press in the first instance, and by what I have been able to gather at the Imperial Foreign Office.

When the news of the murders at Serajevo became known there was evidently anxiety in official quarters lest the Austro-Hungarian Government might take some precipitate action against Serbia which would have far-reaching consequences. Some such idea must have been at the back of Herr Zimmermann's mind when he spoke to the Russian Ambassador in the sense which I had the honour to report to you in my Despatch No. 265 of the 30th ultimo.<sup>(2)</sup> His observations were evidently intended to be passed on and used as a hint to the Servian Government to forestall any possible action by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

The practical absence at first of detailed speculation in the German Press as to what might happen between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was an indication that the situation was difficult for Germany. The papers merely printed telegrams from Vienna, reporting that some immediate steps were in contemplation at Belgrade. When, however, it was announced that the Austro-Hungarian Government were going to await the results of the investigations at Serajevo before taking action, a feeling of relief was noticeable. Then came the statement made by Count Tisza in the Chamber of Deputies at Budapest.<sup>(3)</sup> This statement is referred to as follows in a semi-official communiqué to the "*Kölnische Zeitung*" of the 9th instant: "The declarations made by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, in reply to Count Andrassy's interpellation regarding the murder at Serajevo are welcomed with assent in political circles here. Count Tisza laid stress on the great desirability of the maintenance of peace, but also referred in earnest terms to the necessity of safeguarding the vital interests and the prestige of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The calm and determination of this statement are fully understood here."

The Press have discussed the situation much more freely within the last day or two. The general upshot of their remarks is that Austria-Hungary cannot indefinitely tolerate the state of things prevailing on her Servian frontier. Hard things are said about Serbia and the Servians, and it is freely assumed by some papers that the latter will shelter themselves behind the big Slav brother. There is a consensus of opinion that Germany will and must stand by her ally in this matter.

I asked Herr von Jagow at his weekly reception what news he had from Serbia. He replied that he had none, but added that if the Servian press continued to use the language it did, matters would become serious.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 32.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 22.<sup>(3)</sup> Cf. Nos. 55, 65, 70.

(31661)

No. 45.

*Mr. Crackunthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)*

(No. 126.)

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 10, 1914.*

The severe reprisals taken against the Serb population in Bosnia in consequence of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand have, as was to be expected, unchained the passions of the Servian Yellow Press. I will not trouble you with any of these acrimonious articles which are both irresponsible and unofficial. They have recently been condemned by the Government organ, the "Samouprava" in a leading article in which stress is laid on the correct attitude taken by the Servian Press immediately after the assassination, and on the general reprobation of the crime in Servia. It is therefore, states the "Samouprava," all the more regrettable that certain organs should have been induced by subsequent events in Bosnia to attempt a justification of the murder. The only result of this can be to justify the consequences which the murder has entailed on the Serb population of Austria-Hungary. The hope is expressed that these press polemics will now cease. Servia is now strong enough to discard the employment of threats and insults. The article concludes by emphasising the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Press has seized the opportunity to open a campaign of slander and menace against this country, and to incite the populace to outrages on innocent and peaceful citizens, thereby incurring the blame of every civilised State.

I have, &amp;c.

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

(32017)

No. 46.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 140.)

Sir,

*Vienna, July 11, 1914.*

In view of the bitter feeling against the entire Serb race which has been aroused in the Dual Monarchy by the assassination of the Heir to the Throne, the result of a meeting of common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance and War and of the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary, which was held on the 7th instant in Vienna.<sup>(1)</sup> in order to deliberate on the situation created by the murders, was awaited with keen expectation, and the more ardent spirits received no doubt with some disappointment the announcement made on the following day in the official "Fremdenblatt" that merely the internal situation in Bosnia and the Herzegovina as affected by the outrage had been under consideration. Less responsible papers however professed to be in a position to state that in reality the proceedings at the Council had covered a great deal more ground. Not only had it been decided to institute the severest kind of police control over Serb associations, schools and churches within the annexed provinces, and to exclude with the utmost rigour all suspicious arrivals from across the Servian frontier, but a peremptory diplomatic representation to the Servian Government had been drawn up, for presentation at an early date, in order to compel the latter to put a stop once for all to the noxious propaganda of the Pan-Servian League.

The public mind was considerably agitated by these announcements, which appeared in newspapers known to be occasionally used by the Press Bureau for semi-official communications, and the effect was soon visible in the general fall of securities in the Vienna money market. After Count Berchtold's audience of the Emperor at Ischl on the 9th instant, at which it was understood that His Excellency was to receive His Majesty's final directions regarding the transmission of a

<sup>(1)</sup> *An official account of this meeting will be found in A I No. 8.*

menacing Note to Servia, the alarmist portion of the Press declared that the step in question would be taken within the next few days, inasmuch as the proceedings in the Sarajevo Court had already clearly demonstrated the complicity of Servia in the murders. Yesterday, however, it was thought fit to announce officially in the Press that all statements professing to divulge the results of the Ministerial Council and of the audience of the Emperor were entirely unfounded. Nothing therefore is really known at the present moment regarding the intentions of the Government, and it may well be that they will hesitate to take a step which might lead to a position of great international tension. It seems to be decided to await, at all events, the result of the proceedings at Sarajevo before adopting a final resolution. The Servian Minister at Vienna states that he has no reason to expect that any threatening communication will be addressed to his Government.

I am, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

ALEXANDER CADOGAN.

No. 47.

*Communication from the Servian Legation.*

It appears from documents preserved in Sir A. Nicolson's private correspondence that on some date not specified, the Serbian Minister had privately asked for advice with reference to an article which had appeared in a newspaper called "John Bull" on the 11th July, 1914. This article purported to produce evidence that the Secret Service Bureau attached to the Servian Legation in London had been privy to the plans for the murder of the Archduke. M. Boschkovitch wished to have advice as to prosecution for libel. On the 15th July he was informed verbally by Sir Arthur Nicolson that legal opinion was to the effect that such proceedings might fail; the writer of the article had been very careful to write with such vagueness as to prevent the possibility of any particular person complaining that he was libelled. It was pointed out also that there was no means in this country by which the executive could suppress a newspaper.

(31367)

No. 48.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

Tel. (No. 42.) *En clair.*

*Belgrade, July 11, 1914.*

M. de Hartwig, Russian Minister here, died suddenly last night of heart failure.

MINUTES.

In the political and diplomatic world, M. de Hartwig's death will not cause much grief.—*E. A. C. July 11.*

He was a faithful and active supporter of Russian policy, although his methods were peculiar. His Servian policy was, so far as Russian interests were concerned, distinctly a success.—*A. N.*

I can only say "de mortuis nil."—*E. G.*

(31514)

(b.)

*Belgrade, July 12, 1914.*

D. 10.30 A.M.

R. 11.50 A.M.

Tel. (No. 43.)

My immediately preceding telegram.

By a strange fatality Russian Minister's death took place during visit he was paying to the Austrian Minister on the latter's return from Vienna. Russian Minister was desirous of offering certain personal explanations in regard to various reports concerning his behaviour and attitude after the Archduke's assassination, as to which I am reporting by bag.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am assured that interview was quite friendly, and doctor's evidence is that death would in any case have taken place within a few days.

(1) No. 62.

No. 49.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

*St. Petersburg, July 9, 1914.*

The French Government appear to be much preoccupied by the question of Anglo-Russian relations in Persia and Paléologue tells me that Poincaré, who is expected here on July 20 will make it one of the chief subjects of conversation with Sazonow. If, therefore, you would let me know if there are any special points which Sir Edward would like to have pressed on Sazonow, I will mention them to Poincaré when I see him at his reception of the Diplomatic Body.

Now that the first feeling of horror evoked by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and His Consort has passed away, the general impression would seem to be one of relief that so dangerous a personality should have been removed from the succession to the Throne.

[NOTE.—The greater part of this letter deals with the relations between Great Britain and Russia in Asia. See *Introduction*, p. xi.]

(32282)

No. 50.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 16, 1914.*

D. 1.50 P.M.

R. 3.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 85.) Confidential.

From language held by Minister for Foreign Affairs to a friend of mine, who has repeated it to me, I gather that situation is regarded at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a serious light and that a kind of indictment is being prepared against the Servian Government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy which led to assassination of the Archduke. Accusation will be founded on the proceedings in the Serajevo Court. My informant states that the Servian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda, and that Austro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Servia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used. Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure, and it is thought that the rest



of Europe will sympathise with Austria-Hungary in demanding that Serbia shall adopt in future more submissive attitude.

My informant states that Count Forgach entirely shares these views with his chief and that they are very generally held by all classes in this country.

I asked if Russia would be expected to stand by quietly in the event of force being used against Serbia.

My informant said that he presumed that Russia would not wish to protect racial assassins, but in any case Austria-Hungary would go ahead regardless of results. She would lose her position as a Great Power if she stood any further nonsense from Serbia.

This language is also held by a portion of the press, including the "Neue Freie Presse," which is now in touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official "Fremdenblatt" is more moderate.

I hope to see Minister for Foreign Affairs Friday.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

*Cf. Despatch No. 56.*

#### MINUTE.

Count Trauttmansdorff spoke to me (quite informally) at great length to-day, giving expression to very much the same views.—*E. A. C. July 16.*

(32283)

No. 51

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 16, 1914.*

D. 1.50 P.M.

R. 3.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 86.)

In reply to interpellations in Hungarian Chamber last night concerning tension prevailing between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Hungarian Prime Minister declared that relations between the two countries required clearing up, but that Government were not of opinion that this clarification need of necessity lead to warlike complications. Though hope of peaceful solution is expressed in speech, Count Tisza made a kind of general statement to the effect that every nation must be prepared for war.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 65, 82.

(32300)

No. 52.

*Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 347.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 16, 1914.*

The "Temps" in its issue of to-day's date publishes a leading article on the increase, present and prospective, of the Russian Army which is worthy of note, not only on account of the information which it contains of the details of the Russian military forces, but also because of the effect which it is likely to have on French public opinion which forms its judgment on the military situation of foreign nations largely on information supplied to it by newspapers of the standing of the "Temps." The following is the gist of the "Temps" article:—

Although the Douma and the Council of the Empire have taken the military vote in secret session and the Russian press has been absolutely silent about the matter, it is none the less possible to discern the chief lines of the new military

plan conceived by the Russian General staff. The fundamental idea is the systematic and general numerical increase of the peace strength of the Army. Russia, which has a population of one hundred and eighty millions, is able to proceed to this measure with the greatest ease. She has only to take one soldier out of every hundred of her subjects to form an active army of one million eight hundred thousand men. She has adopted this formula and in future her army will correspond with the progress of her birthrate. The Russian Military authorities, however, are not only going to increase the annual contingent of recruits, they are also prolonging the period of service with the colours. The Ukase of the 20th March, 1906, modifying the military law of 1874 had lowered the duration of service for the infantry and mounted artillery to three years and for the other branches to four years. An alteration in this system has now been adopted: the men who in the ordinary course of events would have finished their period of service in October will be kept with the colours until the following April. As regards the increase in the annual contingents of recruits, it is to be observed that from 1908 to 1913, the figures were practically the same each year, that is to say about 450,000 men were annually incorporated. This resulted in an Army on a peace footing of 1,300,000 men. The next contingent will, however, number 580,000 men, viz., an increase of 130,000 men compared with the 1908-13 period, but this number will progressively increase. By 1918 the Russian Army on a peace footing will reach a total of 1,700,000 men; and, if the calculation be made for the first months of 1919 before the contingent which will have already done three years' service is liberated, the total of the Russian Army on a peace footing must be estimated at 2,300,000 men.

The "Temps" concludes this review of the Russian military strength by observing that the dead-weight of these new masses of soldiers is bound to have its effect on the balance of power. France is more interested than any other nation in the new state of affairs in the Russian Army, and the French contribution towards the common military effort involves the integral maintenance of the three-years' Service Law in France.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

(32459)

No. 53.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 17, 1914.*

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 4.25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 44.)

Vienna telegram No. 85 of 16th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

Present attitude of Servian Government is prudent and conciliatory. Servian Prime Minister has declared to Austrian Minister in unofficial conversation that Servian Government are prepared to comply at once with any request for police investigation and to take any other measures compatible with dignity and independence of State.

But general feeling is that a demand on the part of Austro-Hungarian Government for appointment of a mixed commission of enquiry, for suppression of nationalist societies or for censorship of press, could not be acceded to, since it would imply foreign intervention in domestic affairs and legislation.

(Repeated to Vienna.)

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 50

(32510)

No. 54.

*Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 351.)

Sir,

Paris, July 17, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the annual congress of French Socialists has been taking place in Paris during this week. The most important question which has been discussed is that of the attitude of Socialism in the event of a European War. The proposal put forward by Messrs. Keir Hardie and Vaillant, the French Deputy, that a declaration of war should be met by a general strike on the part of the working classes in the countries concerned was the subject of a lengthy debate, in which a considerable difference of opinion was shown among the delegates. Several of them pointed out the difficulties attending the declaration of a general strike at a time when the country was on the verge of war. It was argued that such a course might merely play the game of the enemy country, where socialist organization might be less strong or where the war was popular, however unjust. To be effective the General Strike would have to be declared simultaneously in both countries, and it was extremely difficult to ensure this happening. It was not to be supposed, said M. Guesde, the leader of one school of French socialists, that the German working class would declare, in company with the French, a general strike that would put their country in the hands of the Russians. France's allies. The delegates were reminded of the difficulties in the way of the success of a general strike in the face of mobilization orders, martial law and the general excitement preceding a war. M. Hervé, the well-known anti-militarist, laid stress, in this connection, on the difficulty of distinguishing between an offensive and a defensive war.

M. Marcel Sembat, speaking in favour of the General Strike, asked what was the good of any international organization if Socialists were going to quail before every obstacle. M. Jaurès said that though he quite recognised the objections to a general strike as being a one-sided measure which might recoil on his own country, he considered that it was the best means by which the working class could combat war, it was, at least preventive, and what the Congress should consider was how to make it as efficacious a weapon as possible.

After further discussion a Committee was appointed to draw up a formula which would be in accordance with the general opinion of the Congress.

M. Jaurès as spokesman of this Committee read the following motion :—

“Entre tous les moyens employés pour prévenir et empêcher la guerre et pour imposer aux Gouvernements le recours à l'arbitrage, le Congrès considère comme particulièrement efficace :

“La Grève Générale Ouvrière, simultanément et internationalement organisée dans les pays intéressés, ainsi que l'agitation et l'action populaires sous les formes les plus actives.”

This motion was carried by 1,690 votes against 1,174, eighty-three delegates abstaining.

Before separating, the Congress passed unanimously a motion approving the Franco-German inter-parliamentary unions at Bâle and Berne, and expressing the hope that autonomy would be granted to Alsace-Lorraine, as this would greatly conduce to a reconciliation between France and Germany.

I have, &amp;c.

GRANVILLE.



(32532)

No. 55.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 18.)*

(No. 143.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 13, 1914.

From an Austrian gentleman in touch with the Ballplatz I hear that, while Count Berchtold is himself peacefully inclined, a feeling that strong steps should be taken against Serbia exists in the minds of several members of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office whose opinions carry weight. These gentlemen argue that the Dual Monarchy will lose its position as a Great Power if it does not once for all make it clear at Belgrade that Servian provocation will no longer be tolerated on this side of the frontier, and they press for military measures to compel acceptance by Serbia of what they hold to be a necessary demand for the participation of Austrian agents in the work of discovering and bringing to condign punishment the instigators and accomplices of the plot against the heir to the Austrian Throne. The "Reichspost" and other more or less independent organs of the Vienna press are conducting a vigorous campaign on these lines. The "Neue Freie Presse" has distinguished itself in clamouring for vengeance against Serbia. On many sides regret is expressed that this country did not go to war with Serbia in 1908, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, so that a blow might have been struck at the neighbouring monarchy which would have reduced it to impotence for a generation. Russia, it is alleged, was then not in a position after her war with Japan to render effective aid to Serbia. That opportunity having been lost, as well as that offered by the recent Balkan wars, Austria-Hungary cannot afford once more to leave unpunished the insolence and audacity of the Servian nationalists.

The "Neue Freie Presse" claims that this time the Dual Monarchy would have the sympathies of the whole of Europe with her if she took severe measures against Serbia. Even Russia would approve a campaign undertaken against a nation tainted with the crime of regicide at home, and ostentatiously condoning the Serajevo assassinations, and the rest of Europe would certainly stand by Austria in a war of righteous self-defence against murder and outrage.

Against language such as this I have already reported in my despatch No. 140 of the 11th July<sup>(1)</sup> that a note of warning has been published in the form of an official communiqué describing as entirely unfounded all the firebrand accounts which the press had been allowed to publish of the results of the recent council of the Common Ministers and of the consultation held at Ischl between the Emperor and Count Berchtold on the 9th July. It is indeed generally assumed that the Emperor himself would be with difficulty moved to sanction an aggressive course of action leading almost certainly to international complications of the gravest kind. That more moderate counsels are more likely to prevail is also rendered probable by the studied caution of the language held by the Hungarian Premier in his replies to interpellations in the Chamber at Budapest on the 8th July.<sup>(2)</sup> While admitting that the Archduke had fallen a victim to a deliberate plot and that six or eight bombs at least were ready to be hurled at his carriage on the fatal day, Count Tisza denied that the population of Bosnia as a whole was disloyal to the connection with the Dual Monarchy, or that any far-reaching conspiracy against Habsburg rule existed among its people. The Government, therefore, would take no precipitate action. It would "do its duty in every direction." What would be done in the area of foreign affairs, he was not competent to say. He condemned the wholesale assaults on Serb property which had unhappily taken place in Bosnia, and he expressed the hope that the *modus vivendi* now existing between the rival sections of the Slavonic race in Croatia would be maintained in future.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 46.<sup>(2)</sup> Cf. No. 65.



The declarations of Count Tisza have had the more effect in calming the public mind in view of the fact that the Austrian Reichsrat has been suspended since March last owing to Czech obstruction, and that the Hungarian Chamber offers, therefore, at the present time, the only means of enlightening the representatives of the people regarding the intentions of the Government. Count Tisza had attended the deliberations of the Common Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War and Finance, on the day preceding his statement, and he expressed no doubt in his speech the sentiments that prevailed in that important council.

But though some restraint has thus been placed on the cry for vengeance against Serbia, this country is still in a very angry mood, and the extracts daily published in Vienna from a portion of the Belgrade press serve to inflame still further the public mind. The Servian Minister, M. Jovanovitch, condemns these utterances, but points that they are partly accounted for, though certainly not justified, by the memory of innumerable attacks, couched in the most insulting language, which the Vienna press has been in the habit of making on the Servian people. He also points to the language recently held by the Servian Prime Minister as expressing the true sentiments of the nation. M. Pasitch is reported to have said that the Servian Government are willing to assist in any manner required by the obligations of a civilised State in investigating the ramifications of the crime of the 28th June on Servian territory.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

THEO RUSSELL.

#### No. 56.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

Vienna, July 17, 1914.

There is only one topic in the Vienna press, even Albania in its throes being almost crowded out—namely, when will the protest against Serbia be put in, and what will it contain? That there will be a protest nobody doubts, and it will probably be coupled with demands intended to humiliate Serbia. From all I hear the Ballplatz is in an uncompromising mood, but very likely Count Berchtold, whom I am to see this afternoon, will be Sphinxlike as ever. The authority for the telegram I sent yesterday<sup>(1)</sup> was Count Lützow, ex-Ambassador at Rome. He has a place near us in the country and we motored over to luncheon. He had seen both Berchtold and Forgatch at the Ballplatz the day before, and had long conversations. He put on a serious face and said he wondered if I realised how grave the situation was. This Government was not going to stand Servian insolence any longer. No great Power could submit to such audacity as Serbia had displayed, and keep her position in the world. A note was being drawn up and would be completed when the Serajevo enquiry was finished, demanding categorically that Serbia should take effective measures to prevent the manufacture and export of bombs, and to put down the insidious and murderous propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. No futile discussion would be tolerated. If Serbia did not at once cave in, force would be used to compel her. Count Lützow added that Count Berchtold was sure of German support and did not believe any country could hesitate to approve—not even Russia.

All this of course is only repetition of what Count Lützow understood Count Berchtold to say, and he may have made the most of it—but it all agrees strangely with the language of most of the Press, and almost all the people one meets. I

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 50.

expressed my doubts whether, if it really came to fighting, which I could not believe, Russia would allow Austria and Serbia to have it out in a cockpit. Count Lützow said Austria was determined to have her way this time and would refuse to be headed off by anybody. Count Tisza's speech does not seem to me to read very reassuringly. He said: "We must have a settlement (Klärung) with Serbia, and we may possibly achieve it without war."

I cannot yet believe Austria will resort to extreme measures, but I think we have an anxious time before us. Tschirsky I feel sure is doing nothing to restrain this country. He confessed to me lately that he did not believe in the possibility of improved relations between Austria and Serbia, and the German Military Attaché does not conceal his belief that the hour of condign punishment for Serbia is approaching. Schebeko told me this. Schebeko says Russia would inevitably be drawn in, if this happened. I hope the private information you kindly give me in confidence in the postscript dated the 7th July to your letter of the 6th<sup>(2)</sup> is correct and that Berlin would be against strong measures against Serbia being taken from Vienna.

Jovanovitch came to see me again this morning. He can get nothing out of the Ballplatz and rather dreads the end of the ominous silence which now prevails there. He says Serbia will do anything that can be reasonably asked to put down crime, but that it is useless to ask for the suppression of sentiments felt by every Servian. It would be just as reasonable, he says, to ask the Poles, Ruthenes, Roumanians and Italians within the Dual Monarchy to surrender the dream of eventual coalition with the main stock of their respective races beyond the border. Holding these sentiments does not necessarily make the different nationalities bad subjects. They will all keep quiet as long as they are well treated, but they keep in the back of their heads the idea that, if some day the Empire went to pieces, they would join hands with their kith and kin.

\* \* \* \* \*

Yours ever,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

P.S.—I have just had a talk with Berchtold. He was charming, announced himself for a visit to our place in the country next Sunday, invited us to stay with him at Buehlau, the place of the famous interview between Arenthal and Iswolsky, told me he had some horses running in some races shortly, but never mentioned general politics or the Servians. We talked a little about Albania and Greek atrocities in Epirus. He did not seem overpleased at the prospect of Greece and Turkey coming to terms, for fear Greece would now make herself more than ever disagreeable on the side of Albania.—M. DE B.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 33. *No copy of this postscript was made by Sir A. Nicolson.*

(82609)

No. 57.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 18, 1914.*

D. 11 A.M.

R. 12:35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 45.)

My immediately preceding telegram of 17th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

I gather from Austrian Minister that he is not personally in favour of pressing Serbia too hard, since he is convinced that Servian Government are ready to take whatever measures can reasonably be demanded of them. He does not view the situation in a pessimistic light.

(Repeated to Vienna.)

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 53.

(32643)

No. 58.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 18, 1914.*

D. 2:10 P.M.

R. 3:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 91.)

Russian Ambassador is afraid that article like the one quoted at length this morning in Vienna press from yesterday's "Westminster Gazette" <sup>(1)</sup> will encourage Austro-Hungarian Government to take severe action against Serbia. Article is described as warning addressed to Serbia by organ of British Government. I have told Russian Ambassador that article is certainly devoid of any official character or importance.

EXTRACT FROM ARTICLE IN "WESTMINSTER GAZETTE," JULY 17, 1914.

. . . . After the crime of Serajevo, we cannot deny that Austria-Hungary has a *prima-facie* case for desiring to clarify her relations with Serbia. There is strong indignation in the Empire, and it is widely believed that the anti-Austrian conspiracy which struck at the Archduke had its origin in Serbia. The case has not been improved by the press campaign which has gone on in Serbia since the assassination; and it is suspected in Vienna and Buda-Pesth that a deliberate attempt is being made to work on the population of Servian nationality in the Empire, in order to prepare their separation from the Monarchy, should an opportunity present itself. In such circumstances the Government cannot be expected to remain inactive; and Serbia will be well-advised if she realises the reasonableness of her great neighbour's anxiety, and does whatever may be in her power to allay it, without waiting for a pressure which might involve what Count Tisza calls "warlike complications." . . . .

## MINUTE.

I do not see that the article justifies the interpretation put upon it by the Russian Ambassador. He assumes the article to have been inspired by His Majesty's Government and asks himself what our object was in getting it written. It was not inspired by us at all.—*E. G.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. No. 73, also despatch No. 156.

(32644)

No. 59.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 18, 1914.*

D. 2:10 P.M.

R. 3:35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 92.) Confidential.

Belgrade telegram No. 44 of 17th July. <sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs did not mention Serbia at interview I had with him yesterday, but Italian Ambassador informed me that, in reply to his question whether situation was becoming grave, Minister for Foreign Affairs demurred to that expression, but admitted that situation required "clearing up" and was far from "serene." Italian Ambassador does not believe that unreasonable demands will be made on Serbia, but he blames Austro-Hungarian Government for allowing public opinion to expect from daily language of press that a kind of ultimatum will be sent in, leading possibly to war. He does not think that either Minister for Foreign Affairs or Emperor would sanction such an unwise proceeding.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

*Cf. Despatch No. 156.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 53.



(32659)

No. 60.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 18, 1914.*

D. 8:50 P.M.

R. 10:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 161.)

In the course of conversation to-day Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the great uneasiness which Austria's attitude towards Serbia was causing him. He had received disquieting telegrams from the Russian Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and Rome, and proposed to ask the French Government to give a word of warning at Vienna. He had just seen the German Ambassador and had impressed on him that Russia's sole desire was to be left in peace. She cherished no aggressive designs against anyone, and wished to devote all her efforts to the development of her internal resources, and to the construction of the railways of which she stood in such need. The period of expansion through which she had passed was now over. The increase in her armaments was not directed against any other Power, but was necessary for the peaceful development of her vast Empire. Germany was, relatively speaking, in a far stronger position than Russia, as she had not the same length of frontiers to defend or such an extent of territory.

The Pan-Serb agitation in Austria was an internal growth, and blame could not be thrown on Serbia any more than Germany could be held responsible for the Pan-German or Italy for the Italian propaganda that was carried on within the Austrian Empire.

In reply to a question of mine, his Excellency said that anything in the shape of an Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent, and she might be forced to take some precautionary military measures.

(32651)

No. 61.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Belgrade, July 19, 1914.*

D. 11:30 A.M.

R. 3:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 46.)

In the course of private conversation with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday I alluded to the "Times" article of the 16th instant, suggesting that the Servian Government should of their own motion undertake to enquire into alleged South Slav conspiracy on Servian soil. Under-Secretary of State pointed out that, until result of proceedings at Serajevo was made public, the Servian Government had no material on which such an enquiry could be based. He assured me that on the publication of the findings of the Court the Servian Government would be fully prepared to comply with whatever request for further investigation the circumstances might call for and which would be in accordance with international usage.

He said he was aware that there was an influential party in Austria who wished to take advantage of the present situation to press Serbia to extremes: but the Servian Government had certain knowledge that restraint would be exercised on Austria from Berlin. Should, however, Austria force on a war, Serbia would not stand alone. Russia would not stand by and see Serbia wantonly attacked, and Bulgaria would be immobilised by Roumania.

(Sent to Vienna.)

*Cf. Despatch No. 80.*



(32784)

No. 62.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 129.) Very Confidential.

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 13, 1914.*

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 42 and 43 of the 11th and 12th instant,<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to report that by a strange fatality M. de Hartwig, the Russian Minister to Servia, succumbed to heart failure within the precincts of the Austrian Legation on the evening of the 10th instant.

It appears that M. de Hartwig was desirous of offering to the Austrian Minister, who had returned to Belgrade the same day, a personal explanation in regard to certain rumours which had become public concerning his behaviour and attitude subsequently to the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. I have no first-hand knowledge of what transpired at the interview and will therefore merely mention some of the reports which had been circulated, and which may have been discussed in the course of conversation.

(1.) The "Reichspost" of Vienna had recently published an article attacking the Russian Minister for holding a bridge party on the evening of the Archduke's murder. It is true that M. de Hartwig was having a quiet game of bridge that evening with the Roumanian and Greek Ministers and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires. but, under the circumstances, the article in the "Reichspost" seems to have contained some very unnecessary animadversions.

(2.) The Russian Minister had been accused of not hoisting the Russian flag at half-mast on the day of the funeral service for the Archduke. Though M. de Hartwig himself affirmed the flag was flying, several of my colleagues state that this was not the case. The Austrian Legation took a strong view of the matter and doubtless the Russian Minister was anxious to smooth matters over.

(3.) I regret to state that M. de Hartwig had recently been using very inappropriate and ill-advised language in regard to the private life and character of the present heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in the presence, among others, of my Italian colleague. I do not know whether his remarks were repeated at the Austrian Legation, but if this was so, it is probable that the interview must have been, on M. de Hartwig's side, somewhat emotional, sufficiently so to hasten an end which, according to doctors' evidence, could in any case have been only deferred a few days. I am however assured that the conversation between the two Ministers was quite friendly, and from what I have seen of Baron Giessl, I should judge that he would most certainly have met M. de Hartwig's explanations in a conciliatory spirit.

On news being received in Belgrade of the strange circumstances attending the Russian Minister's death, sinister reports were at once circulated to the effect that M. de Hartwig had taken a "cup of tea" at the Austrian Legation. I merely mention this as affording an indication of the somewhat mediæval morals prevailing in this city.

I have, &amp;c.

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 48.

(32779)

No. 63.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 295.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 18, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that I had some conversation with M. Cambon yesterday about the general political situation. His Excellency has just returned

from leave of absence. He said that he had seen the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and for the first time since he had known him, had found Count Szögyenyi pessimistic as to the outlook. This pessimism may, perhaps, be partly due to the regret and depression felt by Count Szögyenyi at having in a few weeks to leave a post which he has held for over twenty years. M. Cambon wondered what was the rôle of the German Government in the matter of any *démarche* contemplated at Belgrade by their ally. The Italian Ambassador is equally curious on this point. If there has been an exchange of views between Berlin and Vienna about the nature of the steps to be taken at Belgrade, the result has been kept absolutely secret. The public are in the dark, with the result that a feeling of irritation has revealed itself in some quarters which was expressed a few days ago by the "Kreuz-Zeitung" in the following terms:—

"We notice the same hesitation and indecision as regards the contemplated *démarche* at Belgrade as were shown by the Austro-Hungarian Government during the crisis in the Balkans.

"The Austrian Government are either in possession of sufficient evidence to be able to make representations at Belgrade, in which case they should act quickly and vigorously; or they have not got adequate proof, in which event they should not irritate Servia by foreshadowing diplomatic action which cannot take place for want of sufficient grounds.

"We are prepared in Germany to give the Austrian Government the widest support in this question, but we have a right to expect that the Austrians should make up their mind what they are going to do."

I then asked the French Ambassador whether he did not consider that Russia and her supposed plans occupied public opinion in Germany to the same extent as England had done until lately—that in fact we had made way for Russia in this respect. M. Cambon quite agreed, and added that matters as between France and Germany were by no means what they should be. The Germans were not behaving in a friendly way towards his country. The air would have to be cleared some time or other. His Excellency alluded to the extreme sensitiveness in Germany at the present time on the question of espionage. The same point has struck me. The development of aircraft has, of course, been largely responsible for this result. It frequently occurs that aeroplanes, &c., cross the eastern or western frontiers of Germany. It was reported yesterday, for instance, that the airship "Z 4," in a flight along the Russian frontier had crossed on to Russian territory and been fired at by the Russian frontier guards.

A fortnight or so ago the Russian military attaché left Berlin hurriedly as the result of the arrest of a sergeant named Pohl, from whom he had bought plans of two fortresses on the eastern frontier. Pohl was tried by court-martial two days ago, the proceedings being conducted *in camera* for reasons of State. The sergeant was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Such incidents are not calculated to improve the feelings between Germany and Russia. The German press on the whole showed considerable restraint in their comments on this case. The "Tageblatt" pointed out that it was no good shutting one's eyes to the fact that a regular system of espionage existed, and that no country was blameless in this respect. But members of foreign embassies and legations should be particularly careful not to be mixed up in such matters.

As regards the general question of the relations between Germany and her eastern neighbour, I venture to think that the supposed hostile intentions of Russia have been largely conjured up by the German press itself. That press has no doubt given expression to the feeling of irritation and anxiety caused by the determined efforts of France and Russia to develop their armaments to the utmost possible extent. Whatever confidence the Germans may have in the efficiency and quality of their

army, the enormous masses of men at the command of Russia are a constant source of preoccupation to them. Speculation as to the events which might set those masses in motion against Germany seems to follow almost as a matter of course.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

(32739)

No. 64.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received July 20.)

(No. 145.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Since the assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort I have received from Mr. Jones, His Majesty's Consul at that place, a number of despatches describing the deed itself and the subsequent course of events. I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with copies of these despatches, but I have now the honour to enclose some extracts from the last four which may prove of interest as a record of the state of local opinion.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

P.S.—Extracts from a fifth despatch just received are also annexed as part of the summary above mentioned.—M. DE B. July 17, 1914.

Enclosure in No. 64.

*Information derived from Despatches received from Mr. Jones at Sarajevo,  
July 3-8, 1914:*

July 3.

Unconfirmed rumours were in circulation as to the issue of a decree expelling all Servian subjects from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as to the expulsion of the editor of a Serb paper at Sarajevo, in spite of his being an Austrian subject. The "Sarajevoer Tagblatt" of the 2nd July had been confiscated. Its issue of the 3rd July reported anti-Serb demonstrations in various parts of the province, and the burning of the Orthodox Church at Capljina.

July 4.

An article in the "Bosnische Post" declared that the murders had been proved to have been organised and instigated by the Servian "Narodna Obrana" (National Defence) at Belgrade; that a certain Miko Ciganovic distributed fire-arms and bombs in a Belgrade coffee-house to young men who expressed willingness to carry out the murder of the Archduke, and that Major Milan Pribicevic, of the Servian General Staff and Secretary of the "Narodna Obrana," supplied Ciganovic with the pistols and explosives. Mr. Jones was, however, informed that Major Pribicevic's connection with the assassinations was merely surmise of the editor. He further learnt that investigations had led to the discovery of two other undoubted accomplices of the assassin, students named Grabes and Ilic. A requiem mass for the Archduke and the Duchess was celebrated in the Catholic Cathedral on the 4th July and attended by the whole Consular corps with the exception of the Ottoman and Russian representatives.

July 6.

Grabes had made to the police a statement implicating a Croat student, who was found to have had a bomb and a revolver in his possession and to have given



them to his mother to hide. M. Dimovic, leader of the moderate Serb party in the Sabor, had gone into opposition owing to the attacks on the Serb population. Arrests and searches by the police were reported from various quarters. Mr. Jones further learnt that the Archduke had said, just after the first attempt on his life, that he would have done better to have followed Count Tisza's advice and refrained from paying an official visit to Bosnia.

July 8.

Mr. Jones transmitted a translation of an article from the "Istina" (Truth) of the 7th July, the organ of the moderate Serb party, the first orthodox Serb journal to appear since the assassination, blaming in very moderate language the attacks on the whole Serb community for the crimes of misguided individuals, and recalling that the Servian race had weathered storms far severer than the present one.

July 15.

Three Orthodox priests were brought to Sarajevo on the 14th July on a charge of complicity in the murders. It appears that the accused persons have of late in some cases proved more communicative, but the local papers are debarred from publishing their statements. Mr. Jones is informed that there are reasons for believing the plot to have originated in Servia.

(32742)

No. 65.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 16, 1914.

The Vienna Press being almost exclusively taken up with speculation as to whether and when and how the expected diplomatic protest at Belgrade will be put in by the Austro-Hungarian Government, much interest attaches to the only authentic declarations which have yet been made concerning the intentions of the Common Government, namely to the replies given to his interpellators in the Hungarian Chamber by Count Stephan Tisza, Hungarian Minister President.

Count Tisza's first statement was made on July 8th<sup>(1)</sup> when he declared in effect that, though he was then only in a position to give a very general reply, he might state that the investigation of the Sarajevo crime was being pursued in every direction, and it was the duty of all concerned to have regard certainly to the importance of the interests involved in the maintenance of peace, but to give due weight also to those great interests which are bound up with the existence and prestige of the Monarchy.

Yesterday he again replied to several interpellations, and though his words were characterized by the same caution as before they attained greater precision on one or two points. He said that a clear understanding must be reached with Servia. How this would have to be done, in what direction and by the use of what form of words, he was not yet in a position to state. He repeated that the Government was fully conscious of the great importance attaching to the preservation of peace. They did not believe that the settling of accounts with Servia would necessarily lead to war. He would not prophecy, but would merely say that war was the *ultima ratio*, to be resorted to only when a friendly solution proved absolutely impossible. But every nation should be in a position to make war as a last resource. Exaggerated language had been used about Bosnia. There was no danger of revolution there, and the forces maintained in Bosnia were sufficient to keep the peace. But the revolutionary societies and the schools were the field of a dangerous agitation, which must be resolutely put down.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 55.

<sup>(2)</sup> Cf. Nos. 51, 82.



Count Tisza's speech is generally interpreted as confirming the expectation that a diplomatic protest will be addressed to Serbia, founded on the results of the investigation which is still proceeding at Sarajevo. It is also held to foreshadow a period of great tension leading possibly even to war, if the desired object proves unattainable by other means.

The proceedings in the Hungarian Chamber disclosed no difference of opinion between the Government and the Opposition as regards the necessity of calling Serbia severely to account. Count Tisza did not formulate the precise nature of the indictment which will be brought against the Servian Government, but in the speech of M. Szmrecsanyi, the first interpellator, Serbia is accused of allowing a revolutionary propaganda to be carried on against the integrity of a neighbouring state, and of sending across the frontier a band of conspirators armed with bombs and revolvers. He stated that it was proved that the seat of the Great Servian propaganda was at Belgrade, and also that the propaganda was organized by the Narodna Obrana Association, whose President and Secretary were General Jankovitch and Major Milan Pribicevich. This revolutionary Society had formerly directed its activity against Turkey. It was subsidised by the Servian Government, and drew subscriptions also from abroad. It poisoned the minds of the students and openly advocated murder as a political weapon. Its attention since the Balkan wars had been specially directed to Bosnia and also to Hungary, where it sought to undermine the loyal sentiments of the Slavonic part of the population. He mentioned by name several of the principal Servian agitators, including the three brothers Pribicevich. The Society had started annual celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo with the sole idea of glorifying the idea of a Great Serbia and promoting the restoration of the Empire of Dushan. The propaganda was also carried on with great activity in Croatia, and numerous so-called Servian deserters poured across the frontiers to spy out the land. The success of the plot against the life of the Archduke had been hailed in Servia with ill-concealed delight. No one would think of accusing the Servian Government of having itself supplied the murderous weapons, but it was certainly guilty of encouraging the proceedings of the Narodna Obrana. This could no longer be tolerated. The speaker claimed to be a friend of peace, but peace was incompatible with the continuance of the present state of affairs. The Government must act, and act quickly.

M. Szmrecsanyi promised to furnish the Government with the proofs of what he had alleged. Count Tisza corrected the statement that the Servian deserters were spies. They were more likely peasants trying to escape military service at home.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

*Cf. Mr. Max Müller's despatch No. 82.*

(32813)

No. 66.

*Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)*

(No. 354.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 18, 1914.*

I had the honour, when communicating to you in my despatch No. 347 of the 16th instant,<sup>(1)</sup> the substance of a leading article in the "Temps" on the increase of Russian military strength, to state that that article appeared to me of interest, not only on account of the information therein given, but also because of the effect which information on such a subject and from such a source was likely to have on French public opinion.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 52.

The same observation applies to an article to which the "Matin" of to-day's date gives prominence and which has been written for that newspaper by M. Jules Hedeman, who is now in St. Petersburg, for the visit of the French President. M. Hedeman is perhaps the best known special correspondent in France and his articles always attract much attention here. The following is the gist of the article published by the "Matin":—

The visit of M. Poincaré to Russia is taking place at a moment when the extraordinary awakening of Russia is manifesting itself in the most signal manner. The development of Russia to-day, in all fields of human activity, is only comparable to that of the United States of America some thirty years ago. Russian public opinion, realising the formidable power of the nation, has desired to make it visible to the foreigner . . . to Russia's adversaries. Measures have accordingly been taken (M. Hedeman gives the figures) for bringing about a huge increase in Russian military power. By the winter of 1916 the Russian army, on a peace footing, will have been almost doubled, that is to say, its total will have progressed from 1,200,000 to the colossal figure of 2,245,000 men. Russia will then possess an active army greater in numbers than the joint forces of the Triple Alliance Powers. She will, moreover, thanks to new strategical railways, be able to mobilise as quickly as the other military Powers. The same effort is to be seen in naval matters, and the Russian navy estimates now exceed the British ones. Russia, who was "militarily discredited" after the Manchurian war, is now well on the way to becoming the greatest military Power which the world has ever seen. She is animated, like France, with pacific intentions, and the Emperor Nicholas said a short time ago to a French diplomatist: "Nous voulons être assez forts pour imposer la paix." But Russia will no longer put up with certain proceedings on the part of Germany, such as the despatch of the Liman von Sanders mission to Constantinople and the assumption by its chief of the command of the Constantinople army corps: or the arrest of honourable Russian subjects on a charge of spying; or the violence of language on the part of the Berlin press. Russian diplomacy is already adopting a new tone when it speaks to German diplomacy, and to-day Germany fears her eastern neighbour. Besides the eternal animosity between Slavs and Germans a severe economic struggle between the two countries is beginning which more than ever makes an improvement of Russo-German relations impossible.

The "Temps" published yesterday a further leading article on the additions to the Russian army which have already taken place or are shortly to be carried out. It mentioned, in particular, three new Russian army corps which are to be stationed in Western Russia. The Austrian newspapers, so the "Temps" article observed, anticipate that these new army corps will be quartered round Kief and Odessa, while the German press, probably better informed, expects to see them stationed near Warsaw and Vilna.

I have, &c.  
GRANVILLE.

MINUTE.

Russia is a formidable Power and will become increasingly strong. Let us hope our relations with her will continue to be friendly.—A. N.

(32659)

No. 67.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 936.)

D. 7 P.M.

It is possible that Servian Government have been negligent, and that proceedings at the trial at Serajevo will show that the murder of the Archduke was planned on Servian territory. If Austrian demands in Servia are kept within reasonable limits

[13318]

E 3

and if Austria can produce justification for making them, I hope every attempt will be made to prevent any breach of the peace. It would be very desirable that Austria and Russia should discuss things together if they become difficult. You can speak in this sense if occasion seems to require it.

*Published in Oman, p. 18.*

*Cf. No. 76.*

(33167)

No. 68.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.*

(No. 235.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.*

I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold, in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be made known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 1.*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 92.*

(32981)

No. 69.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 357.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 20, 1914.*

The "Matin" to-day gives prominence to a telegram sent from St. Petersburg by its special correspondent, M. Jules Hedeman, on the subject of the part which the Russian army would play in the event of a European war.

M. Hedeman states that his information is derived from military sources most competent to furnish it. The following is its substance:—

The Russian army is now composed of forty-four army corps, and another one is to be added next year. Should war break out, thirteen army corps, namely, seven in Siberia and the Far East, two in Turkestan, three in the Caucasus, and one in Finland and St. Petersburg, would remain where they are; all the others would take the



offensive on the German and Austrian frontiers. It is improbable that Russia would send any troops to the Russo-Roumanian frontier. Formerly, two Russian army corps would have been sent there to hold in check the Roumanian army, but things have changed, and Roumania is more likely nowadays to join in an attack on Austria-Hungary than to invade Russia, for the Roumanians covet the province of Transylvania, of which the population is Roumanian by race. This being so, Russia is free to oppose thirty-one army corps to Germany and Austria. It is difficult to say what number of army corps the two latter Powers will be able to place against Russia. Before the Balkan war, the Russian military authorities computed the number of Austrian army corps at fourteen, but since the growth of Servian power, and the alteration in Roumania's dispositions, and the ensuing change of attitude on the part of Austria's Servian and Roumanian subjects, the Austrian General Staff is obliged to reinforce the troops on the southern frontiers and in the south of the Empire generally, and this diminishes the strength of the forces which could be brought on to the Russian frontier. Moreover, there is the grave question of the Slav element in the Austrian army, which is not likely to fight well against Russia. Germany and France have respectively twenty-five and twenty-one army corps. Germany could, on the outbreak of war, only put at the most six army corps on the Russian frontier, as nineteen would be needed on the French frontier. The Russian army, thanks to the new strategical railways, can be mobilised and concentrated in sixteen days against ten needed by the German army. Of late, the Russian military experts are more and more inclined to favour an offensive movement. Russia knows that France cannot increase the numbers of her army beyond the total resulting from the three-years law, and does not ask her to make any further effort in that direction, as she, Russia, is ready to neutralise any further increase which Germany may attempt to make. If Germany were to add another 50,000 men to her army, Russia would double or treble that amount. What Russia asks from France is to have her war material in as perfect a state as possible. The revelations recently made in the French Senate made a disagreeable impression in St. Petersburg, but they were not taken "au tragique." It was considered there that it was preferable to recognise and criticise openly any existing defects than to hush the matter up as is done in Germany.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(33049)

No. 70.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)*

(No. 30.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 14, 1914.*

Since my return to Budapest a few days after the assassination of H.I.H the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort, I have been impressed, firstly, by the absence among all classes of the population of any real feeling of grief for the loss, in so tragic a manner, of their future ruler, and, secondly, by the intensity of the wave of blind hatred for Servia and everything Servian that is sweeping over the country. If I may say so, the Hungarian nation, so far as it is mourning at all, mourns not the person, but the dignity and office, of the victim of the tragedy of Serajevo, and is willing to go to any lengths in its desire to revenge itself on the despised and hated enemy who is looked on as the author and inspirer of this outrage against the prospective wearer of the Crown of St. Stephen.

It was a matter of common notoriety how unpopular the late Archduke was among his future Magyar subjects, and, as I have had occasion to point out on more than one occasion. His Imperial Highness took no pains to render himself popular in Hungary. He was credited with cherishing a feeling of sympathy with the diverse non-Magyar nationalities and it was even said that, like the Emperor Joseph II,



he intended to refuse to subscribe to the necessary oath before being crowned King of Hungary, and that he had leanings towards Trialism and was in favour of establishing a Southern Slav Kingdom as a third component part of the Hapsburg Monarchy. How far these reports were true it is not now necessary to inquire, and it may be taken for granted that once on the Throne he would have had to modify his views and yield to the force of circumstances. There can, however, be no doubt as to the sympathetic interest which he took in the aspirations of the various nationalities, and great hopes were founded on his accession both among the Southern Slavs and the Roumanians of Transylvania. This fact renders the crime of Serajevo all the more senseless. It is surely the irony of fate that the future ruler who was commonly regarded as a champion of Southern Slav rights should have fallen a victim to the criminal propaganda of Pan-Servian agitation. It is, therefore, not remarkable that there has been a special ring of truth in the eulogies of the murdered Archduke pronounced by representatives of the nationalities or published in the newspapers devoted to their interests. It was, however, only to be expected that, in the presence of so overwhelming a tragedy, criticism should be silent and Magyar politicians and pressmen of all shades of political opinion have observed the time-honoured principle "*De mortuis nil nisi bonum*," and while avoiding any reference to his admitted unpopularity in Hungary, have confined themselves to dwelling on the great services he had already rendered to the Monarchy, especially in regard to the army and navy, and the heavy loss which the sudden disappearance of a future ruler of such iron will and honesty of purpose meant to the joint interests of Austria-Hungary. When however, we pass from official to national mourning, the state of affairs is far different and is certainly surprising and somewhat distressing to the foreign observer. Among the public at large there has been practically no sign of mourning for the murdered Heir to the Throne, all amusements went on practically as usual and on the day following the assassination there was an especially large attendance at the races. But even in aristocratic and official circles no mourning has been observed. At the principal Club, of which practically all the members belong to the titled aristocracy, many of them being Chamberlains, &c., the only persons wearing mourning have been the Ministers and my colleagues. At the official Requiem Service, besides the large numbers of officials, members of Parliament, &c., who were bound to be present, the upper classes were conspicuous by their absence, most of them preferring to attend a wedding which was held here at the very hour of the Requiem Service, the bridegroom and the bride belonging respectively to the great houses of Szapary and Esterhazy. This attitude of the Magyar nation, especially of the members of the Magnate families, in the presence of a tragedy which has excited the abhorrence and aroused the sympathies of the whole civilized world, appeared to be so remarkable as to deserve special mention in this despatch. I have heard it said that it was partly due to the fancied slight put upon members of the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracies in not being invited to attend the ceremony in the Hofkapelle in Vienna, a circumstance which led to a public demonstration by a large body of noblemen on the occasion of the funeral procession to the station, and formed the subject of an undignified correspondence in the press and of an interpellation by Count Albert Apponyi in the Chamber of Deputies in Budapest. The slight, if there was any, was doubtless due to the requirements of the antiquated Spanish Court etiquette, which, I believe, actually excluded from the ceremony in the Hofkapelle the brother of the murdered Duchess.

There is more foundation for the wide-spread criticism of the funeral arrangements, which was also voiced by Count Apponyi in the House of Deputies. It was felt that the funeral should have been made an occasion for an impressive demonstration by the people of the Monarchy united for once in mourning for their murdered Archduke and in detestation of the crime to which he fell a victim. Count Apponyi criticized the absence of pomp and of any display of military force such as was due to the Head of the Army and Navy, he ridiculed the old Court etiquette which had been

allowed to overrule the feelings of humanity and to prevent what would have been an impressive and useful demonstration of national unity.

The intensity of the feeling against Serbia aroused by her alleged complicity in the assassination has assumed most dangerous proportions in all parts of the Dual Monarchy. In Serajevo the anti-Serb riots necessitated the establishment of a modified state of siege. In Vienna there were demonstrations by the mob directed against the Servian Legation. In Agram and other parts of Croatia there were violent anti-Serb demonstrations by Croats against Serbs, while the members of the Party of Right, especially of the Frank group, created the most outrageous scenes in the Sabor and assailed the members of the Serbo-Croat Coalition with cries of "Traitors" "Servian assassins," &c. From the Hungarian point of view, it must be remembered that the Croats who made these protestations of loyalty to the Dynasty are the very persons who are most anxious for separation from Hungary, and the incident serves to bring into relief the wide gulf which separates the aspirations of Croat and Serb and places additional obstacles in the way of any satisfactory solution of the Southern-Slav question. In Budapest there have been no violent anti-Serb demonstrations, but all classes of the population and the entire press without difference of shade of political opinion at once joined in ascribing the origin of the Serajevo outrage to Servian machinations. Not only the yellow journals, but respectable Government newspapers, among others the "Pester Lloyd," have indulged in the wildest invective against Serbia and the Servian Government. A Government newspaper for instance describes Serbia as a country which bases its national greatness on the assassination of Princes. Without waiting for the result of the investigation into the circumstances and origin of the crime, the press with one accord ascribed it to Servian influence. It was indeed evident from the first to anyone acquainted with the political conditions of the Monarchy that the crime was more probably nationalist than anarchist in its nature and had its origin in the Greater Servian propaganda, an anti-dynastic and irredentist movement; but up to the present nothing has been made public, as a result of the official inquiry, which could in any way associate the Servian Government with the crime. The most one can say at present is that the moral responsibility for the senseless outrage falls on the violent agitation that has been carried on against the Dual Monarchy from Serbia, partly through the press, and partly through political associations, especially since the events of 1908, and that the Servian Government share the responsibility inasmuch as they have failed to check the excesses of this nationalist Pan-Serb movement. Under these circumstances it is impossible not to blame the attitude of the Hungarian press which appears to do all in its power to still further inflame the already heated public opinion of this country. In spite of official *dementis*, the wildest tales as to the results of the inquiry into the assassination are circulated and obtain credence. We read of a wide-spread conspiracy in Bosnia amounting to a revolution. Servian officers are said to be directly implicated and the names of officers of high standing are mentioned as being accessories to the assassination, while it is universally believed that the bombs were specially provided from a Servian military arsenal. Certain newspapers attempted to connect the temporary retirement of King Peter from his duties as sovereign and the reported amalgamation of Serbia and Montenegro with the assassination. Every day the "Pester Lloyd" dishes up for the edification of the public, under the heading "From the Servian Witches' Kitchen," the most violent extracts from the Servian newspapers. At first it must be admitted that the tone of the Servian press was correct and even sympathetic in its condemnation of the outrage, but under the influence of the unmeasured abuse of the Austrian and Hungarian newspapers, it soon changed its tone and gave back as much as it received. Though responsible Ministers on both sides have tried to calm public opinion, this acrimonious press campaign cannot but embitter the already sufficiently strained relations between the two countries and intensify the existing condition of nervousness. Here people of all classes talk openly of war with Serbia.

and certainly such a war would be most popular. On the other hand, in spite of reports to the contrary, it is possible to assert that there are no signs as yet of any military movements that look like preparation for war.

The mere fact that a meeting of the Common Ministers and the two Minister Presidents was held at Vienna on the 7th July<sup>(1)</sup> was sufficient to start the wildest rumours as to action to be taken against Serbia, which were, however, dispelled by an announcement that the meeting had only occupied itself with the consideration of the measures to be adopted in Bosnia to combat the Pan-Serb propaganda and by the peaceful tone of the speech made by Count Tisza the following day in the Hungarian Parliament in reply to an interpellation addressed to him by Count Julius Andrassy.

Count Andrassy asked the Government—

1. How it was possible that, in view of the conditions known to exist in Bosnia, the visit of the Archduke to Serajevo on a national Servian holiday had been allowed?
2. Why proper precautionary measures had not been taken?
3. How could one explain that after the first attempt on his life, the Archduke was allowed to proceed further?
4. What was the extent of the anti-Serb demonstrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
5. Did the Servian population suffer much loss, and if so, why were the demonstrations not at once checked?
6. Is there any truth in the widely-spread and not hitherto contradicted report that the threads of the conspiracy can be traced back to Belgrade, and if so what will the Government do to ensure the punishment of the guilty?
7. What measures does the Government propose to adopt in order that in future it may not be possible to conspire in safety and without punishment against the highest representatives of the State and against the internal safety?

Count Andrassy proceeded to trace the recent history of the Southern Slav movement, particularly of the Pan-Serb propaganda in the annexed provinces, which he described as the immediate source of the assassination. It seemed incredible, he said, that the authorities should have been ignorant of such a wide-spread conspiracy and great negligence had been shown in allowing the Archduke to visit Serajevo on a national holiday and in taking no adequate measures for his protection. He pronounced a severe indictment of the policy pursued toward the Southern Slavs and stated that as the Servians had increased in numbers and power from year to year, so had their hatred towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy grown in intensity.

Count Tisza began his reply by explaining that the Archduke had on the occasion of his visit to Bosnia been acting independently in his capacity of Head of the Army and that he had gone where his military duties called him without consulting the Austrian or Hungarian Governments.

The inquiry into the crime had not proceeded far enough. His Excellency said, for him to be able to make any statement as to the exact extent of the conspiracy, but he must take decided exception to the view held by Count Andrassy that the whole political position in Bosnia was undermined and that a revolution might be expected there at any moment. It was not possible for him to say anything as to the results of the inquiry still proceeding, but, His Excellency asserted, the two Governments and all persons responsible for the foreign policy of the Monarchy were fully alive to their duty both as regards the tremendous interests attaching to the maintenance of peace, and as regards the interests connected with the very existence

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 46.



and the prestige of Austria-Hungary. They were fully alive to the fact that Southern Slav propaganda were carried on in Austria, Bosnia, Croatia and Hungary and this was a factor to be reckoned with. Count Tisza, however, proceeded to defend the loyalty of the majority of the Serbs domiciled in Hungary and the action of his Government in re-establishing a constitutional state of affairs in Croatia with a parliamentary majority taken from the Serbo-Croat Coalition and pointed out that the Croats who were now for party reasons attacking that majority, were the very persons who were most anxious to break the ties binding Croatia to Hungary. His Excellency took the opportunity of declaring how deeply he deplored the excesses committed against Servians after the outrage.

The whole tone of Count Tisza's speech was peaceful and conciliatory and its tendency should be to counteract the warlike feeling which is in the air in this country and which must render all the more difficult the efforts of responsible Ministers towards a peaceable settlement.<sup>(2)</sup>

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

<sup>(2)</sup> See No. 65.

(33005)

No. 71.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

D. 12.20 A.M.

R. 10 A.M.

Tel. (No. 98.)

The French Ambassador informs me confidentially that the Servian Minister and also the Italian Ambassador at Paris have expressed to the French [Acting] Minister for Foreign Affairs their anxiety lest the Austro-Hungarian Government might make a sudden attack on Mount Lovchen, in order to secure a position dominating Montenegro and enabling them to prevent co-operation between Montenegro and Servia. The Italian Ambassador here seems fairly confident that matters will be arranged with Servia without an appeal to force. The French and Russian Ambassadors share this view.

*Cf. despatch of July 19, No. 156. and Count de Salis' despatch of July 26, No. 652.*

#### MINUTES.

Austria would put herself completely out of court by such an unwarranted attack.—E. A. C. July 21.

I doubt if Austria will proceed to any extreme measures—although Berlin is apparently anxious.—A. N.

(33462)

No. 72.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 478.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 21, 1914.

I spoke to M. Cambon to-day of the great apprehension felt as to what Austria was going to demand of Servia. I said that I had found the German Ambassador very apprehensive. Whether or not he knew what Austria was going to demand I could not say, for he had not told me. Probably Berlin was trying to moderate Vienna. I



told M. Cambon of what I had said to Prince Lichnowsky yesterday as to the necessity of Austria making her demand as reasonable as possible and making public as strong justification as possible for it.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

*Cf. M. Cambon's account of this conversation in F No. 19.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 68.

(33199)

No. 73.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 297.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 20, 1914.*

The following semi-official statement appeared in the "North German Gazette" of yesterday's date:—

"In the utterances of the European press in regard to the existing tension between Austria-Hungary and Serbia it is increasingly recognised that Austria-Hungary's desire to clear up her relations with Serbia is justified. In this connection we share the hope expressed in more than one quarter that a serious crisis will be avoided by the Servian Government giving way in time. In any event the solidarity of Europe, which made itself felt during the long Balkan crisis in maintaining peace among the great Powers, demands and requires that the discussions ("Auseinandersetzungen") which may arise between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should remain localised."<sup>(1)</sup>

The "Cologne Gazette" also published an inspired telegram from Berlin yesterday dealing with the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. In this telegram satisfaction was expressed at Mr. Lloyd George's recent speech and at the article in the "Westminster Gazette" of the 17th instant<sup>(2)</sup> to the effect that Austria-Hungary was justified in resisting attempts to alienate the Servian population of the Monarchy and that the Servian Government would do well to realise the justice of her neighbour's apprehensions and to do all in her power to allay them. It was earnestly to be hoped, says the telegram, that the Servian Government would show themselves seriously desirous of stamping out the nationalist propaganda against Austria-Hungary with which the country was permeated.

I learn that the recent article in the "Times"<sup>(3)</sup> on this subject has also been much appreciated here.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD.

(<sup>1</sup>) *Cf. No. 77 and despatch No. 158.*

(<sup>2</sup>) *See No. 58.*

(<sup>3</sup>) *Cf. No. 61.*

No. 74.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

My dear Sir Edward,

*Rome, July 20, 1914.*

It is perhaps a little outside my province to write officially about Germany from Rome, and I had better therefore confine my observations to a private letter. I have just received by the Bag a copy of your despatch No. 214 of the 6th instant to Berlin,<sup>(1)</sup>

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 32.

recording your conversation with the German Ambassador on the subject of the anxiety and pessimism prevailing in Germany with regard to the position between Austria and Servia.

I find exactly the same feeling of uneasiness prevailing at the Germany Embassy here. The Ambassador who had hoped to have taken leave in these summer months, has realised that, as things are at present, it would not be possible for him to go away. He is not actually in Rome, and I have not seen him, for more than a fortnight, so what I have heard of late comes from the juniors.

They seem to anticipate that the Austro-Hungarian Government is about to address a very strong communication to Servia, and fear that Servia, having a very swelled head, and feeling confident of the support of Russia, will reply in a manner which Austria can only regard as provocative. The recent declaration of M. Pasich, which has appeared in the press and has not been contradicted, tends to confirm this view. They believe that the position of Austria in respect of her Slav subjects is such that she cannot accept any but a submissive answer from Servia without compromising her prestige altogether. The one hope for a solution is that Russia may give counsels of prudence at Belgrade, but they do not feel by any means assured that this will be so. I asked what the attitude of Germany would be and my informant was convinced that if the issue remained between Austria and Servia, Germany would have nothing to say, but that if Russia intervened on behalf of Servia, Germany was bound to intervene on behalf of Austria. Their hope was that we and Germany would act together in endeavouring to exercise a moderating influence on our respective friends, and localise the issue if there was to be one. I have been a good deal impressed by the apprehensions of the Germans as to the dangers of the political situation at the present moment.

Very sincerely yours,  
RENNELL RODD.

(33315)

No. 75.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1914.*

D. 1'46 P.M.

R. 2'20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 162.)

President of the Republic told me yesterday that he had discussed Persian question with Emperor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that both had given him most satisfactory assurances as to the instructions which have been sent to Russian consuls. Emperor had declared in the most positive terms that he would [?omitted: not] allow Persia to cause division between England and Russia.

French President of the Council confirmed the above, and added that Minister for Foreign Affairs had admitted that Russian consuls were in the wrong.

(Repeated to Tehran.)

(33319)

No. 76.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1914.*

D. 1'46 P.M.

R. 3'22 P.M.

Tel. (No. 163.)

Servian Minister told me yesterday that he regarded present crisis as most dangerous one through which Servia had passed during the last two years. After

repeating to me all that his Government had done to show their readiness to meet any legitimate demands that Austria might address to them, he said that Count Tisza and Count Forgach were inflaming Austrian public opinion so as to force hands of aged Emperor. On my remarking that if Servia adhered to her present correct attitude it would be impossible for Austria to find a pretext for attacking her, Minister replied that she would create some incident that would furnish her with it.

I repeated above to President of the Republic, whom I saw immediately afterwards, and also mentioned what you had said in your telegram No. 336 of 20th July.<sup>(1)</sup> His Excellency expressed opinion that a conversation *à deux* between Austria and Russia would be very dangerous at present moment, and seemed favourable to moderating counsels by France and England at Vienna.

I also spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I met later in the day. His Excellency said that if Austria could prove plot had been hatched in Servia there was no objection to her asking Servian Government to institute judicial enquiry, and this, he believed, Servia was ready to do. He thought, however, it would be advisable for three Governments to counsel moderation at Vienna. This should be done in friendliest manner, and should not take the form of any collective action. He begged me to telegraph to you in this sense, and said he would speak to the President of the Republic to-day on the subject.<sup>(2)</sup>

#### MINUTES.

Any counsel to Vienna will be a very delicate matter, and in any case I presume we should wait to know what the Austrian Government are going to say at Belgrade.—*G. R. C.*

I very much doubt the wisdom of our making any representations at Vienna. It is for the German Government to do this.—*E. A. C.*

I understand that the Secretary of State intends to see Count Mensdorff. This would be all to the good, but I would deprecate any representations or advice by the three Powers at Vienna. I feel sure that such action would be resented and would do harm.—*A. N.*

I am going to see Count Mensdorff to-morrow.<sup>(3)</sup>—*E. G. July 22, 1914.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 67.

(<sup>2</sup>) See Nos. 84, 90 and F No. 22.

(<sup>3</sup>) See No. 86.

(33322)

No. 77.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 22, 1914.*

D. 2.20 P.M.

R. 4 P.M.

Tel. (No. 88.) Confidential.

Austria-Hungary and Servia.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke to me last night about forthcoming Austro-Hungarian *démarche* at Belgrade, which he evidently expected would have been made before now. He said that attitude of German Government was as described in semi-official statement published in "North German Gazette" of 19th July, and admitted that he had practically drafted this statement himself.<sup>(1)</sup> He insisted that question at issue between Austria and Servia was one for discussion and settlement by those two countries alone without interference from outside. That being his view, he had not considered it opportune to say anything to Austro-Hungarian Government. He added, however, that he had repeatedly impressed on Servian Minister<sup>(2)</sup> necessity of putting Servia's relations with Austria-Hungary on a proper footing. Servian

(<sup>1</sup>) See No. 73.

(<sup>2</sup>) Should presumably be "Chargé d'Affaires." There was at that time no Serbian Minister in Berlin.

Minister had said that his Government could not control Servian press, which was free to publish what it liked.

Secretary for Foreign Affairs observed, with regard to this point, that if a person would or could do nothing to put a stop to a nuisance the complainant must take remedy into his own hands. He said that, in his opinion, Austro-Hungarian Government had shown great forbearance towards Serbia for a long time past.

*Published in BB No. 2 (paraphrased—parts omitted).*

*Cf. despatch No. 158.*

#### MINUTES.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the German Government. On the face of it, it does not bear the stamp of straightforwardness. If they really are anxious to see Austria kept reasonably in check, they are in the best position to speak at Vienna. All they are doing is to inflame the passions at Belgrade and it looks very much like egging on the Austrians when they openly and persistently threaten the Servian Government through their official newspapers.

It may be presumed that the German Government do not believe that there is any real danger of war. They appear to rely on the British Government to reinforce the German and Austrian threats at Belgrade; it is clear that if the British Government did intervene in this sense, or by addressing admonitions to St. Petersburg, the much desired breach between England and Russia would be brought one step nearer realisation.

But I admit that all this is speculation. We do not know the facts. The German Government clearly do know. They know what the Austrian Government is going to demand, they are aware that those demands will raise a grave issue, and I think we may say with some assurance that they have expressed approval of those demands and promised support, should dangerous complications ensue. So much can, I think, be read in the present telegram.

Prince Lichnowsky's vague hints and apprehensions do not quite correspond to the actual situation which his Government is helping to create.—*E. A. C. July 22.*

I will answer this telegram to-morrow after I have seen Count Mensdorff.<sup>(3)</sup>—*E. G. July 22, 1914.*

This telegram is now not worth answering separately.—*E. G. July 24, 1914.*

<sup>(3)</sup> See No. 86.

(38828)

No. 78.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 22, 1914.*

*D. 2:35 P.M.*

*R. 6 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 116.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is in constant touch with Austrian Embassy, told me that he feared that communication to be made to Serbia had been drafted in terms which must inevitably be unacceptable. He had hopes that they might have been modified at Ischl. He is convinced that a party in Austria are determined to take this opportunity of crushing Serbia, which would be quite against the interests of Italy.

(Repeated to Vienna and Belgrade.)

*Cf. despatches Nos. 161, 648 and 664.*



(33657)

No. 79.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 289.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1914.*

I spoke to Count Benckendorff to-day of the apprehension felt about Austria and Servia. I told him of my last conversation with the German Ambassador.<sup>(1)</sup> I found that Count Benckendorff also had met the German Ambassador<sup>(2)</sup> and found him very apprehensive. I said that it was very desirable that the Russian Government should communicate directly with the Austrian Government. If Austria made a demand in Belgrade, and the Russian Minister there was understood to support the Servians in resisting the demand, and Austria and Russia kept each other at arm's length meanwhile, it would be a very difficult situation.

Count Benckendorff spoke of the difficulty of Russia making a friendly communication in Vienna; at present there was nothing to go upon.

I said that I had been thinking what might be done if I were in M. Sazonof's place. It might be possible for M. Sazonof to send for the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg; to refer to the statements in the press that Austria was going to make some demand on Servia; to emphasise the strength of pro-Serb feeling in Russia, and how strong and irresistible this feeling might become if there were a crisis; and then to ask the Austrian Government to take Russia into their confidence by telling them exactly the extent and nature of their grievance against Servia, and what they felt it necessary to ask. It might then be possible for the Russian Government to get the Austrian demand kept within reasonable limits.

I also said that I had told Mr. des Graz, who was proceeding to Belgrade at the end of this week as our Minister there, that it was not our business to take violent sides in this matter, and that what he could say in Belgrade must depend upon what case the Austrians presented. If they proved that the plot to assassinate the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been prepared and organised on Servian territory, and that Austria had real grounds of complaint against Servia, it would be possible for him to urge in Belgrade that the Servian Government really ought to give to Austria the utmost assurances they could for the prevention of such plots against Austria being carried on in Servia in future.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

*Published in Oman, p. 18, but the transcription is not quite accurate.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 68.<sup>(2)</sup> See DD No. 85.

(33348)

No. 80.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 133.)

Sir,

*Belgrade, July 18, 1914.*

In the course of a private conversation with the Secretary-General of the Servian Foreign Office this morning, I alluded to the suggestion made in the "Times" of the 16th instant to the effect that the wisest course for Servia would be to undertake herself and of her own motion an enquiry into the alleged South Slav conspiracy on Servian soil. M. Grouitch pointed out the impossibility of adopting any definite measures before learning the findings of the Serayevo Court which had hitherto been kept secret. With regard to Chabrinovitch, who had made the first attempt on the Archduke's life, it was already public knowledge that on his arrival in Belgrade recently the Servian Government had, as is usual in the case of Austrian subjects coming to reside in Belgrade, made the customary enquiry of the Austrian consulate as to his antecedents and had received satisfactory information upon this point. Of

Princip the Servian Government knew nothing. On publication of the result of the enquiry at Serayevo the Servian Government would be fully prepared to comply with whatever request for further investigation the circumstances might call for and which would be compatible with international usage.

The Secretary-General said he was aware that there was an influential party in Austria who wished to take advantage of the present conjuncture to press Serbia to extremes. But the Servian Government had certain knowledge that restraint would be exercised on Austria from Berlin. Should, however, the worst come to the worst and Austria declare war Serbia would not stand alone. Russia would not remain quiet were Serbia wantonly attacked, and Bulgaria would be immobilised by Roumania. Under present conditions a war between a Great Power and a Balkan State must inevitably, in the opinion of the Secretary-General, lead to a European conflagration.

(Copy sent to Vienna.)

I have, &c.

DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

*Cf. tel No. 61, also S No. 30.*

#### MINUTES.

M. Grouitch made an interesting assertion as to Germany's intention to exercise restraint at Vienna.—*G. R. C. July 24, 1914.*

As to which, however, he has clearly been entirely misled. It would be interesting to know who misled him.—*E. A. C. July 24.*

(33357)

No. 81.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23.)*

(No. 31.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 16, 1914.*

I regret to have to report that the conciliatory tone of the speech delivered by Count Tisza on the 8th instant has not abated the vehemence of the campaign waged between the Hungarian and the Servian presses, and it is impossible to close one's eyes to the dangerous effect which the exaggerated, perverted, or false reports published by the press from day to day are exercising on public opinion here.

It is indeed only natural that the assassination should have imparted to the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia certain grave characteristics of unrest and that the Servian racial origin of the assassin should have provoked a violent outburst of hostile feeling towards Serbia. It is generally believed that a criminal agitation against Austria-Hungary by Panserb societies has been going on for years in Serbia, unchecked by the Government, and the periods of acute tension between the two neighbouring States have been too frequent of late years for this new occasion of strife to be devoid of danger. All the more reason, one would think, for the press to preach patience until the complicity of the Servian Government is proved, but the exact opposite is the case both here and in Vienna.

I am assured on good authority that Count Tisza is exerting his influence to moderate the tone of the newspapers, but hitherto his efforts—if indeed he is making them—have been quite unsuccessful. The "Pester Lloyd" continues the publication of inflammatory extracts from the Servian newspapers under the heading "From the Servian Witches' Kitchen," and the very day after Count Tisza's speech a report was published here, of course without the slightest foundation in fact, that the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade had been blown up.

Hungarian newspapers did not hesitate to reproduce the preposterous statements of certain Servian newspapers that M. Hartwig was poisoned at the Austrian Legation.

On the 13th, a Monday, on which day the majority of the local newspapers do not issue a morning edition, a report was spread about Budapest, and obtained very general credence, that on the previous day, the anniversary of King Peter's birthday, Belgrade had been the scene of anti-Austrian excesses, that Austrians and Hungarians had been attacked and their houses pillaged, and that the members of the Austrian Legation had had to take refuge in Semlin. It soon appeared that these reports were false and that the only foundation for them was to be found in the fact that Baron Giesl had been warned of possible anti-Austrian demonstrations and had thought it prudent to bring the matter to the notice of M. Pasic, who had at once ordered all possible precautions to be taken. It appeared too that certain members of the Austro-Hungarian colony had crossed over to Semlin for safety, while others had taken refuge in their Legation. The whole incident may probably be ascribed to a senseless panic among the Austro-Hungarian colony attributable to the inflammatory tone of the press of both countries. As a matter of fact there was no disturbance in Belgrade on that day, nor was there any anti-Austrian demonstration, as had been feared, on the occasion of the funeral of the late Russian Minister.<sup>(1)</sup>

These rumours, however, from Belgrade were for a time very generally believed here and served to intensify the already existing state of nervousness as to the likelihood of war. Coupled with reports as to mobilisation in Italy against Greece, they produced a panic on the Budapest Bourse, and prices fell heavily on Monday and Tuesday. It is, therefore, satisfactory to be able to report that the tone on the Stock Exchange has since then become more confident and that the fall in prices on the first two days of the week has in many cases already been made good. It is difficult to attribute this return of confidence to the tone of Count Tisza's speech on Wednesday.<sup>(2)</sup> and I believe it to be due to the conviction that if there was any immediate prospect of war or even of military preparation for war, it would not be possible for the Joint Minister for War, the Austrian Minister of the Landwehr, the Hungarian Minister of Honved and the Chief of the General Staff all to be on leave, as is, I am told, the case at the present moment.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

(<sup>1</sup>) Cf. S Nos. 21 and 30.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 82.

(33358)

No. 82.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.---(Received July 23.)*

(No. 32.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 17, 1914.*

In continuation of my Despatch No. 30 of the 14th instant,<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to report that the House of Deputies was on Wednesday [July 15] the scene of a further debate in regard to the present strained relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia resulting from the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

It is one of the consequences of the suspension of parliamentary life in Austria that the Hungarian Parliament has become the forum for pronouncements regarding the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy, with the Hungarian Minister President as the responsible exponent.

Two interpellations were on the order for the day. The first referred to the widespread agitation in Hungary, Croatia and the annexed provinces due to the Pan-Serb propaganda proceeding from Belgrade; it asserted that the conspiracy in Bosnia and the assassination of the Heir to the Throne were the direct result of these propaganda, and demanded an assurance that the Government were prepared to have

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 70.



recourse to the most energetic measures in order to combat this agitation. The deputy responsible for this interpellation delivered a violent and bellicose speech, in the course of which he read the Servian note which closed the crisis arising out of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By this note Serbia definitely and unconditionally renounced her aspirations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, undertook to reduce her military forces to a peace footing and to withdraw her hands from the two provinces, and promised to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary.

The "Pester Lloyd" in a leading article on the debate remarks that the assassination shows how Serbia has kept her promise and then proceeds as follows:—

"The outrage was planned in Belgrade; the murderers were trained in their handiwork in Belgrade; they were provided with money and instruments of destruction in Belgrade; Belgrade and all Serbia are the home of an idea which ever aims at the destruction of our Monarchy and conceives the criminal plots for the accomplishment of that purpose and then consecrates its most adept pupils as national heroes."

Count Tisza commenced his reply by explaining that he was not yet in a position to add anything to what he had said on the 8th instant in regard to the steps that might have to be taken towards Serbia, but the whole tone of his speech strikes one as less conciliatory, I might even say, as more menacing, than his previous statement. Almost his first words were "The question with Serbia must under all circumstances be cleared up"; though as to the ways and means of achieving this end he made no definite statement. The Government, he continued, were fully conscious of the magnitude of the interests dependent on the maintenance of peace and were not of the opinion that this clearing up must necessarily lead to warlike complications. His Excellency then proceeded to utter the solemn warning that war was the tragic *ultima ratio* to which recourse should not be had until all other methods of arriving at a solution had been exhausted, but for which at the same time every nation must be prepared and willing, if it wishes to maintain its position as a nation and a state.

These serious words of warning have been made the subject of special and almost universally favourable comment in the press of both halves of the Monarchy.

Count Tisza's reply now travelled over much the same lines as his reply to Count Julius Andrassy's interpellation on the 8th instant. He disclaimed again on behalf of the Government all responsibility for the Archduke's journey, which was undertaken by His Imperial Highness in his military capacity: he maintained that the general condition of Bosnia was not so desperate as was depicted by the interpellator, that the outrage was the work of a few isolated criminals and was disapproved by the bulk of the Servian population; he admitted that political agitation existed in Bosnia, but not a revolution; stricter measures, he said, administrative, police and educational, must be taken to combat the evil; peace and progress in the annexed provinces had produced a spirit of optimism from which there had been a terrible awakening, but that was no reason for despairing as to the future of the provinces. His Excellency again took up the cudgels on behalf of the Serbo-Croat Coalition in Croatia and defended them against the accusation of cherishing Pan-Serb aspirations.

The conclusion of Count Tisza's speech was more peaceful than the commencement:—

"I must terminate my statement with the common-place remark that political agitation and propaganda certainly exist, against which we must fight; this fight must be waged with energy; we must do all in our power to detect and destroy the root of the evil, but we must avoid all appearance of panic or fear, all methodless and inconsequent activity, all superfluous talk."

The second interpellation, put forward by Count Albert Apponyi, referred to the reports as to dangers threatening the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade



and the lives and property of Austro-Hungarian subjects living there and requested authentic official information in regard thereto as the surest means of calming the excitement aroused among the public.

Count Tisza gave a succinct account of the occurrences in Belgrade on the previous Sunday which had given rise to such alarmist reports. Baron Giesl, His Excellency explained, had received from an apparently trustworthy source warning of the intended demonstration. He had accordingly brought the matter to the notice of M. Pasics who had ordered the necessary precautionary measures to be taken. As a matter of fact, Count Tisza proceeded, no demonstration did take place, and there was no proof that there was any foundation in fact for the warnings received by Baron Giesl. The incident would therefore, said Count Tisza, naturally have no consequence. His Excellency took advantage of this opportunity to address to the Hungarian press a request that when they received reports of events affecting the vital interests of the Hungarian nation, their first thought should not be how these reports could be made use of, for journalistic purposes, but rather whether their publication would redound to the honour and good repute of the nation. The state of nervousness and panic caused by such reports was fraught with grave dangers and the press should be careful to ascertain their accuracy before publishing them.

The debate showed clearly that in spite of the acute differences existing between the Government and the Opposition in internal questions, all parties are at one in their views as to the course to be pursued by the Joint Government in their relations with Servia.

As an illustration of the effect which Count Tisza's above-mentioned warning has had on the press, I would mention that the "Pester Lloyd" and other papers of this morning published a most circumstantial statement in regard to the movements of troops and mobilisation in Servia which would raise the footing of the Servian army from 45,000 to 110,000 men, and in spite of an official *démenti* from Belgrade and contradictions from Vienna, the "Pester Lloyd" in its evening edition maintains the general accuracy of its statement.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

*Cf. Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch No. 65.*

(33479)

No. 83.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

D. 1:50 P.M.

R. 2:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 94.)

In reply to interpellations in the Hungarian Chamber last night concerning present state of relations of the Dual Monarchy with Servia, Hungarian Prime Minister, in declining to give explanations, affirmed that it was not in the interests of the country to discuss the matter at the present moment. He expressed the hope, however, that he would be before long in a position to make a full statement. Situation, he said, was one which might lead either to a peaceful or to a very serious issue.

*Cf. No. 85.*

(33480)

No. 84.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 23, 1914.*

D. 2.18 P.M.

R. 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 165.)

My telegram No. 163 of 22nd July.<sup>(1)</sup>

M.F.A. has instructed Russian Ambassador at Vienna to concert with his French and German colleagues with a view to giving friendly counsels of moderation.<sup>(2)</sup>

French Government are, I understand, sending similar instructions to the French Ambassador.<sup>(3)</sup>

## MINUTES.

Any such communication at Vienna would be likely to produce intense irritation, without any beneficial other effect.—*E. A. C. July 23.*

I am afraid that it is not a judicious move, and I doubt if the Germans will join.—*A. N.*

I fear "German" must be a mistake for "British," but wait till to-morrow.—*E. G.*

Bring up these telegrams to-morrow with the one from Berlin giving Herr von Jagow's views.<sup>(4)</sup>—*E. G.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 76.<sup>(3)</sup> No. 97 and F No. 23.<sup>(2)</sup> See No. 90.<sup>(4)</sup> No. 77.

(33491)

No. 85.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.**Budapest, July 23, 1914.*

D. 2 P.M.

R. 4.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 1.)

Minister-President last night declined to answer interpellation in regard to difference with Serbia on the ground that it was not for the present in the interests of Monarchy to discuss question. His Excellency hoped to be able shortly to make detailed statement. He said situation did not warrant opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary, or even probable. It was still quite uncertain, and could be settled by peaceful means, though possibility of serious complication remains open.

Tone of speech was serious, if non-committal.

Public opinion continues excited, and war would be popular. There has been further fall on Stock Exchange. Press campaign continues unchanged, even in Government newspapers.

Dangerous factor in the situation is widespread conviction that war with Serbia sooner or later is necessary for continued existence of Monarchy; that in the present question Austria-Hungary enjoys the sympathy and tacit approval of the Powers; and that war would therefore be confined to castigation of Serbia by Austria-Hungary.

(Sent to Vienna.)

*Cf. No. 83 and despatch No. 157.*

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 121.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

Count Mensdorff told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Serbia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Serbia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Serbia. I admitted that if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909 Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 3.*

*For Count Mensdorff's account of this conversation see A I No. 59.*

(33669)

No. 87.

*Communication by the Servian Minister.*

Sir Edward Grey.

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.*

The Servian Minister called to-day, apparently with no very specified object. He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria, so long as such demands are kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction. But if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that she must abandon political ideals, no independent State would or could submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities the latter had protected him and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

He asked for my opinion on the whole question. I told him that it was quite impossible to form an opinion, having no data on which to base one. All I could say was that I sincerely trusted that his Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian requests in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. I had no idea of the character of those requests nor on what they would be founded.

A. N.

*Published as despatch in BB No. 30, with slight alteration.*

*Cf. S No. 30.*

(M. Cambon tells me that the Vienna Minister of War has ordered preparations to be made for mobilising 8 army corps—but on the advice of M. Tisza this measure has been postponed. M. Jules Cambon asked M. v. Jagow what were the terms of the Austrian note. The latter replied that he did not know.)(<sup>1</sup>)

A. N.

(<sup>1</sup>) *Cf. F No. 15*



## II.—July 24–August 4.

(88509)

No. 88.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 152.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

I have the honour to report that this evening's "Neue Freie Presse," which has taken a very leading part in the Press campaign against Serbia, announces from Ischl, where Count Berchtold has to-day had an audience of the Emperor, that it is there believed that the expected *démarche* at Belgrade will be made in the course of this week. The demands to be made of Serbia would be couched in a polite form, but would be very definite in substance: and Serbia would be probably given only 48 hours in which to reply. The chief demands according to this article would probably be the following:—

1. That a serious enquiry should be held as to the complicity of those Servians upon whom the proceedings at Sarajevo had cast suspicion.
2. That steps should be taken against those Servian nationalist societies whose activities on Austro-Hungarian soil caused constant unrest in the Dual Monarchy.
3. That steps should be taken in common by the frontier police of both countries for the better watching of the frontier.

Though the other organs of the Vienna press do not contain any such definite announcement of impending diplomatic action at Belgrade, reports from Budapest speak of Count Tisza communicating to the Council of Ministers the text of the note to be presented; and the Stock Exchange, which had for a moment recovered from the fall of last week, is once more suffering from falling markets.

The suggestion that Serbia will be given only 48 hours in which to accept the Austro-Hungarian demands seems unlikely to be well-founded, for the Servian Prime Minister is reported to be absent from Belgrade on a ten days' electioneering tour, whilst the harvest in Austria and Hungary will not have been got in for another 3 weeks, before which time it cannot be desired to bring on a crisis.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to Belgrade.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

THEO RUSSELL.

(88531)

No. 89.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

Belgrade, July 23, 1914.

D. July 23, 10.30 P.M.

R. July 24, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 47.)

I am informed by my Italian colleague that a note was handed in by the Austrian Legation this evening giving the Servian Government forty-eight hours within which to comply with the demands contained therein. I have not yet details, but I am told that the conditions imposed are exceedingly harsh.

(Sent to Vienna.)

(33574)

No. 90.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

D. July 23, 8.25 P.M.

R. July 24, 11.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 95.)

Russian Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to concert with French Ambassador and myself as to representation to be made by us in the same sense, but not collectively. to warn in friendly but firm language Austro-Hungarian Government against sending in a note to Servian Government drawn up in terms which latter could not accept without humiliation.

I informed Russian Chargé d'Affaires that I was as yet without instructions, but that in conversation with Under-Secretary of State, Count Forgach, I had expressed to-day personal hope to above effect.

Under-Secretary of State told me that note was to be presented to-day at Belgrade and that its terms would be published in to-morrow's papers. He said that note was a stiff one, for nothing else would satisfy outburst of public indignation against Serbia which had followed the assassinations. He hoped, but hardly seemed to expect, that Servian Government would yield to peremptory demands which it contained. He told me that complicity of Servian officials in crime was fully proved and that no Government could remain in power here for a week that failed to call Serbia seriously to account.

French Ambassador spoke seriously yesterday to the other Under-Secretary of State, Baron Macchio, on danger of provoking an armed conflict with Serbia. Baron Macchio took his warning in good part and led French Ambassador to think that moderate language would be used in the note. This impression in his Excellency's mind was confirmed by language of Hungarian Minister-President yesterday at Budapest, but I confess that declarations made to me this afternoon, in conversation, by Count Forgach as to state of feeling in this country and impossibility of Government resisting it were such as to make me fear that serious crisis may be at hand.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

*See Nos. 76 and 84.*

(33652)

No. 91.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

D. 1.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 148.)

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to me the note addressed to Serbia with the explanation of the Austro-Hungarian Government upon it.<sup>(1)</sup>

I said that the murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances stated in the Austro-Hungarian note with regard to Serbia naturally aroused sympathy with Austria, but I thought it a great pity that a time-limit, and such a short time-limit, had been introduced at this stage, and the note seemed to me the most formidable document I had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was independent. Demand No. 5 might mean that the Austro-Hungarian Government were to be entitled to appoint officials who should have authority in Servian territory and this would hardly be consistent with maintenance of independent sovereignty of Serbia.

I was not, however, making these comments in order to discuss the merits of the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; that was not our concern. It was

<sup>(1)</sup> Printed in Appendix A.

solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe that I should concern myself with the matter, and I felt great apprehension.

I must wait to hear the views of other Powers and no doubt we should consult with them to see what could be done to mitigate difficulties.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador observed that there had been so much procrastination on the part of Servia that a time-limit was essential. Some weeks had passed since the murder of the Archduke and Servia had made no sign of sympathy or help; if she had held out a hand after the murder the present situation might have been prevented.

I observed that a time-limit could have been introduced at any later stage if Servia had procrastinated about a reply; as it was, the Austro-Hungarian Government not only demanded a reply within forty-eight hours, but dictated the terms of the reply.

(Repeated to Paris No. 206/7; Berlin No. 193/4; Rome No. 186/7; and St. Petersburg No. 342/3; "For information only.")

*Published in BB No. 5 (paraphrased).*

*For Count Mensdorff's account of this conversation see A II No. 14.*

(33653)

No. 92.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 2:50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 49.) Urgent.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

Prime Minister who returned to Belgrade early this morning is very anxious and dejected. He begged me earnestly to convey to you his hope that His Majesty's Government will use their good offices in moderating Austrian demands which he says are impossible of acceptance.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 8 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> ? No. 94.

<sup>(2)</sup> See No. 102 and also S No. 35.

(33656)

No. 93.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

D. 1:30 P.M.

R. 3:10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 99.)

My telegram No. 96 of 24th July<sup>(1)</sup>: Austro-Hungarian note to Servia.

French Ambassador has just called to exchange impressions. We think that note, while containing many just demands, is drawn up in a peremptory manner, rendering immediate unconditional acceptance by Servian Government very difficult. French Ambassador has already seen Servian Minister, who states that active exchange of telegrams is taking place between Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and that, in his opinion, reply of Servian Government will depend on result of this correspondence.

<sup>(1)</sup> NOTE.—This telegram is not printed as it contains nothing but a *précis* of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Personally, Servian Minister thinks if delay for reply could be extended an agreement would not be impossible. On two or three points, however, Austro-Hungarian demands would have to be modified. King of Servia could never humiliate himself by issuing a general order to army in prescribed terms. Demand No. 4, that certain officers are to be dismissed, whose names and offences are not yet made known, is quite unacceptable. as also demand No. 5, concerning participation of Austro-Hungarian agents in suppressing a political movement in Servia.

French Ambassador thought attitude of Servian Minister very moderate and conciliatory.

(Repeated to Embassies and Belgrade.)

(33659)

No. 94.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

D. 1:30 P.M.

R. 3:12 P.M.

Tel. (No. 48.) Urgent.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have seen text of Austrian note, which is curt and peremptory. Servian Prime Minister told me that, although no definite decision has as yet been reached as to the answer to be given, note contains certain demands which are quite unacceptable to Servian Government.

Amongst demands made are the following :—

1. To accept collaboration of the Austro-Hungarian Government with a view to suppression of nationalist movement against Austria-Hungary on Servian soil.
2. To undertake the dismissal from the public service of all officers and functionaries suspected of connivance in the assassination and of whom a list will be furnished by the Austro-Hungarian Government.
3. To eliminate from school and public instruction all teachers and text-books calculated to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
4. To suppress and dissolve nationalist societies in Servia, such as the Narodna Obrana.

Note further demands that a formal declaration by the Servian Government be published in the "Official Gazette" of the 26th inst., condemning the Servian movement and the attempt to detach Serb population of Austria-Hungary from their allegiance to the Monarchy and expressing regret that Servian officials should have participated in propaganda and thus prejudiced the neighbourly relations which Servia promised to observe in the declaration made on the 31st March, 1909.

The time-limit of 48 hours, which expires on Saturday at 6 in the evening, was given verbally.

(Sent to Vienna.)

*Cf. Oman, p. 27.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 89.



(33670)

No. 95.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.**Sophia, July 24, 1914.*

D. 4·30 P.M.

R. 5·5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 34.) Confidential.

There are good grounds for believing that arrangement has been concluded between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria by which latter would endeavour to occupy portion of Macedonia now in possession of Servia in case of outbreak of hostilities.

Bulgaria is being secretly supplied with heavy ammunition and *matériel* of all kinds viâ Danube and Lom Palanca.

Bulgarian army is not yet on war footing, but could rapidly be prepared for a campaign.

(33672)

No. 96.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

D. 4·40 P.M.

R. 6·20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 50.) Very Confidential.

Crown Prince has sent personal telegram to King of Italy appealing to His Majesty on ground of family ties uniting Italian and Servian Royal houses, and in his quality of ally of Austria, to use his good offices to obtain prolongation of time-limit and moderation of Austrian demands.

(Sent to Vienna and Rome.)

(33671)

No. 97.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

D. 7·50 P.M.

R. 10·15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 100.)

My immediately preceding telegram of 24th July: (1) Austria and Servia.

French Ambassador has now received an instruction similar to one communicated to me yesterday by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, but adding that in view of fact that Austro-Hungarian note has already gone in, French Ambassador was to consider, in consultation with Russian Chargé d'Affaires and myself, whether any communication could at this moment be usefully made. I agree with French Ambassador that observations intended to prevent presentation of note or to cause its terms to be modified would now be out of place.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires took occasion to express to Minister for Foreign Affairs his personal views this morning concerning note, which he described as unusual and peremptory, and as being drawn up in a form rendering acceptance, as it stood, impossible. Minister for Foreign Affairs said it must be accepted integrally by 6 P.M. to-morrow, otherwise Austrian Minister was already instructed to leave Belgrade immediately. Step taken had given great satisfaction throughout Dual Monarchy, which felt its very existence was at stake, and his Excellency could not believe that any Power could think of raising objections.(2)

(1) No. 93. Cf. No. 90.

(2) See A II No. 23.

Confidential.

I have had conversation with Turkish Ambassador, who thinks note is justified by behaviour of Serbia for some time past, but that Austro-Hungarian Government must be aware that it cannot be accepted and evidently contemplate an attack on Serbia. His Excellency's impression is that Russia would not intervene in that case, but that Bulgarian and Albanian population of New Serbia would certainly rise and that complications would ensue, giving Austro-Hungary opportunity to side with Bulgaria in demanding a revision of Peace of Bucharest. Turkish Ambassador believes that, though no troops have yet been moved, everything is in readiness for an immediate advance if necessary.

Russian Ambassador assured me before his departure on leave that Russia could not remain indifferent in face of Austrian action intended to humiliate Serbia.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

*Part published in BB No. 7 (paraphrased).*

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(33782)

No. 98.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 491.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

After telling M. Cambon to-day of the Austrian communication to Serbia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.<sup>(2)</sup>

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 86.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 99.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.<sup>(2)</sup>

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 10.*

*For M. Cambon's account of this conversation see F No. 32.*

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 99.

(33736)

No. 99.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.*

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 196.)

D. 7.45 P.M.

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia;<sup>(1)</sup> I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Confidential.

The German Ambassador said that if Servia could not accept the whole of the Austrian demands unconditionally Austria might be expected to move at the expiration of the time limit. He made the personal suggestion that in any case Servia must not reply with a negative, but must send at once a reply that was favourable on some points, sufficient to give Austria an excuse for not taking action immediately.

(Repeated to Paris No. 210/11; Vienna No. 151/2; Rome No. 190/1; and St. Petersburg No. 345/6: "For your information only.")

*Published in BB No. 11 (unparaphrased, except last paragraph.)*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 157, also A II No. 15.*

MINUTE.

Send copy of the first part of this telegram (not the confidential paragraph) to the Italian Ambassador who has asked for information as to my views.—E. G.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 100.



*Communication by the German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.*

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the great Servian propaganda has set itself and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity: to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

*German Embassy, London.*

*Published in BB No. 9.*

*For the German original see DD No. 100. The translation here printed is that of the type-written copy in English left by the German Ambassador.*

#### MINUTES.

Very strong support.— G. R. C. July 25, 1914.

The answer is that owing to the extreme nature of the Austrian demands and the time limit imposed, the localisation of the conflict has been made exceedingly difficult. Because the Austrian terms bear on their face the character of a design to provoke a war. The statements made by Austria and now reasserted by Germany concerning Servia's misdeeds rest for the present on no evidence that is available for the Powers whom the Austrian Government has invited



to accept those statements. Time ought to be given to allow the Powers to satisfy themselves as to the facts which they are asked to endorse.—*E. A. C. July 25.*

Telegrams are posted at the Clubs that the Conservative Press at Berlin have veered round, and are protesting against Germany being implicated in a conflict which Austria-Hungary has conjured, and because Germany was not consulted beforehand in regard to the ultimatum. I do not know if this change of front has any significance.—*A. N.*

If true it is a very surprising change of front. I have assumed in my conversations with Prince Lichnowsky that a war between Austria and Serbia cannot be localised.—*E. G.*

(33673)

No. 101.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.**D. 5.40 P.M.**R. 8 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 166.) Urgent.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned to me this morning saying that he had just received text of ultimatum presented by Austria at Belgrade yesterday that demands a reply in forty-eight hours. Step thus taken by Austria meant war, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy.

\*Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador told me confidentially that result of the visit of the President of the French Republic had been to establish the following points :—

1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.

2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.\*

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would proclaim their solidarity with France and Russia. He characterised Austria's conduct as immoral and provocative. Some of the demands which she had presented were absolutely unacceptable, and she would never have acted as she had done without having first consulted Germany. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance.

I said that I could not speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but that I would telegraph all that they had said. I could personally hold out no hope that His Majesty's Government would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail engagement to support France and Russia by force of arms. We had no direct interests in Serbia, and public opinion in England would never sanction a war on her behalf. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Servian question was but part of general European question and that we could not efface ourselves.

I said that I gathered that His Excellency wished us to join in telling Austria that we could not tolerate her active intervention in Servian internal affairs. If she paid no attention to our representations and took military action against Serbia, did Russia propose to declare war upon her? Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the whole question would be considered by a Council of Ministers to be held this afternoon, but that no decision would be taken till a further Council of Ministers had been held

(1) No. 84.

under the presidency of the Emperor, probably to-morrow. He personally thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilise.

I suggested that the first thing to be done was to try to gain time by bringing our influence to bear to induce Austria to extend term of delay accorded to Servia. The French Ambassador replied that time did not permit of this; either Austria was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once. In either case a firm and united attitude was our only chance of averting war. I then asked whether it would not be advisable to urge Servian Government to state precisely how far they were prepared to go to meet Austria's wishes. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that some of the demands contained in ultimatum might no doubt be accepted, but that he must first consult his colleagues.

As they both continued to press me to declare our complete solidarity with them, I said that I thought you might be prepared to represent strongly at Vienna and Berlin danger to European peace of an Austrian attack on Serbia. You might perhaps point out that it would in all probability force Russia to intervene, that this would bring Germany and (? France) into the field, and that if war became general, it would be difficult for England to remain neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he hoped that we would in any case express strong reprobation of Austria's action. If war did break out, we would sooner or later be dragged into it, but if we did not make common cause with France and Russia from the outset we should have rendered war more likely, and should not have played a "beau rôle."

From French Ambassador's language it almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we declined to join them. Language of Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, was not so (? decided) on this subject.

Austrian Government seemed purposely to have presented their ultimatum at moment when President of the French Republic and President of the Council were leaving Russia on their return to France, where they cannot arrive for four or five days.

Towards the close of our interview we were joined by Roumanian Minister, with whom Minister for Foreign Affairs had a private conversation in which His Excellency invited also Roumanian Government to make representations at Vienna.

(Repeated to Paris. 1.20 P.M., No. 217.)

*Published in BB No. 6 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

#### MINUTES.

The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.

It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Servia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.

I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.

The point that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.

There is still the chance that she can be made to hesitate, if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia.

I can suggest only one effective way of bringing this home to the German Government without absolutely committing us definitely at this stage. If, the moment either Austria or Russia begin to mobilize, His Majesty's Government give orders to put our whole fleet on an immediate war footing, this may conceivably make Germany realize the seriousness of the danger to which she would be exposed if England took part in the war.

It would be right, supposing this decision could be taken now, to inform the French and Russian Governments of it, and this again would be the best thing we could do to prevent a very grave situation arising as between England and Russia.

It is difficult not to agree with M. Sazonof that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come. We shall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we can do in circumstances that may arise to-morrow.

Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen:—

- (a.) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France, and humiliate Russia. With the French fleet gone, Germany in occupation of the Channel, with the willing or unwilling co-operation of Holland and Belgium, what will be the position of a friendless England?
- (b.) Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?

Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Serbia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom. If we can help to avoid the conflict by showing our naval strength, ready to be instantly used, it would be wrong not to make the effort.

Whatever therefore our ultimate decision, I consider we should decide *now* to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes, and that we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments.—*E. A. C. July 25.*

The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation. Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be most careful not to alienate her.—*A. N.*

Mr. Churchill told me to-day that the fleet can be mobilized in twenty-four hours, but I think it is premature to make any statement to France and Russia yet.—*E. G.*

\*[NOTE.—In the Blue Book this passage was omitted (see Introduction, p. vii). By an oversight, however, a reference to it was left in the table of contents. The attention of the Office having been drawn to this fact by a German scholar in the spring of 1924, the text of the missing passage was communicated to him with the permission of the Secretary of State. The passage has therefore since then been published in Germany.]

(93822)

No. 102.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.*

*Foreign Office. July 24, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 17.)

D. 9:30 P.M.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.<sup>(1)</sup>

It seems to me that Serbia ought certainly to express concern and regret that any officials, however subordinate, should have been accomplices in murder of the Archduke, and promise, if this is proved, to give fullest satisfaction. For the rest, I can only say that Servian Government must reply as they consider the interests of Serbia require.

I cannot tell whether anything short of unconditional acceptance will avert military action by Austria on expiration of time limit, but the only chance would be to give a favourable reply on as many points as possible within the limit of time, and not to meet Austrian demand with a blank negative.

You should consult with your Russian and French colleagues as to saying this to Servian Government. Servian Minister here implores us to give some indication of our views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of giving more advice than above, and I do not like to give that without knowing what Russian and French Governments are saying at Belgrade.

(Repeated to Paris No. 212, and St. Petersburg No. 347.)

*Published in BB No. 12 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 99.



(33674)

No. 103.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

D. 8.40 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. No. 89. Confidential.

Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia.

French Ambassador saw Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and has given me an account of the interview. French Ambassador told Secretary of State that he was speaking without instructions and that his remarks were private.

Ambassador said that German Government could not maintain fiction that question at issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was an internal one and could be localised. No question was internal which involved discussions between two Powers. Moreover, attitude of German press had, anyhow, deprived question of any local character, for Germany had publicly ranged herself on the side of Austria-Hungary.

On Secretary of State saying that Servian Government would doubtless give way, French Ambassador asked whether Secretary of State seriously thought that Servian Government could accept certain demands in note, such, for instance, as demand No. 5 and issue by the King of Serbia of an order of day to army in the terms suggested. If King issued such an order the chances were that, in a country like Serbia, he would be assassinated.

Secretary of State suggested that it was for the *Entente* Powers to advise moderation and compliance at Belgrade. Ambassador enquired whether German Government would not also enjoin moderation on their ally. Secretary of State, after some reflection, said that "that would depend on circumstances."

Secretary of State again denied that he had had any previous knowledge of terms of Austro-Hungarian note, and admitted note was too stiff. Ambassador then expressed surprise that he could endorse such a document.

French Ambassador is inclined to think that Austro-Hungarian and German Governments are playing a dangerous game of bluff, and that they think they can carry matters through with a high hand. He thinks his conversation with Secretary of State has given latter much food for reflection. He begged me to treat what he had said as absolutely confidential, as he did not mean to report his conversation to his Government.

*Cf. despatch No. 160, and F No. 30.*

## MINUTE.

We can do nothing for moderation unless Germany is prepared *pari passu* to do the same.—  
E G.

(33652)

No. 104.

*Communication by the Austrian Ambassador.*

Sir E. Grey,

Count Mensdorff telephoned after you had gone, to ask if he could see you this evening. I said you had left the Office and that I did not know when you would be at your house. He asked me if I could call at the Embassy on my way home.

I did so and he told me that he had just received a telegram from his Government authorising him to explain to you that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum but a "*démarche* with a time limit," and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit his Government would break off diplomatic

[13318]

G 2



relations and commence military preparations (not operations). Count Mensdorff wished to let you know this as soon as possible in view of the concern you had expressed at the ultimatum; he said that though it might not be much of a difference it was undoubtedly a "nuance" of one.

H. M.

24.7.14.

*Cf. A II No. 13.*

(33827)

No. 105.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 352.)

D. 12.10 A.M.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at St. Petersburg (Paris) you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

(Sent also to Paris No. 216.)

*Published in BB No. 14.*

(33681)

No. 106.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Budapest, July 24, 1914.*

D. July 24, 8.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 2.)

R. July 25, 12.5 A.M.

Austro-Hungarian note to the Servian Government was communicated late last night by Count Tisza personally to press representatives. I hear that he could not disguise his satisfaction with its terms, for which he takes credit. Count Tisza made speech in Parliament this morning and explained necessity of form and tone of note adding that present situation was not state of war and need not even necessarily lead to war.

Note has been, on the whole, favourably received by press, which considers unusual tone justified by the circumstances. Financial circles are taken aback by its violence, and there has been a heavy fall on the Stock Exchange.

General opinion is that Servian Government cannot accept demands, and that Serbia's day of reckoning has come.

Probability of Russian intervention is denied or disregarded, and Government apparently expects that war will be localised, in spite of fact that they have prejudiced their case by their intemperance.

I am informed that, if favourable reply is not received on Saturday, eight army corps will be mobilised on Sunday morning, and that monitors have already been despatched to Lower Danube.

(Sent to Vienna.)

*Cf. despatches No. 191 and 242.*

(33704)

No. 107

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

D. July 24, 8 P.M.

R. July 25, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 51.)

I hear that in the event of war no attempt will be made to defend Belgrade and that Government will proceed to Krushevatz and thence possibly to Nish.

(Sent to Vienna.)

(33789)

No. 108.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

D. 12 32 P.M.

R. 12 noon.

Tel. (No. 168.)

Your telegram No. 207 of 24th July to Paris.<sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me yesterday whether you had sent any instructions to Vienna. As he will probably repeat the question I should be glad to know what I should say.

## MINUTES.

Our telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of this afternoon (No. 353) <sup>(2)</sup> will have made it clear to Sir G. Buchanan what the position and views of His Majesty's Government are.—E. A. C. July 25.

A telegram was to have been sent this morning instructing Sir M. de Bunsen to give general support to a request to be made by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that more time should be given.<sup>(3)</sup>

That is the telegram to send to Sir G. Buchanan.—E. G.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 91.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 112.<sup>(3)</sup> No. 118.

(33828)

No. 109.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*Tel. (No. 167.) *En clair.**St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

Following official communiqué published to-day:—

“The Government are much engrossed in events which have occurred and with the despatch by Austria-Hungary of an ultimatum to Serbia. The Government are intently following the development of the Serbo-Austrian conflict, with respect to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.”

(Repeated to Paris No. 225.)

*See despatch No. 196.*

(33845)

No. 110.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

D. 12.5 P.M.

R. 1.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 101.)

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 20.*

(33846)

No. 111.

*Mr. Cruckanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 2.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 53.)

Your telegram No. 17 of 24th July :<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

I have seen my Russian colleague and new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and read to them your views. They are as yet without instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of proposed conciliatory terms of Servian reply (see my preceding telegram of to-day)<sup>(2)</sup> I have hitherto abstained from offering advice to Servian Government.

It appears to me highly probable that Russian Government have already urged utmost moderation on Servian Government.

(Repeated to Paris and St. Petersburg.)

*Published in BB No. 22 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 102.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 114.

(33673)

No. 112.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

D. 2.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 353.)

Your telegram No. 166 of 24th July : Austria and Servia.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve, and I cannot promise more on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war in the Servian quarrel.

But if war does take place we may be drawn into it by development of other issues, and I am therefore anxious to prevent war.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 101.

The brusque, sudden, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in very short time Austria and Russia will both have mobilised against each other. In this event, it seems to me that the only chance of peace is for the other four Powers to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to endeavour to arrange matters.

If Germany will adopt this view, I am strongly of opinion that France and ourselves should act upon it.<sup>(2)</sup> Italy no doubt would gladly co-operate.

But the co-operation of Germany would be essential. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included friends or allies of both.

(Repeated to Paris No. 218/19: "You should inform M.F.A.")

*Published in BB No. 24 (slightly paraphrased).*

(<sup>2</sup>) See No. 116.

(33847)

No. 113.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

D. 1.15 P.M.

R. 2.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 120.)

Your telegrams Nos. 190 and 191 of 24th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

I found this morning that the Secretary-General had cognizance of the suggestion that Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should work at Vienna and Petersburg in favour of moderation if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia become menacing.

He is of opinion that Austria-Hungary will only be restrained by unconditional acceptance of note by Serbia (?in so far as) (?otherwise) occupation of Servian territory is contemplated. Italian Government have information that Austrian intention is to seize Salonica railway.

*Published in BB No. 19 (paraphrased).*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 99.

(33849)

No. 114.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 52.)

Reply to Austrian note is now being drawn up at Council of Ministers. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that it will be drawn up in most conciliatory terms and will meet Austrian demands in as large measure as possible. He gave me in advance brief summary of projected reply.

Servian Government consent to publication of declaration in "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reserves. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to mixed commission of enquiry, provided that appointment of such commission can be proved to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers whose guilt can be clearly proved, and they



have already arrested officer mentioned in Austrian note. They agree to suppress Narodna Odbrana.

Opinion of Servian Government is that, unless Austrian Government desire war at any cost, they will accept full satisfaction offered in Servian reply.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 21 (paraphrased).*

*Cf. No. 111.*

(38849)

No. 115.

*Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador.*

Dear Prince Lichnowsky,

*July 25, 1914.*

I enclose a forecast that I have just received of the Servian reply.<sup>(1)</sup> It seems to me that it ought to produce a favourable impression at Vienna, but it is difficult for anybody but an ally to suggest to the Austrian Government what view they should take of it.

I hope that if the Servian reply when received at Vienna corresponds to this forecast, the German Government may feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

Yours sincerely,  
E. GREY.

Enclosure: First 2 paragraphs of Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram No. 52.<sup>(1)</sup>

*This was telegraphed verbatim in English to Berlin by the German Ambassador.  
See DD Nos. 186 and 191a.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 114.

(34198)

No. 116.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold.*

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 197.)

D. 3 P.M.

I have told German Ambassador that Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that rupture of diplomatic relations and military preparations but not operations on part of Austria would be the method of procedure on expiry of time limit. I said this interposed a stage of mobilisation before actual crossing of frontier, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed.

We should now apparently be soon confronted by a moment at which both Austria and Russia would have mobilised. The only chance of peace would be for the four Powers, Germany, Russia (*sic*)<sup>(1)</sup>, France and ourselves, to keep together if Russia and Austria did both mobilise, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross frontier till there had been time for us to endeavour to arrange matters between them.

German Ambassador read me a telegram from German Foreign Office saying that Germany had not known beforehand and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of Austrian note to Servia, but that having launched the note Austria could not draw back.<sup>(2)</sup> The Ambassador said, however, that what I contemplated was mediation between Russia and Austria; this was a different

<sup>(1)</sup> This should be "Italy."

<sup>(2)</sup> See DD No. 158.

question, and he thought Austria might with dignity accept it, and he expressed himself personally favourable to what I had suggested.

I endorsed his observation, saying that between Servia and Austria I felt no title to intervene, but as soon as the question became one between Austria and Russia it was a question of the peace of Europe, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon him that if Austria and Russia mobilised the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. We could do nothing alone. I had had no time to consult the French Government, who were travelling at the moment, and I could not be sure of their views; but if German Government were prepared to agree with my suggestion I was prepared to say to the French Government that I thought it the right thing to do.

(Repeated to Paris No. 221/2; Rome No. 192/3; Vienna No. 355/6; and St. Petersburg No. 154/5: "For your own information only.")

*Published in BB No. 25 (paraphrased).*

*Cf. No. 112.*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD Nos. 180 and 179.*

(34243)

No. 117.

*Communication by Russian Ambassador, July 25.*

Count Benckendorff gave me the enclosed. I told him that Sir M. de Bunsen was being instructed to support this.<sup>(1)</sup>—*E. G. July 25, 1914.*

M. Sazonoff télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914 :

"La communication du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade, ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences Autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement Serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases mêmes des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonoff espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique adhérera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

*Published, with translation, in BB No. 13 also in R No. 4.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 118.

(34199)

No. 118.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 153.)

D. 3.15 P.M.

Russian Ambassador has communicated to me a telegram which his Government have sent to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of which the following is the substance :—<sup>(1)</sup>

“The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps for averting the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Government will prolong the time limit, and as they have stated their readiness to furnish the Powers with the data on which their demands on Servia are based, the Russian Government hope that these materials will be furnished so that the Powers may examine the matter, and if they find that some of the Austrian requests are well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austro-Hungarian Government are indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they act against international ethics, but would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning.”

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague, but since the instruction was sent it was a relief to hear that the steps to be taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government were to be limited for the moment to rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. If, therefore, Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to vary the time limit already stated, I trust that they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

(Repeated to Paris No. 220 and St. Petersburg No. 354.)

*Published in BB No. 26 (with slight verbal alterations).*

*Cf. No. 108.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 117.

(34242)

No. 119.

*Communication by Servian Minister.*

Sir Edward Grey,

*July 25, 1914.*

The Servian Minister called to-day to hand in a copy of the Austrian communication. I told him we already had a copy. He was instructed to add that when the Austrian Minister handed the communication to M. Pasitch, he had verbally stated that unless he received a satisfactory reply by 6 P.M. to-day he was to leave Belgrade with his staff.

M. Pasitch wished the Servian Minister to state further that he would deliberate as to a reply when he had convoked his colleagues, but that no Servian Government would be able to accept the Austrian demands “dans leur ensemble.” M. Pasitch trusted H.M. Government would afford their support to Servia in the present difficult circumstances.<sup>(1)</sup>

(The telegram was dated the day before yesterday.)

I said that we were exchanging views with other Governments, and that I had no information to give him though I gave him verbally the substance of what M. Grouitch had told Mr. Crackanthorpe as to the draft Servian reply.<sup>(2)</sup>

A. N.

<sup>(1)</sup> *Cf. S Nos. 34 and 35.*

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 114.

(33849)

No. 120.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 228.)

D. 4.30 P.M.

I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram No. 52 of 25th July.<sup>(1)</sup> repeated to you. I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.<sup>(2)</sup>

(Sent also to Berlin No. 200 and St. Petersburg No. 360.)

*Published in BB No. 27.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 114.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 115.

(33854)

No. 121.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 25, 1914.*

D. 3.15 P.M.

R. 5.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 81.)

Acting Political Director states that French Government have not yet received explanation from Austrian Government contained in your telegram No. 216 of to-day,<sup>(1)</sup> but have given to Servia, through Servian Minister here, advice similar to that contained in your telegram No. 17 of yesterday to Belgrade.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 15 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 105.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 102.

(33885)

No. 122.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

D. 3.16 P.M.

R. 6 P.M.

Tel. (No. 90.)

Your telegram No. 196 of 24th July<sup>(1)</sup> acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London,<sup>(2)</sup> he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to "speak to" his Excellency about it.<sup>(3)</sup> Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 99.<sup>(2)</sup> DD No. 157.<sup>(3)</sup> DD Nos. 164, 171. Cf. A II No. 32.



Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Confidential.

Secretary of State again repeated very earnestly that he had had no previous knowledge of contents of Austro-Hungarian note, although he had been accused of knowing all about it. He confessed privately that as a diplomatic document note left much to be desired.

French Ambassador here learns from Vienna that Austrians are ready to act with eight army corps.

(Sent to Vienna.)

. (Repeated to Paris No. 233, Rome No. 209 and St. Petersburg No. 370.)

*Published in BB No. 18 (unparaphrased except penultimate paragraph; last paragraph omitted).*

(33884)

No. 123.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

D. 4.20 P.M.

R. 8 P.M.

Tel. (No. 82.)

The "Écho de Paris" announces that the German Ambassador made a verbal communication to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday, stating that German Government approved contents and form of Austrian note to Servia, that German Government hoped that discussion would remain localised between Vienna and Belgrade, and that if a third Power intervened result would be grave tension between the two groups of Powers. The "Écho de Paris" bases on this statement a strong attack on Germany and Austria, whom it accuses of choosing a moment when England and Russia are occupied with Ulster and St. Petersburg strike respectively, and French President of the Republic and President of the Council are on the high seas, to endeavour to humiliate Triple *Entente*, the Serajevo murders being merely an excuse.

German Ambassador has protested at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserting that German Government was ignorant of contents of note until informed like other Governments after its delivery. German Ambassador has further stated that Germany is most anxious that quarrel should be strictly localised and that no third Power should intervene, as such intervention must, in view of terms of alliances, result in very dangerous situation. German Ambassador stated to Acting Political Director that this was not a threat.

The "Écho de Paris" is known to be in close relation with Russian Embassy.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

*Cf. despatch No. 193 and also F No. 36, DD Nos. 169, 170.*

(33852)

No. 124.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

D. 6.30 P.M.

R. 9.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 102.)

Following for Director of Military Operations from military attaché :—

“ Following information is confirmed :—

“ Chief of the Staff informed Italian military attaché last night that until answer from Servia was received no measures other than minor precautionary measures would be undertaken. Arrangements for instant mobilisation were complete, and orders would be issued, in event of non-receipt, or of unsatisfactory nature of reply, without any interval. Usual guards were placed at all main railways and arsenals and dépôts at dawn to-day.

“ Following from good source, but not completely confirmed :—

“ A detachment of siege trains left Southern Railway station at 3 this morning with heavy howitzers.

“ According to good source, but also subject to final confirmation, initial (? mobilisation) will extend to 15th 16th, 13th, 5th, 7th corps and 20th and 41st Honved divisions. (Two groups undecypherable) 12 corps and one other Budapest division of Honved. Consider (group undecypherable) mobilise simultaneously with Galician corps (several groups undecypherable) probable.”

(33883)

No. 125.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

D. 8 P.M.

R. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 169.) Very Confidential.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, in private letter, substance of your telegram No. 216 of 25th July to Paris,<sup>(1)</sup> and I this afternoon discussed with him French Ambassador's suggested communication to Servian Government recorded in your telegram No. 17 of 24th July to Belgrade.<sup>(2)</sup>

As regards former, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austrian Ambassador's explanations did not quite tally with information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards latter, both his Excellency and French Ambassador agreed that as delay accorded expires this evening, it is too late to make such a communication. Minister for Foreign Affairs said Servia was quite ready to do as you suggested, and to punish those proved to be guilty, but no independent State could be expected to accept political demands put forward. From a conversation he had with Servian Minister yesterday, Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that, in event of Austrian attack, Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces to interior, while they would at the same time appeal to Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of such an appeal. Obligations taken by Servia in 1908 (*sic*) to which reference is made in Austrian ultimatum were given to Powers and not to Austria, and he would like to see question placed on international footing. Were Servia to appeal to Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave question in hands of England, France, Italy and Germany. It was possible, he added, that Servia might propose to submit question to arbitration.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 105.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 102.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then told us that at Council of Ministers held under his presidency this morning Emperor had sanctioned drafting of Imperial Ukase, which is only to be published when Minister for Foreign Affairs considers moment come for giving effect to it, ordering mobilisation of 1,100,000 men. Necessary preliminary preparations for mobilisation would, however, be begun at once. On my expressing earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.

French Ambassador then said he had received a number of telegrams from Minister in charge of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that no one of them displayed slightest sign of hesitation, and that he was in position to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side.

After thanking him, Minister for Foreign Affairs turned to me with question "And your Government?" I replied that you did not yet despair of situation, and that great thing was to gain time. I repeated what I had said to Emperor in audience—reported in my despatch No. 100, Secret, of 3rd April [Extracts annexed]—that England could play rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. With the exception of the "Times," nearly the whole of English press was on the side of Austria, to whom Mr. Gladstone had addressed warning of "hands off." The public had their spirit [group undecypherable]. They did not understand that Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing present *status quo* in Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war.

French Ambassador remarked that French Government would want to know at once whether our fleet was prepared to play part assigned to it by Anglo-French Naval Convention.<sup>(3)</sup> He could not believe that England would not stand by her two friends, who were acting as one in this matter.

I said all I could to impress prudence on Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him, if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but unless Germany can restrain Austria I can regard situation as desperate. Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become predominant Power in Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all the risks of war. For ourselves position is a most perilous one, and we shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we cannot hope to maintain that friendly co-operation with her in Asia that is of such vital importance to us. Attitude of Italy, according to Minister for Foreign Affairs, seems to be lukewarm, and she does not seem to have been consulted by Austria beforehand.

(Sent to Paris.)

*Published in BB No. 17 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

(3) [NOTE.—In raising this question the French Ambassador was acting without instructions from his Government. It was merely a private observation arising out of his own personal interpretation of the situation (see Introduction, p. xii).]



*Extracts from a Despatch from Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey dated St. Petersburg, April 3, 1914.—(Received April 7.)*

Private.

\* \* \* \* \*

Speaking next of the European situation, the Emperor said that the only question which caused him any anxiety was that of Albania. He did not know whether it would be possible in the long run to keep Austria and Italy in line with the other Powers or whether they would not leave the concert and adopt a policy of partition. In the latter case they were almost certain to quarrel, and, as this would mean a weakening of the Triple Alliance, it would have some countervailing advantages. He was very sorry for the Greeks as they were being rather hardly treated both with regard to the present situation in Epirus and the question of the islands. If the latter were to be neutralised, it seemed but fair that the Powers should guarantee them against attack by Turkey. He did not, however, know what could be done. It was the old story. Europe was divided into two camps and it was impossible to get the Concert to work together.

This led His Majesty to say that he would like to see a closer bond of union established between England and Russia, such as an alliance of a purely defensive character. On my remarking that I feared that this was impracticable at present, the Emperor said that we might at any rate conclude some arrangement similar to that which existed between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic. I replied that I was ignorant of the terms of this arrangement. His Majesty said that he was also unacquainted with them but that he believed that, if we had not actually a military convention with France, we had discussed and agreed on what each country was to do in certain eventualities. On my observing that the despatch of an expeditionary corps to co-operate with the Russian army was, for material reasons, out of the question, the Emperor said that, even if it was feasible, it would serve no useful purpose, as he had men enough and to spare at home. It might, however, be advantageous to arrange beforehand for the co-operation of the British and Russian fleets. By the year 1917 he hoped to have 8 Dreadnoughts in the Baltic, and, in the event of war, the Germans would have to detach more than that number of ships to watch them. He would never propose that a British fleet should be sent to the Baltic on account of the dangers to which it would be exposed from mines in the Belt and from attack by a superior German fleet passing through the Kiel Canal. The existence, however, of a Russian fleet in the Baltic would ease the situation for the British fleet in the North Sea. At present, His Majesty continued, our understanding was confined to Persia, and he was strongly of opinion that that understanding ought to be extended, either by some sort of arrangement such as he had suggested, or by some written formula which would record the fact of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Europe.

I told the Emperor that I could not speak on this subject in the name of His Majesty's Government, but that I personally should welcome any arrangement that would tend to consolidate Anglo-Russian relations. I could not, however, but ask myself whether, supposing that England had last year been the ally of Russia, she could have rendered her any more effective services than she had actually done as her friend. On several occasions during the prolonged Balkan crisis she had been able to play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna; and it was thanks to her friendly intervention that a more or less satisfactory settlement of the Servian port question had been arrived at and that Austria had yielded about Djakova and Dibra which were blocking the way to a friendly settlement of the all-important question of Scutari. It was doubtful, I thought, whether we could have accomplished so much either at Berlin or Vienna had we approached those two Governments as the ally of Russia: whereas the fact that we were only a friend who might be turned into an ally should Germany and Austria force a war on Russia made them much more ready to listen to us. If Russia had had to yield on the question of Adrianople, this was not so much due to anything which His Majesty's Government had done or left undone as to the desire of the French Government that Russia should take no action that might possibly provoke German intervention. In the question of the German military mission to Constantinople, His Majesty's Government had again used their friendly offices at Berlin with very considerable success.

The Emperor admitted the truth of what I had said about the French and the Adrianople question and also acknowledged the many services which His Majesty's Government had rendered Russia during the crisis. There might, he said, be something in the argument which I had used, but he would nevertheless prefer to see our present understanding assume a more precise and definite character. . . .



(33859)

No. 126.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.**Budapest, July 25, 1914.*

D. 9.44 P.M.

R. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 3.)

I hear that Servian reply was received at Austro-Hungarian Legation shortly before 6, and, as it was not found satisfactory, Minister and staff left Belgrade.

Calling in of reservists has commenced here.

(Sent to Vienna.)

(33855)

No. 127.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 25, 1914.*

D. 7.10 P.M.

R. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 85.)

I have seen acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He had no suggestion to make, except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade. He hopes that Servian Government will give sufficiently favourable answer to Austrian note to obviate Austrian Government proceeding to extremes, but he says that if Servian Government accept Austrian demands in their entirety there would be a revolution in Servia.

*Published in BB No. 16 (paraphrased).*

(33858)

No. 128.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

D. 8.15 P.M.

R. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 91.)

Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I gather that Austro-Hungarian Embassy here consider localisation of crisis between Austria-Hungary and Servia will depend on whether, and, if so, to what extent, Russia and France think that they can reckon on active support of His Majesty's Government in the event of a general complication.

(Repeated to Embassies and Belgrade.)

(33856)

No. 129.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 25, 1914.*

D. 8.30 P.M.

R. 11.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 86.) Confidential.

Your telegraphic instructions No. 219 of to-day,<sup>(1)</sup> which I received this evening. I will make requisite communication to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs when St. Petersburg telegram No. 166 of 24th July<sup>(2)</sup> reaches me.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 112.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 101.

I expressed to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the opinion that in democratic countries such as England and France war could not be made without support of public opinion, and I felt sure that public opinion in England would not sanction a war in support of Russia if she, as protector of Slavs, picked a quarrel with Austria over Austro-Servian difficulty. He admitted, but not as Minister, that it would be difficult to bring French public opinion to fighting point in such a case as present one.

33998)

No. 130.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

D. 10 P.M.

R. 11:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 54.)

Mobilisation ordered.

(33857)

No. 131.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

D. 9:20 P.M.

R. 11:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 55.)

Austrian Minister left at 6:30. Government has left for Nish, where Skuptchina is convened for Monday. Special train is placed at disposal of Diplomatic Corps this evening. I am leaving with my other colleagues, taking one cypher. Vice-consul remains (? in) charge of cyphers and archives.

(Sent to Vienna.)

*Published in BB No. 23 (paraphrased and parts omitted.)*

(34450)

No. 132.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 295.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

I told Count Benckendorff to-day of what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning as to the possibility of Germany, Italy, France and ourselves working together in Vienna and St. Petersburg to secure peace after Austria and Russia had mobilised.<sup>(1)</sup>

Count Benckendorff was very apprehensive that what I said would give Germany the impression that France and England were detached from Russia.

I said that France and ourselves, according to my suggestion, would be no more detached from Russia than Germany would be detached from her ally Austria. I had emphasised to Prince Lichnowsky that the participation of Germany in any such diplomatic mediation was an essential condition, and surely the situation was not made unsatisfactory for Russia if France and England held their hands, provided that Germany also held hers.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 116.

Count Benckendorff urged that I should give some indication to Germany to make her think that we would not stand aside if there was a war.

I said that I had given no indication that we would stand aside: on the contrary, I had said to the German Ambassador that, as long as there was only a dispute between Austria and Servia alone, I did not feel entitled to intervene: but that, directly it was a matter between Austria and Russia, it became a question of the peace of Europe, which concerned us all. I had furthermore spoken on the assumption that Russia would mobilise, whereas the assumption of the German Government had hitherto been, officially, that Servia would receive no support: and what I had said must influence the German Government to take the matter seriously. In effect, I was asking that, if Russia mobilised against Austria, the German Government, who had been supporting the Austrian demand on Servia, should ask Austria to consider some modification of her demands, under the threat of Russian mobilisation. This was not an easy thing for Germany to do, even though we would join at the same time in asking Russia to suspend action. I was afraid, too, that Germany would reply that mobilisation with her was a question of hours, whereas with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact, I had asked that if Russia mobilised against Austria, Germany, instead of mobilising against Russia, should suspend mobilisation and join with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage of time. for, if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would meanwhile have gained time for her mobilisation. It was true that I had not said anything directly as to whether we would take any part or not if there was a European conflict, and I could not say so; but there was absolutely nothing for Russia to complain of in the suggestion that I had made to the German Government, and I was only afraid that there might be difficulty in its acceptance by the German Government. I had made it on my own responsibility, and I had no doubt it was the best proposal to make in the interests of peace.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in Grey, vol. I. p. 317.*

[NOTE.—This despatch, which had been included in the original draft of the Blue Book as No. 28, was afterwards omitted by the direction of Sir Edward Grey (see Introduction, p. vii). The reasons for this as stated in a letter from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to a correspondent on November 7, 1914, were that—

“It recorded a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and one of the Ambassadors [Count Benckendorff] in which the Ambassador did not take the same point of view of a proposal of Sir Edward Grey's as was afterwards taken by his Government and Sir Edward Grey thought it would be kinder to the Ambassador not to publish this fact.”

As will be seen, while Count Benckendorff demurred to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation by the four Powers, M. Sazonof, according to No. 125, was prepared to accept the idea.]

(34451)

No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.*

(No. 217.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day.

I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 29.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 116.

## No. 134.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

My dear Grey,

*British Embassy, Paris, July 25, 1914.*

I do not think that if Russia pick a quarrel with Austria over the Austro-Servian difficulty public opinion in France would be in favour of backing up Russia in so bad a cause.

Consequently the French Government will probably advise the Russian Government to moderate any excessive zeal that they may be inclined to display to protect their Servian client.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(33853)

## No. 135.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

D. July 25, 11.20 P.M.

R. July 26, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 103.) *En clair.*

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent. Wildest enthusiasm prevails in Vienna. Russian Embassy is being guarded by troops to prevent repeated attempts at hostile demonstration on part of the vast crowds parading the streets.

*Published in BB No. 31 (last two sentences omitted).*

(33886)

## No. 136.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

D. 11.5 A.M.

R. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 104.)

Following received last night from military attaché for Direction of Military Operations :—

“According to information just received from good source, but not definitely confirmed, armies against Servia will be composed as follows :—

“Potiorek, headquarters Sarajevo, 15th and 16th corps.

“Ritter von Frank, headquarters Agram, to operate against Belgrade. 13th corps supported by detachments from (? 2nd) and 3rd corps.

“Ritter von Auffenberg, headquarters Budapest, to move via Temesvar up Morava valley, 4th and 7th corps supported by 20th Honved division.

“6th corps and 41st Honved division in reserve.

“12th corps to remain in observation of Roumania.

“Each corps consists of two common army divisions only. In all initially, seventeen divisions, including 12th corps. Besides these there are six independent Honved divisions and one mobile brigade per army corps available.

“Calling in of reservists has commenced.

“There is great doubt as to attitude of Roumania.”



(33869)

No. 137.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

D. 11.50 A.M.

R. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 14.)

Morning papers report that German fleet, numbering twenty-eight large ships, received orders to concentrate during last night at predetermined point off the Norwegian coast.

(33868)

No. 138.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

D. 11.50 A.M.

R. 1.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 13.) *En clair.*

It is reported that the Emperor William left Balestrand at 6 o'clock last night, and is proceeding direct to Kiel.

(34200)

No. 139.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey (Itchen Abbas).*

(a.)

Tel.

[Undated—July 26.]

I think that the only hope of avoiding a general conflict would be for us to take advantage at once of suggestion thrown out by Sazonof in second paragraph of Buchanan's tel. No. 169.<sup>(1)</sup> which you will receive this morning, and that you should telegraph to Berlin, Paris, Rome, asking that they shall authorise their Ambassadors here to join you in a Conference to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications and that abstention on all sides from active military operations should be requested of Vienna, Servia and St. Petersburg pending results of conference. This tel. to be repeated to Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg for communication to M.F.A.'s with instructions to endeavour to obtain suggested engagements as to military questions on which assurance assembling of Conference must necessarily depend. If you approve will you telegraph to Resident Clerk to whom I am giving draft telegrams in above sense.

(b.)

*Sir Edward Grey to Resident Clerk, Foreign Office, London, S.W.**Itchen Abbas, July 26, 1914.*

Tel.

D. 2.2 P.M.

I approve Nicolson's draft telegrams and they should be sent off (Nos. 140/1).—  
E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 125.

(34200)

No. 140.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 232.)

D. 3 P.M.

Ask Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of Italy, Germany, France, and myself in a conference to be held here at once in order to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications. With this view representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade should be authorised in informing Governments to which they are accredited of above suggestion to request that pending results of conference all active military operations should be suspended.

(Repeated to Vienna No. 159: St. Petersburg No. 365: and Nish No. 18.)

(Sent also to Berlin No. 204, and Rome No. 198.)

*Published in BB No. 36 (paraphrased).*

(3200)

No. 141.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 160.)

D. 3 P.M.

MY telegram to Paris No. 232 of to-day.<sup>(1)</sup>

When your Italian, German, and French colleagues have received similar instructions, you should act accordingly.

(Sent also to St. Petersburg No. 366, and Belgrade No. 19.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 140.

(33887)

No. 142.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

D. 1:50 P.M.

R. 3:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 105.)

Following from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

“Following from French information from Budapest [*sic*]:—

“Potiorek, 15th and 16th corps. Von Frank, 13th and 4th corps and 41st Honved division. Von Auffenberg, 6th and 7th corps and 20th Honved division. 12th corps held against Roumania. 1st, 10th and 11th corps, Von Brudermann, held against Russia. General Böhm Ermolli to command reserve army, 14th, 8th, 9th, 2nd and 3rd corps, if any of latter are required later in proceedings.

“Approximate numbers of Potiorek, 4 marching divisions, 2 reserve brigades, 100,000 men. Von Frank, 5 marching divisions, 2 mobile divisions, 2 additional Honved divisions, 156,000 men. Von Auffenberg same as Von Frank, 12 (*sic*) corps, 2 marching divisions, 1 additional Honved division, 1 marching brigade, 68,000 men. In all, 480,000 men, excluding independent cavalry divisions and Landsturm troops. Unconfirmed report states that Archduke Frederick will assume general command.”

33885)

No. 143.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 26. 1914.*

Tel. (No. 234.)

D. 3.30 P.M.

Berlin telegram No. 90 of 25th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

*Published in BB No. 37.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 122.

No. 144.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*

My dear Grey,

53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W., July 26, 1914.

I telegraphed to you<sup>(1)</sup> an idea which occurred to me after reading Buchanan's telegram No. 169.<sup>(2)</sup> It seems to me the only chance of avoiding a conflict—it is I admit a very poor chance—but in any case we shall have done our utmost. Berlin is playing with us. Jagow did not really adopt your proposal to intervene at Vienna, and to be backed up by us and France, but simply “passed on” your suggestion and told his ambassador to speak about it. This is not what was intended or desired. Mensdorff asked to see me this afternoon. It was only to announce officially that relations had been broken off with Serbia, and that Serbia was mobilising. He asked me what news we had from St. Petersburg. I told him that the situation was most gravely viewed there, as was natural, but I gave him no details. I saw Benckendorff to whom I read Buchanan's 169.<sup>(2)</sup> He had no news, but impressed on me that Lichnowsky was convinced we could stand aside and remain neutral—an unfortunate conviction—as were they to understand that our neutrality was by no means to be counted upon and that we could not be expected to remain indifferent when all Europe was in flames, a restraining influence would be exercised on Berlin.

I have just heard you have approved my proposal—I am glad, though I am not hopeful. Still no chance should be neglected.

I lunched with Stamfordham. He told me Prince Henry came over yesterday and breakfasted with the King this morning. Prince Henry said if Russia moved there would be an internal revolution and the dynasty be upset. This is nonsense—but it shows how anxious they are to make out to us that Russia will remain quiet and to spread about that we will be equally quiescent—a foolish procedure—(Prince Henry has gone back to Germany).

Yours sincerely,

A. NICOLSON.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 139.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 125.

(34244)

No. 145.

*German Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey.*

Dear Sir Edward,

9, Carlton House Terrace, S.W., July 26, 1914.

I learn from Berlin that they hear from good source that Russia intends to call out several classes of reserves. In this case we would have to follow as it would mean a mobilisation also against us.

As my Government still hopes to be able to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe they instruct me to request you to use your influence in St. Petersburg in that sense.<sup>(1)</sup>

Believe me, &c.  
LICHNOWSKY.

P.S.—My Government accepts your suggested mediation à quatre.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> See DD No. 199.

<sup>(2)</sup> See No. 116, also DD No. 192.

34516)

No. 146.

*Communication by German Ambassador.*

Sir Edward Grey,

July 26, 1914.

Prince Lichnowsky called this afternoon with an urgent telegram from his Government to say that they had received information that Russia was calling in "classes of reserves," which meant mobilisation. If this mobilisation took place on the German frontier, Germany would be compelled to mobilise—and France naturally would follow suit. Prince Lichnowsky was, therefore, instructed to request that we would urge the Russian Government not to mobilise. The Germans would not mind a partial mobilisation say at Odessa or Kieff—but could not view indifferently a mobilisation on the German frontier.

I told Prince Lichnowsky that we had no information as to a general mobilisation or indeed of any mobilisation immediately. (The Ukase mobilising 1,100,000 men has not been issued.)<sup>(1)</sup> It would, however, be difficult and delicate for us to ask Petersburg not to mobilise at all—when Austria was contemplating such a measure—we should not be listened to. The main thing was to prevent, if possible, active military operations—and I told Prince Lichnowsky in general terms of the proposals for a meeting à quatre here which you had made at Paris-Berlin-Rome—on the condition that Russia, Austria and Servia should suspend active military operations pending results of Conference.<sup>(2)</sup> Prince Lichnowsky liked the proposal.

A. N.

(He was very excited.)

See DD Nos. 236 and 218.

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 125.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 140.

(33890)

No. 147.

*Sir H Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.*

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

D. 2.20 P.M.

R. 4.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 92.)

Austria-Hungary and Servia.

There was a demonstration in front of the Austrian Embassy last night, and large crowds paraded principal streets singing patriotic songs and Austrian national anthem. German public opinion continues to support Austria-Hungary strongly. Up to the present public were so satisfied of the strength of Austrian case that they were convinced that conflict with Servia would remain localised. There are now indications that German public and press are beginning to appreciate gravity of position. While not wanting war, they are nevertheless determined to see Austria-Hungary through.



Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 33 (last paragraph only).*

(33864)

No. 148.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

D. 3.45 P.M.

R. 5.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 122.)

Austro-Servian conflict.

I gather that Italian Government will endeavour to argue, even if Russia should intervene in support of Servia, that inasmuch as Austria did not consult Italy before delivering note, and inasmuch as by her mode of attack on Servia she would be constructively provoking Russia, the *casus fœderis* contemplated by alliance would not arise. It is, however, admitted that this is not view taken by Germany.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

(33891)

No. 149.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

D. 7.35 P.M.

R. 8.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 94.)

Your telegram No. 228 to Paris.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of a Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram No. 52.<sup>(2)</sup>

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

(Repeated to Paris and St. Petersburg.)

*Published in BB No. 34.*

*Cf. No. 115, also DD No. 186 (footnote).*

#### MINUTES.

Very insidious on the part of the German Government. I presume Sir E. Grey will say something to Prince Lichnowsky about this somewhat peculiar way of treating our suggestion that Germany should join in making a communication at Vienna.—*E. A. C. July 27.*

This is the second occasion on which Herr von Jagow has acted similarly.—*A. N.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 120.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 114.

(33888)

No. 150.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

D. 7 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 106.) Confidential.

German Ambassador has expressed to me his confidential (*sic*) belief that Russia, having received assurance that Austria-Hungary will annex no Servian territory, will keep quiet during chastisement which Austria-Hungary is determined to inflict on Servia. I asked if he did not think public opinion might compel Russian Government to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality. He said that days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over. Moscow was perfectly quiet, and everything depended on personality of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could easily resist, if he chose, pressure of a few newspapers. His Excellency did not think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would be so imprudent as to take step which would probably bring into melting-pot many frontier questions in which Russia was interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions. Nor was France at all in a condition to face war.

I said that I thought that the Austro-Hungarian Government had made matters a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of ultimatum to Servia, with many requirements of which one naturally sympathised if only they had been expressed in a more temperate manner. German Ambassador said that it was impossible to speak to Servia effectively in any other way. Germany knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. Servia required lesson and was about to receive one, but there ought to be no extension of the quarrel to other countries: Russia had no right to assume protectorate over Servia, and he doubted her acting as if she made any such claim.

Italian Ambassador says that the German Ambassador has held exactly the same language to him, and that it is founded on similar opinions of both German and Austrian Ambassadors at St. Petersburg. Italian Ambassador fears that it is over-sanguine as to Russian inaction.

German Ambassador asked me if I had heard that Servian Government had made a pretence of giving way at the last moment. His Excellency had heard of a letter which you had addressed to the German Ambassador yesterday hoping that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory.<sup>(1)</sup> I said that I had heard that Servia had been willing to give in practically on every point. He said that it was all a sham, for Servia had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade before making her offer, thus proving that she well knew it to be insufficient to satisfy legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary.

*Published in BB No. 32 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

## MINUTES.

This is only Herr v. Tschirschky.—*E. A. C. July 27.*

That is all—and he is spreading the belief that Russia will keep quiet if no annexations occur! How little can he grasp the real situation.—*A. N.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 115 and DD No. 186 (footnote).

(33893)

No. 151.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, July 26, 1914.*

D. 8.56 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 456.)

I have every reason to believe that attitude of Turkey, in view of rupture of relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, will be one of expectancy, and that her policy will be guided by future events, but that any opportunity of regaining lost territory will be eagerly seized. At present no change has been made in arrangements for meeting between Grand Vizier and M. Venizelos, and unless, as seems probable, latter has to return to Athens, it will take place on 31st July.

Russian Ambassador is very pessimistic and considers Austrian action is aimed at Triple *Entente* and Russia in particular, as much as at Serbia, Triple Alliance considering moment to be favourable to recover loss of prestige resulting from recent events in the Balkans and to crush Serbia out of existence.

(83874)

No. 152.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.**Budapest, July 26, 1914.*

D. 5.50 P.M.

R. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 4.)

Budapest was last night scene of popular demonstrations of wild enthusiasm for war with Serbia.

Early this morning notices were posted up ordering partial mobilisation of Budapest corps and of certain Honved regiments of reservists affected to report themselves within twenty-four hours. Persons belonging to Landsturm are to report themselves during following three days.

General Putnik, Chief of Servian General Staff, was arrested here last night by military authorities at railway station on the way to Serbia.

(Sent to Vienna.)

No. 153.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

D. 8 P.M.

R. 10.40 P.M.

Tel. Private.

I venture to hope that in any statement you may make in Parliament you may find it possible to show that if European peace is being endangered it is not Russia but Austria who is at fault. Russia has done her very best to induce Serbia to accept all Austria's demands which do not conflict with her status as an independent state or with her existing laws. Austria has so far given no sign that she desires peaceful settlement of question and has addressed direct challenge to Russia. Blow struck at Serbia was as Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday really aimed at Russia.

German Ambassador has cited in conversation Minister for Foreign Affairs' views expressed in certain liberal papers favourable to Austria as representing views of His Majesty's Government and of British public opinion. It would, I think, be most

inadvisable to allow belief to gain ground here that our sympathies are on side of Austria. As it is our position is a very delicate one and Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that Emperor had expressed great disappointment on hearing from him what I had said with regard to probable attitude of His Majesty's Government (see my telegram No. 166 of July 24).<sup>(1)</sup>

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 101.

(83865)

No. 154.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

D. 10.6 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 123.)

Your telegram No. 232 to Paris of 26th July :<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Serbia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

As regards second paragraph, while agreeing in principle, he thinks that it would be prudent that Italy in her position as an ally should refer to Berlin and Vienna before undertaking formally to request the latter to suspend all action.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 35 (part omitted).*

<sup>1</sup> No. 140.

(83867)

No. 155.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

D. 8 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 172.)

By Imperial Ukase of the 26th July, Governments of St. Petersburg and Moscow have been placed in a "state of extraordinary protective activity" ostensibly in view of strikes. Strikes here are practically over and measure is doubtless connected with intending mobilisation.

(84071)

No. 156.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 151.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Vienna, July 19, 1914.*

I had some conversation yesterday with my Italian and Russian colleagues concerning the press campaign which is being carried on in Vienna against Serbia.

Duc Avarna told me he had asked Count Berchtold point blank the day before if the situation was to be considered grave. Count Berchtold had demurred to the precise expression used, but said the relations with Serbia required clearing up, and the situation was *peu s  r  ne*. The Duke then enquired if it was true that a stiff



note was to be sent in at Belgrade and hoped if so it would make no unwarrantable demands. Count Berchtold said he did not himself know yet what would happen. The Serajevo proceedings were not yet at an end. All would depend on the precise results of the investigation which was being made by the competent court. Probably a communication would have to be made eventually to the Servian Government. It was too early to say what its contents would be. The Italian Ambassador gave me to understand that he had warned Count Berchtold against the danger of allowing the press to lead the public mind to expect that a kind of ultimatum would be sent and that failing immediate compliance at Belgrade force would be used. The present tone of the "Neue Freie Presse" and other important newspapers, especially the "Reichspost," was likely to have that effect and the Austro-Hungarian Government might find themselves in the end in a difficult position. The animosity of the people against Servia would have been stirred up to such a point that in order to satisfy public opinion language would have to be used in speaking to the Servian Government which would create perhaps a dangerous crisis. Duc Avarna added that he had pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in conclusion that it would be futile to attack a national aspiration by demanding for instance the suppression of so-called patriotic associations, and that it would be well to limit the demands to be made on Servia to a request for co-operation in exposing and bringing to punishment any promoters or accomplices of the crime who might be found in that country. His Excellency was left under the impression that when the time came Count Berchtold would act with due moderation and caution, but it might be difficult to explain to the general public what would be regarded as a retreat from the position originally taken up.

The Russian Ambassador told me that he had postponed his departure on leave of absence owing to the uncertainty of the situation, but that he now felt he could safely go away for two or three weeks and would probably leave for Russia in a day or two. There was however great irritation here against the Servians, and he had found the Ballplatz annoyed by the silence of the Servian Government which had quite rightly, in his opinion, postponed taking any action until it should be in possession of concrete accusations against specified persons on which it could take effective action. M. Schebeko deplored the violence of some of the organs of the press and he pointed out to me a number of articles which had appeared in yesterday's newspapers repeating and commenting on the language of the English press, which was interpreted as an encouragement to the Dual Monarchy to take severe action against Servia. Mention was made for instance of an article in the "Times" of the 16th July as bearing this interpretation, and an article of the "Westminster Gazette"<sup>(1)</sup> of the next day was reproduced at length in several of the Vienna papers under headings describing it as a warning to Servia by the official organ of the British Government. M. Schebeko thought it was a pity that the flames which were all too ready to flare up should be fanned in this way. I told his Excellency that the articles in question were certainly devoid of official inspiration, and I remarked that they did not appear to me to amount to more than the expression of the perfectly reasonable view that Servia would perhaps do well in her own interest to initiate proceedings against suspected persons in that country without waiting for a peremptory demand to that effect from this country. The Russian Ambassador said his Government had made a communiqué to the St. Petersburg press expressing the conviction that the Austro-Hungarian Government would put forward no unreasonable demands, and that this had been intended as a hint that it would be well for this Government to act with moderation. He wondered if the British Government would see its way to making a similar statement in the newspapers. I said I did not myself see that there was any occasion for this at present, so far as I was aware of what the English newspapers were saying.

(<sup>1</sup>) Nos. 58, 73.

The French Ambassador, while deploring the language of the press and noting with some anxiety the reports which reach him of growing irritation among the Serbs of Bosnia against the Dual Monarchy, is inclined on the whole to believe that in the end the Austro-Hungarian Government will see the wisdom of avoiding an armed conflict with Servia. He hears that, notwithstanding the hostile action of the Bosnian Croats against their Serb neighbours immediately after the assassinations, the understanding reached some years ago between the Croats and Serbs of Croatia has been only temporarily disturbed by recent events, and that Serbs and Croats throughout the southern provinces of the Dual Monarchy are likely to make common cause against any too oppressive measures that may be taken against them by the common Government. M. Dumaine has heard from Paris, as I have already had the honour to report by my telegram No. 93, Confidential, of the 20th July,<sup>(2)</sup> that the Italian Ambassador and Servian Minister in that capital have confided to the French Government their fears that Austria-Hungary may be led, in an outburst of anger against Servia, to make a sudden assault on Mount Lovchen, a position which, once in its hands, would enable this country to dictate its will to Montenegro and effectively to prevent armed co-operation between Montenegro and Servia. The capture of Mount Lovchen would no doubt be a serious blow to Servia as well as to Montenegro.

I trust however that my colleagues whose views I have endeavoured to summarise are right in their general belief that warlike complications will be avoided.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 71.

(34114)

No. 157.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 33.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 23, 1914.*

With reference to my Despatch No. 32 of the 17th instant,<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to report that no fewer than 4 interpellations regarding the present difficulties with Servia, one in the name of Count Julius Andrássy, appeared on yesterday's Order of the Day in the Chamber of Deputies, and Count Tisza's replies to the same were awaited with the greatest interest.

As I have already had the honour to inform you by telegram,<sup>(2)</sup> Count Tisza declared that he was still not in a position to reply to the questions addressed to him in regard to any contemplated action, but that he hoped to be able to make a detailed statement very shortly. He explained that it would not be in the interests of the country to open a discussion at the present moment on the questions which formed the subject of the interpellations.

Nevertheless a debate was commenced in which sharp criticisms were directed against the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the methods adopted by the present Government in dealing with the Southern Slavs and the dilatoriness and want of decision evinced by the Government in their treatment of the incidents arising from the assassination of the Archduke. One speaker went so far as to say: "What is the present position of the Monarchy? A few old gentlemen, retired Excellencies and aged generals, have made a close ring and keep the King hermetically sealed in. They plod along on the same old lines. Such a policy can perhaps be defended in peaceful times. But now, in a moment of crisis, what is required is more consideration, more justice, more moderation towards the Hungarian Opposition, and more energy and greater determination in dealing with these old gentlemen."

Count Tisza stated that the position of affairs was not such as to justify the

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 82.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 85.

conclusion that a serious turn for the worse was either certain or even probable; the foreign situation was still uncertain and could be solved by peaceful means, though he could not overlook the possibility of serious conflict.

The debate then turned to the question of the bitter dissensions between the Government and the Opposition, and to the grave prejudice which they caused the country at a time when all parties should show a united front to the foreign enemy. After much mutual recrimination, Count Tisza, in reply to an appeal of Count Julius Andrassy, promised that, as long as the present tension in foreign relations continued, he would on his part do all in his power to mitigate the excesses of party conflict, but though he was most eager for an understanding with the Opposition, he could not, with that object in view resign his position as leader of the Government, under present circumstances, so long as he retained the confidence of his party. His Excellency concluded by stating that he had always been prepared to take the initiative at the proper moment towards the re-establishment of normal parliamentary conditions and that he felt that the proper moment would be provided by some foreign complication. He was, however, prepared not to wait any longer for such foreign complications to arise, but at once to enter into negotiations with the Opposition with a view to restoring a healthy and regular parliamentary life and enabling the Opposition to draw a veil over the past.

It remains to be seen whether these excellent intentions will be realised or will merely remain a pious aspiration.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

(33912)

No. 158.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received July 27.)

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

I have the honour to report that, when I saw Herr von Jagow late yesterday afternoon at his weekly reception, his Excellency spoke of his own initiative about the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Government were about to make at Belgrade. He evidently had expected the Austro-Hungarian Government to act before now.

I said that I had read with interest the communiqué which had appeared in the "North German Gazette" of the 20th instant.<sup>(1)</sup> Herr von Jagow said that that communiqué faithfully represented the views of the German Government. He could tell me that he had practically drafted it himself. His Excellency observed incidentally that, although the German Bourse had been, and still was, weak, he knew for a fact that this weakness was due to the manœuvres of speculators.

Herr von Jagow maintained with great emphasis that the question at issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was one which concerned those two countries alone. Austria-Hungary felt that she must "have it out" with Serbia and he saw no reason why third parties should interfere. That being his opinion he did not see that he could have made any remarks to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the subject of their forthcoming *démarche*.

His Excellency said that he did not accuse the Servian Government of direct complicity in the plot which had led to the murder of the Archduke, but he considered that by doing nothing to check the unbridled utterances of a portion of the Servian press, the Servian Government were partly responsible for the creation of a situation which made that crime possible. He had told the Servian Minister over and over again that it was very desirable that Serbia should put her relations with Austria-Hungary on a proper footing and should take steps to control the Servian press. The

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. Nos. 73, 77.



Minister had replied that the press was free in Servia and that his Government could not control it.

Herr von Jagow remarked to me that if a man had a neighbour who either could not or would not put a stop to a nuisance, he had the right to help himself as best he could. His Excellency considered that Austria had shown great forbearance for a considerable time past. I understood this remark to apply to the Austrian attitude in Balkan affairs generally, and this impression was confirmed when Herr von Jagow added that if he had been Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, he would have annexed the Sandjak.

The impression left on me by this conversation was that Herr von Jagow would approve prompt and vigorous action on the part of Austria-Hungary at the present juncture, and that he is aware of the general character of the *démarche* to be made at Belgrade.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

MINUTE.

This confirms the impression that Herr von Jagow has, if anything, egged on the Austrians.—*E. A. C. July 29.*

(33914)

No. 159.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.---(Received July 27.)*

(No. 301.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

The Berlin press has almost without exception expressed complete approval of the attitude adopted by the Austro-Hungarian Government in the note addressed to the Servian Government. The hope is generally expressed that any conflict which may ensue will be solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but at the same time it is made quite clear that if any other Great Power intervenes the German people will be prepared to support their Austrian allies, if necessary by force of arms.

The "*Lokal-Anzeiger*" is so far the only newspaper to print an article which can in any way be assumed to represent the views of the German Government. This article is as follows:—

"We have before us an historical document of the first order. To appreciate properly the tone and contents of this note, one must in the first place bear in mind that its authors composed it under the influence of the wrathful indignation inspired by the crime of Serajevo. They had hitherto maintained complete self-control and had not been afraid even to incur the reproach of weakness and indecision. Now however that they had put pen to paper to establish the responsibility for the murder of the Austrian Heir Apparent and to draw the inevitable deductions, every sentence of this terrible indictment breathes a spirit of scornful indignation against the leaders and instigators of the Pan-Slav movement. With outspoken clearness the Servian Government are held responsible for what has happened, with stern directness all the facts are marshalled which have been a cause of so much trouble to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy during recent years. Vienna and Budapest have taken some time to consider the matter but they have at last made up their minds to take the bull by the horns and hold him fast until peace and security shall have been safeguarded for all time. Count Berchtold and Count Tisza have couched their accusations and demands in language which accords well with the fateful gravity of the situation and no one can any longer be in doubt as to what is now at stake. The Servian Government have had time enough to prepare for this eventuality: they are well enough informed as to the proceedings and state of feeling in the Dual Monarchy to know



that the patience even of the aged and much tried Emperor is exhausted. The short time limit set to them should therefore be sufficient for them to take such decisions as they think fit. The day of reckoning with Serbia is at hand. After the events of recent years its coming was inevitable if our ally did not mean to sacrifice her prestige in the world and especially in the Near East. Speculations on this point have been rife, but all doubts have now been set at rest and we may note with great satisfaction that the requirements of the situation have been recognised at Vienna and courageously enunciated.

"This note will be regarded as a severe blow at Belgrade. There is no doubt that the Servian Government are faced by a disastrous choice—they have now got to pay for past misdeeds. Either they accept the humiliating conditions of the note, which must damage their prestige for a long time to come, or else they refuse—in that case the Austrian guns, which have too often been loaded and unloaded in the past, will go off. There will be no further question of haggling, bargaining or negotiating, the time for consideration, goodwill, hope and confidence is past. Serbia must make her choice quickly and without reserve. She will perhaps sound St. Petersburg, Paris, Bucharest and Athens. But it will avail her nothing. Vienna knows what she wants, and she will not rest until her wishes have been enforced in their entirety. The German people are relieved to feel that the Balkan situation is at last to be cleared up. They congratulate their ally on her resolute decision and will not fail to give proof of their loyalty and readiness to help in the difficult days which may possibly be in store for her."

In its evening issue the "Lokal-Anzeiger" was still more decided in its attitude:—

"There is no going back," it says, "either for the Dual Monarchy or for those who are determined loyally to fulfil their duties as allies if serious contingencies arise."

With reference to Russia the same article goes on to say:—

"We cannot assume that she will be prepared to touch a thing which is stained with innocent blood. Serbia will fulfil the Austrian demands—or else she will go under."

The Conservative "Kreuz-Zeitung," after expressing full approval of the action of Austria-Hungary, goes on to express the hope that the internal situation in Russia will prevent that country from doing anything to stiffen the back of Serbia. France, it thinks, is for the moment comparatively peaceably inclined and, "as England is completely taken up with the Home Rule question," it considers that Serbia has little prospect of support from the Powers of the Triple Entente. It was therefore to be hoped, the paper continues, that Serbia would, however unwillingly consent to Austria's demands. Even if popular passions or other unforeseen circumstances should upset this calculation, there was reason to expect that the inevitable war would be localised between Austria and Serbia. The German Government would no doubt use their influence in this direction, whilst England was doing the same as regards her friends. In any case, however, Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary was fully operative, and it was perhaps desirable to emphasise the fact that the German people were in all circumstances ready and willing to meet to the fullest extent the obligations arising out of that alliance.

Similarly the "Tägliche Rundschau" says:—

"How is Germany affected by all this? Primarily not at all, if Austria and Serbia are let alone. But to the last degree if, contrary to all statesmanlike expectations and in the face of the most elementary moral sense, such should not be the case."

Even the Radical "Tageblatt" endorses the action of Austria-Hungary. "However much," it says, "every decent person must wish for the maintenance of peace, it must be admitted that Austria-Hungary could not have acted otherwise—and she can count on the fullest moral and material support at any rate of her allies, in the action now undertaken."

The Liberal "Vossische Zeitung" too admits that Austria could not have acted otherwise if she wished to maintain her position as a Great Power. The future of the Hapsburg Monarchy, it says, was now at stake. Either that Monarchy would put forth all its strength to restore an imposing Edifice of State, or else total ruin would be the result. "What Austria is now doing, she is compelled to do in self-defence; but whoever seeks to intervene without just cause, would be committing an outrage against his own people and against all the peoples of Europe."

The only adverse criticism of the note which I have seen has appeared, curiously enough, in the Pan-German and Chauvinist "Post." The note it says, was no note but an ultimatum of the stiffest description. It was convinced of the *bona fides* of the Austro-Hungarian Government in attributing the Serajevo murder to Servian intrigues. But on what did they base their weighty accusation? Even if a Servian Major had had a hand in the intrigue and Servian frontier officials had been bribed and involved in the affair, it was going rather far to accuse a whole people of the murder, as was clearly implied in the note. Why did Austria not publish the evidence which she must surely have in her possession, why did she not furnish incontrovertible proof that she was not animated solely by a desire for revenge, and that there were solid facts which proved the existence of a Pan-Slav conspiracy against the Monarchy? The brief assertions made were certainly of a compromising nature for Servia, but one ought to know what the latter had to say in her own defence. Austria, however, left no time for a reply. She insisted on immediate compliance with a series of impossible demands. Why was it that she acted in this way? She knew that her prestige was at stake. It was evident that she wanted to bring about a war with Servia.

Hence arose the question whether she was right in thinking that Servia was so weakened by the last two Balkan wars as to be incapable of serious resistance, and also whether the Czech and Southern Slav regiments were reliable. A further question of great moment also presented itself—would and could the Austro-Servian conflict be localised? This question could hardly, at present, be answered. It all depended on the attitude of Russia, and no one could guarantee that she would be content to remain a passive spectator. The pride of Bulgaria must also be taken into consideration, for she might be expected to regard with favour an opportunity to wipe out old scores against her hated rival. And if Russia supported Servia, would not France think that the moment had come to attack Germany, and so prevent her from supporting Austria?

"A whole string of questions," it concludes, "is involved in the delivery of the Austrian note. Never was the danger of a European war more imminent than now. Austria ought to realise her responsibility for the energy which she has now so unexpectedly displayed . . . Is Austria acting independently? Well and good. Let her continue to act independently. We can wait."

The frequent comments on the habitual vacillation and indecision of the Vienna Cabinet, which appeared in the Press before the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note, have practically amounted to goading on the Austro-Hungarian Government to take resolute and determined action once for all.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

#### MINUTE.

If it is the case that the articles in the "Lokal-Anzeiger" may be assumed to represent the views of the German Government, it is not surprising that Austria should have felt she was being encouraged from Berlin.—*E. A. C. July 29.*

(33916)

No. 160.

*Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 303.) Confidential.

Sir,

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

The French Ambassador asked me to go and see him this morning. M. Cambon enquired what I thought of the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia. I said that it contained certain demands, notably Nos. 5 and 6 which it appeared to me difficult for an independent State to accept. His Excellency agreed and said that, in his opinion, there would be war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

M. Cambon went on to say that in his view it was more than a coincidence that the Note should have been presented at Belgrade at the moment when the French President was leaving St. Petersburg. Discussion between M. Viviani and M. Sazonow was now precluded for the moment. He then showed me a telegram which he had just received from the French Ambassador at Vienna. In this telegram M. Dumaine reported that, in the event of the rejection of their demands, the Austro-Hungarian Government were prepared to act with eight Army Corps. M. Dumaine further stated that Count Tisza had warned the Austrian Government that, given the composition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a war, even with Serbia alone, would raise the racial question in a dangerous form. The French Ambassador at Vienna further reported that his German colleague had been active in advising resolute action against Serbia, though he admitted that he did not see eye to eye with the German Government on this point. M. Cambon said that he was going to see Herr von Jagow in the afternoon and should tell him privately that Herr von Tschirschky was partly to blame for the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called at this Embassy in the course of the afternoon. He took a very gloomy view of the outcome of the crisis. He did not know what course his Government would take. It might be that if the King of Serbia abdicated, a new situation would arise which might induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate their demands. I said that the time limit made this difficult. I also said that Russia was so great and so important that she could afford not to consider the question of prestige in dealing with Slav opinion.

The French Ambassador came to the Embassy on his way back from the Foreign Office. I have had the honour to report by telegraph the substance of his conversation with Herr von Jagow.<sup>(1)</sup> As M. Cambon was on the point of leaving the latter, Herr von Jagow asked him whether he considered the situation serious. M. Cambon replied that he considered the situation very serious.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

MINUTE.

Herr von Tschirschky has apparently been another link in the chain of encouragement given to Austria to go ahead ruthlessly.—*F. A. C. July 29.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 103.

(33981)

No. 161.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 276.) Confidential.

Sir,

Rome, July 22, 1914.

I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to Rome yesterday evening to attend a banquet given by the Persian Minister to celebrate the coronation of the Shah. As I was placed next to his Excellency, we had an



opportunity for some conversation and he at once began to speak of the grave situation existing between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He was afraid a dangerous spirit of excitement and self-confidence existed at Belgrade. He however still had hopes that the known pacific aims of the Emperor would prevent the precipitation of a crisis. Should Serbia, as she anticipated, be supported by Russia, there was no doubt that Germany would join Austria. This did not merely depend on her obligations as an ally, but Germany believed that it was a vital question for Austria if she was to maintain her position and prestige, to achieve a success, and it was Germany's interest to promote it. What, then, I asked, would Italy do and how far did her obligations bind her? He said the Triple Alliance was purely for defensive purposes. It remained to be seen in what direction events would move. Obviously nothing could be further from Italy's desire than to become a party in such a struggle. I saw his Excellency again this morning and he then told me that he had every reason to fear that the communication which the Austro-Hungarian Government were about to make to Serbia had been drafted in terms which Serbia must regard as unacceptable.<sup>(1)</sup> There was just a hope that as Count Berchtold had been to Ischl, the Emperor might cause its terms to be somewhat modified. There was, however, a party in Austria—the strongest party—which aimed at taking this opportunity for crushing Serbia. It was not of course Italy's interest that Serbia should be crushed.

I said it was to be hoped that both our countries would be able to steer clear of any conflict. It was hardly conceivable that we should be drawn into a struggle where no direct interests of our own were involved, where, in fact, in the case of Italy, she would probably be siding against her own real interests.

The Marquis Di San Giuliano said that as our two nations were associated with groups which were by force of circumstances likely to be ranged in antagonism, it seemed quite conceivable that in the special circumstances of the case, we might arrange to "pair," like members of the British Parliament.

We were of course only discussing hypotheses which it is earnestly to be hoped may never be realised, but this new form of counter-insurance seemed rather to commend itself to him.

An Austrian success which would extend her influence in the Adriatic or enable her to acquire any new position there would of course bring her into conflict with her ally, and Italy has now to contemplate the eventuality of being called upon indirectly to contribute to such a result. Under all the circumstances, in view of the far from satisfactory internal situation in this country and of the reaction which appears to be setting in against the gravitation towards Vienna which Italian foreign policy has assumed during the last two years, it is difficult for me to believe that some way will not be found here, if a conflict should arise, of evading the obligations of an alliance, the perils of which the present situation is calculated forcibly to illustrate.

In the ante-room I saw the Servian Chargé d'Affaires, who assured me that it was only the minor papers of no importance that were attacking Austria in his country. The general tone at Belgrade was calm. Unfortunately the Austrian press was making capital out of these second-rate newspapers and reproducing their articles as typical of Servian opinion.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. *Telegram No. 78.*



(33982)

No. 162.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 278.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Rome, July 23, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that the Secretary General whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office spoke to me much in the same terms as I have reported in my despatch No. 276 of yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had spoken about the issue between Austria-Hungary and Servia. I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. He also took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusiones which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. In view of the very grave consequences which may ensue, it is evident that the Italian Government are already preoccupied with studying the manner in which they can best find a plausible reason for not becoming involved.

I have, &amp;c.

RENNELL RODD.

*Published in BB No. 38 (parts omitted).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 161.

(33986)

No. 163.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)*

(No. 282.)

Sir,

*Rome, July 23, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that the Bulgarian Minister who has just returned to Rome after a visit to Bulgaria came to see me yesterday. M. Rizoff, as I have on several occasions pointed out, is a capable and very well-informed representative and I have generally found his information on Balkan matters to be correct. He was of course chiefly concerned to discuss the menacing situation between Austria-Hungary and Servia and the probable attitude of Russia in the event of a crisis. As conditions in Russia are always closely followed by Bulgaria it was interesting to hear his views on the subject. He was of opinion that the revolutionary spirit is very rife in Russia at the present time and is seriously preoccupying the Government. It had spread to even the country populations where the peasants assembled to hear books and newspapers read by anyone who possessed letters. Maxime Gorky was just now the name to conjure with in Russia. The whole movement was really agrarian and concerned with the ambition of the people to obtain possession of the land. Pan-slav movements were for the educated and the few. The pretext might be a useful one to employ, but he did not think it affected the mass of the people. It was a question now whether a war would not hasten the outbreak of a revolutionary movement. On the other hand there is always the possibility that a war may create a diversion and turn a dangerous spirit into a new channel. He was on the whole inclined to believe that internal conditions in Russia would give the Government pause and make them hesitate to accept the greater risk of war.

As regards his own country he felt assured that neutrality would be observed. Not that Bulgaria was in any way incapacitated by her recent disastrous experiences. Her state of preparedness was as high and probably better than before the Balkan campaign. The only war that the Bulgarian people would at the present time contemplate with any enthusiasm would be one against Roumania. But even of that

he was persuaded that there was no danger. The obvious policy for Bulgaria was to keep out of any entanglements and to watch events and eventually perhaps she would find an opportunity in the misfortunes of others to recover something of what she had lost in the second Balkan struggle. His country people at the present time showed no great predilections for one or the other group of Powers. The only country to which they felt attracted was Great Britain, because the British people and press were the only ones in Europe that had shown impartiality and had condemned Roumania's attitude in taking advantage of the moment when Bulgaria stood with her back against the wall.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

*Cf. No. 649.*

No. 164.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

*St. Petersburg, July 23, 1914.*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have seen but little of Sazonow during the past fortnight, as he only returned from the country on the eve of Poincaré's arrival and since then I have only met him once at a party. In the one regular conversation which I had with him last Saturday he discussed the Persian question in a very conciliatory spirit, and you will have seen from my telegram that both he and the Emperor have given the French President satisfactory assurances as to the instructions sent to the Russian consuls. I had, at Paléologue's request, furnished Poincaré with an *Aide-mémoire* respecting all the more important points which we have raised with regard to Persia: and both he and Viviani seem to have discussed the whole question at length with Sazonow and to have been quite satisfied with what he told them. They both spoke to me about the Trans-Persian Railway and expressed the hope that we would come to an agreement on the lines proposed by the Russian Government. I have telegraphed what Klemm said to me on the subject and I personally think that the Russian proposal is a reasonable one. The Russians are very anxious to begin the construction of the lines in the North before the Bagdad Railway nears completion and if we give them satisfaction on this point they will be the more disposed to listen to any proposals which we may put forward about the Persian question in general. The present is, I think, a propitious moment for trying to settle all these outstanding questions: but unfortunately there is very little time left for negotiations as Sazonow still talks of going away for a holiday about the middle of our August. If we allow the negotiations to drag on till the autumn he may not be in such an accommodating mood as he is at present.

Both he and Poincaré are much perturbed about Austro-Servian relations. Sazonow takes a very reasonable view of the situation and will make no difficulties if Austria confines her action to asking for an official enquiry in the event of her being able to prove that the plot against the Arch Duke was hatched in Servia. If on the contrary she makes the Arch Duke's assassination a pretext for adopting an aggressive attitude towards Servia, Russia will sooner or later be forced to intervene in some way or another. Sazonow has spoken very strongly to Pourtalès on the subject and, while assuring him that the one thing Russia desires is to be left in peace in order that she may develop her internal resources, said that, though Russia was "pacifiste" she could not remain "passive" under provocation. Sazonow regards Tisza and Forgach as two very dangerous men and fears that the latter's influence at the Ball Platz is all powerful. I knew Forgach at Sofia and always regarded him

with the greatest distrust. He is very intelligent and very ambitious but utterly unscrupulous.

\* \* \* \* \*

We have had a series of very bad strikes during the past week. They are entirely political in character; and the Secret Committee that organises them has seized the moment of the withdrawal of the troops from Petersburg to Krasnoe, for the review to be held to-day in Poincaré's honour, to try to intimidate the Government. They are the outcome of the reactionary policy of Maklakoff, the Minister of the Interior, and till he allows the workmen to have recognised organisations of their own, with whom the Government can deal in times of trouble Russian industry will be at the mercy of an unknown Secret Committee that enforces strikes by terroristic methods.

Ever yours,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

(33902)

No. 165.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

D. July 26, 12 midnight.

R. July 27.

Tel. (No. 107.)

Following from Military Attaché for the D.M.O. :—

“Following is confidential :—

“Only units of 2nd Vienna corps affected are 44th and 99th regiments, which left without waiting for reservists last night. It is believed that they are to replace two Austro-Serb regiments of 13th corps. Reservists for 4th and 99th regiments are now being equipped and will follow in batches. First day of mobilisation is 28th July. Mobilisation placards affecting 13th and 3rd corps (Trieste) are confirmed.

“At Semlin presence of three heavy howitzer batteries and complete monitor squadron is confirmed. Passage of troop trains through Maria Theresiopel is confirmed. Calculations as to time required to concentrate on three centres Serajevo, Peterwardein and Temesvar is as follows: 28th, 29th inclusive, mobilisation, 30th July to 4th August inclusive, transport of troops. 5th August considered earliest day on which general advance possible. Italian intelligence practically same as French, except that 3rd corps replaces 6th corps. Rumour that Chief of Staff has left Vienna is unconfirmed.”

(33903)

No. 166.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

D. July 26, 12 midnight.

R. July 27, 9.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 108.)

Military attaché's information is that mobilisation will be completed 31st July, and concentration near the Servian frontier about 5th August. Russian Ambassador, just returned from leave, does not propose to press for more time in sense of last paragraph of your telegram No. 153 of 25th July.<sup>(1)</sup> He thinks that the Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent. French and Russian Ambassadors were with me when repetition of your telegram No. 232 of 26th July to Paris<sup>(2)</sup> arrived. I informed them of its

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 118.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 140.



contents, with which they both expressed their great satisfaction, though doubting if either Austro-Hungarian Government or German Government would accept the principle that Russia is an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute.

Italian Ambassador was also instructed to support Russian request for postponement of time limit, but too late to take any useful action. Italian Ambassador expressed to me in confidence his strong disapprobation of terms of ultimatum, and generally of Austro-Hungarian policy regarding Servia.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 40 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

(83964)

No. 167.

*Consul-General Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Odessa, July 27, 1914.*

D. 12:45 P.M.

R. 12 noon.

Tel. (No. 9.)

Yesterday evening I saw telegram from Servian Government to the Consul-General, calling up all their reservists.

South-western Railway here declared on war footing since midnight, all the officials on leave recalled. Twenty-seven trains left here for all parts of this military district.

Troops camping in the neighbourhood of Odessa ordered to return.

(84007)

No. 168.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Christiania, July 27, 1914.*

D. 11:15 A.M.

R. 12:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 15.)

On the receipt of instructions men-of-war have all taken in considerable quantities of coal and are reported to be sailing at eight this morning.

Eleven ships reported still in Sognefjord at midday yesterday. Four reported proceeding south, thirty miles south of Stavanger, possibly escort of Emperor.

All German naval officers' families have been ordered to return to Stettin at once on a destroyer.

[NOTE.—A further telegram (No. 17) from Mr. Findlay despatched July 27, 10:30 P.M., and received July 28, 8 A.M., reads: British vice-consul at Molde has reported departure at 3 P.M., 26th July, of the following German ships: "Hannover," "Schleswig-Holstein," "Moltke," "Deutschland," "Pommern," "Seydlitz" and "Stralsund."]

(84060)

No. 169.

*Sir H. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Copenhagen, July 27, 1914.*

D. 11:55 A.M.

R. 12:55 P.M.

Tel. (No. 17.) *En clair.*

President of French Republic who was expected in Copenhagen to-day has cancelled his official visit at the last moment.

*Cf. despatch No. 646.*



(34092)

No. 170.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

D. 10·6 A.M.

R. 1·15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 173.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday a long conversation with Austrian Ambassador, in which latter tried to explain away objectionable features of Austria's recent action.<sup>(1)</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he perfectly understood Austria's motives, but ultimatum had been drafted in such a form as to render it impossible for Serbia to accept it as a whole. While some of demands were reasonable enough, others were not only incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent State, but could not possibly be put into immediate execution, as they entailed revision of her existing laws. Russia, his Excellency added, was object of such suspicion in Austria that it would be useless for her to offer her good offices at Belgrade. He thought, however, England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria with a view to putting an end to present tension. Ambassador promised to inform his Government of what his Excellency had said.

In reply to question Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to me, I said that I had in conversation, reported in my telegram No. 166 of 24th July,<sup>(2)</sup> correctly defined attitude of His Majesty's Government, and that you could not promise to do more. His Excellency was wrong in believing that we should promote cause of peace by telling Germany if she supported Austria by force of arms she would have us to deal with as well as France and Russia. Such a menace would but stiffen her attitude, and it was only by approaching her as a friend anxious to preserve peace that we could induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war. If, however, we were to succeed, his Excellency must do nothing to precipitate a conflict, and I therefore trusted that mobilisation ukase would be deferred as long as possible, and that when it was issued troops would not be allowed to cross frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did not believe that we should succeed in winning over Germany to cause of peace unless we publicly proclaimed our solidarity with France and Russia. No effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken until Imperial ukase was issued, and if it was deferred too long Austria would profit by delay to make her military preparations complete, while Russia could do nothing. Order to mobilise might perhaps be accompanied by a statement that troops would be retained on this side of the frontier. He could not tell me when ukase would be issued, but spoke of day on which Austrian army entered Serbia as a likely date.

His Excellency strongly condemned arrest of Servian General Poutnik in Hungary as likely to aggravate present tension.

(Repeated to Paris.)

*Published in BB No. 44 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

#### MINUTE.

Sir G. Buchanan spoke well.

I am afraid that the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question of mobilization. Austria is already mobilizing. This, if the war does come, is a serious menace to Russia who cannot be expected to delay her own mobilization, which, as it is, can only become effective in something like double the time required by Austria and by Germany.

If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned Germany will do the same, and as German mobilization is directed almost entirely against France, the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilization for even the fraction of a day.

<sup>(1)</sup> See A II No. 73.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 101.

From Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 109<sup>(3)</sup> just come in, it seems certain that Austria is going to war because that was from the beginning her intention.

If that view proves correct, it would be neither possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilizing.

This however means that within 24 hours His Majesty's Government will be faced with the question whether, in a quarrel so imposed by Austria on an unwilling France, Great Britain will stand idly aside, or take sides. The question is a momentous one, which it is not for a departmental minute to elaborate.

It is difficult not to remember the position of Prussia in 1805, when she insisted on keeping out of the war which she could not prevent from breaking out between the other Powers over questions not, on their face, of direct interest to Prussia.

The war was waged without Prussia in 1805. But in 1806 she fell a victim to the Power that had won in 1805, and no one was ready either to help her or to prevent her political ruin and partition.—*E. A. C. July 27.*

(<sup>3</sup>) No. 175.

(34332)

No. 171.

*Communication by the Servian Minister.*

Sir Edward Grey,

*July 27, 1914.*

The Servian Minister this morning gave me the text of the Servian reply to read, he will send me a copy this afternoon.<sup>(1)</sup> So far as I could gather from a simple perusal it practically concedes all the Austrian demands, and it is difficult to see how Austria can honestly proceed to hostile operations when Servia has yielded so much. I am glad to see that our military attaché at Vienna reports that mobilization will not be finished till Friday and concentration near Servian frontier completed by Wednesday week, so we have a few days ahead of us.

The Servian Minister was instructed to say that his Government hoped that after reading the reply H.M. Government would be ready to assist Servia towards a pacific issue. I told him I would transmit his message to you, and that he could understand that we were anxious to see a peaceful solution.

A. N.

#### MINUTES.

A careful comparison of the Austrian Note and the Servian reply shows that the latter has been read at Vienna with a fixed determination to find it unsatisfactory, for it swallows nearly all the Austrian demands "en bloc," and it is difficult not to consider such reservations as are made quite reasonable.

The differences are as follows:—

In the notice to be published in the "Journal Officiel" and in Army Orders, the Servian Government condemn "all" or "any" instead of "the" propaganda directed against Austria.

In undertaking 2, the Servian Government do not bind themselves to prevent the "Narodna Odbrana" and other such societies from continuing their activity under other names and forms. This has been seized upon by Austria as a cause for dissatisfaction, though there is nothing to show that Servia would not be willing to dissolve any new societies or clubs against whom evidence was brought.

In undertaking 3, the Servians do not specifically mention "le corps enseignant" and ask for proofs of the propaganda fomented by public instruction.

In 4, Servia will comply, on proof.

As regards 5, Servia asks for a more precise definition of what is wanted.

Point 6 contains the only direct refusal, namely, to admit Austrian participation in a criminal enquiry on Servian soil, for reasons which are at least good arguments.

And on point 9, Servia asks for instances.

Otherwise, with the addition of a plea for reference to the Hague or the Powers, the Servian note meets Austria's demands.—*G. R. C. July 28, 1914.*

The answer is reasonable. If Austria demands absolute compliance with her ultimatum it can only mean that she wants a war. For she knows perfectly well that some of the demands are such as no State can accept, as they are tantamount to accepting a protectorate.—*E. A. C. July 28.*

(<sup>1</sup>) Printed, with Austrian comments, in Appendix B.

(34891)

No. 172.

*Communication by the Swiss Minister.*

Sir Edward Grey,

July 27, 1914.

The Swiss Minister called to say that His Government had telegraphed in regard to the situation, being extremely anxious as to the position of Switzerland in the event of the European conflict. I told him that I had still hopes that a conflict might be averted so long as no active military operations were undertaken, and hitherto none had been undertaken. Every day that passed was a day gained in favour of the efforts of those who were working for a pacific solution. M. Carlin observed that the Servian Government seemed to have conceded practically all the Austrian demands. I said that so it appeared to me, and this fact strengthened my hope of peace.

A. N.

(34568)

No. 173.

*Communication from the French Embassy.*

Sir A. Nicolson,

M. de Fleuriau asked me to note that the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had told his French colleague that opinion in Vienna was convinced that "la Russie ne tiendrait pas le coup."

Russia has decided to mobilize "en principe" 13 army corps. but the mobilization is only to become effective if Austria employs force against Servia.

M. Cambon returns at 11 this evening.

G. R. C.

27/7/14.

(34569)

No. 174.

*Communication from the French Embassy.*

M. de Fleuriau, finding Sir A. Nicolson engaged this morning, asked me to take a note of the following information :—

Yesterday (Sunday) afternoon, the German Ambassador in Paris asked the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French Government should urge moderation in St. Petersburg. M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that such a step depended on similar action being taken by Germany at Vienna, to which Herr von Schoen answered that this would not be in conformity with the attitude taken up by Germany *vis-à-vis* of Austria and Servia. The acting Minister for Foreign Affairs then suggested that the four non-interested Powers should offer their intervention: the Ambassador had no instructions.

Later in the evening the German Ambassador again saw the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and proposed a communiqué to the press to the effect that, during their conversations, M. Bienvenu-Martin and Herr v. Schoen had endeavoured to find a way whereby the Powers could ensure peace.

The Ambassador expressed his personal surprise that Austria was not satisfied with the Servian reply. He insisted on the desire of the German Government for peace, and said that if *we* (the British Government) were to give good advice at St. Petersburg it would be helpful. He thought that Austria would decline formal mediation or a conference, but that the sound of a pacific note from St. Petersburg and conciliatory advice from the Powers would be well received.

M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that Germany was in the best position to speak with effect at Vienna, especially now that Servia has practically accepted all the Austrian conditions. The rupture of diplomatic relations and mobilization by Austria



made any intervention urgent, as the day the Austrian forces entered Serbia, the situation would oblige Russia to declare herself and would precipitate the war which Germany wished to avoid.

Herr v. Schoen agreed and observed that he did not say that Germany would not give advice at Vienna.

G. R. C.

27/7/14.

*Cf. No. 184; also F Nos. 56, 57, and R II*

MINUTE.

The German attitude is, to my mind, an untenable one if Germany really, as she so profusely professes, desires peace. She declines to take or evades taking any action at Vienna—and one would imagine that Russia was the aggressive and provocative party and was to be restrained while Austria dealt with Serbia. A long telegram from Vienna by Dr. Dillon in to-day's D.T. is worth reading.

Dr. Dillon is an intimate friend of Count Berchtold and he is evidently stating Austrian case with a naked simplicity which is notable. He avows that the Servian "question" is merely a pretext for an endeavour, in conjunction with Germany, to re-establish Austria's position in the Balkans and to displace Russia and it is stated that no intervention or mediation will be allowed. We are witnessing a most cynical and desperate measure and Germany should, for her own reputation, show facts that she is not willing to associate herself with it or in any case will assist in mitigating its effects and limit its scope.—A. N.

(34179)

No. 175.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 2.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 109.)

After conversations with all my colleagues of the Great Powers, I believe that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Serbia, that she believes her position as a Great Power is at stake, that her note was drawn up so as to make war inevitable, and that she is unlikely to listen to proposals for mediation until punishment has been inflicted on Serbia. If Russian Ambassador is rightly informed, effort of Germany to isolate conflict must fail, as he believes that Russia will be compelled to act. Postponement or prevention of war with Serbia would undoubtedly be a great disappointment in this country, which has gone wild with joy at prospect of war. Italian Ambassador is greatly concerned, and is casting about for a means of circumscribing conflict which he regards as inevitable. He asked me this morning if I thought following might be usefully proposed:—

Austria to repeat to Powers in form of positive engagement promise already made to Russia to the effect that she desires neither to annex any territory nor to crush Serbia, nor to deprive her of her independence, but merely to obtain guarantees for future.

His Excellency thought that possibly Russia might consent to keep quiet. He would think it over and perhaps communicate with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs as to terms of possible formula. He begged that his name might not be mentioned as having thrown out this suggestion, which was still in a very crude form.

I informed his Excellency of proposal you are making for a conference of less interested Powers in London. He spoke gratefully of your efforts for peace, which had been so useful before, but feared that proposed inclusion of Russia among the directly interested Powers would be obstacle to acceptance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot receive me till 11 A.M. to-morrow. Unless you have any special directions to send me, I propose to express hope of His Majesty's



Government that war may yet be avoided, and to ask whether his Excellency cannot suggest even now way out.<sup>(1)</sup>

(Repeated to Paris No. 245; Berlin No. 209; Rome No. 204; St. Petersburg No. 378; Belgrade (Nish) No. 22.)

*Published in BB No. 41 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

#### MINUTE.

The suggestion of the Italian Ambassador seems to me too vague for any practical purpose. If Austria proposes neither to annex nor to crush Serbia nor to deprive her of her independence, then it is difficult to know what meaning to attach to the alternative of "obtaining guarantees for the future."

The outlook is bad. All now depends on what line Germany may be prepared to take.—*E. A. C. July 27.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 187.

(34245)

No. 176.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 208.)

D. 3 P.M.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Minister for Foreign Affairs has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

(Repeated to Paris No. 241/2; Vienna No. 165/6; Rome No. 202/3; and St. Petersburg No. 375/6: "You should inform M.F.A.")

*Published in BB No. 46.*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 258.*

(34246)

No. 177.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 377.)

D. 3.30 P.M.

My telegram No. 208 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.<sup>(1)</sup>

Russian Ambassador tells me that impression prevails in German and Austrian circles that we shall stand aside in any event, and deplored effect of this impression.

I have pointed out that orders we have given to First Fleet, which happens to be concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave ought to dispel this impression, though Russian Ambassador must not take my reference to it as meaning that we promised anything more than diplomatic action.

I also observed that we hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe that so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory Russia will not take any action. I added that it would be absurd for us to appear at Berlin and Vienna to be more Servian than the Russians are.

(Repeated to Paris No. 243/4: "You may inform M.F.A.")

*Published in BB No. 47 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.

(34210)

No. 178.

*Consul Bosanquet to Sir Edward Grey.**Riga, July 27, 1914.*

D. 2.55 P.M.

Tel.

R. 3.30 P.M.

Mines have been laid down at Bolderaa and no vessels are allowed in or out.

Reported all troops in camp in this neighbourhood have been ordered to the frontier. Bolderaa is reported to be on a war footing. Please acknowledge.

(Repeated to Embassy.)

*Cf. No. 228.*

(34212)

No. 179.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

D. 2.13 P.M.

Tel. (No. 174.)

R. 3.45 P.M.

French Ambassador informs me that since my conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, reported in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day<sup>(1)</sup> his Excellency has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg as to modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 45 (paraphrased).**Cf. No. 205.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 170.

## MINUTE.

This is confusing. In three consecutive days M. Sazonof has made one suggestion and two proposals all differing from each other.

1. The suggestion.—If Serbia were to appeal to the Powers, Russia would stand aside and leave question in hands of England, France, Italy and Germany (July 25).<sup>(2)</sup>
2. July 26.—Proposal to Austrian Ambassador that England and Italy should collaborate with Austria with a view to putting an end to present tension.<sup>(1)</sup>
3. July 27.—Proposal that Russia will converse directly with Vienna.

One really does not know where one is with M. Sazonof and I told Count Benckendorff so this afternoon.—A. N.

*Cf. Letter No. 239.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 170.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 125.

(84214)

No. 180.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Christiania, July 27, 1914.*

D. 8.25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 16.)

R. 4 P.M.

French President has put off his visit to King of Norway.

(84213)

No. 181.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Brussels, July 27, 1914.*

D. 2.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 2.)

R. 4 P.M.

Statements appear in the Belgian newspapers this morning with regard to partial mobilization and other military preparations, but I have ascertained that these are unfounded. No measures of the kind have so far been taken by the Belgian Government.

*Cf. despatch No. 243.*

(84215)

No. 182.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Budapest, July 27, 1914.*

D. 12.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 5.)

R. 4.5 P.M.

My telegram No. 4 of July 26th.<sup>(1)</sup>

Chief of Servian General Staff released last night and sent by special train to Servian frontier.

Popular demonstrations in favour of war continue.

(Sent to Vienna.)

## MINUTE.

The release was a wise measure.—E. A. C. July 27.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 152.

(34227)

No. 183.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 27, 1914.*

D. 2:45 P.M.

R. 4:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 88.)

Your telegrams Nos. 232 and 234 of yesterday :<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

French Government accept your proposal and have sent instructions accordingly to French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening. French Ambassador in Berlin instructed to concert with British Ambassador as to advisability of joining him in speaking to the German Government. French representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade have also received necessary instructions, but Ministry for Foreign Affairs thinks that it would be dangerous for *Entente* Ambassadors to speak at Vienna until it is known that Germans have done so with some success.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs gathers from German Ambassador that Austrians are particularly suspicious of words "intervention," "mediation" and "conference" and suggests therefore that care should be taken to speak of conversations, moderating advice, &c.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 42 (paraphrased and part omitted).**Cf. No. 194.*<sup>(1)</sup> Nos. 140, 143.

(34228)

No. 184.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 27, 1914.*

D. 3:42 P.M.

R. 6 P.M.

Tel. (No. 89.)

My telegram No. 82 of 25th July :<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

German Ambassador has had several further interviews with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Acting Political Director and persuaded them to insert a communiqué in order to allay press campaign against Germany. Following communiqué appeared this morning :—

"German Ambassador and Acting President of the Council have had a fresh conversation, in the course of which they considered what measures could be taken by Powers for maintenance of peace."

German Ambassador is much dissatisfied, and has expressed his desire for stronger wording and for phrase indicating "solidarity" between the Powers and for description of conversation as "very friendly." Ministry for Foreign Affairs propose to do no more.

German Ambassador constantly repeats that all depends on Russia, and Ministry for Foreign Affairs look upon this as a bad sign.

I think we ought to urge French Government to issue notice suggested by German Ambassador.

*See despatch No. 193, also Nos. 174 and 204, and F No. 62, R No. 35 and R II.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 123.



## MINUTES.

There is probably more behind all this than meets the eye. The German hardly concealed endeavour is to get all the Powers to declare that the quarrel between Austria and Serbia in no way concerns any third parties. This no doubt is what M. de Schoen means by the "solidarity" of all the Powers. I imagine the French are afraid that if they agree to such an announcement of "solidarity," this will be exploited at Berlin and used at St. Petersburg to prove to Russia that France is a lukewarm supporter.

There may of course be some other explanation of the difference between the Acting French M.F.A. and the German Ambassador. But whatever the explanation is, I doubt whether we should be wise in mixing ourselves up in this journalistic controversy or giving unpalatable advice to the French Government in a matter in which it is at present difficult to see clear, but which cannot, I think, be of really great importance.—*E. A. C. July 27.*

We cannot suggest to the French Government how they should word their "communiqués" of conversations in which we had no part. We certainly had far better not interfere in these matters.—*A. N.*

(34231)

No. 185.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 27, 1914.**D. 6.17 P.M.**R. 9 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 96.)

Your telegram No. 232 of 26th July to Paris.<sup>(1)</sup>

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace, fall in with your suggestion. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 43.**Cf. No. 218.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 140.

## MINUTE.

So far as we know, the German Government has up to now said not a single word at Vienna in the direction of restraint or moderation. If a word had been said, we may be certain that the German Government would claim credit for having spoken at all. The inference is not reassuring as to Germany's goodwill.

At the same time the rapid succession of fresh proposals and suggestions coming from St. Petersburg made it easier for Germany to find fresh excuses for her inactivity.—*E. A. C. July 28.*

(34229)

No. 186.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 27, 1914.*

D. 8 P.M.

R. 9:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 90.) *En clair.*

The President of the Republic will reach Dunkirk with the Prime Minister on the morning of 29th July.

(34179)

No. 187.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

D. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 171.)

My telegram No. 208 to Sir E. Goschen to-day,<sup>(1)</sup> repeated to you, will show you the line to take. I have spoken to Austrian Ambassador in the same sense.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 188.

(34608)

No. 188.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 124.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.*

Count Mensdorff told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced, and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this

decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.<sup>(1)</sup>

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 48.*

*For Count Mensdorff's account of this conversation see A II No. 72.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.



(34517)

No. 189.

*Communicated by the Italian Ambassador.*

Sir Edward Grey,

July 27, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador informs me that the Italian M.F.A. entirely agrees with you as to a Conference à quatre here. As to question of asking Russia, Austria and Servia to suspend military operations pending results of the Conference he would recommend it warmly to Berlin and he will enquire of the Cabinet of Berlin as to the procedure to be followed at Vienna.

A. N.

*This was communicated to Sir Rennell Rodd as a despatch (see BB No. 49).*

(34850)

No. 190.

*Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, July 27, 1914.*

*Mr. Bonar Law:* I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a question of which I have given him notice: whether he would communicate any information to the House as to the situation which exists between Austria and Servia?

*The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey):* The House will, of course, be aware, through the public Press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at this moment. I think that it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which His Majesty's Government have so far taken up.

Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, which has appeared in the Press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Servia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone, I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that, if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe: a matter that concerned us all.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that, if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, who were not directly interested in the Servian question—should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four Powers endeavoured to arrange settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia, I made by telegraph yesterday afternoon the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed:—

I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a Conference to be held in London immediately to endeavour to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorise their representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed Conference and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the Conference.



To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is, of course, a proposal in which the co-operation of all four Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the Press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of Powers, including Powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Servia and becomes one in which another Great Power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow: no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict, the consequences of it, direct and indirect would be incalculable.

*Mr. Harry Lawson:* May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it is true that this morning the German Emperor accepted the principle of mediation which he has proposed?

*Sir E. Grey:* I understand that the German Government are favourable to the idea of mediation in principle as between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but that as to the particular proposal of applying that principle by means of a Conference which I have described to the House, the reply of the German Government has not yet been received.

(34320)

No. 191.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 24, 1914.*

In my telegram No. 2 of to-day<sup>(1)</sup> I had the honour to report that the action taken in Belgrade yesterday by the Austro-Hungarian Government, had met with an almost universally favourable reception at the hands of the press of Budapest.

In support of this statement I beg to submit a short summary of the opinions published by some of the more important newspapers.

The "Az Ujság," a Government paper, writes that comment is superfluous, as there cannot be, either in the Monarchy or abroad, any difference of opinion regarding the actual facts as stated in the note. The energetic tone of the demands corresponds with the gravity of the established facts. The hope is expressed that Servia will find means to avert the most serious consequences. The Hungarian nation must await developments quietly and with self-possession and in the full consciousness of its strength and preparedness to fight.

The "Budapesti Hirlap," a Government newspaper, considers that the demands made by the note are such that their fulfilment cannot be refused by a State which wishes to live in peace with its neighbour. The situation, says the "Budapesti Hirlap," is grave, but for that very reason it may be hoped that Servia will accept the demands.

The "Pester Lloyd," a Government paper, writes that Servia must realize that Austro-Hungarian patience is exhausted and that her day of reckoning has come. The inquiry of Serajevo has clearly proved the complicity of Servian officers and officials

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 106.

in the assassination of the Archduke and the existence, unchecked if not actually encouraged, within the Servian borders, of a movement aimed against the integrity of the Monarchy. Right and truth are on the side of Austria-Hungary, and if within 48 hours Serbia has not accepted unconditionally, nothing remains but war. The "Pester Lloyd" appeals to the Powers not to interfere in this quarrel which concerns only Austria and Serbia: any intervention will be regarded by the latter as an encouragement to continue her former course of behaviour towards the Monarchy.

The "Pesti Hirlap," an Opposition paper, writes that it is useless to try and disguise the fact that the note is a formal ultimatum and that the future depends solely on the answer of Serbia.

The "Pesti Napló," an Opposition paper, says that the decided tone of the note places the Monarchy in the presence of a *fait accompli*, from which there is no going back. The decision lies in the hands of Serbia. It will not be easy for Serbia to accept the Austrian conditions, but if she can bring herself to take this difficult step, she can secure peace and quiet for herself as well as for the Monarchy. In the contrary event it means war. Hungarians have nothing to fear, they will do their duty.

The "Budapest," an Opposition paper, approves the *démarche* of the Government and qualifies the note as evidence of the quiet yet determined attitude of a nation that has received a deadly insult.

The "Neues Pester Journal" (1867 party) considers that the demands of the note are severe, but that they were dictated by the necessity of preserving the integrity of the Monarchy. It is open to Serbia to accept them, otherwise the Monarchy is justified in compelling her to do so by force of arms.

The "Alkotmány," the organ of the Clerical party, holds that the action of the Government was necessary and that the nation will face the consequences with confidence and self-possession.

The "Budapester Tagblatt," an independent newspaper, describes the note as dignified in tone and firm and decided in substance, and says that it can only produce the desired "clearing up" and not a European war, as no Power wishes to support a policy of murder.

Alone the Socialist newspapers, especially the "Népszava," protest against the step taken in Belgrade which they qualify as the work of the autocracy. The "Népszava" declares that the working classes are opposed to the war which is provoked by the sins of the Monarchy, and considers that the ultimatum has been worded in such a way as to make it impossible for Serbia to accept.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

No. 192.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

My dear Grey,

*British Embassy, Paris, July 27, 1914.*

I am sure that the French Government do not want to fight and they should be encouraged to put pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav States whatever their conduct, for this will lead to war.

I do not believe that the German Emperor and Government were accessories before the fact to the terms of the Austrian note. If they had been the Emperor would not have been away yachting.

The demonstrations in the streets here are nothing compared with those at Berlin where the attitude of the populace is not reassuring.

[13318]

Iswolsky is expected back here to-day or to-morrow and he is not an element of peace.

If you get together meetings between yourself and the French, German and Italian Ambassadors call them consultations for the Austrians would resent a sort of repetition of the London reunions which ended in being dubbed the London Conference. They would consider that they were being treated as a Balkan Minor State.

The Quai d'Orsay represented by M. Berthelot is not sufficiently *coulant* with the German Ambassador. It might well have consented to announce in the Press as suggested by him that his *démarches* had been very friendly and that some mention should be made of *solidarité*.

Yours sincerely,  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

(34239)

No. 193.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 369.)

Sir,

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the following communiqué has appeared in to-day's press:—

“L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Président du Conseil par intérim ont eu un nouvel entretien au cours duquel ils ont recherché les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix.”

This communiqué has doubtless been issued to check a chauvinistic movement in the press, the beginning of which I had the honour to report to you by my telegram No. 82 of the 25th instant.<sup>(1)</sup> The object of this movement was to make the public believe that the German Ambassador in Paris had, by the orders of his Government, made a *démarche* at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which amounted to giving France brutally to understand that, unless other Powers kept out of the quarrel, they would have Germany to deal with and the prospect of a general European conflagration. The “*Écho de Paris*” led this movement, which was taken up by other Nationalist organs and to some extent by the “*Temps*” and by M. Clemenceau in his newspaper “*L'Homme Libre*.”

Had the French public become convinced that the action of M. de Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay was in the nature of a warning to France to remain quiet or to take the consequences, it is likely that great indignation would have been aroused here, and that the task of those interested in stimulating French public opinion to range itself decidedly on the side of Russia in the present controversy would have been facilitated.

I enclose an extract from the “*Matin*” of to-day's date.<sup>(2)</sup> giving a short account of the attitude of the Paris crowds yesterday. A hostile manifestation took place in front of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, which is said to have been organised by either Servians or Czechs. The demonstrators were dispersed by police and the “*Temps*” states that the French Ambassador at Vienna was instructed to express the regrets of the French Government at the occurrence.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

*Cf. telegram No. 184.*

MINUTE.

“Satisfactory.”—E. A. C. July 29.

(1) No. 123.

(2) Not printed.



(84250)

No. 194.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 370.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

The substance of the Memorandum was forwarded to you in my telegram No. 88 of to-day's date,<sup>(1)</sup> on information furnished verbally this morning by the Acting Political Director.

I have, &amp;c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 194.

*Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.*

Par une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.<sup>(2)</sup>

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois,<sup>(1)</sup> autorisé M. Paul Cambon à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Saint-Petersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [*sic*]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

*Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.**Published, with translation, in BB No. 51. (Last sentence of letter omitted.)**Cf. F No. 50 last paragraph.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 183.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 112.



(34291)

No. 195.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 114.)

Sir,

*The Hague, July 27, 1914.*

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning whether he was at all anxious about the political situation in Europe. His Excellency said he was rather inclined to be optimistic about it.

I have since learned that all the Cabinet Ministers who are in the country or abroad have been summoned back to The Hague and that the Queen returned here to-day and held a Cabinet Council.

The Roumanian Minister has just telephoned to me that he hears that the Dutch Army is to be mobilised, but I think this is a little premature and I can get no confirmation of the rumour.

I have, &amp;c.

H. G. CHILTON.

(34252)

No. 196.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)*

(No. 225.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

With reference to my telegram No. 167 of to-day's date,<sup>(1)</sup> giving the text of an official communiqué to the Press on the subject of the despatch by Austria-Hungary of an ultimatum to Serbia, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the translation of a further official communiqué published to-day in the "Vechernoe Vremya," which, though ostensibly dealing with the French President's visit in connection with international politics in general, is freely referred to by the Press as having a direct bearing on the Austro-Servian crisis.

The Russian Press is unanimous in its condemnation of Austria's action against Serbia and in assuming that it has been encouraged, or at least connived at, in Berlin. With the exception of the "Rech" the Press adopts a threatening attitude towards Austria and urges the Russian Government to mobilise its frontier forces at once.

The "Novoe Vremya" states that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna has been instructed to propose to the Austrian Government an extension of the time limit fixed in the Note to the Servian Government, in order to give the Russian Government time to be acquainted with its contents, and that the Austrian Ambassador here only informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at ten yesterday morning of the contents of the ultimatum which is to expire to-night at six. The same paper says that the official in charge of the Press Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has declared that the Austrian document leads to the conclusion that the Austrian Government are determined to bring about complications with Serbia. The "Novoe Vremya" complains that not one of the Ministers of the Triple Entente Powers was at his post at Belgrade, while all the Representatives of the Triple Alliance were on the spot. It expresses the opinion that a Servian Government that would in forty-eight hours agree to carry out the insolent demands of Austria would in the next forty-eight hours cease to be a Government. Inacceptable demands have been purposely presented to Serbia with threats of violence in event of non-compliance and, the

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 109.

"Novoe Vremya" says, the best reply thereto is the publication of the two above-mentioned communiqués. The same organ in its approval of the attitude of the Russian Government says that this time they have not been caught napping but have acted with the firmness in keeping with the dignity of Russia and the wishes of her people. This time Russia will be found united and ready. Russia wishes for peace for her internal development but if war comes, it will be a war of the people and not of the Government only. Most of the papers publish a telegram from Vienna to the effect that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade has been instructed to leave the town with all his staff if by six o'clock Serbia has not notified her acceptance of all the demands of the ultimatum.

The "Petersburgh Courier" in a violent leading article declares that the Austrian ultimatum is unparalleled in its insolence and cynicism not only as regards Serbia but also as regards the Triple Entente. It does not doubt that the Austrian attack is being encouraged by Germany and attributes the conduct of the two countries to the mismanagement by the Triple Entente Powers of their affairs in the Near East. The article says the acceptance of the demands by Serbia is out of the question and the only hope of saving the situation lies in vigorous action on the part of the Triple Entente. The "Petersburgh Courier" urges Russia to mobilise her frontier forces at once and to inform the Austrian Government that Serbia will not have to fight alone against Austria.

The "Rech" says that it is evident from the Russian Note to Austria proposing an extension of the time limit and a transfer of the Austro-Servian question to international judgment, that the Russian Government do not understand the situation. Austria and Germany have emphasized the necessity of localizing the issue and Count Tisza has expressly announced that it is a case of compliance or war. The "Rech" is opposed to intervention and reminds its readers that Russia's allies have hitherto clearly shown their unwillingness to enter upon a conflict over complications in the Near East, adding that "our English friends are already giving the wise advice to yield." The writer considers that the ultimatum is the first move in a pre-concerted plan to involve the Triple Entente in a European conflict and it is still possible to avoid the trap. The only way, however, to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia is, the "Rech" maintains, to refrain from any encouragement of Serbia, in the matter of which Russia is already somewhat to blame.

The "Bourse Gazette" says that never within the last forty years has the question of peace or war in Europe been so acute and the full force of the ultimatum is being felt in Petersburg and Paris rather than at Belgrade. The "Bourse Gazette" advises Serbia to weigh the situation carefully before taking a decision but at the same time warns Austria that the Russia of 1914 is not the Russia of 1908, and that whatever the result of an Austro-Servian war Russia will never, under any conditions whatever, permit any encroachment on the territory or independence of Serbia.

The "Sviet" considers the chances of peace are small and the chances of confining the struggle to Austria and Serbia are still less. This organ observes that it is generally believed that Germany and Italy have approved Austria's action which means that the chances of war have been carefully weighed at Berlin. Possibly the German Government consider, says the "Sviet," that war now would be more advantageous to Germany than war a year or two later, but if this surmise be correct the absence of the German Emperor in Norwegian waters is strange.

The "Russkoe Slovo" says that if England will but say one word peace will be maintained and a sharp reminder will at the same time be administered to Berlin and Vienna which will bring the two Cabinets to their senses.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 196.

*Official Communiqué.*

(From "Vechernoe Vremya" of July 25, 1914.)

The visit of the President of the French Republic has afforded an opportunity for the Governments of the two allied and friendly nations to note the fullest concordance of their views on various questions of international policy, the discussion of which in turn has been evoked by their solicitude for the maintenance of peace and the political equipoise in Europe and particularly in the Near East.

(34288)

No. 197.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

Tel.

R. 8 A.M.

Two Servian merchant-vessels captured at Orsova by Hungarian monitor. Two other Servian steamers fired on and damaged.

I have urged on Servian Government greatest (?prudence) and moderation, pending efforts being made towards peaceful solution.

*Published in BB No. 65 (paraphrased).*

(34255)

No. 198.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

D. July 27, 8:40 P.M.

R. July 28, 9 A.M.

Tel. (No. 175.)

My telegram No. 173 of 27th July: <sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

I found Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon very conciliatory and more optimistic. He did not, he said, know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue. He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He suggested that, in order to safeguard Austria against any revolutionary Servian propaganda in future and to dispose her to renounce some of her extreme demands, Powers might come to a private understanding to instruct their Ministers at Belgrade to keep in constant touch with each other, and to interchange all the information which any one of them might receive with regard to any Servian machinations or plots directed against Austria. In the event of any such information reaching them, they should be empowered to exercise pressure on Servian Government with a view to preventing such plots maturing. While there should be no question of their being invested with character of an international commission, Ministers would be able by co-operating together to maintain close supervision over any anti-Austrian movements. He again referred to fact that obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference was made in Austrian

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 170.



ultimatum, were given to the Powers. On my enquiring whether he intended to put forward proposal to above effect, his Excellency said that it would be very difficult for him to do so. He would greatly prefer that it should come from you, and he asked me to say that if you approved he would be grateful if you could put it forward.

I then asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers,<sup>(2)</sup> and, on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of instructions which you had sent me and enquired whether he would prefer direct exchange of views, which he had proposed, to such a conference. German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed personal opinion that former would be more agreeable to Austria. His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if conference was accepted by other Powers, but he trusted that, if it took place, you would keep in touch with Russian Ambassador.

Italian Ambassador alone of my three colleagues has so far received any instructions.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 55 (paraphrased—parts omitted).*

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 140.

(34312)

No. 199.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

*D. July 27, 12·7 A.M.*

*R. July 28, 10·30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 111.)

The Russian Ambassador has had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.<sup>(1)</sup> Having just returned to his post from St. Petersburg he said that he was well acquainted with the state of Russian public opinion and with the views of the Russian Government. He could assure Under-Secretary of State that if actual war with Serbia began it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia, which had yielded on previous occasions, and especially during annexation crisis in 1909, was not prepared to give way again. He earnestly hoped, therefore, that something might be done before an actual invasion of Serbia took place. Under-Secretary of State said that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube in which the Servians had been the aggressors. Russian Ambassador has replied that he would do his utmost to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise the Russian Government to induce the Servian Government to fall back before the Austrian advance when it takes place, and to avoid any conflict as long as possible. Time so gained should suffice to enable settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation yesterday between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was perfectly reasonable, and in fact an understanding was practically reached between them as to guarantees Serbia might be reasonably asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. Russian Ambassador urged that Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that Austria-Hungary could fairly ask of an independent Power. Under-Secretary of State promised to submit this suggestion to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(<sup>1</sup>) *For this see R No. 41.*



Russian Ambassador is rendered a little more hopeful of possible settlement by fact communicated to him, as also to me, by the French Ambassador that the German Ambassador at Paris made yesterday evening to the French Government some observations showing that Germany no longer excluded altogether idea of mediation to stop hostilities breaking out. But Russian Ambassador thinks that best prospect of arrangement lies in a direct negotiation at St. Petersburg in the manner proposed by him.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 56 (paraphrased and last paragraph omitted).*

#### MINUTE.

The first ray of hope.—E. A. C. July 28.

(34304)

No. 200.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

D. 12.45 A.M.

R. 11 A.M.

Tel. (No. 112.)

Following from Military Attaché for D.M.O. :—

“Mobilisation confirmed of 8th corps complete and 9th corps at least partially. Main railway line Prague–Pilsen–Vienna–Budapest–Temesvar closed during period of transport seems to indicate these corps may be included in expeditionary forces.

“All cavalry regiments of 2nd corps leaving for Galicia now 6 regiments of field artillery now being mobilised. One other regiment of 2nd corps left Vienna to-day uncertain yet which.

“Consul at Ragusa reports troops leaving for Castelnuovo.

“Local papers publish account of great activity in Montenegro.

“Partial mobilisation is reported.

“According to good reports 12th corps is at first to be mobilised partially only.

“Railways between Hermanstadt and Kronstadt and the Roumanian frontier are both permanently closed to the public.

“Limit of zone of concentration in S. Hungary appears to be now from Mitrovitsa to Ica on the west to Bazfracs (*sic*)(<sup>1</sup>) (south of Weisskirchen) on east.

“My Italian colleague tells me that he has reliable information that troops in the Tirol will be withdrawn from the frontier and whole 14th corps held in reserve.

“I heard to-day unofficially that the military attachés will probably proceed 3rd August to destination not yet known.”

(<sup>1</sup>) *This should probably be Bazias.*

(34339)

No. 201.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, July 27, 1914.*

D. July 27, 9.30 P.M.

R. July 28. 11.55 A.M.

Tel. (No. 457.)

Grand Vizier tells me that he was ready to start to-morrow for Brussels but interruption of railway communication and, I understood, the return of the Greek Prime Minister to Athens. will prevent an immediate meeting which is, he hopes, only deferred.

(Repeated to Athens.)

(34346)

No. 202.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 27, 1914.*

D. July 27, 9.15 P.M.

R. July 28, noon.

Tel. (No. 125.)

My telegram No. 123 of 26th July: <sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

I have just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has returned to Rome. He greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending conference, but had hope that military action may be practically deferred by fact of conference meeting at once. He does not, as at present informed, see any possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in note to Servia, but believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think such will be advice of Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its integrity on advice of four Powers invited to conference. This would save her face in allowing her to think she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria alone.

This is also view of Servian agent here, provided some explanation could be given as to how points 5 and 6 of conditions would be applied.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me both before and after communication of note and again to-day he has assurances from Austria that she demands no territorial sacrifices from Servia.

Telegrams from Vienna to press here stating Austria is favourably impressed with declarations of Italian Government had no foundation. He has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to note.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 57 (paraphrased—part omitted).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 154.

(34255)

No. 203.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

D. 1.25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 388.)

Your telegram No. 175 of 27th July. <sup>(1)</sup>

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between Russian and Austrian Governments.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 198.

I should be willing to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention, in exchange of views with Austria, his willingness to co-operate in some scheme of the kind? It might then take more concrete shape.

(Repeated to Paris No. 253: Berlin No. 216; Vienna No. 174: Rome No. 213: and Nish No. 28.)

*Published in BB No. 69 (slightly paraphrased).*

(34228)

No. 204.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 252.)

D. 1:30 P.M.

Your telegram No. 89 of 27th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

I suppose French reluctance is due to desire to avoid appearance of being detached from Russia, and I cannot urge them to risk that.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 184.

(34427)

No. 205.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 28, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 126.)

D. 12:10 P.M.

R. 2:10 P.M.

Your telegram No. 200 of July 25th to Berlin.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

*Published in BB No. 63.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 120.

(34519)

No. 206.

*Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 28, 1914.*

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914. Répété à Paris et à Berlin.*

Confidentiel.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des Représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une révision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice Français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

*Published, with translation, in BB No. 53.*

*Cf. No. 179.*

[NOTE.—The document as printed in the Blue Book and here is a precise copy of the typewritten sheet left by Count Benckendorff at the Foreign Office. From the version published later from the archives at St. Petersburg it appears that the following concluding sentence has been omitted from the original as telegraphed to Count Benckendorff :—

S'il s'agit d'une action modératrice quelconque à St. Pétersbourg, nous la déclinons à l'avance, vu que dès le début nous avons pris une position à laquelle nous ne pouvons rien changer, car nous allons déjà au-devant de toutes les exigences acceptables de l'Autriche.

A scrutiny of the document handed in by Count Benckendorff shows in fact that the bottom of the page has been cut off. The explanation seems to be that this telegram, which was originally addressed to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, consisted of two portions, which are clearly distinguished in the Russian original; the first three paragraphs referred to the proposals communicated to M. Sazonof by Sir George Buchanan at St. Petersburg; the last two paragraphs to a communication which had reached M. Sazonof from M. Isvolsky at Paris. It was then quite natural that Count Benckendorff should hand on the first portion to Sir Edward Grey, but not the second portion, which had nothing to do with the British Government. It seems that an error was made in the Russian Embassy in London; the two final paragraphs should have been deleted, but in fact only the last one was deleted. The last paragraph as it stands is obviously incomplete.

The version given in "*The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*" which is a translation from the German "*Die Fälschungen des russischen Orangebuches*" is incorrect, for it is made to appear that the fourth paragraph reported part of the observations made by M. Sazonof to Sir George Buchanan; it is put in oblique narration and not paragraphed; for this there is no justification in the Russian original. The correct version is published in "*Un Livre Noir*," vol. II, pp. 279-280, but in this the last sentence from "concernant" to "Cabinet Impérial" is omitted.]

(34514)

No. 207.

*Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 28, 1914.*

Confidentiel.

*Le 15/28 Juillet 1914.*

M. Sazonoff télégraphie qu'il a eu Dimanche un entretien prolongé avec le Comte Szapary.

En examinant la réponse de la Serbie aux<sup>(1)</sup> (avec lui les) 10 points formulés par la note Autrichienne, M. Sazonoff a fait observer sous forme amicale que si même la Serbie a pu s'y soumettre (s'y soumettait), malgré la rédaction malheureuse de la note Autrichienne, quelques-unes des exigences Autrichiennes seront irréalisables.

Ainsi les points 1 et 2 exigent l'assentiment législatif de la Skoupchtina Serbe à la modification des lois sur la presse et le droit d'association, assentiment qui ne pourra guère être obtenu.

Les points 4 et 5 ne manqueraient pas de provoquer des conséquences des plus dangereuses, tels que des complots anarchiques contre les Membres de la Famille Royale et le Président du Ministère, un résultat qui certainement n'entre pas dans les vues du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal.



Quant aux autres points, M. Sazonoff a dit à l'Ambassadeur qu'il lui semblait que moyennant certaines modifications dans les détails un terrain d'accord pourrait être trouvé sans difficulté, pour peu que les accusations formulées soient basées sur des preuves suffisantes.

M. Sazonoff, a ajouté que dans l'intérêt de la paix, un intérêt que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche venait de déclarer aussi précieux pour l'Autriche-Hongrie que pour les autres Puissances, il serait urgent de mettre fin le plus tôt possible à la tension actuelle.

Dans ce but M. Sazonoff a exprimé le désir que le Comte Szapary soit muni des pouvoirs nécessaires pour entrer avec lui dans un échange d'idées privé qui permettraient une révision de quelques points de la note Austro-Hongroise du 10/23 Juillet.

De cette façon, pense-t-il, il serait peut-être possible de trouver une formule acceptable pour la Serbie et répondant en même temps, pour l'essentiel, aux exigences du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale.

*English translation in R No. 25.*

#### MINUTES.

I do not think that the method by which M. Sazonof has opened these "friendly negotiations" is likely to lead to any result. He tells the Austrian Ambassador in fact that part of what Serbia has promised to do she is unable to do, and he asks that Austria should discuss with him a revision of some points in the Austrian note—a note which has already been published and communicated.—*A. N. July 28, 1914.*

On the very day when I was urging upon the German Government that the Servian note had conceded nearly all that Austria asked and that the Austrian Government should take a favourable view of it, M. Sazonof was telling the Austrian Ambassador that the Servian note was worth much less than its face value!—*E. G.*

(The above minutes are by direction of Secretary of State to be cancelled.)<sup>(2)</sup>—*A. N.*

(1) [NOTE.—From a corrected copy which was communicated later by Count Benckendorff (No. 258), it appears that the words printed in italics were an incorrect translation and there should be substituted for them the words immediately following printed in brackets—see also No. 208, Enclosure 2.]

(2) *Cf. No. 208 min.*

(34514)

No. 208.

*Russian Ambassador to Sir A. Nicolson.*

*Tuesday, July 28,*

My dear Nicolson,

*Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

I send you herewith M. Sazonoff's last telegram received this morning.

I gather that when he had his conversation with Count Szapary, he had in hand only the Austrian Note not the Servian answer, at least not the text, which he received yesterday as the enclosed telegram shows.

I see further that there is a mistake in the translation of the conversation with Ct. Szapary which I gave you this morning.<sup>(1)</sup> the correct translation which I enclose separately is a further proof, that Mr. Sazonoff knew little of the Servian answer.

Yours truly,

BENCKENDORFF.

2 enclosures.

I will send you a new corrected copy of the telegram in question.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1) No. 207.

(2) See No. 258.

## MINUTE.

It is clear from this that M. Sazonof did not criticize the Servian reply but the Austrian note and the adverse comments made upon what M. Sazonof said must be cancelled.<sup>(1)</sup>—E. G.

Enclosures in No. 208.

(1.)

*Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.*

Je viens de prendre connaissance de la réponse remise par le Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giessl.

Cette réponse par sa modération et la disposition exprimée par la Serbie de donner à l'Autriche la satisfaction la plus positive, dépasse tout ce que à quoi je m'attendais.

Je ne puis concevoir en quoi peuvent consister les exigences ultérieures de l'Autriche-Hongrie, à moins qu'elle ne cherche qu'une prétexte pour une campagne contre la Serbie.

(2.)

Please read "si même la Serbie s'y soumettait" instead of "si même la Serbie a pu s'y soumettre."

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 207 min.

(34514)

No. 209.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*

My dear Grey.

53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W., July 28, 1914.

You will have seen from the later telegram<sup>(1)</sup> which Benckendorff sent me, and which I forwarded to you, that unwittingly we have done Sazonof an injustice. It was not the Servian reply which he was criticising with the Austrian Ambassador but the Austrian note—a very different thing—and when he received the Servian reply he was much pleased with it and said that it went farther in the way of concessions than he had considered possible.

Yours sincerely,

A. NICOLSON.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 208. See also No. 185.

(34515)

No. 210.

*Russian Ambassador to Sir A. Nicolson.*

*July 28th, evening.*

My dear Nicolson,

*Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

1. I enclose a telegram which reached me very late to-night.

2. The more I think of it, the more I come to the conclusion that, when speaking to Count Szapary, M. Sazonoff knew very little or nothing of the Servian answer. He never quoted it at all. He does not say: Although Serbia has accepted, but "even if Serbia should accept." And when finally he received yesterday the Servian answer, he telegraphs quite differently. I don't know whether all this is of any real importance at that hour. At any rate it puts a different construction on the telegram which I gave you yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> I am very sorry to say not correctly translated.

Yours sincerely,

BENCKENDORFF.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 207. Cf. also Nos. 208/9.

Enclosure in No. 210.

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff en date du 15/28 Juillet 1914.*

Confidentiel.

Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement Allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

*Published, with translation, in BB. No. 54.*

(34317)

No. 211.

*Communication from French Embassy.**French Embassy, Londres.*

Le Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey<sup>(1)</sup> relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani est prêt à envoyer aux Représentants français à Vienne, Pétersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement Britannique.

27 Juillet 1914.

*Published, with translation, in BB No. 52.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 140.

(34518)

No. 212.

*Communication by the Russian Ambassador.**July 28, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador at Paris communicated yesterday (27th) to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs by order of his Government that the reply of Servia is considered unsatisfactory, and that, in any case, Austria-Hungary would undertake energetic action the next day (28th) with a view of forcing Servia to give the required guarantees. On M. Bienvenu-Martin asking his Excellency what form this action would take, the latter replied that he had no indication, but that it could only mean either (1) an ultimatum or (2) a declaration of war or (3) the invasion of Servia.

Above communicated by Count Benckendorff.—A. N.

It is a telegram sent by M. Isvolsky to St. Petersburg and repeated by him direct here.—A. N.

*This was communicated to Sir George Buchanan as a despatch dated July 29.*  
*Cf. F No. 75 and A II Nos. 62 and 70. M. Isvolsky's telegram to St. Petersburg*  
*is published in R No. 37 and R II.*

[NOTE.—In the text as published in the original Russian Orange book, the last sentence differs slightly from that given here, which is identical with that in R II and with the account given by M. Bienvenu-Martin.]

(34428)

No. 213.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.*

*The Hague, July 28, 1914.*

D. 10.40 A.M.

R. 2.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 14.)

Queen of the Netherlands returned hurriedly to The Hague yesterday and held two Cabinet Councils.

I learn that all leave has been stopped in the army and navy, and that officers and men on leave have been recalled. Preparations are being made for mobilisation at the earliest possible notice if necessary. Government have requisitioned all tugs at Amsterdam, Rotterdam and other ports in case of need. Movements of troops are being carried out all over country and night exercises taking place.

(34429)

No. 214.

*Consul-General Sinclair to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Brindisi, July 28, 1914.*

D. 1.30 P.M.

R. 2.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 6.)

Vice-Consul Watson returned from Montenegro reports mobilisation.

Telegraphic communication delayed.

Austrian warship and 3 torpedo-boat-destroyers off Antivari.

Montenegro prepared to evacuate ports.

(34431)

No. 215.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

D. 2.3 P.M.

R. 2.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 97.)

My telegram of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke yesterday in same sense to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. In talking over his reply this morning my two colleagues and I found that to all of us he had, while refusing proposed conference, said that nevertheless he desired to work with us for maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if this wish on his part is sincere it is only to form of your proposal that he objects. We therefore wondered whether it

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 185.



might be possible for you to put proposal in another form omitting word "conference," or perhaps even to propose to him that he himself should suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 60 (paraphrased and part omitted).*

*Cf. No. 223 and F Nos. 73, 74.*

#### MINUTES.

Sir E. Grey has telegraphed to-day to Berlin that he will suspend his suggestion if there is any chance of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg.—*G. R. C. July 28, 1914.*

Apart from that however there is much sound sense in the suggestion that Germany should be asked, if as she says, she is so anxious to work for peace, what *she* proposes the Powers should do.—*E. A. C. July 28.*

I am a little tired of these protestations and should like to see some practical action. If direct conversations are to take place between Vienna and St. Petersburg we had better not confuse the matter by making any fresh proposal.—*A. N.*

(34433)

#### No. 216.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

*D. 1 P.M.*

*R. 2:50 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 91.)

Lord Granville met Russian Ambassador at dinner last night. His Excellency declared to him his belief that war is inevitable and by fault of England; that if England had at once declared her solidarity with Russia and France, and her intention to fight if necessary, Germany and Austria would have hesitated, whereas, as it is, His Majesty's Government had encouraged Austria. M. Isvolsky would not listen to any excuses for Austria. He said that a promise by Austria to respect territorial integrity of Serbia would be useless if Serbia were reduced to state of vassalage, that Austria's object is to extend Germanic influence and power towards Constantinople, which Russia cannot possibly permit. He added that eventuality ought to be just as repugnant to England as to Russia. His Excellency declared that to allow Austria a free hand with Serbia would be as deep a humiliation for Russia as that which he himself had had to accept in 1909; he had no choice then, as Russia was not in a position to fight, but things were very different now. His Excellency further explained that he had been much blamed in 1909 for accepting German proposal without consulting England and France, but he had done so deliberately in order that humiliation might fall on Russia alone and not on all the three Powers of the *entente*, which would have meant its collapse.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, July 28, 6:30 P.M., No. 394.)

#### No. 217.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

*D. 3:30 P.M.*

*R. 4 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 98.)

Following from consular officer at Danzig:—

"Four German torpedo-boats, 82 S, 83 S, 84 S. 86, left yesterday, 27th July, for sea."

(34231)

No. 218.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 218.)

D. 4 P.M.

Your telegram No. 96 of 27th July :<sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

Your construction of proposed conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement, but none would be put forward unless it was ascertained that it would be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with each of whom it would be easy for those conferring to keep in touch through their respective allies.

But I entirely agree that direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia is the most preferable method of all, and as long as there is a prospect of that taking place I would suspend every other suggestion.

I understand that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed friendly exchange of views to Austrian Government, and if Austria accepts it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from German Ambassador here that German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram No. 208 of yesterday to you.<sup>(2)</sup>

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris No. 255, and St. Petersburg No. 391; also to Vienna 176/7, Rome 214/5, Nish No. 30/31 : "For your own information only.")

*Published in BB No. 67 (paraphrased and last sentence omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 185.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 176.

(34231)

No. 219.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 392.)

D. 4 P.M.

Austria and Servia. My telegram No. 218 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should inform Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that the information about German mobilisation is very confidential.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 218. See also No. 185.

(34231)

No. 220.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 256.)

D. 4.5 P.M.

Austria and Servia. My telegram No. 218 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.<sup>(1)</sup>

Your Excellency should inform French Minister for Foreign Affairs of first paragraph of Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 96 of 27th July<sup>(2)</sup> and of my reply to it.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 218.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 185.

(34449)

No. 221.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 28, 1914.*

D. 3.50 P.M.

R. 4.15 P.M.

Tel.

Servian Government expected immediate attack on Belgrade on departure of Austrian Minister and so removed at once. Plan of campaign is now to draw into interior as large a portion as possible of Austrian army so as to weaken Austria elsewhere. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that Russian support is assured. Servian army is concentrated in Morava valley.

Skuptchina will probably meet to-morrow when situation may be clearer.

## MINUTE.

The statement that Russian support is assured is open to more than one interpretation. Perhaps this equivocal word was chosen on purpose.—*E. A. C. July 28.*

(34475)

No. 222.

*Mr. Erskine to Sir Edward Grey.**Athens, July 28, 1914.*

D. 4.15 P.M.

R. 6 P.M.

Tel. (No. 128.)

Constantinople telegram No. 457 of 27th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

M. Venizelos, without consulting Greek Government, informed Grand Vizier through Greek Minister at Constantinople that, owing to grave situation and Bulgarian mobilisation he was returning to Athens.

Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and King have telegraphed urging him not to return as he is misinformed as to situation, and Bulgaria shows no sign of moving.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 201.

(34431)

No. 223.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

D. 6.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 220.)

Your telegram No. 97 of 28th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

German Government having accepted principle of mediation by the four Powers between Austria and Russia if necessary, I am ready to propose that German Minister for Foreign Affairs should suggest lines on which this principle may be applied, but I will keep the idea in reserve till we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

*Published in BB No. 68 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 215.

(34476)

No. 224.

*Mr. Erskine to Sir Edward Grey.**Athens, July 28, 1914.*

D. 5 P.M.

R. 6.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 129.)

Bucharest telegram No. 24 of 27th July<sup>(1)</sup>: Austria and Servia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs defines Greek attitude in similar terms, but does not commit himself as to attitude in the event of modification of *status quo* by Austria, having received assurance from Austrian Government that they contemplate no annexation of territory.

He states that Greek and Roumanian Governments have warned Bulgaria jointly that they will not tolerate her intervention and that he has received assurance that she will not move.

(Repeated to Sophia, Belgrade and Bucharest.)

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 316. *This tel. was not received till July 30.*

(34460)

No. 225.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 28, 1914.*

D. 2.30 P.M.

R. 6.45 P.M.

Tel. *En clair.*

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

*Published in BB No. 66.*

*Cf. No. 233.*

(34463)

No. 226.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

D. 12.40 P.M.

R. 7.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 113.)

Urgent. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that war with Servia will be declared to-day.

(34464)

No. 227.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

D. 1.10 P.M.

R. 7.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 114.)

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency began by reading to me a full report of your speech of yesterday in the House of Commons, which is not reported fully in Vienna press. The upshot of our conversation is that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against

[13318]



Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict. Will telegraph further.

*Published in BB No. 61 (paraphrased and part omitted).*

(34484)

No. 228.

*Consul Bosanquet to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Riga, July 28, 1914.*

D. 7.43 P.M.

R. 8.45 P.M.

Tel.

My telegram of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

Ships now piloted in and out of port.

I am informed confidentially that Riga customs and port officials have been put under orders of the commander of the fortress. Reported that goods traffic suspended on certain lines owing to movement of troops. Yesterday business code telegram to Germany refused.

(Repeated to Embassy.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 178.

(34461)

No. 229.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

D. 7.10 P.M.

R. 9.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 92.)

In accordance with your circular telegram No. 242 of the 27th July to Paris,<sup>(1)</sup> I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* this afternoon substance of your conversation with German Ambassador recorded in your telegram No. 208 of the 27th July to Berlin.<sup>(1)</sup>

Minister is grateful for the communication, for it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace between the Powers.

*Published in BB No. 58 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.

(34465)

No. 230.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

D. 4.10 P.M.

R. 9.40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 115.)

As directed by your circular telegram No. 242 of 27th July<sup>(1)</sup> to Paris, I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram No. 208 of 27th July to Berlin.<sup>(1)</sup> I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech, which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.

London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair base of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian (*sic*) Ambassador at Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 62.*

*For Count Berchtold's account of this conversation see A II No. 90.*

(34474)

No. 231.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, July 28, 1914.*

D. 7.30 P.M.

R. 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 127.)

My telegram No. 125 of 27th July: <sup>(1)</sup> Austria and Servia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked me to submit the following to you at once:—

Servian Chargé d'Affaires this morning in a long conversation had said he thought Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6.

Such explanations might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, as it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give them to Servia. The Powers might then advise Servia to accept unconditionally.

Meanwhile Austro-Hungarian Government had published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. <sup>(2)</sup> Many points besides explanation, such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda, were, Minister for Foreign Affairs considered, quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as Servian Chargé d'Affaires had considered practicable. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was not to be in judicial or administrative measures, but only in investigation. This Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted. Here, therefore, he thought ground might be cleared.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 202.

<sup>(2)</sup> See Appendix B.

I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration, and only reproduce from memory.

Above all, Minister impressed upon me his anxiety that discussion should begin at once. He had given Italian Ambassador a wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany.

*Published in BB No. 64 (paraphrased).*

(34462)

No. 232.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

D. 7.10 P.M.

R. 9.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 93.)

Your telegram No. 244 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

I informed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador recorded in your telegram No. 377 to St. Petersburg of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

He is grateful for the communication. He quite appreciates impossibility of His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia which in its present condition is not one affecting England, and that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed to the Russian Government in German and Austrian sources.

German Ambassador informed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but he gave no assurance in regard to her independence when asked whether that also would be respected.

*Published in BB No. 59 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 177.

(34468)

No. 233.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Nish, July 28, 1914.*

D. 6.30 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 59.)

Pessimistic news contained in my immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

Servian Government telegraphed *en clair* to their representatives abroad to the effect that Austria had declared war. There is now some doubt as to authenticity of telegram. Prime Minister thinks that it may be a trap in order to induce Servia to attack, but he assures me that Servia will remain perfectly quiet until Austria shows her hand.

#### MINUTES.

This explains an enquiry this morning from the Servian Chargé d'Affaires, whether the declaration of war had been officially notified to us by the Austro-Hungarian Government.—E. A. C. July 29.

The official notification has been published in Vienna.—A. N.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 225.

(34470)

No. 234.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

D. 8.45 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 178.)

Following from Warsaw yesterday:—

“(? Forces) of infantry leaving Warsaw for frontier.”

(34473)

No. 235.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

D. 8.45 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 180.)

Foreign press correspondents have been informed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that (? German Government have) refused mediation, as dispute is purely one between Austria and Servia, and that on the first move of Austria against Servia Russia would mobilise.

(34652)

No. 236.

*German Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey.**9, Carlton House Terrace, S.W..*

Dear Sir Edward,

(Undated) ? July 28.

I just receive news from Berlin that they have *immediately* taken steps in Vienna in the sense you spoke to me yesterday at noon.<sup>(1)</sup>

They have also communicated to Count Berchtold the desire expressed by M. Sazonow to enter in direct conversation with Vienna.

I begin to hope that it has once more been possible owing to Anglo-German collaboration to save the peace of Europe.

Believe me, dear Sir Edward, yours sincerely,

LICHNOWSKY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.

[NOTE.—Published in *Oman* p. 54, with the date July 29. This is not the date on which the letter was despatched and received, but that on which it was registered in the Foreign Office. Reference to DD No. 278 shows that it belongs to July 28.]

No. 237.

*Sir Edward Grey to French Ambassador.*

Private.

Dear M. Cambon,

*July 28, 1914.*

On reading de Bunsen's telegram<sup>(1)</sup> I find it does *not* imply that the Austrians admit the Servian answer to be in any way satisfactory; but de Bunsen states that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna has received a satisfactory account of Sazonof's conversation with the Russian (*sic* Austrian) Ambassador at St. Petersburg and there seems to be some prospect of the conversations continuing favourably.

Yours sincerely,

E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 199.



(34926)

No. 238.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 508.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

M. Cambon expressed great satisfaction to-day at the statement that I had made in the House of Commons yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> and at the notice that had appeared concerning our fleet. He said that, if once it were assumed that we would certainly stand aside from a European war, the chance of preserving peace would be very much imperilled.

I said that I had yesterday called the Austrian Ambassador's attention to the notice about our fleet. I had explained that we should not have thought of calling up reserves or taking any step of a menacing character; but that, our naval force having been collected for manœuvres, we could not, when there was a possibility of European conflagration, choose this moment for dispersing it. I had mentioned this to the Austrian Ambassador as an illustration of the anxiety under which the whole of Europe was placed by the Austrian action.

I informed M. Cambon generally of what I had urged upon the German Government respecting the Servian reply; how desirable I thought it that a favourable construction should be put upon the lengths to which Servia had gone in meeting the Austrian demand; and I told him of the disappointment I had expressed to the Austrian Ambassador that the Servian reply was treated as so unsatisfactory.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

*See Nos. 176 and 188.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 190.

No. 239.

*Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir G. Buchanan.*

Private.

My dear Buchanan,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.*

I am much obliged to you for your letter received by the last Messenger, which was written before the crisis had assumed such a very acute stage. I hope that we have kept you fully informed by repeating to you the telegrams which we have received and sent, so it is unnecessary for me to go into details. What has puzzled me a little have been the fresh proposals which Sazonof makes almost daily.<sup>(1)</sup> One day he said that if Servia would agree, Russia would be ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of ourselves, France, Germany and Italy. On receipt of your telegram mentioning this we put forward the suggestion that a small conference of the four Powers should be held here, and that the other Powers should engage to abstain from active military operations pending the results of this conference. However, Germany declined to entertain the idea, so the matter has fallen through. Then came next day the proposal which Sazonof had made to your Austrian colleague that Italy and ourselves should collaborate with Austria in finding an issue. We had not time to digest this new idea when another telegram arrived saying that he was going to open up conversations direct with Vienna. I must say that this seems the best procedure, but I do not know whether Austria will be ready to fall in with it. The great hope that we have of course is that Austria will abstain from actually entering Servian territory, as I rather gather from what you tell us and from what we hear from others that an actual invasion of Servia by Austria could not possibly be regarded with indifference by Russia. Of course in that case all hope of a peaceful solution will vanish.

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. *Minutes in No. 179.*

I can quite understand Russia not being able to permit Austria to crush Serbia. I think the talk about localising the war merely means that all the Powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia. This to my mind is quite preposterous, not to say iniquitous. I do not understand after the very satisfactory way in which Serbia has met the Austrian requests how Austria can with any justification proceed to hostile measures against her. If she deliberately provokes war with Serbia with the intention of giving her what she calls a lesson, she is, I think, acting most wrongly, for she must know very well that such action on her part would in all probability lead to a general European conflagration, with all its untold disastrous consequences. Germany has not played a very straight game—at least so far as we are concerned—in all this business. On two occasions we asked her to use moderating language at Vienna and we promised to support her if she did so. She contented herself with simply passing on our proposal as our proposal, which of course was not what we desired or requested, and again she brushed on one side the idea of a small conference here as being an impractical suggestion. Then Lichnowsky says that he is so pleased that Anglo-German co-operation seems likely to be successful. His interpretation of the word "co-operation" must be totally different from that which is usually accepted.

It is no use indulging in surmises as to how much Germany knew of Austria's move before it was actually made. I know for the past two or three weeks the German Ambassador here has been exceedingly anxious and perturbed, and on more than one occasion has said to some of his colleagues that if they knew all that he did they would be equally disquieted. Moreover I cannot believe that Austria would have gone so far as she has done without having informed Germany, her ally, of her proposed procedure, and secured her promise of co-operation.

What has preoccupied, and I confess has troubled, me very much, is satisfying Russia's very natural request as to what we should do in certain eventualities. I foresaw as well as you did that this crisis might be taken by Russia as a test of our friendship, and that were we to disappoint her all hope of a friendly and permanent understanding with her would disappear. We, of course, living under such conditions as we do here, when no Government practically can take any decided line without feeling that public opinion amply supports them, are unable to give any decided engagements as to what we should or should not do in any future emergencies; but I think we have made it perfectly clear that in any case neither Germany nor Austria could possibly rely with any certainty upon our remaining neutral, and I think this fact has been much impressed upon them by one or two incidents which have occurred within the last two or three days. The decision to keep our battle fleet together instead of allowing it to disperse in order to give leave to its crews was officially notified and given prominence in the papers, and has been immediately taken as a sign by Germany and others that we are prepared to take our share in hostilities if circumstances arose to make it necessary for us to do so. Moreover you will see that the tone of our press, after the first shock which was occasioned by the Austrian ultimatum, has come round to the fact that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to stand outside a general European conflagration. There is no doubt whatsoever that were we drawn into this conflagration we should be on the side of our friends. Although therefore we were unable to give Sazonof a definite undertaking as to what our attitude would be, I think you will see that there is very little doubt, supposing we were called upon to take a share, that we should not hesitate to do our duty.

You have certainly handled a most difficult situation in your usual skilful and tactful manner, and you can be quite sure that your action and language have been thoroughly appreciated and approved here. I am sorry that I cannot write further to-day, but you will understand that one is quite overwhelmed with work at this moment.

(34851)

No. 240.

*Parliamentary Debates. July 28, 1914.*

*Mr. Bonar Law:* I wish to ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can communicate on the European situation.

*The Prime Minister:* There are no new developments sufficiently definite to enable any further statement to be made, but we hope that no unfavourable inference will be drawn from this. I cannot say more.

*Lord Hugh Cecil:* Can the right hon. Gentleman say if hostilities have broken out?

*The Prime Minister:* We have no definite information about that.

(34256)

No. 241.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 153.)

Sir,

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Sarajevo giving particulars as to certain results of the investigation held with the object of ascertaining details of the plot to assassinate the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort.

I have, &amp;c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 241.

(No. 15.)

Sir,

*Sarajevo, July 21, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that according to information received this day the authorities have succeeded in discovering the names of eighteen persons concerned in the plot to assassinate the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand two of whom are Moslems and one a Croat. Of the two Moslem conspirators one has been arrested and the other has fled to Montenegro.

At Tuzla, it appears, according to the same source, that the authorities have recently discovered the existence of a secret society formed amongst the students of the high school ("Gymnasium") of which thirty-six members have been brought hither under arrest.

The society in question which had taken the name of "Jugoslavenska Revolucionarna Nacionalna Omladina" (South Slavonic Revolutionary National Youth), appears to have had a newspaper entitled "Borba" (The Struggle), which was written out and then copied by means of a hectograph for distribution amongst the initiated in one of the first articles of which the writer advocates undisguisedly the complete extirpation of the reigning dynasty.

I have, &amp;c.

J. FRANCIS JONES.



(34504)

No. 242.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 29.)*

(No. 35.)

Sir,

*Budapest, July 25. 1914.*

I have the honour to report that at the opening of the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies yesterday morning the Minister President informed the House of the delivery of the Note to the Servian Government and also of the delivery of the explanatory Circular Note to the Governments of the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin.

His Excellency expressed the opinion that the step taken by Austria-Hungary required neither justification nor further explanation; rather was it a matter for surprise that this step had been so long delayed: the reason for this delay was that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not wish to act under the influence of passion and resentment, but only on full proof and mature consideration. Count Tisza was bold enough to qualify the step now taken as grave but not provocative or aggressive, on the ground that all that the note demanded was the fulfilment by Servia of certain neighbourly duties. Such questions, His Excellency continued, could not be made the subject of long pourparlers and negotiations and that was the reason for the form of the note and the shortness of the period allowed for a reply. "I do not," concluded Count Tisza, "regard the present situation as constituting a state of war or even as necessarily involving the dangers of war. The Monarchy seeks for peace and wishes for peace. Nobody can accuse us of aiming at war, though we are of course fully alive to all the consequences of the step we have taken. In the firm conviction that we stand for a just cause, and that the vital interests of the Monarchy and of the Hungarian nation demand the accomplishment of this step, we are prepared to bear all its consequences." The speech was received with wild enthusiasm by the whole House, even the Opposition joining in the applause.

Count Julius Andrássy immediately rose and, after stating that he personally had long been convinced that the existing relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia could not be allowed to continue, announced that he was empowered to declare on behalf of the united Opposition that, notwithstanding the wide gulf which separated them from the Hungarian Government and which unfortunately remained unaltered, they were prepared to fulfil their patriotic duties in every respect, and that they hoped and expected that every Hungarian would follow their lead and would not forget that, if events took a serious turn, the honour and vital interests of the Hungarian nation were at stake, and for that every man must be prepared to make sacrifices.

Count Andrássy suggested that the current debates in the House should be suspended until the pending questions of foreign politics be settled, so that they might not have to occupy themselves with secondary questions when their minds were filled with the question of peace or war. Count Tisza, however, recommended that they should continue the discussion of the bill before the House, and thus, by unswerving adherence to their daily parliamentary labours, afford to the world a proof of Hungary's composure and imperturbable fixity of purpose.

This latter course was adopted and for once peace and unanimity reigned in the Hungarian Parliament.

I have, &amp;c.

W. G. MAX MÜLLER.

*Cf. telegram No. 106.*



(34496)

No. 243.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*

(No. 114.)

Sir,

*Brussels, July 28, 1914.*

I have seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon who informed me that the Belgian Government have carefully considered the various eventualities which may arise from the present European crisis and that they have determined to offer resistance to the utmost of their power should the integrity or neutrality of Belgium be assailed from any quarter.

So far orders have only been issued to stop short leave and to bring two out of the six divisions of the army up to full peace strength. Preparations have, however, been made for prompt mobilization, and it is calculated that the force available would amount to nearly 150,000 men.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. VILLIERS.

*Cf. No. 181.*

No. 244.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private and Confidential.

My dear Grey,

*British Embassy, Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I asked the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon whether the Russian Ambassador had used to him language in any way similar to that held to Granville which I described (see my telegram No. 91 of to-day)<sup>(1)</sup> for if it represented the view of his Government and he had just come from Petersburg it was not promising for the preservation of peace.

M. Bienvenu-Martin said that M. Iswolsky had spoken of the position as very serious but by no means hopeless and he (M. Bienvenu-Martin) did not at all despair of an arrangement being come to.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 216.

(34494)

No. 245.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 285.)

Sir,

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

The comments of the Italian press regarding the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia fall broadly under two categories, those of the official and subventioned press and of the independent papers.

The observations of the former are somewhat guarded in tone, reflecting nothing more than the purely official point of view, and expressing a formal rather than enthusiastic acquiescence in the action of Austria, while passing over in silence the manner in which this action has been carried out.

The "Popolo Romano" adopts this line in its most official form and emphasises the view expressed that fundamentally, and apart from any minor question of an unusually sharp word or phrase here or there in the Austrian note, Austria is altogether in the right, and Serbia in the wrong, by contrasting the correct attitude adopted by Austria to Serbia throughout the Balkan wars as compared with the irridentism and chauvinism manifested in Serbia ever since the annexation of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, and culminating in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

But though this conveys the view which it is at present prudent for official opinion to adopt, it is far from reproducing the general feeling in this country with regard to the present situation. This feeling is reflected more truly in the columns of the independent press, which, from the "Corriere della Sera" of Milan to the "Mattino" of Naples and the "Messaggero" of Rome, show complete lack of sympathy with Austria in the latest phase of her relations with her Balkan neighbour. The "Corriere," as a matter of fact, passes severe judgment on both countries for the situation which has now arisen; Serbia, it considers, showed inexcusable callousness in the matter of the assassination of the Archduke, and has since taken no steps whatever to endeavour to assist Austria in tracing the real originators of the plot, or to check the anti-Austrian propaganda which rages freely in the country. But, on the other hand, the terms of the Austrian note were such as no independent State could be expected to accede to; and the net result of their acceptance would be nothing less than the temporary abolition of Servian independence with Austrian control of all the internal and constitutional questions of the country. In whatever light the note is viewed, its effect is melancholy. If Austria desired to make Serbia feel her responsibility for the Serajevo crime by imposing her yoke upon her, even though Serbia accepted the punishment, the result would only be to embitter still further the relations of the two States, and to render still more difficult the problems connected with the Slav population of the Austrian Empire. But if the Austrian Government wished by this note to show her strength and fearlessness of the consequences; if she sought to untie the Gordian knot of her policy by cutting it, seeing no other solution than this disastrous menace to the peace of Europe, the terms of the note were certainly the best calculated to achieve this end.

In one point at any rate all papers are unanimous: in expressing the hope that actual war may be averted: great hopes are entertained of an Anglo-Italian intervention in some quarters and the Italian press seem fully alive to the delicate position in which Italy would be placed in the event of a war between her ally and a Power on whom she counts to keep that ally in check. She herself would endeavour to keep out of the conflict: and according to the "Giornale d'Italia," her sole policy in view of the present situation is that no change shall occur in the Balkan or Adriatic equilibrium, unless the interests of Italy be first safeguarded. Austria has, it is true, denied any intention of seeking territorial gains in Serbia; were she eventually to succumb to such a temptation, the *status quo* would at once be altered, and Italy would have to protect her own interests.

I learn that great efforts have been made to restrain the press from taking any very strong line in discussing the situation, and they have so far been successful in so much as public opinion remains calm in an attitude of somewhat anxious expectancy.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

(34474)

No. 246.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

D. 12.45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 217.)

Your telegram No. 127 of 28th July: (1) Austria and Serbia.

I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard

(1) No. 231.

from Vienna and Berlin is that any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia will not be accepted by Austria. It is therefore impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if any suggestions he can make there are favourably received. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Published in BB No. 81 (paraphrased).*

(34469)

No. 247.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

D. July 28, 8:45 P.M.

R. July 29, 1 A.M.

Tel. (No. 177.)

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day substance of your telegram No. 208 of 27th July to Berlin,<sup>(1)</sup> and he begged me to thank you for language you had held to German Ambassador. He had received same disquieting news from Vienna as that reported in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. [group undecypherable],<sup>(2)</sup> and accordingly took pessimistic view of the situation. I asked him whether he would be satisfied with assurances which I understood Austrian Ambassador had been instructed to give with regard to Servia's independence and integrity. I was sure that His Majesty's Government would welcome any arrangement that would avert a European war, but it was important that we should know real intentions of Imperial Government. His Excellency replied at once that no engagement that Austria might take on these two points would satisfy Russia, and that on day that Austria crossed Servian frontier order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued. I said that German Ambassador had in conversation with myself contended that Russian Government could not pretend that their hands were being forced by public opinion as there was no excitement and no demonstrations. His Excellency replied that Ambassador was quite wrong and that it was only thanks to precautions taken by police that there had been no hostile demonstrations before Austrian and German Embassies. He had to-day received a telegram from Minister of the Interior, who was making a tour in the provinces, telling him that he need have no fear concerning internal disturbances, and that in event of war whole nation would be behind Government.

I asked whether it would not be possible in last resort for Emperor Nicholas to address personal appeal to Emperor of Austria to restrict Austria's action within limits which Russia could accept. His Excellency replied to my question by repeating that only way to avert war was for His Majesty's Government to let it be clearly known that they would join France and Russia. Prince Henry of Prussia, he heard, was being sent on mission to England, and he trusted that His Royal Highness would not be left in doubt as to what England would do.

As his Excellency had to report to Emperor this afternoon I was unable to ascertain result of conversation which he subsequently had with Austrian Ambassador, but from a hurried conversation which I had with latter I gathered that, while Austria is ready to discuss international question with Russia and to assure her that she has no ulterior aims directed either against Servian independence and integrity or against Russia's interests in the Balkans, she considers her quarrel with Servia is one that only concerns herself.

German Ambassador appealed to me to give moderating counsels to Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I told him that I had not ceased to do so from the beginning, and that it was now the turn of German Ambassador at Vienna to use his restraining

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176.

<sup>(2)</sup> ? No. 175.



influence. I warned his Excellency that Russia was thoroughly in earnest, and that nothing would avert general war if Austria attacked Servia. Ambassador had not received any instructions about suggestion of conference, and my French and Italian colleagues are still awaiting their final instructions before acting with me.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 72 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

#### MINUTE.

Russia has mobilized in Southern districts.—A. N.

(34467)

No. 248.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

D. July 28, 8.10 P.M.

R. July 29, 1.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 117.)

Russian Ambassador informs me that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined suggestion of Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs means of settling Austro-Servian conflict.<sup>(1)</sup> Russian Ambassador is sure that Russian Government will now willingly acquiesce in your proposal regarding a conference of the less interested Powers in London, and his Excellency thinks that in such a conference lies only present prospect of preserving peace of Europe. All hope need not be abandoned so long as actual contact between opposing armies has not taken place.

Confidential.

Russian Ambassador says that public opinion is still quiet in Russia, but will probably become more and more excited during the next few days. His Excellency is pessimistic and thinks that any German attempt to overawe Russia, as in 1909, would lead immediately to war. He says that Russian Minister of War is bellicose and Emperor of Russia already very angry, so that the least thing might precipitate conflict.

Italian Ambassador also takes a very serious view of the situation and anxiously awaits opening of conference in London. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed his Excellency to-day that he had instructed Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to assure Russian Government that Austria-Hungary desired neither to gain territory nor to crush Servia. But Italian Ambassador believes that nothing short of unconditional acceptance by Servia of all Austrian demands would stop Austrian advance against Servia.

(Repeated to Embassies and Nish.)

*Published in BB No. 71 (paraphrased, part marked "Confidential" omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 179.



(34499)

No. 249.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 28, 1914.**D. July 28, 12 midnight.**R. July 29, 8 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 99.)

Austria and Servia. At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, namely that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a base for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. His Excellency further said that he resented articles in French press which stated that decision of peace or war rested with German Emperor. This decision rested with Russia and Russia alone. In conclusion his Excellency reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 71 (with one omission).*

#### MINUTES.

Not much comfort in this, especially as Vienna has rejected discussion with St. Petersburg.<sup>(1)</sup>—*G. R. C. July 29, 1914.*

It is difficult to believe that the German Government have done anything at all.—*E. A. C. July 29.*

There have certainly been no indications that Germany has exercised any moderating influence at Vienna. It is going rather far to put the responsibility on Russia who has been willing to adopt any and every course likely to lead to peace. I suppose Germany wishes Russia to join with the other Powers in keeping the ring while Austria strangles Servia.—*A. N.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 248.

(34466)

No. 250.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Tel. (No. 116.)

R. July 29.

I have received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that the Servian Government, not having replied to note of 23rd July in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague Conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

*Published in BB No. 73.**Confirmed by despatch, see BB No. 50.*

## MINUTES.

I think we should not, in present circumstances, issue the otherwise usual declaration of neutrality.—E. A. C. July 29.

I agree,—better wait as to neutrality declaration.—A. N.

(34520)

No. 251.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

D. July 28, 10 P.M.

R. July 29, 10.45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 118.)

Following for D.M.O. from Military Attaché :—

“Complete mobilisation of 99th corps now practically certain. 1st, 10th, 11th Galician corps not yet mobilised. Trains with cavalry left Budapest for Galicia yesterday. Constant reports of General Bohm Ermolli that he will command one of the armies entering Servia instead of von Frank or von Auffenberg. Mountain troops, including mountain artillery, are being transferred from 14th and 3rd corps districts to Bosnia. Concentration of units has begun and is proceeding simultaneously with calling (? omitted: in) of reservists. On enquiry at War Office here whether more than one attaché would be allowed. I was told that instructions would be issued next week and that in the meantime it was impossible to answer question. Please send series of Servian maps.

“To list of units confirmed as mobilised, add 40th and 41st Honved divisions. Summary according to information so far actually verified is: completely mobilised, 8th, 9th, 4th, 7th, 13th, 15th and 16th corps and 40th and 41st divisions. Partially: 2nd, 3rd, 12th, 14th corps. Possibly partially: 6th corps and 20th division. No positive information concerning other Landwehr or Honved troops.”

(34545)

No. 252.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 29, 1914.*

D. 12.5 A.M.

R. 11.40 A.M.

Tel. (No. 128.)

Berlin telegram No. 96 of 27th July<sup>(1)</sup> is in contradiction with your telegram No. 208 of 27th July to Berlin,<sup>(2)</sup> in which German Ambassador was reported to have accepted idea of conference in principle.

Italian Government have information from Berlin showing that No. 96 of 27th July correctly represents German view, but Minister for Foreign Affairs understands that it is rather the "conference" than the principle which creates difficulty. He is telegraphing to Berlin to-night urging that idea of an exchange of views in London should be adhered to, and suggests that German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might propose formula which he could accept. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with direct communication between St. Petersburg and Vienna and would keep door open if latter fail to have any result.

He is also informing Berlin that public opinion here will not pardon the Government if every possible step has not been taken to avoid war and urging that in this Germany must co-operate.

Even if it proved impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that Italy and England should still continue to exchange views, each as representing one group.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest and thought it would have a great effect if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, as Germany was really desirous of good relations with ourselves.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 80 (paraphrased).*

#### MINUTES.

The last paragraph is significant, coming from Italy.—*E. A. C. July 29.*

I ask myself what is the use of exchanging views at this juncture. To my mind the only possible way of avoiding a conflict is to ask Austria to take no military action pending conversations and it is quite clear that such a request would be peremptorily rejected and would not be supported by Germany. I am of opinion that the resources of diplomacy are, for the present, exhausted.

We have two undoubted facts before us—

1. Austria will invade and endeavour to crush Serbia.
2. If Austria invades Serbia, Russia will act in support of Serbia. Appeals either to Austria or Russia to alter their course would be futile and would lead to misunderstandings.—*A. N.*

The German Ambassador told me to-day that what I had said in the House of Commons in reply to a question from Mr. Lawson<sup>(3)</sup> on Monday about Germany having accepted in principle the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia correctly represented the German statement made by him to me.<sup>(4)</sup>—*E. G.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 185.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 176.

<sup>(3)</sup> No. 190.

<sup>(4)</sup> See DD No. 357.

(34556)

No. 253.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

D. July 28, 11.20 P.M.

R. July 29, 12 noon.

Tel. (No. 119.)

Following from the Naval Attaché for the Admiralty:—

“Danube monitors completed to full crews at Budapest 24th and proceeded same night probably to Semlin and Pancsova. Rumour here that the fleet is to be mobilised.”

(34567)

No. 254.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, July 29, 1914.*

D. 10 A.M.

R. 12.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 20.)

All German warships reported on good authority to have left Norwegian waters and to have passed Skaw yesterday.

(34598)

No. 255.

*Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.**Cettinje, July 27, 1914.*

D. July 28, 8 P.M.

R. July 29, 12.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

From Cettinje, sent via Scutari.

Semi-official paper to-night publishes the text of a telegram from Prince Regent of Servia to King, thanking him for assurances that Montenegro is united with Servia for defence of Serb race. Telegram from the King in reply concludes: “My Montenegrins are on frontier prepared to fall in defence of our independence.”

Decree of mobilisation has not yet been issued, but troops are being collected from this neighbourhood and sent to frontier posts. Peasants report Austrians evacuated Budua yesterday, burning their superfluous stores.

Telegraphic communications via Cattaro suspended since Sunday.

*Cf. despatch No. 651.*

## MINUTE.

The certainty of war between Austria and Montenegro reinforces the argument in favour of the withdrawal of our detachment from Scutari.—E. A. C. July 29.



(34574)

No. 256.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7.40 P.M.

R. 12.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 60.)

Vice-consul at Belgrade telephones that shots are being fired over Belgrade, and that Austrians are making pontoon bridge over Save, railway bridge having, according to information received here, been blown up.

I have instructed vice-consul to hoist flag over legation, and in event of Austrians entering Belgrade to make immediate notification to military authorities with a view to ensuring safety of legation.

(34584)

No. 257.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, July 29, 1914.*

D. 10.56 A.M.

R. 12.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 15.)

My telegram No. 14.<sup>(1)</sup>

Although mobilisation not yet actually ordered all main railway bridges on line of German frontier are guarded by troops also all harbours and even piers at seaside resorts.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 218.

(34607)

No. 258.

*Russian Ambassador to Sir A. Nicolson.**Wednesday, July 29.**Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

My dear Nicolson,

I am sending you—

- (1.) The corrected translation of the telegram, you know.<sup>(1)</sup>
- (2.) A telegram concerning our mobilisation, it is addressed to Sverbief, but I have to communicate it to you.
- (3.) A telegram concerning the pourparlers between M. Sazonoff and Count Szapary.

I will send you whatever I receive in order not to lose time.

Yours v. sincerely,

BENCKENDORFF.

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 207, 208.

Enclosure (2).

*M. Sazonoff télégraphie à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Berlin le 15/28 Juillet 1914.**Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

En conséquence de la déclaration de guerre adressée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial déclarera demain la mobilisation dans les circonscriptions militaires d'Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, et Kazan. Veuillez en informer

le Gouvernement Allemand en confirmant à cette occasion l'absence en Russie de toute intention agressive contre l'Allemagne. L'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne n'est pourtant pas rappelé de son poste.

*Translation published in BB No. 70.*

Enclosure (3).

*M. Sazonoff télégraphique à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres le 15/28 Juillet 1914.*

Confidentiel.

*Chesham House, Chesham Place, S.W.*

D'urgence. La déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche rend manifestement vains mes pourparlers directs avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St. Pétersbourg.

L'action du Cabinet de Londres en faveur d'une médiation et aussi pour arrêter les opérations militaires de l'Autriche contre la Serbie me paraît de toute urgence. Sans l'arrêt des opérations militaires, une médiation ne servirait qu'à traîner les choses en longueur et permettrait à l'Autriche d'écraser entretemps la Serbie.

*Translation published in BB No. 70.*

*Cf. R No. 48.*

No. 259.

*American Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey.*

Dear Sir Edward,

*American Embassy, London, July 29, 1914.*

I send you informally a paraphrase of a telegram that I have just received from my Government, which it is a pleasure to transmit to you. My recollection is that in our conversation yesterday I suggested this subject; and I need not say that I hold myself at your service.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER HINES PAGE.

Enclosure in No. 259.

*Embassy of the United States of America.*

*Paraphrase of Telegram received at the American Embassy, July 29, 1914.*

The Secretary of State asks the Ambassador whether he thinks the good offices of the United States would be acceptable or serve any high purpose in the present crisis if offered under Article 3 of the Hague Convention.

*Cf. No. 370.*

(34637)

No. 260.

*Consul-General Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.*

Odessa, July 29, 1914.

D. 1.5 P.M.

R. 2.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 11.)

My telegram No. 9 of 27th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

All the troops of this district have returned to winter quarters and two divisions ordered to be ready to move to the Austrian frontier.

Informed that Kieff district is mobilising.

South-western railway ceased to receive private goods.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 167.

No. 261.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

D. 2.45 P.M.

R. 3.15 P.M.

Tel.

Following from Consulate, Danzig, 29th July :—

“German cruiser ‘Magdeburg’ left for Kiel yesterday at 8 in the morning.”

(34660)

No. 262.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

D. 1.50 P.M.

R. 4.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 121.)

Following from naval attaché for Admiralty :—

“Austrian fleet reported to be assembled at Cattaro.”

(34699)

No. 263.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

D. 4.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 226.)

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the

Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondent at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed. Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

(Repeated to Paris No. 263/4. St. Petersburg No. 402/3: "You should inform M.F.A."; also to Vienna No. 183/4. Rome No. 222/3: "For information only.")

*Published in BB No. 84.*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 357.*

*See also No. 284.*

(34664)

No. 264.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

D. 4.27 P.M.

R. 5.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 100.) Urgent. Secret and Confidential.

Austria and Servia. Imperial Chancellor sent for me again to-day. He informed me that he had at once communicated to Vienna your opinion that Servian reply might form basis of discussion.<sup>(1)</sup> He regretted to state that Austro-Hungarian Government had answered that it was too late to act upon your suggestion as events had marched too rapidly.<sup>(2)</sup> Upon receiving their answer his Excellency had sent a message to Vienna stating that while he was of opinion that Servian reply had shown a certain desire to meet Austrian demands he quite understood that in view of past experiences Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied without some sure guarantees that demands they had made upon Servia would be scrupulously carried out in their entirety. He had added that he presumed that hostilities about to be undertaken against Servia had exclusive object of securing such guarantees particularly as Austro-Hungarian Government had already given assurances at St. Petersburg that she had no territorial designs. If this view was correct he advised Austro-Hungarian Government to speak openly in that sense, for he hoped that by holding such language all possible misunderstanding might be set aside.<sup>(3)</sup> He had, he told me, as yet received no reply from Vienna.

His Excellency hoped that you would realise from fact that he had gone so far in giving advice at Vienna that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

His Excellency begged me most urgently to request you to regard this communication of language he had held in Vienna as most secret and confidential and not to mention it to representatives of any other Power. He had not even

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 176, see also DD No. 277.

<sup>(2)</sup> See DD No. 313.

<sup>(3)</sup> For text of this message see DD No. 323.



mentioned it to Prince Lichnowsky. That he now communicated it to me was a proof of confidence he felt in you and of his desire that you should know how sincerely he appreciated your efforts in the cause of general peace and that he was doing his best to support them.

Finally his Excellency informed me that an exchange of telegrams was taking place between German Emperor and the Czar.

*Published in BB No. 75 (paraphrased and parts omitted).  
The full unparaphrased text has been published in Oman, p. 54/5, with  
Sir Arthur Nicolson's minute.*

#### MINUTES.

The one important point is the concluding sentence. It is difficult to attach much importance to the rest.—E. A. C. July 29.

M. Sazonof told Sir G. Buchanan most positively that no assurances which Austria gave as to respecting integrity and independence of Serbia would satisfy Russia. I do not think that Berlin quite understands that Russia cannot and will not stand quietly by while Austria administers a severe chastisement to Serbia. She does not consider that Serbia deserves it, and she could not, in view of that feeling and of her position in the Slav world, consent to it.—A. N.

I have written separately a telegram in reply.<sup>(4)</sup>—E. G.

(<sup>4</sup>) No. 266.

(34666)

No. 265.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

D. 4.30 P.M.

R. 7.27 P.M.

Tel. (No. 122.)

French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me that at present there is no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by declaration of war and Emperor's appeal to his people published this morning. Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe declaration made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to acquire Servian territory nor to destroy independence of Serbia. But Italian Ambassador feels sure that Austro-Hungarian Government would refuse to do this.

Confidential.

French Ambassador is reporting to French Government that he is convinced by admissions of Servian Minister, with whom he was in close contact till Minister departed 26th July, that growing condition of unrest in Southern Slav provinces of Dual Monarchy was such that Austro-Hungarian Government were compelled either to acquiesce in separation of those provinces or make a desperate effort to retain them by reducing Serbia to impotency. Servian Minister always said that time was working for Serbia, and he told French Ambassador that within three years Southern Slav provinces would be ready to rise against Austria-Hungary without Serbia having to raise her little finger. Austria-Hungary realises she could wait no longer, and

determined on war, from which it looks as if nothing would now deter her. French Ambassador thinks this shows that conflict is not due to German instigation and that it does not necessarily show that Germany desires European war, as is thought by many in France.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 79 (paraphrased—last paragraph omitted).  
Cf. F No. 93.*

(34664)

No. 266.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 227.)

Your telegram No. 100 of July 29th.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should thank German Chancellor for his confidence which I much appreciate and will respect as he desires. If he can succeed in getting Austria to give assurances that will satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with Russia we shall all join in gratitude for the preservation of the peace of Europe. He may rely upon His Majesty's Government continuing to take every opportunity of working for peace.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 264.

(34679)

No. 267.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Sophia (viâ Pola), July 29, 1914.*

D. 3:30 P.M.

R. 9:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 35.)

Athens telegram No. 129 of July 28th.<sup>(1)</sup>

Greek and Roumanian Ministers have jointly warned Bulgarian Government that their Governments will use their utmost endeavours to maintain the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, and they have demonstrated their solidarity in this matter.

Bulgarian Government have instructed their representatives to inform the Governments to which they are accredited that Bulgaria will observe strict neutrality. The policy of Bulgaria will be, however, one of opportunism.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 224.

(34677)

No. 268.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7.20 P.M.

R. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 130.)

Your telegram No. 217 of July 29th.<sup>(1)</sup>

In view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation, Minister for Foreign Affairs now thinks moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note. Utmost he now hopes is that Germany may be induced to use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia.

*Published in BB No. 86 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 246.

(34668)

No. 269.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 29, 1914.*

D. 3.5 P.M.

R. 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 63.)

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

General bombardment of Belgrade expected to-night. In view of exposed position of British Legation, vice-consul has removed all cyphers and secret archives to German Legation, and has ordered all refugees to leave. Prime Minister tells me that he has now left it entirely to military authorities whether Belgrade shall be defended or not. Vice-consul telephones that shell fell in legation garden and that so far damage is inconsiderable.

<sup>(1)</sup> Probably No. 291 (a).

(34665)

No. 270.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7.45 P.M.

R. 9.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 94.)

President of the Republic's arrival this afternoon was the occasion of a large patriotic manifestation. There were a few cries of "A Berlin!"

Many newspapers are writing about Germany in a way calculated to excite public opinion. The "Temps" declares, as Germany has made no attempt to restrain Austrian action and must know what may result therefrom, it is evident that she desires war.

French public up to the present is disinclined to allow itself to be worked up to warlike excitement. State of Bourse creates anxiety.

*Cf. Private Letter No. 320.*

(34675)

No. 271.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

D. 8.30 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 184.)

In conversation reported in my telegram No. 182 of July 29th,<sup>(1)</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed considerable doubt as to attitude of Roumania in the event of general war and said that he feared that King would side with Austria, though sympathies of his subjects were on side of Russia.

I also forgot to mention that His Excellency does not wish reference made to the fact that it was at suggestion of German Ambassador that he had proposed direct conversation with Austria.

I hear from my French colleague that Chief of General Staff sent this afternoon to German military attaché and assured him on his word of honour that, up to the present, no single military preparation has been taken against Germany.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 276.

<sup>(2)</sup>[NOTE.—This is not quite in accordance with the account given by the German Military Attaché in his official telegram sent from St. Petersburg (DD No. 370): "He (the Chief of the General Staff) assured me in the most solemn form on his word of honour that up to that time, 3 o'clock in the afternoon, there had not been any mobilisation anywhere—that is the calling up of a single man or horse. He could not give any pledge for the future but could expressly confirm that His Majesty did not wish mobilisation on the front opposite to our frontier."]

(34676)

No. 272.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7.20 P.M.

R. 10.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 129.)

I understand that <sup>(2)</sup> press messages reporting movement of ships or troops are no longer accepted here. But there is no indication as yet of any further summons of time-expired classes to colours.

(34668)

No. 273.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.**Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

D. 10.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 34.)

Your telegram No. 63.<sup>(1)</sup>

I presume Vice-Consul is remaining in German Legation in charge of cyphers, &c.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 269.



(34669)

No. 274.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 29, 1914.*

D. 6.50 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 64.)

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

Prime Minister informed me that, should military authorities decide to defend Belgrade, due notice will be given to inhabitants so as to afford them time to leave.

(1) No. 269.

(34670)

No. 275.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 29, 1914.*

D. 6.50 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 65.)

Prime Minister asks me to express to you his deep gratitude for your statement in the House of Commons on 27th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 83 (paraphrased).*

(1) No. 190.

(34673)

No. 276.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

D. 8.40 P.M.

R. 11.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 182.)

Order for partial mobilisation was signed to-day.

In accordance with instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 392 of 28th July,<sup>(1)</sup> I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegram No. 218 of 28th July to Berlin<sup>(2)</sup> and told him in confidence of what German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said to Sir E. Goschen on the subject of mobilisation. His Excellency had already heard it from another source and said that mobilisation would only be directed against Austria. It was for this reason that it had been decided not to order the general mobilisation which military authorities had strongly recommended.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had, on advice of German Ambassador, proposed direct conversation between St. Petersburg and Vienna, but that Austrian Government had now definitely declined such an exchange of views. In informing German Ambassador of this refusal on Austria's part he proposed to urge return to your proposal for conference of four, or, at all events, for exchange of views between you, three Ambassadors less directly interested and, if you thought it advisable, Austrian Ambassador. He did not care what form such conversations took and he was ready to accept almost any arrangement that was approved by France and England. There was no time to lose, and war could only be averted if you could

(1) No. 219.

(2) No. 218.

succeed by conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually in arriving at some formula which you could get Austria to accept. Russian Government had done all they could do to maintain peace and had been perfectly frank and conciliatory throughout, and he trusted British public realised it would not be their fault if their efforts to maintain peace failed.

I mentioned to him suggestion made in Rome telegram No. 125 of 27th July.<sup>(3)</sup> and asked whether he would raise objections if this suggestion were carried out. His Excellency said he could not be more Servian than Serbia and would agree to anything four Powers could arrange provided it was acceptable to Serbia. Sharpness of ultimatum, however, would have to be toned down by some supplementary statement or explanations.

As regards proposal referred to in your telegram No. 388 of 28th July.<sup>(4)</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs said it was one of secondary importance to which he did not attach weight under altered circumstances of situation. His Excellency further told me that German Ambassador had informed him that his Government were continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna. If German Ambassador uses same language to his Government as he did to me to-day, I fear he will not help to smooth over matters. He accused Russia of endangering peace of Europe by mobilising and on my referring to all that Austria had recently done said there were matters he could not discuss. I reminded him that Austria had already partially mobilised, that her consuls here had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join colours, and she had now declared war on Serbia, knowing from what had passed during Balkan crisis that this was an act that Russia could not submit to without humiliation. If Russia had not shown that she was in earnest by ordering mobilisation, Austria would have believed that she could go to any lengths and thus trade on Russia's desire for peace. A week or more would elapse before mobilisation was completed and Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by immediately crossing frontier. In the meantime we ought all to work together to find issue out of dangerous situation.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 78 (paraphrased and part omitted).*

(<sup>3</sup>) No. 202.

(<sup>4</sup>) No. 203.

(34688)

No. 277.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Constantinople, July 29, 1914.*

D. 9 P.M.

R. 11:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 461.)

I gathered from remark let fall by Austrian Ambassador here that designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. He spoke of assistance on which Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule and of deplorable economic situation at Salonica under Greek administration.

*Published in BB No. 82 (paraphrased).*

MINUTE.

This is significant, especially if read together with the second paragraph of Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 122.<sup>(1)</sup>—E. A. C. July 30.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 265.

(34668)

No. 278.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.**Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 35.)

D. 11.45 P.M.

My telegram No. 34.<sup>(1)</sup>

Cyphers and other highly secret documents left with Vice-Consul at Belgrade should be burnt at once. One cypher should be kept on person of Vice-Consul.

Acknowledge receipt and report when action taken.

*Cf. Nos. 389 and 394.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 273.

(34684)

No. 279.

*Consul Bosanquet to Sir Edward Grey.**Riga, July 29, 1914.*

D. 7.30 P.M.

Tel.

R. 11.50 P.M.

Reported that all lights are extinguished on Russian Baltic coast. No goods above 70 pounds accepted on Riga-Orel Railway.

(Repeated to Embassy.)

(34685)

No. 280.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

D. 8.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 26. Commercial.)

R. midnight.

Official "Messenger" gives notice that coast lights in neighbourhood of Sebastopol, with exception of Cherson lighthouse, have been extinguished. Entry of vessels Sebastopol and neighbouring bays prohibited between sunset and sunrise, and vessels compelled by stress of weather to take shelter at night may enter Kamyshev and Kasachi Bays.

Vessels not obeying Russian warships near Sebastopol will be fired on.

(34678)

No. 281.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

D. 11.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 101.)

R. midnight.

Austria and Servia. I found Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion

that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war.<sup>(1)</sup> He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. Neither Chancellor nor Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has spoken to me about the British Admiralty measures, but the reports published here apparently caused considerable uneasiness in financial world. Shares of Hamburg-Amerika and German Lloyd lines have dropped several points, and one of the most prominent Berlin financiers, who, owing to losses already incurred through the crisis, was in need of money, states that he endeavoured to sell his shares in those lines, but found no buyers.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 76 (last two sentences omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. Letter No. 677.

(34999)

No. 282.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

(No. 128.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum,<sup>(1)</sup> which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff deprecated this.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed. The original of this document will be found in the Austrian Red Book, vol. II, No. 48; an English translation in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 461. The Foreign Office copy is printed and in German.



In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 91.*

*(There is a note on the file copy "Intransmissible! War!")*

(35000)

No. 283.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 509.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed.<sup>(1)</sup> But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans: and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav, we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 87.*

<sup>(1)</sup> *Cf. No. 286.*

(34877)

No. 284.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 251.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July to your Excellency,<sup>(1)</sup> I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's telegram of the 28th July<sup>(2)</sup> and of my reply to it.<sup>(3)</sup> I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, [without]<sup>(4)</sup> taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 90.**(There is a note on the file copy—"Not sent—War.")*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 263.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 231.<sup>(3)</sup> No. 246.<sup>(4)</sup> The word "without" is not in the original.

(34998)

No. 285.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 252.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government

yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was of course too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 88.*

*(There is a note on the file copy—"Not sent—War.")*

*Prince Lichnowsky's report to Berlin of the conversation recorded in this and the following despatch, together with the comments of the German Emperor, will be found in DD No. 368.*

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 263, 284, also DD No. 357.

(35001)

No. 286.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 253.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing

that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 89.*

*(There is a note on the file copy—"Not sent--War.")*

<sup>(1)</sup> See DD No. 265.

(34997)

No. 287.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.*

(No. 221.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador made me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano, suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers—a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy—might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 92.*

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 223.

(34852)

No. 288.

*Parliamentary Debates. July 29, 1914.*

*Mr. Bonar Law:* May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any information in regard to the European situation to give to the House?

*The Prime Minister:* As the House is aware, a formal Declaration of War was issued yesterday by Austria against Servia. The situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity. I can only say, usefully say, that His Majesty's Government are not relaxing their efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of possible conflict.

*Mr. Walter Guinness:* May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he has received any information as to the alleged revolutionary outbreak in Russian Poland?

*The Prime Minister:* No, Sir.



(34710)

No. 289.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)*

(No. 227.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that the public of the capital showed considerable excitement yesterday over the Austro-Servian crisis. Newspaper offices were besieged by crowds clamouring for the latest news and those who obtained papers read out the latest telegrams to the people round them. A detachment of soldiers with a band evoked spontaneous cheers which were taken up all along the Newsky Prospect. In the afternoon a large crowd of all classes collected in one of the main avenues of the town and raised cheers for Servia and hoots and groans for Austria and Germany. The police made an unsuccessful attempt to disperse the crowd which made its way to the Servian Legation. The Servian Minister, M. Spalaikovich, appeared at a window and was received with an ovation, whereupon he made a speech expressing the filial sympathy of his country for Russia, but closed the window when the cry of "down with Austria" was raised. Several attempts at hostile demonstration before the Austrian and German Embassies were frustrated by the police. Crowds sang the national anthem outside some of the barracks and Russian officers were greeted with cheers in the streets. At 3 A.M. this morning a large crowd driven back from the German Embassy renewed the demonstration in front of the Servian Legation where one of the Servian secretaries made a speech on the crisis. The crowd cheered with enthusiasm and held a Russian officer shoulder high to reply.

All the papers publish articles on the chances of war or peace. The "Novoe Vremya" says all depends on Germany, who is under no treaty obligation to support Austria in acts of provocation. The German Government, says the writer, will never allow the German army to be used as a weapon in the hands of Austria. The "St. Petersburg Courier" publishes agency telegrams to the effect that the German Emperor has returned to Berlin several days earlier than was originally intended; that the Chief of the Prussian General Staff has hurried back to Berlin from Karlsbad; and that a general mobilisation of the Servian army has been officially notified. The "Rech" states that you, Sir, have advised the King to address the German Emperor directly with a view of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute.

I have, &amp;c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

(34667)

No. 290.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

D. July 29, 8.50 P.M.

R. July 30, 12.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 123.)

Following for Director of Military Operations from military attaché:—

"List of units mobilised in 8th corps includes Landwehr division and cavalry regiments whose headquarters are at Stanislau. Prague and Pardubitz cavalry do not seem to be affected. In press circles it is said that a frontier skirmish unfavourable to Austrians took place yesterday east of Foca. No account of this appears in papers."

(34671)

No. 291.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Nish.*

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

R. July 30, 1914, 2.20 A.M.

Considerable panic in Belgrade, in consequence of which refugees are crowding into British Legation to seek protection of our flag.

(34672)

(b.)

*Nish.*

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

R. July 30, 1914, 2.25 A.M.

I am informed by telephone from Belgrade that two shells have fallen on portion of British Legation exposed to Austrian fire, doing considerable damage.

(34737)

(c.)

*Nish.*

Tel. (No. 66.)

R. July 30, 1914, 11 A.M.

Information received here this morning is to the effect that Austrians recommenced bombardment of Belgrade yesterday evening. Servians replied from forts and bombardment ceased. Minister for War states that Servian frontier has not yet been violated.

(34680)

No. 292.

*Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.**Cettinje, July 28, 1914.*

D. July 29, 7 P.M.

R. July 30, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 25.)

General mobilisation ordered.

(34784)

No. 293.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

D. July 30, 1.20 A.M.

R. July 30, 9 A.M.

Tel. (No. 102.) Secret. Urgent.

(? Austria and) Servia. Chancellor having just returned from Potsdam sent for me again to-night and made the following strong bid for British neutrality in the event of war. He said he was continuing his efforts to maintain peace, but that (group omitted: ? in the event of) a Russian attack on Austria, Germany's obligation as Austria's ally might, to his great regret, render a European conflagration inevitable, and in that case he hoped Great Britain would remain neutral. As far as he was able to judge key-note of British policy, it was evident that Great Britain would never allow France to be crushed. Such a result was not contemplated by Germany. The Imperial Government was ready to give every assurance to the British Government provided that Great Britain remained neutral that, in the event of a victorious war, Germany aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France.

In answer to a question from me, his Excellency said that it would not be possible for him to give such an assurance as regards colonies.

Continuing, his Excellency said he was, further, ready to assure the British Government that Germany would respect neutrality and integrity of Holland as long as they were respected by Germany's adversaries.

As regards Belgium, his Excellency could not tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the action of France, but he could state that, provided that Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion of the war.

Finally, his Excellency said that he trusted that these assurances might form basis of a further understanding with England which, as you well know, had been the object of his policy ever since he had been Chancellor.

An assurance of British neutrality in conflict which present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to a general neutrality agreement between the two countries, the details of which it would, of course, be premature to discuss at the present moment.

His Excellency asked me how I thought you would view his request. I replied that I thought that you would like to retain full liberty of action, and that personally I did not consider it likely that you would care to bind yourself to any course of action at this stage of events.

After our conversation I communicated to his Excellency the contents of your telegram No. 227,<sup>(1)</sup> and he begged me to convey to you his best thanks.

*Published in BB No. 85 (paraphrased).*

*DD No. 373 contains the German Chancellor's record of his statement.*

*Cf. also No. 677.*

#### MINUTE.

The only comment that need be made on these astounding proposals is that they reflect discredit on the statesman who makes them.

Incidentally it is of interest to note that Germany practically admits the intention to violate Belgian neutrality but to endeavour to respect that of Holland (in order to safeguard German imports viâ the Rhine and Rotterdam).

It is clear that Germany is practically determined to go to war, and that the one restraining influence so far has been the fear of England joining in the defence of France and Belgium.—*E. A. C. July 30.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 266.

(36819)

No. 294.

*M. Viviani à M. Paul Cambon.—(Communicated by French Embassy.) (No date.)*

Tél.

*Paris, le 30 juillet, 1914.*

L'Ambassadeur de Russie me fait savoir cette nuit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a notifié à M. Sazonof la décision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armées si la Russie ne cesse pas ses préparatifs militaires. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement du Tsar fait remarquer que ces préparatifs n'ont été commencés qu'à la suite de la mobilisation par l'Autriche de huit corps d'armée et du refus de cette Puissance de régler pacifiquement son différend avec la Serbie. M. Sazonof déclare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hâter ses armements et envisager l'imminence de la guerre, qu'elle compte sur le secours d'une alliée, la France et qu'elle considère comme désirable que l'Angleterre se joigne sans perte de temps à la Russie et à la France. Comme je vous l'ai indiqué dans mon télégramme

du 27 de ce mois. le Gouvernement de la République est décidé à ne négliger aucun effort en vue d'une solution du conflit et à seconder l'action du Gouvernement impérial dans l'intérêt de la paix générale.

La France est d'autre part résolue à remplir toutes ses obligations d'alliance.

Mais dans l'intérêt même de la paix générale et étant donné qu'une conversation est engagée entre les Puissances moins intéressées je crois qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de précaution et de défense auxquelles la Russie croit devoir procéder elle ne prenne immédiatement aucune disposition qui offrirait à l'Allemagne un prétexte pour une mobilisation totale ou partielle de ses forces.

*Cf. F. No. 101, R. No. 58. Un Livre Noir. vol. II pp. 289-90, also No. 300.*

(34746)

No. 295.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

*D. July 29, 11:30 P.M.*

*R. July 30, 11 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 124)

Russian Ambassador informs me that Russia has ordered mobilisation of corps destined for operations on Austrian frontier. Military attaché learns from his Russian colleague that thirty-one divisions will be mobilised, namely, those of Vilna, Warsaw, Kieff, and Odessa army corps. News is not yet generally known in Vienna this evening, but I believe it will not be a surprise to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which has tardily realised that Russia will not remain indifferent. In present temper of this country irrevocable steps may be taken unless mediation which German Ambassador [*sic*] declared its readiness in principle to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested be rapidly brought to bear. Both Russian and French Ambassadors have spoken to-day to German Ambassador, who feigned surprise that Russia should take so much interest in fate of Serbia. Russian Ambassador explained impossibility of her doing otherwise and expressed hope that matters might yet be arranged. He said that Russia had already used her influence to secure compliance of Servian Government with principal demands of Austria. She would probably go further still in this direction if approached in a proper manner. But she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement and she was justly offended at having been completely ignored in the matter. Interview with French Ambassador was disagreeable, but German Ambassador in the end said that personally he thought German Government might consent to act as a mediator with other three Powers, provided that proposals could still be formulated which would have any prospect of acceptance on both sides. From what Russian Ambassador tells me, I gather that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Serbia, but his Excellency greatly fears effect on Russian public opinion if a serious engagement takes place before an agreement is reached.

Italian Ambassador fears that Austro-Hungarian Government would decline mediation if offered before Austrian arms had obtained at least one decisive victory over the Servians

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 94 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

*Cf. DD No. 386.*



(34778)

No. 296.

*Consul-General Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.**Odessa, July 30, 1914.*

D. 12:40 P.M.

R. 12:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 12.)

Mobilisation of army and navy reservists of 1901 to 1913 declared. Reservists to present themselves to-morrow morning.

(35028)

No. 297.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, July 30, 1914.*

D. 11:39 A.M.

R. 12:55 P.M.

Tel. (No. 17.)

Royal decree published to-day temporarily (? re-)newing Decree of October 30th, 1909 (see Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 200 of November 30th, 1909) and prohibiting foreign men-of-war or vessels converted into men-of-war from entering Netherlands territorial waters, exceptions made for (1) fishery cruisers; (2) men-of-war in distress or damaged or forced by stress of weather or those destined exclusively for religious, scientific, or humanitarian purposes.

Exceptions to restrictive prohibitions mentioned in (1) and (2) only applicable with regard to those Powers which observe the same line of conduct towards Netherlands men-of-war.

Translation of decree by post to-night.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> *This despatch is not printed as it contains nothing but the text of the decree.*

(34845)

No. 298.

*Consul-General Hearn to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Hamburg, July 30, 1914.*

D. 12:25 P.M.

R. 1:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 11.)

Secret. Vice-Consul at Bremerhaven reports that activity is being shown by staff officers, who have arrived; that forts are being manned and submarine defences also being placed along that whole North Sea coast and by Heligoland.

(Embassy informed.)

## MINUTES.

These are preparations for war against England.—E. A. C. July 30.

Or for defence against an English attack.—A. N.

(b.)

(34849)

*Hamburg, July 30, 1914.*

D. 12:25 P.M.

R. 1:50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 12.)

Secret. Vice-Consul at Emden reports that artillery there were alarmed at two this morning and left hurriedly for Borkum, where garrison has been raised to war strength less reserves.

(Embassy informed.)

(34807)

No. 299.

*Russian Ambassador to Sir Arthur Nicolson.—(Received July 30.)**Russian Embassy, London,**July 30, 1914.*

My dear Nicolson,

I received yesterday night two of the enclosed telegrams. They seem to me of importance. As they refer to Schebeko's telegram of which I gave you a résumé yesterday afternoon, I enclose a translation of that telegram as well.

Yours sincerely,

BENCKENDORFF.

Enclosures in No. 299.

(1.)

Confidentiel.

*Télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Vienne à M. Sazonoff en date du  
15/28 Juillet 1914.*

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de St.-Pétersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note Austro-Hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise était devenue si aiguë et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

*Cf. A II No. 95.*

(2.)

Confidentiel.

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff en date du 16/29 Juillet 1914.*

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée Austro-Hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin, dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

*Cf. DD No. 343.*

(3.)

Confidentiel.

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres du  
16/29 Juillet 1914.*

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement Britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

*Published, with translation, in BB No. 93.*

(36820)

No. 300.

*Communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 30, 1914.*

Confidentiel.

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres du 16/29 Juillet  
1914 (N 1551).*

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a informé aujourd'hui de la décision prise par le Gouvernement allemand de mobiliser ses forces armées, si la Russie n'arrêtait pas ses préparations militaires. Les mesures en question n'ont été prises par la Russie qu'après que l'Autriche-Hongrie eut mobilisé huit corps d'armée et quand il fut devenu manifeste que le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne montrait aucun désir de consentir à quelque moyen pacifique pour aplanir son différend avec la Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne pouvant pas obtempérer au désir exprimé par l'Allemagne, il ne lui reste plus qu'à hâter ses armements et à compter avec l'éventualité de la guerre devenue probablement inévitable.

Veuillez informer de ce qui précède le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

*Cf. No. 294 and Un Livre Noir. vol. II, p. 289.*

(34866)

No. 301.

*Sir R. Rold to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 30, 1914.*

D. 12 noon.

R. 2:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 131.)

I saw the German Ambassador, who had just returned to Rome, last night. He thought that if Serbia could be induced to submit and ask for peace early, say as soon as Belgrade was occupied, Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands. He said that, owing to configuration of the country and strength of positions round Nish, it would require 400,000 to 500,000 men to ensure success of operations if campaign were pushed to a conclusion, in which case Austrian terms must be more difficult.

Could discussions, in which Germany might take part with us, once be engaged, he thought that Russia would gladly suspend any action pending their issue. There was menace of acute distress in Russia, and round his wife's Russian properties people's food supply was in danger, so she had every reason to avoid war if she could obtain some small measure of satisfaction. Germany's difficulty was that during recent years she had so often intervened to prevent her ally from chastising Serbia that at Vienna value of her alliance began to be called in question, and now she was pledged to secure Austria liberty of action in Serbia.

I put forward personal suggestion that Germany might embody some formula which she could accept for exchange of views, and on returning to Embassy found your telegram No. 226 of 29th July to Berlin,<sup>(1)</sup> from which it appeared that you had already urged this course.

*Parts published in BB No. 100 (paraphrased).*

## MINUTE.

I think it is unnecessary to repeat this. Only Russia can induce Serbia to submit, and we know how Russia would meet the suggestion.—*G. R. C. July 30, 1914.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 263.

(34855)

No. 302.

(a.)

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

D. 1:15 P.M.

R. 3:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 185.) Urgent. Very Confidential.

Minister for Foreign Affairs received French Ambassador and me this morning. He told us he had yesterday afternoon conversation with German Ambassador in which latter had said that his Government would guarantee that Austria would not violate Servian integrity. Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that though territorial integrity might be respected Serbia would inevitably become vassal of Austria just as Bokhara, though its territory had been left intact, was a vassal of Russia. Were Russian Government to tolerate this, there would be a revolution in country. High words were exchanged on both sides, Minister for Foreign Affairs accusing Austria of pursuing a policy of blackmail and Germany of being animated by desire of gaining time to complete her military preparations.



Russian Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs told us, had absolute proof of military and naval preparations being made by Germany against Russia more especially in direction of Gulf of Finland. Yesterday evening it was decided to issue this morning order for partial mobilisation—thirteen army corps referred to in my telegram 182 of July 29th<sup>(1)</sup> and at the same time to commence preparations for general mobilisation.

At two o'clock in morning German Ambassador had second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs in which former, seeing that war was inevitable, broke down completely and appealed to latter to hold out a last straw and to make some suggestion he could telegraph to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs then read out text of French formula given by him to Ambassador of which following is translation :—

“ If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia. Russia engages to stop all military preparations.”

If Austria rejects this proposal preparations for a general mobilisation will be proceeded with and European war will be inevitable. For strategical reasons Russia can hardly postpone converting partial into general mobilisation now that she knows that Germany is preparing and excitement in country has reached such a pitch that she cannot hold back if Austria refuses to make concession. Minister for Foreign Affairs is to see Emperor this afternoon.

(Repeated to Paris No. 270, Berlin No. 234, Vienna No. 188, Rome No. 230 : “ For information only.”)

*Published in BB No. 97 (paraphrased—parts omitted).*

*A telegram from M. Sazonof containing this was also communicated to the Foreign Office by Count Benckendorff either on July 30 or 31 as follows :—*

(b.)

(36818)

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres,  
le 17/30 Juillet 1914.*

Je télégraphie à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Berlin :

“ L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de me poser la question si nous pouvions nous contenter d'une promesse du Gouvernement austro-hongrois de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie. J'ai répondu que cette déclaration ne suffisait pas.

“ Pressé par l'Ambassadeur d'indiquer à quelles conditions nous consentirions encore d'arrêter nos armements, j'ai autorisé l'Ambassadeur à télégraphier d'urgence à Berlin :

“ ‘ Si l'Autriche-Hongrie, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires.’

“ Veuillez télégraphier quelle attitude prendra le Gouvernement allemand en présence de cette preuve nouvelle de notre désir de faire tout le possible pour une solution pacifique. Veuillez le faire d'urgence, car nous ne saurions accepter que de tels pourparlers ne servent qu'à gagner du temps au profit de l'Autriche et de l'Allemagne.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 276.

[NOTE.—The account of these events given in telegram 302 (a) differs from that given by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg. According to his statement in "*Am Schidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden*" p. 41, which is supported by the telegrams published in "*Deutsche Dokumente*," Count Pourtalès saw M. Sazonof in the afternoon of July 29 (DD No. 365), and again about 7 o'clock (DD No. 378) in the evening when he communicated the message from the German Chancellor referred to in No. 300, and a third time, at the invitation of M. Sazonof, about midnight (DD Nos. 401 and 412). He also saw him about midday on July 30. The conversation referred to in the first paragraph of Sir George Buchanan's telegram is, according to his account, that which took place in the middle of the night (DD No. 412), and it was not then, but on the morning of July 30, that M. Sazonof, in answer to Count Pourtalès' appeal, wrote down the formula recorded in the third paragraph (DD No. 421). The telegram of Count Pourtalès to the German Foreign Office recording this interview was despatched at 1 p.m. on July 30, and begins: "I have just had a conversation with M. Sazonof." If this is correct Sir George Buchanan must have received the information from M. Sazonof immediately after Count Pourtalès left him; the interview must have been a very short one and, not unnaturally, he did not get quite clear as to what happened in each of these separate interviews. On the other hand, the account given by M. Paléologue (F No. 103) agrees with that of Sir George Buchanan; they both received the information at the same time from M. Sazonof, and this agrees with the account given in a Russian publication containing the Diary of events in the Russian Foreign Office. The telegrams as published later from the Russian archives and translated in "*The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*" throw no light on the matter as the hours of despatch are not given, but the Russian Ambassador in Berlin did not receive the telegrams informing him of the new formula till some time after Pourtalès' telegram to the Foreign Office had been received late in the afternoon.]

(34734)

No. 303.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

D. 3:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 231.)

Your telegram No. 102.<sup>(1)</sup>

You must inform German Chancellor that his proposal that we should bind ourselves to neutrality on such terms cannot for a moment be entertained.

He asks us in effect to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy without further territory in Europe being taken from her.

But apart from that, for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between Germany and England would offer positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. My answer must be that we must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any development of the present crisis, so unfavourable and regrettable, as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is to continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 293.

And if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and this crisis be safely passed, my own endeavour would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no hostile or aggressive policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has had for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the reaction and relief that will follow may make some more definite rapprochement between the Powers possible than was possible before.

*Published in BB No. 101 (paraphrased).*

(35070)

No. 304.

*Consul Bosanquet to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Riga, July 30, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 3.40 P.M.

Tel.

I am informed that the Russian Asiatic Steamship "Mittava" is ordered to Reval for Government use and others of the same company are likely to follow.

No ships could leave Riga yesterday but possibly some to-day. Railway bridges have small guards. Entrance to Libau probably mined.

Secret police reported to have information of possible Russian general strike to-morrow.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

(34865)

No. 305.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

D. 1.45 P.M.

R. 3.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 103.)

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you<sup>(1)</sup> he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there.<sup>(2)</sup> He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria, he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of position to Germany in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done

<sup>(1)</sup> Nos. 263, 285,

<sup>(2)</sup> See DD No. 395



nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and if, and when, they mobilised, they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night<sup>(3)</sup> contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

(First two paragraphs repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 98 (with slight verbal differences).*

<sup>(3)</sup> This refers to Prince Lichnowsky's account of the conversation recorded in No. 286 (cf. DD No. 368). Cf. Nos. 317 and 677.

(34870)

No. 306.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

D. 4 P.M.

R. 4.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 104.) Urgent.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to say that there is no truth in the rumour circulated this morning in special editions of newspapers here that orders for German mobilisation would be issued to-night.

(34876)

No. 307.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

D. 3.50 P.M.

R. 5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 135.)

News of Russian mobilisation is still carefully held back, press making no mention of it this morning. French Ambassador tells me that official notification made yesterday by Russian Ambassador at Paris concluded with the statement that the Russian Ambassador had not yet been recalled from Vienna. Russian Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. He does not yet know how Austro-Hungarian Government are taking it, but hopes that mobilisation will be regarded as what it is, namely, a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia. Russian Ambassador says that Russian Government must have assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure Slav provinces of Austria from continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory. Mobilisation is proceeding at Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan, not, as I heard yesterday, at Wilna and Warsaw.

Italian Ambassador read me to-day Montenegrin manifesto denouncing aggressive action of Austria against Servia, and declaring that Montenegro identified herself with Servian cause. His Excellency believes that Austria will not invade Montenegro unless attacked first.

French Ambassador hears from Berlin that German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke European war.



Confidential.

Unfortunately German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is not likely to plead cause of peace with entire sincerity. I am privately informed that German Ambassador knew text of Austrian note to Servia before it was sent off and telegraphed it to the German Emperor, but I am not able to verify this, though I know from German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 95 (paraphrased and parts omitted).*

#### MINUTE.

If it is true that the German Emperor had previous knowledge of the ultimatum, this would explain the great difficulty in which the German Government now find themselves in speaking to the Austrian Government.—A. N.

(34835)

No. 308.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 271.)

D. 5 P.M.

Your Excellency should inform Government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government have authorised British man-of-war to leave Durazzo, and have decided, in view of Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia, and of possibility of complications that may involve Montenegro, to withdraw Colonel Phillips and the British detachment from Scutari and Alessio.

(Sent also to Berlin No. 235, Vienna No. 189, Rome No. 231, and St. Petersburg No. 409.)

(34959)

No. 309.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 412.)

D. 7.35 P.M.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.<sup>(1)</sup> Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday<sup>(2)</sup> as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram No. 185 of 30th July,<sup>(3)</sup> and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss

<sup>(1)</sup> See DD No. 439.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 285.

<sup>(3)</sup> No. 302.

how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No 274.)

*Published in BB No. 103.*

*A copy of this telegram was telegraphed in English by Prince Lichnowsky to Berlin, at 9 56 P.M., DD No. 460.*

(34959)

No. 310.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 275.)

*D. 7 45 P.M.*

My telegram No. 412 of 30th July to St. Petersburg.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say that I know from his telegram to M. Cambon to-day<sup>(2)</sup> that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate crisis, and I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

(Sent also to Berlin No. 234, Vienna No. 188, and Rome No. 230.)

*Published in BB 104 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 309.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 294.

(34882)

No. 311.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 127.)

*R. 9 P.M.*

Russian Ambassador, on leaving Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon came to French Embassy, where I happened to be, and gave French Ambassador and myself account of his interview.<sup>(1)</sup> It was quite friendly. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that of course as Russia had mobilised Austria must do so also, but this was not to be considered as a threat, but merely as adoption of military precautions similar to those taken across the frontier. Also there was no objection to conversations between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg being continued, though Minister for Foreign Affairs did not say that they could be resumed on basis of Servian reply.

On the whole Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to pack up his things on the strength of rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. Russian Ambassador now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria, but he hears from Berlin that German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was much annoyed by mobilisation and threatened a German mobilisation both on Russian and French frontiers, though Russian mobilisation was only against Austria. Russian mobilisation is still kept dark in Vienna.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 96 (paraphrased and last 3½ lines omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> A III No. 45.

## MINUTES.

This looks at last as if some German pressure were making itself felt at Vienna.—*E. A. C.*  
*July 31.*

Surely it was Austria who mobilised before Russia did.—*A. N.*

(34881)

No. 312.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

*D. 7.50 P.M.*

*R. 9.20 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 126.)

Following for Director of Military Operations from military attaché :—

“ 11th corps, Lemberg, received orders to mobilise yesterday. It is not yet known whether Landwehr of this corps is affected, or whether 1st and 10th corps are to mobilise. 37th regiment left Vienna day before yesterday. In all, 4th, 19th, 99th, and 37th have left corps.

“ 5th horse artillery brigade in Komorn has been mobilised, which may indicate that 16th cavalry brigade or whole 2nd cavalry division are mobilised for service in Galicia.

“ 10th cavalry division, Budapest, is mobilised, but it is not known whether it has proceeded north or south, probably former.

“ According to all accounts mobilisation has proceeded with perfect smoothness and without any untoward incident of any kind. Czechs and Southern Slavs have made no protest whatever. Concentration has proceeded simultaneously with mobilisation, and at least 100,000 men are now in Neusatz–Werschetz zone.

“ War is undoubtedly very popular everywhere.

“ Bridge at Semlin was not seriously damaged and can be easily repaired.”

(34884)

No. 313.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

*D. 7.55 P.M.*

*R. 9.30 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 105.)

Austria and Servia. Military attaché has heard report that bodies of troops are being conveyed by rail to both eastern and western frontiers of Germany. Military attaché further informs me that unusual military activity is observable, and that, in his opinion, order for mobilisation is imminent.

## MINUTE.

No doubt a good deal of mobilization work is steadily going on in all countries.—*E. A. C.*  
*July 31.*

(34891)

No. 314.

*Consul-General Hearn to Sir Edward Grey.**Hamburg, July 30, 1914.*

D. 7.6 P.M.

R. 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 13.) Secret.

Vice-Consul at Emden reports mining Ems probable and Emden reservists have joined troops proceeding Borkum. He understands that mobilisation notices were posted this morning.

(Embassy informed.)

(34885)

No. 315.

*Mr. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.**Dresden, July 30, 1914.*

D. 7.30 P.M.

R. 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 1.)

I have just heard that (2 100th and 1st Grenadier regiment of the Saxon army has been ordered to the Silesian frontier and is leaving Dresden to-day.

## MINUTE.

This is decidedly ominous. Clearly, although Germany avoids the use of the word "mobilization," she is doing the thing.—*E. A. C. July 31.*

(34883)

No. 316.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.**Bucharest, July 27, 1914.*

D. July 27, 12.40 P.M.

R. July 30, 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

Servian Chargé d'Affaires enquired of Minister for Foreign Affairs on 17th July [*sic*] as to Roumania's attitude in Austro-Servian conflict, but received only vague replies. Since then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in answer to enquiries from my French colleague, has defined Roumania's attitude as follows :—

Roumania regards herself as solid with Greece for maintenance of Treaty of Bucharest, so that if Bulgaria were to take advantage of present situation to attempt to upset treaty, Greece and Roumania would oppose her.

As regards Austro-Servian conflict, so long as it is restricted to obtaining satisfaction of Austria's claims for assassination and guarantees for future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Roumanian Government regarded these questions as unconnected with execution of treaty and will not intervene. But if Austria were to try to modify *status quo* established by treaty, solidarity of Roumania and Greece would be at once demonstrated.

(Repeated to Athens, Belgrade and Sophia.)



(34865)

No. 317.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 237.)

D. 10.30 P.M.

Your telegram No. 103 of 30th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

Telegram from German Ambassador referred to by German Chancellor in last paragraph but one of your despatch evidently refers to a warning given by me that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 102 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 305.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 286.

(34878)

No. 318.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 30, 1914.*

D. 8.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 95.)

R. 10.30 P.M.

I had audience of President of the Republic this evening in order to give him your message of congratulation on success of his visit to St. Petersburg, for which he wishes me to thank you.

He told me that in middle of last night French Government received information that German Government had informed Russian Government that unless Russia stopped her mobilisation Germany would mobilise.<sup>(1)</sup> In middle of day a further report from St. Petersburg stated that German communication had been modified and had become a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation, answer to which is that she will do so provided that Austria will give assurance that she will respect sovereignty of Serbia, and will submit certain of the demands of Austrian note not accepted by Serbia to an international discussion.

President of Republic thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government will not accept these Russian conditions. He is convinced that preservation of peace between Powers is in hands of England, for if His Majesty's Government announce that, in the event of conflict between Germany and France, resulting from present differences between Austria and Serbia, England would come to aid of France, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement. He, however, said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France is pacific, she does not desire war, and she has not gone farther at present than to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares, and French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. French Government have reliable information that round Thionville and Metz German troops are concentrated ready for war.

President of Republic said that if there were a general war on the continent England would inevitably be involved in course of it, for protection of her vital interests, and a declaration by her now of her intention to support France, who desires to remain at peace, would almost certainly prevent Germany from embarking on a war.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 99 (paraphrased—parts omitted).**See also despatch No. 379.*<sup>(1)</sup> See R II

## MINUTES.

Sir E. Grey will no doubt approve Sir F. Bertie's language.

What must weigh with His Majesty's Government is the consideration that they should not by a declaration of unconditional solidarity with France and Russia induce and determine these two Powers to choose the path of war.

If and when, however, it is certain that France and Russia cannot avoid the war, and are going into it, my opinion, for what it is worth, is that British interests require us to take our place beside them as Allies, and in that case our intervention should be immediate and decided.—  
E. A. C. July 31.

I have answered this separately.<sup>(2)</sup>—E. G.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 352.

(35145)

No. 319.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 512.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do.<sup>(1)</sup> He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened that it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we would do on certain hypotheses, i.e., if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is enclosed herein, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.<sup>(2)</sup>

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 105.*

Enclosure in No. 319.

*Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. Paul Cambon.*

*Le 30 juillet 1914.*

Je vous prie de porter à la connaissance de Sir E. Grey les renseignements suivants touchant les préparatifs militaires français et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra que si la France est résolue, ce n'est pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression. Vous attirerez l'attention de Sir E. Grey sur la décision prise par le Conseil des Ministres de ce matin; bien que l'Allemagne ait pris ses dispositifs de couverture à quelques centaines de mètres ou à quelques kilomètres de la frontière, sur toute la frontière, du Luxembourg aux Vosges, et porté ses troupes de couverture sur ses positions de combat, nous ne l'avons pas fait; bien que notre plan, conçu dans un esprit d'offensive, prévoit que les positions de combat de nos troupes de couverture seront aussi rapprochées de la frontière que le sont les troupes allemandes. Nous livrons ainsi une bande du territoire national sans défense à l'agression soudaine.

Nous n'avons pas pour le faire d'autre raison que de montrer à l'opinion et au

(<sup>1</sup>) For copy of this letter see BB No. 105 (Enclosure 1).

(<sup>2</sup>) Cf. No. 367.

Gouvernement britanniques que la France comme la Russie ne tireront pas les premières.

Ci-joint le tableau des mesures prises à leurs dates des deux côtés de la frontière :

En France, comme en Allemagne, les permissionnaires ont été rappelés, les troupes sont dans leur garnison, les ouvrages d'art gardés.

En Allemagne, non seulement les troupes en garnison à Metz ont été poussées jusqu'à la frontière, mais encore, elles ont été renforcées par des éléments transportés en chemin de fer de garnisons d'intérieur, telles que Trèves ou Cologne.

Rien d'analogue n'a été fait en France.

L'armement des places de la frontière (déboisements, mise en place de l'armement, constructions de batteries, renforcement de réseaux de fils de fer), a été commencé en Allemagne samedi 25. Il le sera en France jeudi 30.

Les gares ont été occupées militairement en Allemagne samedi, en France, dimanche.

Enfin, voici d'autres mesures qui ont déjà été prises en Allemagne et pas encore en France :

Rappel de réservistes par convocations individuelles.

Rappel de réservistes résidant à l'étranger (classes de 1903 à 1911).

Convocation d'officiers de réserve.

Sur la frontière côté allemand, routes barrées; automobiles ne circulant qu'avec un permis.

[NOTE.—The copies of the letter from Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon of November 22, 1912, and of M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey of November 23, 1912, printed as enclosures in BB No. 105 are not enclosed in the original despatch to Sir F. Bertie.

The third enclosure published in BB No. 105 was inserted in error; it belongs to a later date and will be found printed in No. 338. The cause of the mistake was as follows: When the record of Sir Edward Grey's conversation with M. Cambon was sent down to the Department, the paper referred to in the record given to Sir Edward Grey by M. Cambon was not attached. Instructions were therefore given to the printers that it should be added as soon as it came down. M. Cambon, however, had personally given to Sir Edward Grey two telegrams dealing with the subject of French and German military preparations, one on the 30th July, the other on the 31st July. The latter was sent down first; it was therefore included by the printers under the impression that this was the document referred to and the mistake was not noticed during the revision of the proof, which was being conducted under circumstances of the highest urgency.

The obvious blunder, by which a document dated the 31st July was included in a despatch dated the 30th July, was pointed out to the Foreign Office by numerous correspondents. At this stage a serious error of judgment was made. Instead of rectifying and explaining the mistake, which would then have been inconvenient, as the Blue Book had by this time been translated into other languages and published broadcast, in later editions of the Blue Book the date of the enclosure was cancelled. At the request of the British Government a similar modification was made in the French Yellow Book, with the result that a document was there also printed under a wrong date. It should be added that the papers dealing with this matter do not appear to have been referred to Sir Edward Grey.]

## No. 320.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

Private.

My dear Grey,

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

The feeling here is that peace between the Powers depends on England; that if she declare herself *solidaire* with France and Russia there will not be war for Germany will not face the danger to her of her supplies by sea being cut off by the British Fleet at a time when she could not get them from Russia and France and little from Austria who would require all that is available from elsewhere for her own needs.



People do not realize or do not take into account the difficulty for the British Government to declare England *solidaire* with Russia and France in a question such as the Austro-Servian quarrel. The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war break out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake.

Travelling to and from "les Eaux" in the East of France is becoming difficult owing to the moving of troops from the centre of France towards the Eastern frontier and "les Eaux" generally are being deserted even those in the West of France.

The newspapers but not yet the people are becoming bellicose. The Bourse is practically closed and the Bank of France is preparing to issue notes for 20 francs 10 francs and 5 francs, meanwhile strings of people are asking for change for notes of 50 francs and 100 francs, &c., and the Bank employés make as much delay as possible in fulfilling the Banks' obligation to give coin whether gold or silver in exchange for its notes.

Yours sincerely,  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

(b.)

Private and Confidential.

My dear Grey,

Paris, July 30, 1914.

The Spanish Ambassador (Urrutia) has been here just as the messenger is about to leave for London. He says that the President of the Republic told a friend this morning that he considers war inevitable. Urrutia says that the *couverture* of the troops on the Eastern frontier of France is completed.<sup>(1)</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

<sup>(1)</sup> See Introduction, p. xii.

(34906)

No. 321.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 376.)

Sir,

Paris, July 29, 1914.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Yarde-Buller. Military Attaché to this Embassy, relating to the present military situation in France with reference to the crisis and the preparations which have been made in event of war.

I have, &c.  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 321.

Sir,

Paris, July 29, 1914.

Having spent the last few days in looking round both in and outside Paris, I have the honour to lay before your Excellency the following notes:—

1. All precautions prior to a mobilisation have been carried out and it now only remains for the button to be pressed for the necessary reservists to be called up; in connection with this I would mention that the report in some papers to the effect that "reservists are joining their units" is not correct; what has taken place is as follows: certain men who have to undergo their reserve (*répétition*) training have asked to be allowed to do so at the present time instead of later on and I believe some have been permitted to do so.

2. All officers and men on leave have or are rejoining their units as quickly as possible.



3. Troops undergoing exercises at camps have been ordered to rejoin their garrisons.

4. General Officers are hard at work and cannot get away; I was asked to meet two at lunch yesterday outside Paris, but both of them wired to say it was impossible to leave their posts which, as a matter of fact, were only a few miles away.

5. All railway stations and lines are strongly guarded, the stations in Paris being occupied by troops, the lines and the bridges between towns and villages patrolled by gendarmerie and Forest Rangers, and in special cases (such as where there are socialist colonies, *e.g.*, St. Denys) these guards are exceptionally strong. This guarding of the railway lines commenced last Sunday and judging from what I have personally seen on the lines over which I have made short trips during the last few days, I should say that every precaution has been taken thoroughly to safeguard them from any attempts on the part of spies, socialists or other desperadoes.

6. The Eiffel Tower, containing the great wireless central receiving station, is also guarded both by police and soldiers and a wooden structure, similarly guarded, has been erected round the pond where the wires go to earth. Visitors are, however, permitted to ascend the tower as usual, though I presume they are watched should they carry any parcels!

7. I have had a great many conversations with both officers and social people during the last few days and am much impressed with the quiet way in which affairs are viewed: a very serious tone is prevalent everywhere as must be the case, in addition to which it must be remembered that should mobilisation take place most of the men in every household whether they be the sons of the householder or whether they be his butler, footman, chauffeur, labourer and so forth will have to go off on service; similarly all banks and trading houses, mercantile concerns and so forth will be depleted of their clerks and employés; numerous private automobiles and horses will also be commandeered.

8. The following point may be of interest which I heard last night from one of the big French bankers here: he has had communications by letter and telephone with a corresponding firm in Berlin and whilst at dinner he was called to the telephone; on his coming back to his place at the dinner table he said that his German friend had telephoned from Berlin to say that the Emperor's best endeavours were being directed to keeping the peace and that the Emperor had said that he did not consider the situation justified the alarm that was at present being shown.

9. I have this day elicited the information that some of the German *Reserve* Officers have been called up to join their units and that though it is believed these are principally for the units on the Russian frontier, some have also been called up for the French frontier.

10. The parliamentary enquiry into the question of the deficiency in war material, initiated by the recent declarations of Monsieur Humbert in the Senate, has been adjourned which is a wise and probably necessary move under the present circumstances.

I have, &c.

H. YARDE-BULLER, Colonel,  
Military Attaché.

(34993)

No. 322.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 109. Commercial.)

Sir,

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from Sir F. Oppenheimer, commercial attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on Germany's financial position in connection with the present crisis.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 322.

*Sir F. Oppenheimer to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 29.)

Sir,

*Frankfort-on-Main, July 29, 1914.*

There is a certain danger that the reports of the events which have, during the last few days, taken place upon the leading German Stock Exchanges may lead to an erroneous opinion abroad concerning the present financial strength of Germany. I am therefore anxious to summarise Germany's present financial position, as far as it is of importance in connection with the grave international situation.

Since the Morocco crisis (the middle of 1911) the whole financial policy of this country has been guided by only one consideration, viz., Germany's financial preparedness in case of war. The full task which the responsible officials have set themselves has not yet been entirely completed, but a part, large beyond expectation, has been accomplished during the short period of three years which has elapsed since the Agadir incident. Germany stands to-day in a position of exceptional financial strength.

*The Reichsbank.*—The gold at the disposal of the Reichsbank amounted on the 15th July, 1914, to the grand total of 1,344,000,000 M. (15th July, 1911, only 884,000,000 M.). This gold reserve represents a record for Germany. The supply of silver is likewise exceptionally high and amounts to over 300,000,000 M. At the same time the war chest at Spandau, which contains 120,000,000 M. in gold coins out of the French war indemnity, has recently been augmented by 85,000,000 M. in gold—as part of the 120,000,000 M. by which it is to be increased under the latest Army Reform Acts. A large portion of a similar silver reserve of 120,000,000 M. voted by the same law has likewise been stored. In further opposition to the financial situation at the time of the Morocco crisis, there is to-day practically no foreign money on loan in Germany; certain limited amounts of French money are supposed to be on loan in Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, the Reichsbank holds very considerable amounts of foreign bills (gold bills). An ample supply thereof in the porte-feuille of the Reichsbank has been one of the chief items in the financial programme of the president of the Reichsbank, because in times of an international crisis the sale of these bills prevents, not only the withdrawals of gold from Germany, but the bills could even be used to embarrass certain foreign money markets. In the Imperial Bank return these foreign bills, the amount of which is not separately stated, figure under "bills of exchange generally." In the balance sheet of the 31st December, 1913, the total of these foreign bills amounted to over 140,000,000 M.—and among these British bills figured with 59,000,000 M. The Reichsbank also keeps cash deposits abroad—resulting from the maturity of bills cashed by its agents and the value of which has not been utilised. On the 31st December, 1913, these cash deposits abroad amounted to 68,000,000 M.

*The leading Banks.*—Among the leading banks there is not one which has not, since the Morocco crisis, greatly improved its financial status under pressure from the

Reichsbank. Assets have been rendered more liquid, and cash reserves have been increased. Though this general improvement in the liquidity of the status of the leading banks cannot be denied, this part of the official financial programme is probably less advanced than the others. Yet my informants are confident that these banks could to-day survive a prolonged period of political uncertainty (by which is meant the period between an international scare and the moment at which the prearranged plans for Germany's financial mobilisation are put into operation), which was not the case in 1911 (see my Consular despatch No. 10 to Foreign Office of the 21st October, 1911).

*General Public.*—As far as the general public is concerned, the financial situation has greatly improved because the dangerous wave of speculation has been checked. Speculation by the masses no longer constitutes a disquieting factor as it did at the time of the Morocco crisis. The exceptional levy on capital for military purposes, the first instalment of which is due in 1914, has had a sobering and economising effect. Owing, moreover, to the fact that the last twelve months have been months of a very quiet home trade, the credit of the mass of smaller manufacturers and traders is not strained as it would otherwise have been. It is also a fact worth recording that during the first quarter of 1914, the increase in the deposits of the German savings banks publishing their returns amounted to over 200,000,000 M. as against an increase of barely 100,000,000 M. for the first quarter, 1913.

As far as the German financial aspect during the present international crisis is concerned, it is indeed a fortunate circumstance that the industrial boom should have come to an end in 1912, for which a scarcity of available capital was greatly responsible. If the last industrial boom has substantially increased the wealth of the country, if the record export trade and the now ubiquitous German carrying trade have helped the unprecedented influx of gold in 1913, the slump of the last twelve months has enabled debtors steadily to reduce their credits and to put their houses in order. There are to-day none of the dangerous difficulties of overstrained trading credits which complicated the financial situation at the time of the Agadir incident. For Germany it is a fact of immeasurable importance that the present political crisis should have supervened during a slump.

The ease of the German money market of to-day as compared with that of the middle of 1911 can be gathered from the borrowing rates. In Germany the discount rate amounted—

In 1911 (average)	to 4.40 per cent.
„ 1912 „	4.95 „
„ 1913 „	5.88 „
„ 1914 (January)	to 4½ per cent. : since 5th February, to 4 per cent.

The private discount rate amounted—

In 1911 (average)	to 3.55 per cent.
„ 1912 „	4.22 „
„ 1913 „	4.98 „
„ 1914 (first quarter)	to 2.86 per cent.
„ 1914 (second quarter)	to 2.57 per cent.

The issue of the Prussian loan early in 1914, with its seventy-fold over subscription, proved the extraordinary abundance of money in Germany. The stringent terms of the recent Bulgarian loan also proved the relative ease of the German money market. Had other money markets been able to compete with Germany to take over the loan, it is certain that the final usurious terms could not have been exacted.

It is clear that on a financial basis, as sketched above, it would be comparatively easy for Germany to put into operation her “financial mobilisation.” The German public has so far shown greater confidence in the financial situation of Germany than



it did at the time of the Morocco crisis. There have been, it is true, withdrawals of capital from banks and minor runs on savings banks, and those chiefly in Alsace-Lorraine, but the amounts have not equalled those withdrawn and hoarded during the Morocco crisis. To some extent this greater confidence may be due also to the persistent financial instruction to which the German public has been submitted since that incident. An endless number of articles have been published to reveal the folly of the domestic hoarding of cash, to prove the security of private property in time of war, to demonstrate the extent of Germany's pecuniary resources. Outside the Bourses there have been so far no signs of a panic.

It is true, events upon the German exchanges have been much less satisfactory: all over Europe the leading exchanges seemed to have failed more or less to accomplish their mission. In Germany there have been great drops in Government stock and industrial shares—among the latter some could secure no quotations at all. The drop in the industrial stocks and shares is perhaps not so very surprising. The home trade has seldom been worse than during the last few months: manufacture has been kept alive chiefly by foreign orders. If these orders were none too remunerative at least they kept the factories going, but by the present war the foreign trade will be the first to suffer—even if Germany does not become entangled in the political crisis. The most serious drops in the German Government stock were due to the fact that the international complications arose so near the German settling day (industrial shares are dealt in by way of modified cash transactions: while Government stock is paid for on settling days); to the fact that the diplomatic intercourse between Austria and Servia would be broken off, if at all, late on a Saturday and that no one could foretell how far the international crisis might have spread by Monday. The imminent danger of greater financial disasters was fully realised by the leading banks, which agreed upon concerted action to prop the market. Their intervention has undoubtedly had a beneficial effect—as did also the large purchases of Government stock by the Prussian State Bank (“*Seehandlung*”). These measures have for the time being rendered unnecessary any further discussion of the suggestion that the German Stock Exchanges should be closed for a few days—a measure resorted to in Austria: they also prevented the German Government stock from meeting with the fate of the French rente on the Paris Exchange, where it had to be struck out of the quotations altogether.

The panic-like events on the Stock Exchange cast no aspersion upon the strength of the German money market, for the exchanges in times like the present are greatly at the mercy of nervous and weak holders. In exceptional times, a crowd labours under special tendencies of contagion which blur the picture of the true state of affairs. The financial situation of the German money market has never been stronger than to-day: it is eminently ready, should the occasion arise, to assist the smooth working of the measures which are known as Germany's financial mobilisation. Germany's financial strength is the result of the lesson taught by the Morocco incident. Germany has ever since been determined to show the world that on that occasion she had decided to “*reculer pour pouvoir mieux sauter*.” As far as her financial position is concerned, she has attained her object.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS OPPENHEIMER.

MINUTE.

A great contrast to the panic here. Germany is organised and the Government gives guidance and help. I am convinced everything here would similarly fall into its right place if the same guidance were given.—*E. A. C. July 31.*



(34912)

No. 323.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 115.)

Sir.

*The Hague, July 29, 1914.*

As I have already had the honour to report,<sup>(1)</sup> preparations are proceeding in the Netherlands for an eventual mobilisation of the Army and Navy should it be found necessary.

The "Official Gazette" of this morning publishes two Royal Decrees dated the 27th instant. which read as follows:—

- (1.) "The Transfer to the Landweer and discharge from the service of men incorporated in the Militia who, according to Article 99 of the Militia Law, should be so transferred or discharged, is hereby suspended."
- (2.) "The discharge from the service of conscripts who are in the Landweer and who, according to the 1st, 2nd or 3rd paragraph of Article 37 of the Landweer Law, would have to be so discharged, is hereby suspended."

I hear that troops are stationed at all the principal bridges on the railway lines to the German frontier and that the bridge at Deventer crossing the river Yssel and on the main line to Berlin is in the hands of engineers provided with explosives. The forts at the Helder, the Hook of Holland and Ymuiden are being fully manned and there are even 50 soldiers day and night in the small fishing harbour of Scheveningen, the seaside resort of The Hague and several armed men on the pier there and at other places along the coast.

I hear also that the Admiralty have recalled the war vessels "Noord Brabant" and "Kortenaar," the latter of which was in Mexican waters, though I can get no official confirmation of this news. The "Zeeland" returned yesterday from its cruise in the Baltic with Prince Henry of the Netherlands on board.

The press here is divided on the subject of these military precautions, some of the newspapers ridiculing them as alarmist and unnecessary and others praising the caution and foresight of the Government. It looks, however, as if the Government were determined to do all in their power to preserve the neutrality of the Netherlands. should it be threatened.

I have, &amp;c.

H. G. CHILTON.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 213.

(35056)

No. 324.

*Mr. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 66.)

Sir.

*Berne, July 29, 1914.*

I have the honour to enclose an article from the "Journal de Genève" of to-day's date regarding the political situation in Europe. It takes the point of view that the German Emperor alone can put an end to the present threatening position of affairs.

The Swiss Press has on the whole discussed the merits of the Austro-Servian dispute with good sense and moderation. It is generally considered here that the Servian reply to the Austrian Ultimatum was sufficiently conciliatory to have opened the door to further negotiations. At the same time Swiss journalists imperfectly understood the questions at issue between the two countries and have always been too ready to assume that small nations in their quarrels with Great Powers are invariably in the right. The attitude of the Swiss Press during the Boer War will be fresh in your memory.

It is needless to say that the prospect of a general conflagration, with Switzerland standing out as a rock surrounded by rough seas, is causing great uneasiness here. There is I think no question that this country will strictly maintain her neutrality but any infringement of her frontier will be met with armed force.

The Federal Government have long been considering the question of food supply in time of war as Switzerland depends to a great extent on foreign countries for corn and many of the necessaries of life. Coal also comes exclusively from abroad. Large numbers of people here and in the other large towns are already laying in stores with a view to possible emergencies.

I am informed that the National Bank holds about £8,000,000 in metal currency of which nearly five million sterling in gold. One of the principal Bankers here told me that gold was not to be had and that he had been obliged to send both to Paris and London for it.

Except for some excitement at the newspaper offices all is calm here and it is generally hoped that the hostilities will be localised.

I have, &c.

EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

(35008)

No. 325.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 116.)

Sir,

*The Hague, July 30, 1914.*

With reference to my despatch No. 115 of yesterday<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to report that His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Rotterdam has forwarded me a letter which he received yesterday from the British Vice-Consul at Flushing stating that he had been told by the Inspector of Pilotage there that he had received detailed instructions to remove all buoys and beacons the moment he received the order to do so from the Minister of Marine.

I have, &c.

H. G. CHILTON.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 323.

(35009)

No. 326.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 117.)

Sir,

*The Hague, July 30, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that the "Handelsblad" of Amsterdam states that the Amsterdam Stock Exchange was closed yesterday until further notice.

This decision has been taken at a meeting of the Board of the Association of stock Dealers owning that Exchange and is intended to prevent a panic. As the principal European Stock Exchanges are closed there is a danger of large amounts of foreign securities being thrown on the Amsterdam market, and of the great drop in the quotations of foreign Government securities causing a similar fall in Netherland securities.

I have, &c.

H. G. CHILTON.

(34888)

No. 327.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 31, 12.25 A.M.

R. July 31, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 128.)

Following for Director of Military Operations from military attaché:—

“All cavalry are now mobilised, but not all yet concentrated. General mobilisation is impending. Please inform me where to go in the event of withdrawal of this Embassy. It occurs to me that, knowing Galicia and Bukovina and Austrian army (? I might be) of service if attached as attaché to the Russian Kieff army, if not, propose, failing instructions, to proceed to Paris and report to military attaché for general service.”

(b.)

Tel. Urgent. Private.

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

My telegram No. 128.

Message from the Military Attaché was sent without my knowledge, and I think that the enquiry it contains is premature.

(34945)

No. 328.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 11.25 P.M.

R. July 31, 9 A.M.

Tel. (No. 188.)

Italian Ambassador called to-day and said that as our two Governments were both working together to avert war, he wished to keep in close contact with me. He spoke of the suggestion reported in Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 125 of 27th July<sup>(1)</sup> that the four Powers should induce Serbia to accept Austrian ultimatum in its integrity, and asked me if I thought that such a solution would be acceptable to Russia. I told him what Minister for Foreign Affairs had said on the subject (see my telegram No. 182 of 29th July<sup>(2)</sup>), adding that his Excellency had not indicated how ultimatum could be toned down so as to render it acceptable both to Serbia and Austria.

On his asking if I had any suggestion to make, I said I thought point 6 might be made more palatable to Serbia if Austria were to state that she would be satisfied if Austrian consul in Serbia were admitted to take part in enquiry, while Austria might be reassured were Powers engaged to instruct their representatives at Belgrade to see that engagements taken by Serbia were duly carried out. Ambassador told me he had seen German Ambassador this morning, but said nothing about formula given to latter by Minister for Foreign Affairs, so that I gathered he does not think it would be accepted by Austria.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day substance of your telegram No. 226 of 29th July to Berlin.<sup>(3)</sup>

(Repeated to Embassies.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 202.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 276.<sup>(3)</sup> No. 263.

(34939)

No. 329.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 30. 1914.**D. July 31, 12.42 A.M.**R. July 31, 10 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 106.)

Your telegram No. 226 of 29th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

I am unaware whether the Imperial Government has answered communication made to them by you through German Ambassador asking what method they would suggest by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Austria and Russia. Last night I was told that they had not had time to answer yet. To-day French Ambassador asked Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Imperial Government had proposed any course of action. Secretary of State answered they had considered it would save time if they dealt with Vienna direct and that they had asked Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. They had, however, as yet received no answer.<sup>(2)</sup>

Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether length to which he had gone in giving moderating advice at Vienna had not precipitated matters rather than otherwise.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 107 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 263.<sup>(2)</sup> See F No. 107.

(34985)

No. 330.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, July 30, 1914.**D. July 30, 11.45 P.M.**R. July 31, 10 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 16.)

My telegram No. 15.<sup>(1)</sup>

Burgomaster of Hague has by order of Minister of War posted notices all over town calling upon members of coastguard "Landweer" to assemble fully armed at 10 o'clock to-night at various places on the coast known to them.

Town is full of armed men hurrying to their posts.

Similar instructions issued to men of other towns near coast while Landweer of inland towns ordered to patrol all frontiers.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 257.

34983

No. 331.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 30, 1914.**D. July 30, 8.25 P.M.**R. July 31, 10 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 133.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this evening to say he had heard Austrian Government had declined further direct discussions at St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he had reason to think that Germans, who were most anxious to avoid issue with us but seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, were now disposed to give more conciliatory counsels at Vienna.

[13318]



He was instructing Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask German Government to suggest resumption of idea of exchange of views between the four Powers in any form which would not be unacceptable to Austria. He thought that Germany might invite Austria to formulate precisely what terms she would demand from Servia, with a guarantee that she would not annex territory nor deprive her of independence. Anything less than Austrian note would be useless to ask for. Germany would advocate nothing implying non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain what Russia would accept, and with knowledge of these two standpoints discussions should be initiated at once. As long as Austria had received no check there was still time. He was in any case disposed to continue exchange of views with us if four Powers' discussion was impossible.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 106 (paraphrased).*

(34879)

No. 332.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Nish, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 5·30 P.M.

R. July 31, 10 A.M.

Tel. (No. 73.) Urgent.

Prime Minister informs me that Austrians are now deliberately bombarding Belgrade by sections, no serious attempt being made to occupy town.<sup>(1)</sup>

#### MINUTE.

This bombardment of Belgrade does seem an unnecessary piece of vandalism, and gives the impression that the object is the destruction of the Servian capital as a form of punishment. This is unfortunately quite in accordance with Austrian methods. It will, however, be better that we should not be the first to raise protests.—*E. A. C. July 31.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. No. 485.

(34972)

No. 333.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

D. 9·23 A.M.

R. 10·15 A.M.

Tel. (No. 189.)

German vessels have been warned to be ready to leave Russian waters at 24 hours' notice. Similar notification reported to be issued at Archangel.

His Majesty's Consul at Riga reports entrance to Libau probably mined.

(35026)

No. 334.

*Mr. Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Odessa, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 5·10 P.M.

R. July 31, 10·30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 14.)

Seven companies of infantry from Nicolaieff and five from Odessa left for frontier, also two batteries of artillery from Odessa. 60th Regiment leaves here to-morrow.

(85023)

No. 335.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 413.)

D. 11.40 A.M.

German Ambassador informs me that in consequence of German suggestions conversation has taken place between Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Russian Ambassador at Vienna, and that Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg can converse with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, with instructions to give explanations about the Austrian note to Servia, to discuss suggestions and any questions that affect directly Austro-Russian relations. He added that if Russian Government object to eight army corps being mobilised in Austria it might be pointed out that this is not too much against 400,000 Servians.

I was asked to urge St. Petersburg to show goodwill in discussions and to suspend military preparations.

I feel great satisfaction that discussions are resumed between Russia and Austria, and you should express this to Minister for Foreign Affairs and say I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

As to military preparations, I said to German Ambassador I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless Austria would put some limit to her advance into Servia.

(Repeated to Paris No. 278: "You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.")

*Published in BB No. 110 (paraphrased).*

*Cf. DD Nos. 444 and 489.*

(85052)

No. 336.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 108.)

D. 11.35 A.M.

R. 1.40 P.M.

Austria and Servia. Your telegram No. 231 of July 30th.<sup>(1)</sup>

I read Chancellor this morning a paraphrase containing exact words of your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war. H.E. was so taken up with the news reported in my immediately preceding telegram<sup>(2)</sup> that he made no remarks whatever upon your communication. He asked me whether I would let him have paraphrase I had just read to him as an *aide-mémoire* as his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all I had said, and he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer. I therefore handed to him my paraphrase on condition that it should not be regarded as an official document but merely as a record of conversation.<sup>(3)</sup> (? To this) H.E. agreed.

*Published in BB No. 109 (paraphrased).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 303.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 337.<sup>(3)</sup> Cf. DD No. 497.

(35051)

No. 337.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

D. 11.55 A.M.

R. 1.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 107.)

Austria and Servia. Chancellor informs me that he has just received news to the effect that Russia has burnt her cordon of houses along German frontier, sealed her public offices in neighbourhood of frontier and carried off her money chests into the interior. He has been unable to get absolute confirmation of this intelligence, as Russo-German frontier was now entirely closed, but if, as he thinks, it is true, it can only mean that Russia looks upon war as certain, and that she is now taking military measures on the German frontier. This news reaches him, he said, just as the Tsar has appealed to the Emperor in the name of their old friendship to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor is doing so. Chancellor added that he himself had done everything possible and even more perhaps than Austro-Hungarian Government liked at Vienna to preach moderation and peace, but his efforts had been seriously handicapped by the mobilisation of Russia against Austria. If now the news he had received proved true and military measures were also being taken against Germany, he could not remain quiet, as he could not leave his country defenceless while other Powers were gaining time. He was now going to see the Emperor and he wished me to tell you that it was quite possible that in a very short time, perhaps even to-day, they would have to take some very serious step.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 108 (paraphrased and parts omitted).**Cf. No. 677.*

## MINUTES.

This is an endeavour to throw the blame for military preparations on Russia. All our information shows that short of the issue of actual "mobilization orders" in set terms, German mobilization has for some time been actively proceeding on all three German frontiers.—E. A. C. July 31.

Russia is taking very reasonable and sensible precautions, which should in no wise be interpreted as provocative. Germany, of course, who has been steadily preparing now wishes to throw the blame on Russia—a very thin pretext. However comments are superfluous.—A. N.

(35082)

No. 338.

*Communicated by French Ambassador, July 31.**Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Paul Cambon.**Le 31 Juillet 1914.*

L'Armée allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontières. Hier, vendredi,<sup>(1)</sup> par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retrait à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent, mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France.

Tout le 16<sup>e</sup> corps de Metz, renforcé par une partie du 8<sup>e</sup> venu de Trèves et de Cologne, occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de

(1) [This is a mistake; July 31 was a Friday.]

milliers *sont rappelés* en Allemagne : c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. Or, nous n'avons *rappelé aucun* réserviste. Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait.

J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi, le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.<sup>(2)</sup>

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

*Printed with translation in BB No. 105 (3), but under the wrong date (see Nos. 319 note, 358, also F No. 106).*

*(The words in italics are underlined in the original.)*

<sup>(2)</sup> [This is also incorrect; the Austrian note was delivered on a Thursday (23 July), the reference should probably be to the Serbian answer, which was delivered on Saturday (25 July).]

(35077)

No. 339.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*

Secret.

Sir E. Grey.

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

One of our Agents arrived from Cologne this morning and reports that troop trains are pouring through there on their way to the western frontier. This confirms what M. Cambon told me this morning that though Germany has not issued decree of mobilisation she is really mobilising. French Government think that Germany wishes to incite the Paris Cabinet to issue mobilisation decree first and thus give France the appearance of being the aggressor.

A. N.

(35078)

No. 340.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 241.)

D. 2.45 P.M.

European crisis. My telegram No. 413 of 31st July to St. Petersburg,<sup>(1)</sup> which has been repeated to you to-day.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about this proposal.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 335.



I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.<sup>(2)</sup>

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Minister for Foreign Affairs as to proposal above. If you think it desirable, you can also give Chancellor a memorandum of my telegram No. 231 of yesterday;<sup>(3)</sup> I presume you have told him of it verbally.

*Published in BB No. 111 (last sentence omitted).*

*Cf. Nos. 336 and 385 and DD No. 497.*

#### MINUTE.

Sir W. Tyrrell told me to-day he is *quite* certain that a paraphrase of the first part of this telegram was sent to the German Ambassador on the evening of July 31 in a private note by the S. of S. He says that Prince Lichnowsky referred to the offer in a conversation which he had with him early on Saturday morning.—*E. D. August 25, 1915.*

<sup>(2)</sup> *DD No. 489.*

<sup>(3)</sup> *No. 303.*

(35064)

No. 341.

*Consul Bernal to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Stettin, July 31, 1914.*

*D. 12:35 P.M.*

*R. 2:50 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 2.)

Government to-day prohibited export of all food by sea.

#### MINUTE.

If this is not a warlike preparation of equal importance as the Russian removal of treasure to the interior, words have no meaning.—*E. A. C. July 31.*

(35063)

No. 342.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

*D. 12:30 P.M.*

*R. 3:10 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 96.)

I have seen President of the Council this morning after Cabinet Council. He has no recent information except that there are conversations in a friendly tone at Vienna between the Russian Ambassador and the Austrian Government.

I carried out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 275 of 30th July<sup>(1)</sup> in regard to your latest suggestion to the Russian Government (your telegram No. 412 of 30th July to St. Petersburg).<sup>(2)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs will give me this afternoon reply of the French Government as to whether they can support your proposal at St. Petersburg.

<sup>(1)</sup> *No. 310.*

<sup>(2)</sup> *No. 309.*

(35071)

No. 343.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

D. 2:15 P.M.

R. 3:35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 109.)

Semi-official News Agency stated that Federal Council will to-day issue order prohibiting export from Germany of grain, flour and fodder and animals and animal products.

(35266)

No. 344.

*Communication by the German Embassy.*

Baron Schubert, Secretary of the German Embassy, called to-day and read out a telegram from the German Chancellor, stating that Russia had proclaimed a general mobilisation of her army and her fleet; that, in consequence of this, martial law would be proclaimed for Germany; and that, if within the next twelve hours Russia did not withdraw her general mobilisation proclamation, Germany would be obliged to mobilise in her own defence.

W. T.

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.**See DD No. 488. The telegram was despatched from Berlin at 3:10 P.M.**Cf. No. 347.*

(35075)

No. 345.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

D. 3:00 P.M.

R. 4:40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 4.)

My despatch 114 of July 28th.<sup>(1)</sup>

The six army divisions have all been brought up to full peace strength. Military preparations are being actively pursued. It is now officially estimated that a complete mobilisation would give 250,000 men. I believe, however, that available strength would not be more than about 100,000 men in the field and 80,000 men in garrison and that even with this force there would be a deficiency of artillery and other equipment.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 243.

(35074)

No. 346.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

D. 3:9 P.M.

R. 4:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 111.)

My telegram No. 110 of 31st July<sup>(1)</sup>: European crisis.

Extra sheets are already being disseminated stating on official authority that Emperor has proclaimed a condition of imminent danger, and that His Majesty is taking up his residence in Berlin.

This proclamation is understood to be natural precursor to mobilisation.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 349.

(35076)

No. 347.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

D. 6.40 P.M.

R. 5.20 P.M.

Tel.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 113.*

[NOTE.—The date of despatch seems to be wrong. The final decision to issue orders for general mobilisation was made by the Tsar during the afternoon of July 30, and the official telegram ordering mobilisation was despatched at 6 o'clock that evening. Mobilisation orders were posted in the streets of St. Petersburg during the night. It is therefore most improbable that Sir George Buchanan should have despatched a telegram on the evening of the 31st announcing that it had been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation: on that day he must have said that the orders for general mobilisation had been issued. The telegram was probably sent at 6.40 P.M. on July 30 and delayed in transmission and a mistake made by the clerk who decyphered the original telegram. This, however, cannot now be verified as the original cypher telegrams sent in from the Post Office are not preserved. From this time onwards there was much delay in the telegraphic service with Russia, and it became necessary to arrange that telegrams should be sent by a circuitous route *via* Aden. M. Paléologue's telegram announcing general mobilisation (F No. 118) which was despatched at 10.43 A.M. on July 31 was not received in Paris till 8.30 P.M. (see Renouvin, *Les origines immédiates de la guerre*, p. 146 and *Un Livre Noir*, Vol. II, p. 294). The hour of receipt is correct. The preceding papers show that there was no information in the Foreign Office of Russian general mobilisation except the reports from Berlin. At 4.45 P.M. on July 31 Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed to Berlin:

“ Sir William Tyrrell informs me that the Government here has no news of any kind about the mobilisation of the whole Russian army and navy. They will at once communicate with St. Petersburg.”—DD No. 518;

and Mr. Asquith said in the House of Commons at about 5 o'clock: “ We have just heard—not from St. Petersburg but from Germany—that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilisation of her army and fleet.” See No. 344.]

(35080)

No. 348.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

D. 5.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 287.)

I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French Government is prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German Government. It is important to have an early answer.

(Sent also to Berlin No. 244, *mutatis mutandis*.)

*Published in BB No. 114.*

*See Nos. 380, 383.*

(35079)

No. 349.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 110.)

D. 3.50 P.M.

R. 5.35 P.M.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me he has just received a telegram from German Ambassador at St. Petersburg stating that Russia is mobilising whole army and fleet. He said, as this general mobilisation could not but be directed against Germany, Imperial Government would at once proclaim "Kriegsgefahr." which he explained to me meant strained relations involving certain defensive measures. He added that mobilisation would follow almost immediately.

I asked him whether he could not still advise Austro-Hungarian Government, in general interest, to do something to reassure Russia, and to show herself disposed to continue discussion on friendly basis. He replied that only last night he had telegraphed to Vienna begging Austro-Hungarian Government to send a reply to your last proposal, and that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied that he would communicate with Emperor this morning and take his wishes.<sup>(1)</sup> This, his Excellency added, had given him a ray of hope, as he had thought that it meant that your proposal was at all events receiving consideration, but this news from St. Petersburg seemed to him almost to alienate all hope of a peaceful solution. At any rate Germany must prepare for all emergencies.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 112 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. DD Nos. 395, 465.

(35081)

No. 350.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.**Bucharest, July 31, 1914.*

D. 1.30 P.M.

R. 5.40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 27.) Very Confidential.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

My French and Russian colleagues, who had until now been hopeful as to attitude of Roumania in event of general conflict, are now very anxious. They did their utmost jointly this morning to draw from Prime Minister an assurance of neutrality, but Prime Minister declined to commit himself and said that question must be discussed at a council in which leaders of different parties will take part. I understand that return of M. Take Jonescu from abroad is awaited.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

<sup>(1)</sup> Probably No. 316.



(35080)

No. 351.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.**Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 9.)

D. 6.15 P.M.

In view of possibility of European war I have asked French and German Governments separately whether each is prepared to respect neutrality of Belgium provided no other Power violates it.<sup>(1)</sup>

In view of existing treaties you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say I assume that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain neutrality and desire and expect other Powers to observe and uphold it.

You should ask for an early reply.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 115 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 348.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 395.

(34878)

No. 352.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 290.)

D. 7.30 P.M.

Your telegram No. 95 of 30th July :<sup>(1)</sup> European crisis.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been decisive factor in situation. Germany does not expect our neutrality.

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has gone yet, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was in Morocco question, which was a dispute directly involving France. In this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I have told French Ambassador that we cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.

He has urged that His Majesty's Government should reconsider this decision, and I have said they will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development, but that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at this moment.

*Published in BB No. 116 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 318.

(35088)

No. 353.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. 6.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 97.) Confidential.

R. 8.15 P.M.

"Times" correspondent was sent for by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and given a list of the German military preparations on French frontier, which are declared to be greatly in excess of French precautions, which Ministry for Foreign Affairs admit to have been taken, but later than by Germany. French press is only being told of this in general terms.

"Times" correspondent thinks that Ministry for Foreign Affairs wished him to prepare public opinion in England for mobilisation which may be ordered at any moment, and to induce it to consider such a measure has been forced upon France.

See "Times" of August 1, 1914, which contains a statement nearly identical with that in No. 338.

(35100)

No. 354.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.*

*The Hague, July 31, 1914.*

D. 6.53 P.M.

R. 9.3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 18.) *En clair.*

Following Royal decree is issued this afternoon in extra edition of "Official Gazette":—

- "1. Prohibiting export of all gold and bullion from the Netherlands.
- "2. Stating the total sum of current bank notes, &c., in gold and bullion.
- "3. Declaration of danger of war, and bringing into force article 186 of Constitution respecting expenses of troops quartered on private individuals.
- "4. Authorising War Minister to requisition railways and rolling-stock of all Dutch railway companies as far as necessary in interests of defence of country. (This has been done; railways, &c., in charge of Chief of General Staff.)
- "5. Authorising War Minister to call out all levies of army, navy and Landweer. Men must be at their posts to-morrow."

Railway authorities inform me it will probably be impossible for private passengers to travel on Dutch railways.

(35129)

No. 355.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Antwerp, July 31, 1914.*

D. 5.48 P.M.

R. 9.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 15.)

Informed that two German ships belonging to Hansa line which sailed from Antwerp July 30th "Kandenfels" for Bremen and "Schildturm" for Bombay have been recalled by owners from Flushing to Antwerp.

Admiralty informed.

(35130)

No. 356.

*Consul-General Mazse to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rotterdam, July 31, 1914.*

D. 6.10 P.M.

R. 9.17 P.M.

Tel. (No. 9.)

Principal local coaling firm suspended loading owing to feared great risk of seizure at sea. More than twenty ships detained.

(35089)

No. 357.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. 8.35 P.M.

R. 9.46 P.M.

Tel. (No. 99.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me at 7 o'clock this evening. German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency when I arrived.

Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes me to tell you that German Ambassador announces to him that, owing to Russian Government having given orders for total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have addressed an ultimatum to them requiring demobilisation of Russian forces, and, failing an undertaking by Russian Government within twelve hours to comply with German demand, German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of German army on Russian and French frontiers.

German Ambassador could not say from what time the twelve hours terminates.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks what will be attitude of England in these circumstances? German Ambassador will call at Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. for an answer from French Government as to what will be their attitude in the circumstances and intimated he would probably require his passports.

Russian Ambassador says he is not aware of any general mobilisation of Russian forces.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Published in BB No. 117 (paraphrased).*

*Cf. F No. 117, DD No. 528 and letter No. 374.*

<sup>(1)</sup>[NOTE.—In the reproduction of the telegrams between St. Petersburg and Paris published in Russia there is no telegram informing M. Isvolsky of Russian general mobilisation.]

(35090)

No. 358.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. 8.35 P.M.

R. 10.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 100.)

"Times" correspondent has just been told by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that several French engines on the frontier have been appropriated by Germans. Portion of line on German side torn up and mitrailleuses placed on them, and that general French mobilisation has not been ordered, only mobilisation of frontier corps.

## MINUTES.

It becomes more and more absurd for Germany to pretend that her hand is being forced by French and Russian mobilization. She herself has taken as drastic measures as any other Government. The German Government is throwing dust into our eyes for the purpose of delaying if not hindering those British preparations which alone would enable us to take a part in the struggle should we eventually recognize the fact that we have no choice.—E. A. C. August 1.

Germany has been playing with us for the past few days.—A. N.

(34668)

No. 359.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe.**Foreign Office, July 31, 1914**D. 10·20 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 36.)

My telegram No. 35 Urgent.<sup>(1)</sup>

It is most important to know if you have acted on my instructions and whether cyphers left at Belgrade have been burnt.

Send immediate answer.

*Cf. Nos. 389, 394.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 278.

(35109)

No. 360.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 31, 1914.**D. 4·16 P.M.**R. 10·45 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 129.)

Your telegram No. 271 to Paris.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have informed Count Forgach, Under Secretary of State, who said that Austria-Hungary did not yet know what they would do about their contingent to Scutari. [? He asked that] complications would be avoided with Montenegro, whose participation in war Austrian Minister at Cetinje was endeavouring to prevent. If Montenegro kept quiet Austria would not attack her. As regards general situation, he deplored Russian mobilisation, to which Austria has been compelled to respond, but he said that Austrian Ambassador in London was being instructed to tell you that on neither side was mobilisation to be regarded as necessarily hostile act. Conversations were proceeding between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and telegrams were being exchanged between German Emperor and Emperor of Russia. He earnestly hoped that these efforts might still stave off general war. I spoke of fear that Germany would mobilise. He thought that Germany must do something to secure her own position. Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise Russian claim to intervene in quarrel with Serbia. I reminded him that Russia had stood behind Serbia during discussion of Albanian frontier at London Conference of Ambassadors, and that accepted frontier line was a compromise between views of Austria-Hungary and Russia. I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise now, but he spoke in a conciliatory tone and evidently did not regard situation as desperate. I have informed Russian Ambassador of above conversation and his Excellency will himself see Count Forgach this afternoon. Russian Ambassador is exerting himself strongly in interests of peace, explaining that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly in Serbia, that new Russian Minister to Serbia is a man of very moderate views as compared with his late predecessor and that Russia counselled Serbia to yield to demands of Austria as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 118 (paraphrased—parts omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 308.



(35110)

No. 361.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

D. 4.16 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 130.)

Following for Director of Military Operations from military attaché :—

“Order for general mobilisation has not been given yet, but is hourly expected. Although 1st, 10th and 11th corps have not actually mobilised, they have been strengthened by junior reservists of corps. Order has been given to mobilise all fortresses in Galicia, and reservists of engineers and fortress artillery are already being called up.

“This year's recruits have been called this month in advance of usual date. Archduke Frederick, General Conrad, General Auffenberg are all in Vienna. It appears total forces concentrated against Serbia are termed ‘army of Balkans,’ and are placed under Potiorek, with von Frank, Shammarodbohm Ermoli (*sic* ? General Böhm-Ermoli) under him, but this is not confirmed.

“Two cavalry divisions accompany main army in Hungary, and are now credibly reported near Arad.

“Force opposite Belgrade includes 44th and 46th regiments of 4th corps.

“Some of troops from Vienna have proceeded via Trieste to Ragusa.”

(35105)

No. 362.

*Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.**Budapest, July 31, 1914.*

D. 5.30 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 8.)

Official press agency has been informed that general mobilisation has been ordered (?but no) announcement is to be made in the newspapers until to-morrow. Preparations for further mobilisation are very evident here.

(Sent to Vienna.)

(35091)

No. 363.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. 9.20 P.M.

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 101.)

Following from military attaché for War Office :—

“Position of French troops as follows :—

“Those absolutely on frontier took up their covering positions on the 30th July with orders not to approach within 8 kilom. of frontier. Remainder in garrison quarters at Rheims, Dijon, Bourges. War Office just received news that railways in Alsace-Lorraine reserved for military purposes. German troop trains moving towards frontier; some railway and telegraph lines cut. War Office think Germany mobilises this afternoon.”

(35384)

No. 364.

*French Ambassador to Sir A. Nicolson.*

Cher Sir Arthur,

*Le 31 Juillet 1914.*

11:30 soir.

Je vous envoie ci-joint un télégramme que je viens de recevoir et qui montre que l'Allemagne se livre déjà sur notre territoire à de véritables actes de guerre.

Sir Edward Grey a bien voulu me prévenir que le cabinet se réunirait demain matin et m'a donné rendez-vous à 3.

Vous jugerez peut-être opportun de lui remettre le télégramme que je vous envoie, avant le conseil de cabinet.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

Mr. William Martin vient de remettre à Lord Stamfordham la lettre de M. le Président de la République.<sup>(1)</sup>

Enclosure in No. 364.

*Télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur de France  
à Londres, le 31 Juillet 1914.*

Dès mercredi dernier, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris avait annoncé au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que l'Allemagne se mettrait en état "de menace de guerre." C'est cet état de menace de guerre que l'Allemagne vient d'adopter et qu'elle s'efforce de représenter comme une conséquence des mesures prises par la Russie qui sont volontairement exagérées.

Une série de faits viennent de se produire sur la frontière française :

Le Commissaire de Police allemand d'Amanvillers a confisqué la locomotive française No. 6113 de l'Est. La voie est coupée à Amanvillers et à Novéant, les fils télégraphiques à Novéant.

A la station frontière de Montreux, les Allemands ont coupé la voie et empêché quatre locomotives françaises de passer en Allemagne.

A Pagny, ils ont installé des mitrailleuses et coupé la voie.

A Montreux-Vieux, les nouvelles machines françaises ont été confisquées par les Allemands.

L'Allemagne a rompu toutes les relations télégraphiques et téléphoniques internationales.

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 366.

(35112)

No. 365.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, July 31, 1914.*

D. 11 P.M.

R. 11:50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 139.)

My telegram No. 137.<sup>(1)</sup>

In view of German demand to Russia for demobilisation in twelve hours, and of her demand for French declaration of intentions, Minister for Foreign Affairs anticipates state of war will exist between these Powers to-morrow. He is now with President of the Council considering question of declaration of Italian neutrality. He

<sup>(1)</sup> There is no record of a telegram bearing this No.

[13318]

would be grateful for your advice on point. He presumes, as Italy is taking no part in hostilities, while reserving her future liberty of action, she should issue such declaration of neutrality at once to make her position clear. Would England do so in similar situation?

## MINUTES.

This seems to depend on the terms of the alliance.—*G. R. G. August 1, 1914.*

The question which the Italian govt. ask is one which can only be answered by the Cabinet.<sup>(2)</sup>—*E. A. C. August 1.*

<sup>(2)</sup> See No. 433.

## No. 366.

*Communicated by the French Embassy.*

*S. Ex. M. Viviani, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, à S. Ex. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France à Londres.*

*Paris, le 31 Juillet 1914.*

Départ : 3h. 20 soir.

Arrivée : 4h. 15.

Tél. (No. 402.)

Mr. William Martin arrivera ce soir à 10 heures 45 : il sera porteur d'une lettre<sup>(1)</sup> de M. le Président de la République pour le Roi d'Angleterre. Veuillez faire en sorte que cette lettre puisse être remise ce soir même à son destinataire.

<sup>(1)</sup> *A copy of this letter will be found in CDD, p. 542.*

(35146)

## No. 367.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 513.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral; I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. The commercial and financial situation was exceedingly serious; there was danger of a complete collapse that would involve us and everyone else in ruin; and it was possible that our standing aside might be the

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 319.

only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit, in which we should be involved. This might be a paramount consideration in deciding our attitude.

I went on to say to M. Cambon that though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon expressed great disappointment at my reply. He repeated his question of whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. The latest news was that Russia had ordered a complete mobilisation of her fleet and army. This, it seemed to me, would precipitate a crisis, and would make it appear that German mobilisation was being forced by Russia.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870, we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength: and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 119 (parts omitted).  
Cf. F No. 110.*

No. 368.

*Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir Edward Grey.

*July 31, 1914.*

It seems to me most essential, whatever our future course may be in regard to intervention, that we should at once give orders for mobilization of the army. It is useless to shut our eyes to the fact that possibly within the next 24 hours Germany will be moving across the French frontier—and if public opinion, at present so bewildered and partially informed, is ready in event of German invasion of France to stand by the latter, if we are not mobilized our aid would be too late. Mobilization is a precautionary and not a provocative measure—and to my mind is essential.

MINUTE.

A. N.

There is much force in this. We ought to prepare and I think it should be considered early to-morrow.—E. G. *July 31, 1914.*



No. 369.

*Sir E. Crowe to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

Dear Sir Edward.

July 31, 1914.

Will you pardon me if I venture to put before you in perhaps rather crude words—they have of necessity been written rather rapidly—some simple thoughts which the grave situation has suggested to my mind.

If you think them worthless please put them aside. Nothing is further from my mind than to trouble you needlessly or add to your grave perplexities at this moment.

Yours sincerely,

EYRE A. CROWE.

Enclosure in No. 369.

*Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe, July 31st, 1914.*

The theory that England cannot engage in a big war means her abdication as an independent State. She can be brought to her knees and made to obey the behests of any Power or group of Powers who *can* go to war, of whom there are several.

The theory further involves not only that there is no need for any British army or navy but also that there has been no such need for many years. It cannot have been right to impose on the country the upkeep at an enormous annual cost of an unnecessary because useless force.

If the theory were true, the general principle on which our whole foreign policy has hitherto been declared to rest would stand proclaimed as an empty futility. A balance of power cannot be maintained by a State that is incapable of fighting and consequently carries no weight.

The fact that British influence has on several momentous occasions turned the scale, is evidence that foreign States do not share the belief that England cannot go to war.

At the opening of any war in all countries there is a commercial panic.

The systematic disturbance of an enemy's financial organisation and the creation of panic is part of a well-laid preparation for war.

Commercial opinion is generally timid, and apt to follow pusillanimous counsels. The panic in the city has been largely influenced by the deliberate acts of German financial houses, who are in at least as close touch with the German as with the British Government, and who are notoriously in daily communication with the German Embassy.

It has been the unremitting effort of Germany to induce England to declare herself neutral in case Germany were at war with France and Russia. The object has been so transparent that His Majesty's Government have persistently declined to follow this policy, as incompatible with their duty to France and Russia and also to England herself. The proposal was again pressed upon us in a concrete form yesterday. It was rejected in words which gave the impression that in the eye of His Majesty's Government the German proposal amounted to asking England to do a dishonourable act.

If it be now held that we are entirely justified in remaining neutral and standing aside whilst Germany falls upon France, it was wrong yesterday to think that we were asked to enter into a dishonourable bargain, and it is a pity that we did not close with it. For at least terms were offered which were of some value for France and Belgium. We are apparently now willing to do what we scornfully declined to do yesterday, with the consequence that we lose the compensating advantages accompanying yesterday's offer.

The argument that there is no written bond binding us to France is strictly correct. There is no contractual obligation. But the *Entente* has been made,

strengthened, put to the test and celebrated in a manner justifying the belief that a moral bond was being forged. The whole policy of the *Entente* can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. This honourable expectation has been raised. We cannot repudiate it without exposing our good name to grave criticism.

I venture to think that the contention that England cannot in any circumstances go to war, is not true, and that any endorsement of it would be an act of political suicide.

The question at issue is not whether we are capable of taking part in a war, but whether we should go into the present war. That is a question firstly of right or wrong, and secondly of political expediency.

If the question were argued on this basis, I feel confident that our duty and our interest will be seen to lie in standing by France in her hour of need. France has not sought the quarrel. It has been forced upon her.—E. A. C.

(35567)

No. 370.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay (Washington).*

(No. 431.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

The American Ambassador having written to me to say that his Government were willing to offer their services for mediation in the present European difficulties.<sup>(1)</sup> I saw him this afternoon and informed him how hitherto all suggestions of mediation in the dispute between Austria and Servia, which was at the root of the European difficulties, had been refused. I should be only too delighted if any opportunity arose in which the good offices of the United States could be used. I had asked the German Government to suggest any means by which mediation could be applied, but had not yet received an answer. I asked Mr. Page whether the offer of the United States to mediate had been made in other capitals besides London. Of this he was not sure.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> See No. 259.

(34848)

No. 371.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Baz-Ironside.*

(No. 54.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

The Greek Minister called on the 28th instant and informed Sir F. Crowe in strict confidence that communications were passing between the Greek and Roumanian Governments with a view of a joint warning being addressed to Sophia that if Bulgaria were to attack Servia, Greece and Roumania would move on Bulgaria.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

(36002)

No. 372.

*Communicated by German Embassy, midnight, July 31, 1914.*

Translation.

On the 29th July the Tsar asked His Majesty the Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Austria-Hungary and Russia. The Emperor at once declared his readiness to do so: he so informed the Tsar by telegram, and immediately took the necessary

steps at Vienna. Without waiting for the result Russia then mobilised against Austria-Hungary, whereupon the Emperor at once informed the Tsar that such action rendered his mediation illusory; the Emperor further requested the Tsar to stop the military preparations against Austria. This was, however, not done. The German Government nevertheless persevered with their mediation at Vienna. In putting forward the urgent proposals that she did, the German Government went to the utmost limit possible with a sovereign State which is her ally. The suggestions made by the German Government at Vienna were entirely on the lines of those put forward by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them for serious consideration at Vienna. They were considered this morning at Vienna. While the deliberations were taking place, and before they were even terminated, Count Pourtales announced from St. Petersburg the mobilisation of the whole Russian army and fleet. This action on the part of Russia rendered any answer by Austria to the German proposal for mediation impossible. It also affected Germany, whose mediation had been solicited by the Tsar personally. We were compelled, unless we wished to abandon the safety of the Fatherland, to answer this action, which could only be regarded as hostile, with serious counter-measures. We could not idly watch Russia mobilising on our frontier. We therefore told Russia that if she did not stop her warlike measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours we should mobilise, and that would mean war. We asked France whether in a Russo-German war she would remain neutral.

*Communicated in German. For German text see DD No. 513; see also No. 384.*

(35149)

No. 373.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 380.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

I had an audience of the President of the Republic this evening in order to congratulate him, on your part, on the success of his visit to Petersburg. I deemed it well when conveying to him your congratulations not to make any special reference to the complete accord which he had established with Russia.

M. Poincaré desired me to thank you for your message. His visit had he said been in every way satisfactory and altogether a great success.

I told the President that when I was in London in the middle of July you had directed me to explain to him on my return to Paris the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to Albania; I had not been able to do so for he had left for Petersburg when I got back to Paris; and now the question of Albania had, in view of the very grave state of affairs arising out of the Austro-Servian differences, become a matter of very secondary importance. You had been willing to sanction the recruiting and drilling at Scutari by Colonel Phillips and the other officers of the international contingents of an Albanian force for the service of the Prince of Albania provided that those officers were not to take part in any military operations undertaken by such force. In no circumstances would His Majesty's Government consent to a British military force taking part in an international occupation of Albania. As therefore they would not send a British force to assist in repelling the insurgents in their advances on territory allotted to Albania, they could not object to other Powers undertaking the task if they wished to do so. Austria and Italy might propose to occupy Albania for the purpose of restoring order. You would prefer that they should do so with the consent of the other Powers rather than as their mandatories, which would involve responsibilities which His Majesty's Government might be unwilling to accept.

M. Poincaré said that the question of Albania had been superseded by the present very grave situation, arising out of the Austro-Servian difference. In the middle of



the night (3 A.M. 30th July), the French Government had received intelligence from Petersburg that the German Ambassador had informed M. Sazonow that unless Russia stopped her mobilisation of troops Germany would mobilise hers.<sup>(1)</sup> M. Poincaré had had at once consultations with the Ministers for War and of Marine as to what preparations should be made by the French Government to meet such an eventuality. At 1 P.M. to-day a further report from the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg stated that the German Ambassador had made a second communication to M. Sazonow which reduced the previous one to a request on the part of the German Government to be made acquainted with the conditions subject to which Russia would demobilise. M. Sazonow's reply was that Russia would consent to do so provided that Austria would give an assurance that she will respect the Sovereignty of Serbia and will submit certain of the demands in the Austrian note not accepted by Serbia to an international discussion.<sup>(2)</sup>

The President of the Republic thinks that the Austrian Government will not accept these Russian conditions. He is convinced that the preservation of peace between the Great Powers of the continent depends upon the attitude of England, for if His Majesty's Government would announce that in the event of a conflict between Germany and France resulting from the present differences between Austria and Serbia England would come to the aid of France, there would not be war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I told M. Poincaré that it would be very difficult for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, for the majority of the House of Commons would probably not appreciate the necessity for making it. It might be regarded at the present moment as an intervention in the Austro-Servian question, a matter in which England is not directly interested. M. Poincaré maintained that it would be in the interest of peace, which is a great English as well as French interest. France, he said, does not desire war. She wishes to remain at peace. The French Government have not gone further at present than preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares and they will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. If war broke out between Russia and Austria, and Germany came to the assistance of Austria, France would be bound by her treaty engagements to aid Russia. There would be general war on the continent in which England would inevitably be involved in the course of it for the protection of interests vital to her position. By a declaration now of her intention to support France, whose great desire is peace, a war would almost certainly be prevented, for Germany, though she might be ready to fight France as well as Russia, would not run the risk of having her sea-borne trade destroyed and of being starved by the British fleet.

I said that the orders to the British fleet not to disperse must be a pretty clear indication to Germany, without any formal announcement, of what might happen if there were war between Germany and France. M. Poincaré replied that such an announcement would prevent such a war, and even if it did not prevent it, British aid to France at the outbreak of hostilities would assist in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Aid given later might be too late, and if England remained neutral and Germany became omnipotent on the continent, the position of England would be entirely altered to her detriment as a Great Power.

M. Poincaré wished me to report to you for your earnest consideration the reasons which he had given to me in support of a declaration by His Majesty's Government such as he suggested.

I have transmitted to you by telegraph<sup>(3)</sup> the substance of my present despatch in regard to the situation arising out of the Austro-Servian differences.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(<sup>1</sup>) *R No. 58 and R II.*

(<sup>2</sup>) *See No. 302 and R No. 60.*

(<sup>3</sup>) *No. 318.*



No. 374.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

My dear Grey,

*British Embassy, Paris, July 31, 1914.*

When the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this evening I imagined that it was for the purpose of giving me the answer of the French Government to your proposal which I communicated to him this morning in regard to a formula of arrangement between Austria and Russia.<sup>(1)</sup>

When I arrived at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs the German Ambassador was with M. Viviani and I went in just after the departure of the Ambassador.

Naturally from the character of the communication which M. Viviani had just received he was in a highly nervous state and forgot all about the object for which he had sent for me.

M. de Schoen could not say when the ultimatum to Russia expires.

Evidently the Germans want to hurry matters on before the Russians can be ready.

M. de Schoen sent a message of good-bye to the President of the Republic.<sup>(2)</sup>

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

*Cf. telegram No. 357.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 342.<sup>(2)</sup> F No. 120.

(35305)

No. 375.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 119.)

Sir,

*The Hague, July 31, 1914.*

The "chef de cabinet" at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that all the Dutch regiments were now at full strength and that the next step, which he hoped would not have to be taken, was concentration.

M. Doude said the vulnerable point was the Province of Limburg and that up to the present there were no more regiments there now than there were in normal times, though the regiments stationed there were, like all other regiments in this country, at war strength. M. Doude added that troops could be sent to Limburg from other parts of Holland in a few hours if necessary.

I have, &amp;c.

H. G. CHILTON.

(35148)

No. 376.

*The Danish Minister to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*Danish Legation, London, August 1, 1914.*

By order of my Government I have the honour to inform you that in view of the more and more serious aspect of the international situation the King's Government have considered it right to call out for precautionary purposes about 14,000 men to the navy and about 13,000 men to the naval fortifications.

I have, &amp;c.

H. GREVENKOP CASTENSKIOLD.

*Cf. No. 530.*

(35101)

No. 377.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 11.4 P.M.

R. August 1, 12.35 A.M.

Tel. (No. 6.) *En clair.*

Orders issued this evening for general mobilisation of the Belgian army.

*Cf. No. 415.*

(35106)

No. 378.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.**Antwerp, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 8.41 P.M.

R. August 1, 12.50 A.M.

Tel.

Public notice just posted in Antwerp station stating that all railway communication with Germany has ceased.

(35099)

No. 379.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 8.37 P.M.

R. August 1, 1.25 A.M.

Tel. (No. 192.)

No vessels allowed to leave St. Petersburg till further notice.

(35098)

No. 380.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. August 1, 1.10 A.M.

R. August 1, 2.5 A.M.

Tel. (No. 103.)

On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram No. 287 of this afternoon,<sup>(1)</sup> I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make [group undecypherable].

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia does not demobilise at once.<sup>(2)</sup> He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

M. Jaurès has been killed in a restaurant by a young man on the ground that he was a pacifist and a traitor.

*Published in BB No. 124 (last sentence omitted).**Cf. No. 382.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 348.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 344.

(35309)

No. 381.

*Sir Eyre Crowe to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*Tel. Urgent. *En clair*

D. 2:5 A.M.

An important and urgent telegram of some length is going to you in cypher.<sup>(1)</sup>  
Please arrange to have it decyphered without delay.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 384.

(35094)

No. 382.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, July 31, 1914.*

D. August 1, 1:12 A.M.

R. August 1, 2:15 A.M.

Tel. (No. 104.)

My telegram No. 103 of to-night.<sup>(1)</sup>

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

*Published in BB No. 125.**Cf. No. 474.*

## MINUTES.

France will respect Belgian neutrality, Germany will not. But Germany will delay a definite answer until it is too late for England to act effectively.—*E. A. C. August 1.*

We should take no reply or a postponed reply as a refusal.—*A. N.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 380.

(35097)

No. 383.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 2 A.M.

R. August 1, 3:30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 114.)

Your telegram No. 287 of 31st July to Paris:<sup>(1)</sup> Belgian neutrality.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he could not possibly give me an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Chancellor. I said that I hoped that the answer would not be too long delayed. He then gave me to understand he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain extent part of their plan of campaign. After taking note of your request, he told me in confidence

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 348.

that Belgium had already committed certain acts which he could only qualify as hostile. On my asking him for details, he gave me as an instance that the Belgian Government had already embargoed a consignment of grain destined for Germany.

In telling me that it was unlikely that the Imperial Government would be in a position to answer, he said that in any case it would be necessary for them to know what France replied to your enquiry.

I shall speak to him again on the subject to-morrow, but I am not very hopeful of obtaining a definite answer.

*Published in BB No. 122 (paraphrased).*

*Cf. No. 510 and DD No. 522.*

#### MINUTES.

Qu. Repeat to Paris (No. 300 Aug. 1, 9.45 P.M.).

And repeat Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 104<sup>(2)</sup> to Berlin :—

And telegraph to Sir E. Goschen :—

“ Your telegram No. 114.

“ French Government state that they will respect neutrality of Belgium, unless it is violated by another Power which thereby may force France to take measures of self-defence.

“ You should inform M.F.A.”—*G. R. C. August 1, 1914.*

The Cabinet are discussing the question. Wait.—*E. A. C. August 1.*

I am not sure that we should inform German Government of French reply in any case without French consent. The two countries may very shortly be at war and we should not pass on anything from one to the other. If France asks us we can say we have had no reply from Germany.—*A. N.*

The French Government have given the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs so it is presumably no secret. I told the German Ambassador of it to-day.<sup>(3)</sup>—*E. G.*

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 382.

(<sup>3</sup>) No. 448.

(35113)

No. 384.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 423.)

D. 3.30 A.M.

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King :—

“ My Government has received the following statement from the German Government :—

[Here follows text of Memorandum printed in No. 372.]

“ I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world.”



(Repeated to Paris No. 291 (3.45 A.M.): "You should apply to the President at once for an audience, and communicate to him the following message sent by the King to the Emperor of Russia.")

*Published in the Press on August 5, 1914. See CDD, p. 536.  
Cf. No. 490, and private letter No. 665.*

(35096)

No. 385.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

*D. August 1, 2 A.M.*

*R. August 1, 3.45 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 113.)

Your telegram No. 241.<sup>(1)</sup>

I spent an hour with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor, at the request of the Tsar, and the Imperial Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

Germany's demand to Russia has been published to-night in the extra sheets, and large crowds are parading the streets singing patriotic songs.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB No. 121 (last sentence omitted).  
Cf. No. 510.*

#### MINUTE.

M. de Etter told me to-day that when he left St. Petersburg on Wednesday no mobilization of any degree was taking place there or in the "government" of St. Petersburg. He came by the Nord Express through Germany. The German railways were filled in all directions with moving troops.—*E. A. C. August 1.*

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 340.

(35143)

No. 386.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

D. 2 A.M.

R. 3.55 A.M.

Tel. (Unnumbered.) *En clair.*

Following communiqué issued to-night :—

(Translated from German.)

"After the work of mediation undertaken at the wish of the Tsar himself has been upset ('gestört') by the Russian Government by the general mobilisation of the Russian army and fleet, the German Government have let it be known in St. Petersburg to-day that German mobilisation is contemplated unless Russia suspends her preparations for war within twelve hours and makes a definite declaration on the subject. At the same time an enquiry has been addressed to the French Government as to their attitude in the case of a Russo-German war."

(35098)

No. 387.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 9 P.M.

R. August 1, 4 A.M.

Tel. (No. 132.)

Following from military attaché for Director of Military Operations :—

"General mobilization was ordered to-day for army, Landwehr, Honved and Landsturm. Latter includes all men up to 37 years in Austria and up to 42 years in Tyrol and Hungary."

*Cf. No. 427.*

(35108)

No. 388.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Nish, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 10 P.M.

R. August 1, 8 A.M.

Tel. (No. 71.)

Vice-consul at Belgrade telephones town being bombarded and shells falling around British Legation. Excesses on the part of komitajis are feared. Two British subjects have been arrested as spies, but released on intervention of vice-consul. They are now with him in the German Legation, over a portion of which the British flag is flying.

(35107)

(b.)

*Nish, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 8.20 P.M.

R. August 1, 8.45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 68.)

Skuptchina has been opened by the Crown Prince in speech in which, after review of present grave situation, stress was laid on the declared intention of the Emperor of Russia not to disinterest himself in the fate of Serbia. Friendly attitude of France and England was emphasised.

No. 389.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 9.10 P.M.

R. August 1, 9.40 A.M.

Tel. (No. 74.)

British vice-consul at Belgrade who slept last night in German Legation telephoned this morning that bombardment ceased towards evening yesterday and that no firing took place during night.

I will endeavour to ascertain whether any further damage has been done to British Legation and report.

Cyphers and all highly secret archives were carefully destroyed by fire yesterday afternoon.

*Cf. Nos. 278, 359 and 394.*

(35115)

No. 390.

*Consul Bosanquet to Sir Edward Grey.**Riga, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 4 P.M.

R. August 1, 9 A.M.

Tel.

Mobilisation declared at Riga, first day to-morrow. Officers visiting Riga have left for their regiments. Cossacks arrived last night. Cannon have been sent in the direction of Windau.

No more foreign correspondence accepted here.<sup>(1)</sup>

(Repeated to Embassy.)

<sup>(1)</sup> A further telegram despatched July 31, 11.30 P.M., and received August 1, 9 A.M., states "Last paragraph means letters for abroad."

(35104)

No. 391.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 2.40 P.M.

R. August 1, 10 A.M.

Tel. (No. 464.)

Grand Vizier hopes that meeting with Greek Prime Minister may take place, and I think he would accept if it were proposed at some point in the Ægean, possibly Imbros. He is in a very reasonable mood, and has clearly abandoned any wish to regain possession of Chios and Mitylene, the importance of which to Turkey has been diminished by partial elimination of Greek population from the mainland opposite. He attributes continuance of unfortunate incidents reported from various places in Aidin and Brussa vilayets to the panic-stricken condition of the inhabitants, and evidently thinks that they have been much exaggerated. Recent reports from Smyrna certainly show an improvement in situation.

With regard to general outlook, his Excellency is hopeful, believing that [? Russia] having no material interests at stake will not go to war. Attitude of Turkey at present will be one of strict neutrality. In case of complications their policy, and in particular with regard to Straits, has not yet been considered.

(Repeated to Athens.)

*Cf. No. 568.*

(35134)

No. 392.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, July 31, 1914.**D. July 31, midnight.**R. August 1, 11 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 135.)

This afternoon air has been thick with rumours of war, caused by total mobilisation of Austro-Hungarian army, and by statement published in "Neue Freie Presse," with consent of censor, that German Government have required answer from Russian Government within twenty-four hours as to meaning of Russian mobilisation. Neither French nor Russian Embassy are aware of change in situation since yesterday.

(35147)

No. 393.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.**D. August 1, 12.15 A.M.**R. August 1, 11 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 193.)

Since despatch of my telegram No. 191<sup>(1)</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram No. 412 of 30th July<sup>(2)</sup> with formula recorded in my telegram No. 185 of 30th July.<sup>(3)</sup> He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

"Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante."

He further said that Emperor Nicholas's telegram commenced by thanking Emperor William for His Majesty's telegram, which held out possibility of pacific solution, and by giving assurances that Russia's military preparations concealed no aggressive intentions whatever. While explaining reasons why it was impossible to stop a mobilisation which had already begun, Emperor engaged not to move a man across the frontier so long as conversation with Austria continued. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he trusted you would consent to this conversation taking place in London, as atmosphere there was far more favourable to pacific solution.

In conclusion, his Excellency begged me to convey to you his warm thanks for what His Majesty's Government have done in the cause of peace. If Germany had made this last pacific "geste" and if war was eventually averted, it would be in great measure due to the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. This was a service which neither Emperor, Government, nor Russian people would ever forget.

(Repeated to Embassies.)

*Published in BB. No. 120 (paraphrased—part omitted).*

## MINUTE.

We have had this in greater detail this morning from M. de Etter.—E. A. C. August 1.

<sup>(1)</sup> This telegram appears not to have been received.

<sup>(3)</sup> No. 302.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 309.



No. 394.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 30, 1914.**D. July 30, 11:30 P.M.**R. August 1, 11 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 69.)

Your telegram No. 35<sup>(1)</sup> received. I am at once endeavouring to get into telephonic communication with British Vice-Consul. I will report when action taken.

*Cf. Nos. 359, 389.**(<sup>1</sup>) No. 278.*

(35152)

No. 395.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 1, 1914.**D. 10:24 A.M.**R. 12:25 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 7.)

Your telegram No. 9 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have carried out your instructions. Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for the communication, and replied that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain neutrality, and desires and expects other Powers to observe and uphold it.

He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent and that there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that Belgian Government believed that in case of violation they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country.

*Published in BB No. 128 (paraphrased, cf. No. 415).**(<sup>1</sup>) No. 351.*

(36821)

No. 396.

*Communicated by Belgian Minister, August 1.**M. Davignon to Count de Lalaing.*

M. le Comte,

*Bruzelles, le 31 juillet, 1914.*

La situation internationale est grave : l'éventualité d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne peut être écartée de nos préoccupations.

Nous avons toujours observé avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'État neutre que nous imposent les traités du 19 avril, 1839. Ces devoirs nous nous attacherons inébranlablement à les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances.

Les dispositions amicales des Puissances à notre égard ont été affirmées si souvent, que nous avons la confiance de voir le territoire belge demeurer hors de toute atteinte, si des hostilités venaient à se produire à nos frontières.

Toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'observation de notre neutralité n'en ont pas moins été prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armée belge est mobilisée et se porte sur les positions stratégiques choisies pour assurer la défense du pays et le respect de sa neutralité. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en état de défense.

Il est à peine nécessaire, M. le Comte, d'insister sur le caractère de ces mesures. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de nous mettre en situation de remplir nos obligations

internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu être inspirées, cela va de soi, ni par le dessein de prendre part à une lutte armée des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de défiance envers aucune d'elles.

Veillez, je vous prie, donner lecture et laisser copie de la présente dépêche à M. le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères de Grande-Bretagne et prier son Excellence d'en prendre acte.

La même communication a été faite aux autres Puissances garantes de notre neutralité.

Veillez, &c.  
DAVIGNON.

(36823)

No. 397.

*Communicated by German Embassy, August 1, 1914.*

Translation.

Our geographical military position leaves no alternative but to answer Russia's mobilisation by declaring a state of imminent danger which must be followed by mobilisation if Russia does not forthwith stop her military preparations. We could not wait quietly to see whether counsels of prudence prevail at St. Petersburg while Russian mobilisation continued in full swing, as this would involve our being completely outstripped in military preparedness. If Russia continues to mobilise and we do not start to do so, East Prussia, West Prussia, and perhaps also Posen and Silesia are at the mercy of the Russians. In his last telegram to the Emperor the Tsar declared that he will abstain from any act of provocation. A mobilised Russian army on our frontier without our having mobilised constitutes, however, without any provocative action, a danger to our very existence. The provocation of which Russia has been guilty in mobilising against us at a moment when we were mediating at Vienna in accordance with her wishes is, moreover, so strong that no German nor any foreigner would understand it if we failed to answer with strong measures.

[NOTE.—This was communicated in German. For the original German see the telegram from the German Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky in DD No. 529.]

(36824)

No. 398.

*Communication from Russian Embassy.*

M. de Etter informed me to-day that according to a telegram from M. Sazonof dated to-day, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had made a communication to the effect that unless the German demand for demobilisation not only against Germany but against Austria was complied with by 12 o'clock (noon) to-day, the German Government would feel compelled to order a general mobilisation.

Asked whether mobilisation necessarily meant war, the German Ambassador said no, but it was very near to it.

August 1, 1914.

E. A. C.

(35255)

No. 399.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

D. 12:30 P.M.

R. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 115.)

Owing to misapprehension due to confusion resulting from proclamation of *Kriegsgefahr* yesterday the Telegraph Office refused to despatch some of our telegrams yesterday evening. I immediately caused categorical instructions to be issued by the Imperial Foreign Office and Military Governor of Berlin to telegraph employés for the future to forward my telegrams at once and matters are now in order. It is possible however that owing to pressure on the lines my telegrams may be delayed in transmission.

Vice-Consuls at Emden and Bremerhaven report that telegraph employés will only transmit telegrams from them to the Embassy in German. Am making enquiries.

(35251)

No. 400.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 30, 1914.*

D. July 30, 9:20 A.M.

R. August 1, 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 67.)

British Vice-Consul at Belgrade has just telephoned as follows:—

“Foreign diplomatic and consular representatives left at Belgrade headed by the Belgian Minister who is the only ‘*chef de mission*’ now there, made representations yesterday afternoon to the military authorities pointing out danger to inhabitants should the town be defended. They were informed that the military authorities were the sole judges of what was expedient in the interests of the country. Foreign representatives accompanied by Prince George then proceeded to the park overlooking the Save and hoisted white and German flags in the hope of inducing the Austrians to open *pourparlers*. This was apparently not understood by the Austrians. When flag was removed firing recommenced but Vice-Consul tells me the Austrians are not firing into town but at fort in proximity of which is British Legation. He thinks that Servians intend to defend town in order to gain time for concentration and this is confirmed by information I have gathered here.”

(35181)

No. 401.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

D. 12:30 P.M.

R. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 116.)

Military Attaché reports that all necessary steps on frontiers and for protection of railways have been taken. He believes that preparations are so advanced that normal duration of mobilisation period will be shortened.

(85159)

No. 402.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 249.)

D. 1.50 P.M.

Great Central Railway Company's steamers and other British merchant ships are, we are informed, detained forcibly by the authorities at Hamburg.

Ask German Government to send orders at once for them to be allowed to proceed without delay, otherwise the effect on public opinion here will be deplorable. We are most anxious on our side to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and I hope German Government will be equally careful not to take any step that would make the situation between us impossible. I cannot ascertain on what ground the detention of British ships has been ordered.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 456 and 496.

Cf. No. 677, also DD Nos. 610, 634.

(85270)

No. 403.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 107.)

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 2.30 P.M.

I have seen President of the Republic and have communicated to him your urgent telegram No. 291 this morning.<sup>(1)</sup>

He says German Government are endeavouring to put on Russia responsibility for critical state of affairs; that Emperor of Russia did not order a general mobilisation until after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria; that measures already taken by German Government, though not designated a general mobilisation, are so in effect; that France is already forty-eight hours behindhand as regards German military preparations, and that a French general mobilisation will become necessary for self-defence: that whereas German troops are actually on the French frontier, and have made incursions on it in places, orders to French troops are not to go nearer to German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. from it, so as to avoid any ground for accusations of provocation to Germany; that Emperor of Russia has expressed his readiness, notwithstanding mobilisations, to continue his conversations with German Ambassador with object of preservation of peace, which is sincere desire of France, whose wishes are markedly pacific; and that French Government do not quite despair of war being avoided.

*Published in BB No. 134 (paraphrased).*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 384.

(35284)

No. 404.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

D. 12.20 P.M.

R. 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 117.)

Military Attaché reports that many reserve officers but no men as yet called out. (? Most of) cavalry and artillery regiments and almost entire general staff have left Berlin. Supreme confidence reigns in military circles in Berlin.

Military Attaché confident in event of war Germany will pass part of her forces through Belgium.



(35277)

No. 405.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.**D. July 30, 1:30 P.M.**R. August 1, 3 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 187.)

My telegram 178.<sup>(1)</sup>

Following from Warsaw :—

“ Forces of infantry are stationed along railway bridges. Troops are being sent daily. Population within fortress region of Novogeorgievsk has been ordered to leave.”

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 234.

(35427)

No. 406.

*Communicated by the French Embassy.*

In communicating the annexed memorandum M. de Fleuriau begged, at the instance of his government, that Sir E. Grey's attention should be drawn to the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that for this reason the *casus fœderis* under the term of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

E. A. C., August 1.

Enclosure in No. 406.

*Ambassade de France, à Londres.*

A la question du Gouvernement Allemand, qui l'informait des ultimatums lancés à la France et à la Russie et demandait quelles seraient les intentions de l'Italie, le Marquis de San Giuliano a répondu que—

“ la guerre entreprise par l'Autriche et les conséquences, qui pouvaient en ressortir, avaient, d'après les paroles mêmes de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne une portée agressive, qu'elles étaient donc en contradiction avec le caractère purement défensif de la Triple Alliance, et que, dans ces conditions, l'Italie demeurerait neutre.”

1<sup>er</sup> Août 1914.

No. 407.

*Communicated by the French Ambassador (August 1).**Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à M. Paul Cambon.*

31 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement allemand prétendant que le Gouvernement russe a ordonné la mobilisation totale de ses forces de terre et de mer a décidé à midi de prendre toutes les dispositions militaires que comporte l'état dit de “ menaces de guerre.”

En me communiquant cette décision ce soir à 7 heures M. de Schoen a ajouté que le Gouvernement Allemand exigerait que la Russie démobilise. Si le Gouvernement Russe n'a pas donné une réponse satisfaisante dans un délai de douze heures, l'Allemagne mobilisera à son tour.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n'étais nullement renseigné sur une prétendue mobilisation totale de l'armée et de la flotte russes, que le Gouvernement Allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires qu'il prend dès aujourd'hui.

M. de Schoen m'a demandé en terminant au nom de son Gouvernement quelle serait en cas de conflit entre l'Allemagne et la Russie l'attitude de la France; je ne lui ai pas répondu. Il m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma réponse demain samedi à une heure. Je n'ai pas l'intention de lui faire une déclaration à ce sujet et je me bornerai à lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses intérêts. Le Gouvernement de la République ne doit en effet compte de ses intentions qu'à ses alliés ou amis.

*Cf. F No. 117 for translation.*

(35303)

No. 408.

*The Netherlands Minister to Sir Edward Grey.*

(No. 2162.)

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

*Londres, le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.*

Je viens d'être chargé par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à La Haye de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la Reine, à la fin de maintenir le cas échéant la neutralité de son territoire par tous les moyens dont il dispose, a appelé sous les armes tous les conscrits de l'armée, de la réserve (landweer) et de la flotte qui ne se trouvent pas en service actif.

R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

[NOTE.—Another note of the same date (No. 2164) transmits text of order regulating the admission of foreign ships of war into Dutch territorial waters and into river territory situated within these waters.]

(36822)

No. 409.

*Russian Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey.*

Dear Sir Edward,

*Russian Embassy, London, August 1, 1914.*

I send you herewith a telegram, which I am sorry, reached me only this morning. If it had not been for the German ultimatum to us, this shows clearly that things might have been arranged. Whether they can now, it is not for me to say. But I strongly feel that the responsibility for the situation as it is cannot be thrown on Russia.

Yours sincerely,

BENCKENDORFF.

Enclosure in No. 409.

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff en date du 18/31 Juillet à l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Londres. Répété à Paris.*

Veuillez exprimer à Sir Edward Grey notre vive reconnaissance pour son amicale attitude, et la fermeté et la clarté des vues qu'il a exposées et transmises aux Gouvernements Allemand et Austro-Hongrois. Grâce au point de vue énoncé par Sir Edward Grey tout espoir d'une solution pacifique n'est pas encore écarté. J'ai prié Sir George Buchanan de transmettre à Sir Edward Grey que je suis convaincu que les négociations n'ont de chance de succès que si elles sont menées à Londres, ce qui faciliterait à l'Autriche l'acceptation d'un compromis.

*Cf. R No. 69 for translation.*

(35262)

No. 410.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

D. August 1, 3.10 P.M.

R. August 1, 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 194.)

Following from Military Attaché for War Office:—

Mobilization ordered in Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan military districts on July 30th. Naval reservists in Petersburg called out on same date.

Notices posted up at 4 A.M. on July 31st ordering general mobilization. All classes of reservists in Petersburg to present themselves at 6 A.M. on August 1st. Each line regiment will form reserve regiments. Order applies to seven European districts. Not known whether units in Caucasus and Asia will be raised to war strength but believe probable. All leave classes of European cossacks called out. Estimates of units affected 27 regular corps and 15 second line.

No movement of troops noticed in Germany on line of Berlin-Schneidemuhl-Dirschau-Königsberg-Eydkunen, but all bridges guarded. Only half the harvests in Eastern Germany cut and that in most cases still lying in the fields. Harvest in south Poland and south Russia reported gathered.

Russia has been quietly moving troops principally cavalry and artillery to frontier. Reported 16 trains left Petersburg on one night. Kovno was reinforced from Vilna last night. Second division of cavalry guards is reported to be under orders for Suvalki. Military censorship commences officially August 1st.

All civilian goods transport to Eastern frontier ceases to-day. From to-morrow only single pair of trains for public use will be run on Finland lines.

(35293)

No. 411.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 250.)

D. 3.10 P.M.

Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austrian Government to discuss with Russia, and readiness of Russia to accept a basis of mediation, which is not open to objections raised to original formula suggested by Russia.

I still believe that if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war it might be possible to secure peace.

His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act that may precipitate matters, and I hope German Government may be able to make some use of the Russian communications referred to above to relieve tension. Things ought not to be hopeless while Russia and Austria are ready to converse.

*Published in BB No. 131 (paraphrased).**Cf. Nos. 393 and 418.*

(35294)

No. 412.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 201.)

D. 8.15 P.M.

European crisis. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called upon me this morning and communicated to me the substance of a telegram which had been sent by the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, in which the latter was instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Austro-Hungarian Government had no intention of territorial aggrandisement in Servia, or of impairing the sovereign rights of that country. His Excellency was further instructed, with regard to the report which had been published in Paris that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak, to state that there was no truth in that report.

Subsequent to this call, Count Mensdorff called again at the Foreign Office, and communicated the substance of a telegram which was sent yesterday by Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to the effect that Count Berchtold had sent yesterday for the Russian Ambassador in Vienna and had explained to him that there was a wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had "banged the door" on all further conversations, and Count Berchtold had begged the Russian Ambassador to do his best to remove this impression, which the Ambassador had promised to do. On this occasion Count Berchtold reiterated to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which he had already given at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary did not contemplate either the acquisition of Servian territory or an infraction of Servian sovereign rights.

Count Mensdorff called special attention to the statement contained in this telegram that Austria-Hungary had not broken off conversations with St. Petersburg. (Sent to Paris No. 296; Berlin No. 251; Rome No. 246; and St. Petersburg No. 427.)

*Published in BB No. 137 (paraphrased).  
Cf. A III Nos. 94, 62 and 66.*

(35290)

No. 413.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 1, 1914.*

D. 1.25 P.M.

R. 3.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 109.)

Following for War Office from Military Attaché:—

"War Office state that orders given last night for five French covering army corps to close up. Following should be position this evening. Second corps Montmedy Verdun sixth Verdun Toul; twentieth Nancy; twenty-first Epinal; seventh Belfort. Germans reported still moving to frontier."



(35302)

No. 414.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.**Peking, August 1, 1914.*

D. 8.50 P.M.

R. 4 P.M.

Tel. (No. 140.)

Six officers and 110 men of German contingent have left for Tsingtau with their machine-guns, not howitzers. All German reservists throughout China are ordered to proceed to Tsingtau where German, Austrian and Italian ships of war are concentrating. German authorities have warned British Subjects to be ready to leave. Hong Kong and Admiralty informed.

(35278)

No. 415.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

D. 11.37 A.M.

R. 4.5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 8.)

My telegram No. 6 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that decision to mobilise at once was taken, firstly, in view of similar measure in Holland; secondly, to prove for external and internal purposes that Belgium is determined to defend neutrality; thirdly, because reorganisation having been so recently introduced, some confusion and delay may occur, and the Belgian Government are of course desirous that an emergency should not find their preparations unpremeditated.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 377.

<sup>(2)</sup> The substance of the last two lines seems to have been added to the paraphrase of No. 395, published in BB No. 128.

(35299)

No. 416.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.**Bucharest, August 1, 1914.*

D. 11.30 A.M.

R. 4.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 28.)

My immediately preceding telegram of 31st July<sup>(1)</sup>.

I have refrained from advising neutrality as I feel uncertain as to attitude of Roumania, which may give Russia pause, but, on the other hand, I feel that Great Britain's advice might carry weight. Roumania's avowed objection to remaining neutral is that in the general settlement she may suffer. The fact that Great Britain has advised neutrality might diminish this fear.

*Cf. No. 432.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 350.

(34855)

No. 417.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

Tel. (No. 252.)

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 5 P.M.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff of 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

“(Urgent.)

“Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: ‘Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit Austro-Serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les grandes puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement Austro-Hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d’état souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s’engage à conserver son attitude expectante.’”

*See No. 393 and R No. 67.*

(35860)

No. 418.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 5.5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 253.)

M. de Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated 31st July, which are as follows:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.<sup>(1)</sup> M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to all the six Powers.)

*Published in BB No. 133.*

*The original telegram has been published in R II but is not included in “Un Livre Noir.”*

<sup>(1)</sup> *For the conversation between M. Sazonof and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, see A III Nos. 44, 45 and 97.*

[NOTE.—From Count Szápáry's account it appears that this statement as to the result of the conversation is not quite correct. Count Berchtold had authorised the Ambassador to explain the text of the Austrian note to Serbia, but not to allow the substance of it to become the basis of negotiation. In his telegram to Vienna, Count Szápáry himself says that M. Sazonof “appeared to attach an exaggerated importance to what I said” as the conversation did not bring out “the purely retrospective and theoretical character of the conversation about the text of the note.”]

(35309)

No. 419.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 297.)

D. 5.25 P.M.

The war. I have definitely refused all overtures to give Germany any promise of neutrality, and shall not entertain any such suggestion unless it were on conditions that seemed real advantages for France.<sup>(1)</sup>

German Ambassador here seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it, that after mobilisation on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive.<sup>(2)</sup>

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 596.*

*Cf. also ib. Nos. 562 and 570.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 352.

<sup>(2)</sup> [NOTE.—*For the later history of this suggestion see Nos. 453 and 460; also DD Nos. 630 and 631; Grey Vol. II, p. 312; Prince Lichnowsky's "My Mission to London, 1912-14," and the following statement made by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons on August 28, 1914:—*

*"Lord Robert Cecil asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the publication by the German Government of certain proposals which are alleged to have been made to secure French and English neutrality during the War; and whether the publication is complete and accurate?"*

*"Sir E. Grey: I have seen an incomplete publication. The circumstances were as follows: It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published. This second telegram does not seem to have been published."*

(35311)

No. 420.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

D. 10 A.M.

Tel. (No. 136.)

R. 5.45 P.M.

As no press telegrams can be sent, following may be of interest:—

Official Vienna Gazette states that the general mobilisation is occasioned by Russian mobilisation, implying no aggressive tendency whatever, but is precautionary step for necessary protection of Monarchy.

Moratorium of fourteen days is declared for private debts.

"*Fremdenblatt*" says that Russia acts as if we were attacking one of her vassal States, but we wish Serbia to be really independent; we would feign believe the assurances of the Russian Government that Russia has no aggressive intentions, but we cannot leave our northern frontier unprotected.

(35330)

No. 421.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 78.)

D. 9 A.M.

R. 6 P.M.

British Vice-Consul at Belgrade telephoned that firing yesterday, which was directed against all quarters of the town, ceased in the evening and night was quiet. Vice-Consul believes that strenuous defence of Belgrade is now contemplated and doubtless Prince George, who is a firebrand, would favour this . . . I have therefore reminded Servian Government that in this event British subjects should receive due notice.

One of our flags has been flying uninterruptedly over British Legation.

(35362)

No. 422.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 6.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 428.)

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that, though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia, they would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The understanding of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that, if in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government.

(Repeated to Paris No. 297, and Berlin No. 254.)

*Published in BB No. 135.*

(35386)

No. 423.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

D. 1.10 P.M.

R. 6.40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 137.)

Following for D.M.O. from military attaché :—

“My Russian colleague asked for my opinion yesterday concerning chances of the transfer of army of Balkans against the Russian forces if the war was extended.

“I said that it depended on Servia but that if withdrawal on a large scale took place Servians would escape punishment which Austria obviously wished to give them as the smaller decisions would be swallowed in the larger. For



reasons of morality [*sic*] it would be difficult to withdraw troops from before the Servians. Detachments in Bosnia were much scattered and railway capacity small. In view of possible action by Roumania respectable force would have to remain in any case. If the Servians pressed too hard they might initiate a general engagement and permit prematurely detachment of Austrian forces. If they did not press enough they might be masked by insignificant forces and fail in their rôle. I said that their position in the general scheme should be explained to them and a Russian staff officer of high standing despatched there before it was late.

"My Russian colleague said that he agreed and was telegraphing in that sense to the General Staff.

"We agreed that Servians would draw off equivalent of 18 divisions as minimum and 24 as maximum."

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No. 424.

*Communication by the French Ambassador.*

53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.,

Sir Edward Grey,

August 1, 1914.

M. Cambon pointed out to me this afternoon that it was at our request that France had moved her fleets to the Mediterranean, on the understanding that we undertook the protection of her Northern and Western coasts. As I understand you told him that you would submit to the Cabinet the question of a possible German naval attack on French Northern and Western Ports it would be well to remind the Cabinet of the above fact.

A. N.

I have spoken to the P.M., and attach great importance to the point being settled to-morrow.—  
E. G., 1.8.14.

(95313)

No. 425.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

D. 5.45 P.M.

R. 8 P.M.

Tel. (No. 110.)

Military attaché reports that Minister of War telephoned asking him to come and see him, which he did at 3.40 P.M. He said that orders for general mobilisation of French army were issued at 3.40. The reasons for doing this are that Minister of War knows that Germans have under their system of "*Kriegszustand*" called up six classes; three are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, remaining three will be reserve. He considers that this is tantamount to mobilisation, and is therefore a mobilisation under another name. There are eight army corps on a war footing opposed to French forces on frontier, and he expects an attack at any moment. Hence it is absolutely necessary to safeguard against this. He has left a zone of 10 kilom. between French troops and German frontier. French will not attack, and Minister of War is very anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is purely defensive. He ended by saying, "We rely on ourselves first and on you."

*Published in BB No. 136 (paraphrased—last sentence omitted).*

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(35370)

No. 426.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 299.)

D. 8.20 P.M.

After the Cabinet to-day, I told M. Cambon that the present position differed entirely from that created by the Morocco incidents. In the latter, Germany made upon France demands that France could not grant, and in connection with which we had undertaken special obligations towards France. In these, public opinion would have justified the British Government in supporting France to the utmost of their ability. Now, the position was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.

M. Cambon said that he could not transmit this reply to his Government, and he asked me to authorise him to say that the British Cabinet had not yet taken any decision.

I said that we had come to a decision: that we could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expeditionary military force to the continent. Such a step had always been regarded here as very dangerous and doubtful. It was one that we could not propose, and Parliament would not authorise unless our interests and obligations were deeply and desperately involved.

M. Cambon said that the French coasts were undefended. The German fleet might come through the Straits any day and attack them.

I said that that might alter public feeling here, and so might a violation of the neutrality of Belgium. He could tell his Government that we were already considering the Belgian point, and that I would ask the Cabinet to consider the point about the French coasts. He could say that the Cabinet had not yet taken any decision on these points.

*Cf. No. 447.*

No. 427.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

D. 8.50 P.M.

R. 9 P.M.

Tel. (No. 139.)

Following for Director of Naval Intelligence from Naval Attaché:—

“General mobilisation of army and fleet.”

*Part published in BB No. 127.*

*Cf. No. 387.*

(35314)

No. 428.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 1, 1914.*

D. 7.10 P.M.

R. 9.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 111.)

Political Director tells me that German Ambassador called at Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning. He was informed that French Government do not comprehend for what reason his communication yesterday evening was made. It seemed to them strange that, at a moment when Russia and Austria were ready to converse, German Government presents an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia, general mobilisation in that country not having been ordered until after decree of Austrian general mobilisation, and Russian Government having expressed its readiness to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. There not being any differences at issue between Germany and France, it appeared an extraordinary proceeding for Ambassador to make a menacing communication requesting for an answer the next day, and intimating that if answer not satisfactory he would have to break off diplomatic relations and leave Paris.

German Ambassador stated that he had packed up, but he said nothing about passports. He is to see Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening.

*Published in BB No. 126 (paraphrased).**See F' Nos. 120, 125.*

(35325)

No. 429.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 1, 1914.*

D. 1.30 P.M.

R. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 140.)

French Ambassador informs me that he has heard that German merchant vessels in Mediterranean have been instructed in case of necessity to make for Sicilian ports.

(35326)

No. 430.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 1, 1914.*

D. 7.26 P.M.

R. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 141.)

My telegram No. 139.<sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that this morning either he misunderstood German Ambassador or that latter was misled with regard to German demands to Russia and France imposing time limit for answer as they had not been communicating up to an early hour this morning at Paris.

Rome press of this morning nevertheless contains announcement but not an official one of Italy's intention to observe neutrality.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 365.

(35345)

No. 431.

*Mr. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Berne, August 1, 1914.*

D. 5.55 P.M.

R. 9.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 3.)

Swiss army will mobilise 3rd August.

Financial panic here. All banks refusing cheques on abroad. Change unobtainable. As Switzerland is filled with British tourists, grave position may arise. Would it be possible to send messenger here with £500 in gold? Many provision dealers are sold out, six or seven closed. Government are taking sensible steps to allay excitement. Should be glad if military attaché could be sent here.

Very Secret.

French military attaché (?has) just told me that he has certain information that Germany is mobilising. He has informed Paris.

(35344)

(b.)

*Berne, August 1, 1914.*

D. 7.10 P.M.

R. 10.15 P.M.

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

Federal Council have ordered partial mobilisation of the whole of the Swiss army.

(35299)

No. 432.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 9.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 10.)

The war. Your telegram No. 28 of 1st August :<sup>(1)</sup> Roumanian neutrality.  
We cannot give advice.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 416.

(35112)

No. 433.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 9.55 P.M.

Tel. (No. 247.)

The war. Your telegram No. 139 of 31st July.<sup>(1)</sup>

It has been our general practice to issue a proclamation of neutrality after the outbreak of a war in which we have decided to take no part.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 365.



(35341)

No. 434.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, August 1, 1914.*

D. 6.5 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 23.)

Following communication has just been made to press :—

“The Norwegian Government has to-day declared itself neutral Power in war between Austria-Hungary and Servia. The Government has taken the necessary steps to safeguard Norwegian neutrality. The coast fortifications have been placed in a position of defence, and greater part of those men-of-war not already in commission are being prepared for defence of the country's neutrality.”

*Cf. No. 475.*

(35331)

No. 435.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, August 1, 1914.*

D. 4 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 79.)

British Vice-Consul telephones that situation is becoming critical in Belgrade. There is a general panic and the inhabitants are hiding in cellars during intermittent bombardment.

It is urgently necessary that immediate pressure be brought to bear upon the Austrian military authorities to allow train to approach Belgrade under white flag to convey away non-combatants, among whom are several British subjects.

*Cf. No. 463.*

(35371)

No. 436.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Greene (Tokyo).**Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

D. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 35.)

I told the Japanese Ambassador to-day that the situation in Europe was very grave.

We had not yet decided what our action should be, but under certain conditions we might find it necessary to intervene. If, however, we did intervene, it would be on the side of France and Russia, and I therefore did not see that we were likely to have to apply to Japan under our alliance, or that the interests dealt with by the alliance would be involved. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Cf. No. 571.*

(35400)

No. 437.

*Communication by the Greek Minister.*

The Greek Minister called to make the following urgent communications from his Government :—

1. Greek Government learn from good source in Constantinople that Austrian Ambassador there asked Orient Railway Company the quantity of coal in the Company's depôts in Salonica : what quantity they had for working trains, and what quantity they could, if necessary, provide for the Austrian squadron which might go to Salonica to intercept munitions of war destined for Servia viâ that port. (Made confidentially and with all reservation.)

2. From a good source Greek Government learn that firm of Karl Burner of Hamburg are negotiating in Turkey for purchase of old rifles, to send them secretly to India to arm Moslems : it is believed that the Young Turks are party to this move.

I thanked M. Gennadius.

August 1, 1914.

G. R. C.

*Cf. No. 438.*

(35400)

No. 438.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont (Constantinople).*

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 330.) Confidential.

D. 10 P.M.

Greek Government have informed me confidentially that they learn from a good source that the firm of Karl Burner of Hamburg are negotiating in Turkey for purchase of old rifles, intention being to send them secretly to India to arm Moslems. It is believed that Young Turks are party to this action.

Can you obtain any confirmation of report?

*Cf. No. 437.*

(35315)

No. 439.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

D. 8.35 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 112.)

Military attaché reports following information from War Office, 5 P.M. :—

"Germans continue pushing troops towards frontier. Great activity at Berlin railway stations; troop trains proceeding both towards east and west frontiers. It is believed German mobilisation taking place on Russian frontier, and that six corps will be employed against Russia."

(35322)

No. 440.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

D. 8.21 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 200.)

His Majesty's Consul at Riga reports that all foreign telegrams refused.

No foreign vessels allowed to leave Baltic and Finland ports.

(35342)

No. 441.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, August 1, 1914.*

D. 6.5 P.M.

R. 10.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs has made the following communication to the press:—

“Norwegian Consul-General at Hamburg has telegraphed that all ships lying in Hamburg and Cuxhaven are forbidden to leave those ports until further notice.”

(35329)

No. 442.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 30, 1914.*

D. August 1, 5.20 P.M.

R. August 1, 10.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 72.)

Prime Minister informs me that news has been received that the Austrians had crossed the river Drina forming Servian frontier opposite Bieline and are also advancing towards Plevic in the sanjak.

(36826)

No. 443.

*Swiss Minister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

*Légation de Suisse, Londres, le 1<sup>er</sup> août, 1914.*

Sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que le Conseil fédéral de la Confédération suisse a décidé la mobilisation de toute l'armée, à partir d'aujourd'hui.

Cette mesure a pour seul but le maintien de l'intégrité et de la neutralité de la Confédération.

J'ajoute qu'une déclaration formelle de neutralité, de la part de la Suisse, sera notifiée ultérieurement au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Veuillez, &amp;c.

CARLIN.

*Cf. No. 431.*

(35846)

No. 444.

*Sir H. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.**Copenhagen, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 19.)

D. 6:50 P.M.

R. 10:15 P.M.

Following information confirmed by M.F.A. :—

2,700 reserve marine artillery and seamen called out to strengthen defences.

No question of mobilisation.

Proclamation of neutrality issued by Denmark yesterday in terms of Royal ordinance of December 20th, 1912.

Proclamations issued simultaneously by Norway and Sweden.

Danish Bank rate has risen to about 7 per cent. Bourse was closed to-day.

(35823)

No. 445.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 201.)

D. 1:20 P.M.

R. 11:15 P.M.

German Ambassador handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs formal declaration of war this evening at 7 o'clock.

No. 446.

*Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir Edward Grey,

*53, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.,**August 1, 1914.<sup>(1)</sup>*

I presume you have received the enclosed telegram.<sup>(2)</sup> The action of Germany clearly constitutes her the aggressor, and in these circumstances there should be no hesitation as to our attitude. I am sure that the country would fully endorse when the facts are stated our coming to the aid of our friends. I have also little doubt that the opposition leaders in this case would, if consulted, be of the same mind.

We should mobilise to-day so that our expeditionary force may be on its way during next week. Should we waver now we shall rue the day later.

A. N.

<sup>(1)</sup> This is the date in Sir A. Nicolson's own writing; clearly it is a mistake for August 2.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 473.



(35569)

No. 447.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(No. 518.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

M. Cambon to-day, in the conversation that is partially recorded in my telegram No. 299 of the 1st August,<sup>(1)</sup> urged upon me very strongly our obligation to help France if she was attacked by Germany. He even said that, for the sake of public opinion in England, France had drawn her forces back from her German frontier, so that she was now in a position to take only the defensive, and not the offensive, against Germany. She had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean and had left her northern and western coasts exposed.

I said that, as long as we did not give Germany any promise of our neutrality—and as a matter of fact we had hitherto definitely refused to give such a promise—the French might be sure that the German fleet would not pass through the channel, for fear that we should take the opportunity of intervening, when the German fleet would be at our mercy. I promised, however, to see whether we could give any assurance that, in such circumstances, we would intervene.

As to the question of our obligation to help France, I pointed out that we had no obligation. France did not wish to join in the war that seemed about to break out, but she was obliged to join in it, because of her alliance. We had purposely kept clear of all alliances, in order that we might not be involved in difficulties in this way. I had assured Parliament again and again that our hands were free. It was most unreasonable to say that, because France had an obligation under an alliance of which we did not even know the terms, therefore we were bound equally with her, by the obligation in that alliance, to be involved in war.

M. Cambon admitted that there was no obligation of this kind, but he urged very strongly the obligation of British interests. If we did not help France, the *entente* would disappear; and, whether victory came to Germany or to France and Russia, our situation at the end of the war would be very uncomfortable.

I admitted the force of this, but I said that it was for us to consider the point of what British interests required, and to deal with it in Parliament. I was aware that very grave considerations were involved.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 426.

(35568)

No. 448.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 256.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and, as I was authorised to tell him this, I gave him an *aide-mémoire* of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Published in BB No. 123.*

Enclosure in No. 448.

*Memorandum.*

The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which has been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

*(The File Copy is marked "Not sent—War.")*

*For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation see DD No. 596.*

*Cf. also No. 419.*

No. 449.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey.*

My dear Grey,

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The American Ambassador tells me that if there be war which he thinks a certainty the American Embassy is to have charge of German interests and he believes that the American Embassy at Berlin will have charge of French interests. The German Ambassador is still here but the American Ambassador expects him to leave.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(35337)

No. 450.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

*D. August 1, 3.50 P.M.*

*R. August 2, 1 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 138.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs will receive me to-morrow. He will see the Russian and French Ambassadors this afternoon. The Russian Ambassador has just called to tell me of the German ultimatum requiring Russia, within twelve hours, to say

she will demobilise. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the German Ambassador if the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war. The German Ambassador answered that it would (group omitted: ?force) Germany to mobilise. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna says that the so-called complete mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than the taking by Russia of corresponding military precautions to those taken by Germany. He thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that Germany will attack Russia immediately, as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept up long. Tension between Russia and Germany seems greater even than that between Russia and Austria. The Russian Ambassador says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria, and would be satisfied even now with assurance as to the independence and integrity of Servia. His Excellency will again point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that refusal to make this slight concession must entail most terrific consequences. Russia would fight this time to the last extremity.

He is convinced that Germany desired war from the first. I agree that the German Ambassador at Vienna did, and that his action here has probably been coloured by his strong personal bias.

French Ambassador intends to ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered, and speak earnestly on the extreme danger of the situation. I fear that nothing can alter determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their minds, with Germany behind them. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I reply always that no one can say, but England cannot be expected to abandon her friends.

*Published in BB No. 141 (paraphrased—last sentence omitted).*

(35317)

No. 451.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

*D. August 1, 9.30 P.M.*

*R. August 2, 2.15 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 115.)

Naval attaché reports following information from Ministry of Marine:—

“The Chief of the General Staff reports that the whole of the French fleet is ready in every respect for any eventualities. Battleships “France” and “Parisien” will be ready to join the fleet on 15th August.”

(35316)

No. 452.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

*D. August 1, 9.30 A.M.*

*R. August 2, 3 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 114.)

Military attaché reports that the Minister of War sent for him again this evening at 8 o'clock. Minister of War stated that he wished to keep him informed on the situation. He told him that there were eight German army corps opposed to French, but real object of interview was evidently to convey Minister's opinion as follows:—

That there is only one way of securing peace, which is for England to act militarily instead of diplomatically. Military attaché assured him that England

was doing her utmost to ensure peace. Minister of War laid great stress on the fact that the 10-kilom. zone which he had arranged between French troops and German frontier was a proof of French endeavour to commit no provocative act. This zone is still occupied by peasants.

*Published in BB No. 140 (paraphrased—part omitted).*

(85318)

No. 453.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

D. August 2, 1.15 A.M.

R. August 2, 4.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 116.)

*August 1, midnight.*—The war. Your telegram No. 297 of this evening.<sup>(1)</sup>

Do you desire me to state to French Government that after mobilisation of French and German troops on Franco-German frontier we propose to remain neutral so long as German troops remain on the defensive and do not cross French frontier, and French abstain from crossing German frontier? I cannot imagine that in the event of Russia being at war with Austria and being attacked by Germany it would be consistent with French obligations towards Russia for French to remain quiescent. If French undertook to remain so, the Germans would first attack Russians and, if they defeated them, they would then turn round on the French.

Am I to enquire precisely what are the obligations of the French under Franco-Russian Alliance?

*See No. 460.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 419.

(85320)

No. 454.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.*

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

D. (From Aden)<sup>(1)</sup> August 2, 5 A.M.

R. 3.25 A.M.

Tel. (No. 198.)

Following from military attaché for War Office:—

“Mobilisation proceeding smoothly including horse conscription. All fifteen classes of reservists taken in St. Petersburg. In Moscow and Kieff 1910 to 1913 classes Ban of Opolchenie taken in addition, but not here as yet. Reported that 200,000 reservists taken in Petersburg.

“Finland declared in a state of war and placed under Commander of Petersburg district for civil and military government.

“Notices posted calling for labourers to cut down trees and dig trenches near Petersburg. Reported that 50,000 men required to construct defences at Oranienbaum and Sestrerets (*sic* ? Sestrorjezk).

“Reported that transport of reservists to Finland commenced on 25th July.

“Reported that Emperor will command with Minister of War as Chief of Staff. Grand Duke Nicholas to command against Austria.

“All Guard Corps to go to west.

“Cholera increasing at Kamenets Podolsk.”

<sup>(1)</sup> Owing to uncertainty and delays in the other routes the alternative route *via* Aden was used from this date.



(35332)

No. 455.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, July 31, 1914.**D. July 31, 5:38 P.M.**R. August 2, 5:30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 112.)

My French Colleague informs me that he was told by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon that the Imperial Government had instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to ask the Russian Government to countermand order for mobilisation against Germany.

*(This telegram took 36 hours to come through.—G. R. C., 2/8/14.)*

(35334)

No. 456.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.**D. August 2, 1 A.M.**R. August 2, 5:45 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 120.)

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August<sup>(1)</sup> acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

*Published in BB No. 143.**Cf. Nos. 496 and 677.**(<sup>1</sup>) No. 402.*

(35366)

(b.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.**D. 11:30 A.M.**R. 11:55 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 123.)

My telegram of 1st August.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

*Published in BB No. 145.*

(35333)

No. 457.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.**D. August 1, 8:45 P.M.**R. August 2, 6 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 119.)

Order for general mobilisation of army and navy has just been issued.  
August 2nd first day of mobilisation.

*Published in BB No. 142 (paraphrased).*

(85935)

No. 458.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.**D. August 2, 1:32 A.M.**R. August 2, 6:30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 121.)

Your telegram No. 250 of 1st August.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia [two groups undecypherable] abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

*Published in BB No. 138.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 411.

(85319)

No. 459.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St Petersburg, August 1, 1914.**D. August 2, 7:30 A.M.**R. August 2, 8:40 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 195.)

My telegram No. 193 of 31st July.<sup>(1)</sup>

At audience accorded yesterday Emperor read German Ambassador his telegram to German Emperor, and matters were in no way advanced.

Austrian Ambassador saw Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening, but had no precise instructions. He tried to turn conversation away from Servian question to that of general relations between Russia and Austria. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that these relations, taken by themselves, were perfectly good, and he desired to keep them on friendly footing. Question at present at issue was whether Servia was to be left free and independent, or whether she was to be crushed and made vassal of Austria. It was useless to talk about Austrian and Russian relations in the abstract while this issue of the question remained unsettled. London was only place where a discussion could take place with any hope of success, but Austria was doing her best to render all discussion impossible by bombarding Belgrade, which was virtually an unfortified town.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 393.<sup>(2)</sup> See A III No. 97.

In informing French Ambassador and myself of the above this morning, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that during Balkan crisis he had told Austria that attack on Servia meant war with Russia. Russia could no more consent to Servia becoming a vassal of Austria than Great Britain could to Holland being made a dependency of Germany. It was a vital question for Russia. Austria had throughout pursued a tortuous and immoral policy, and, having secured Germany's support, thought she could defy Russia. Germany's attitude had been equivocal and double-faced, and whether she was or not cognisant of terms of ultimatum, she had deferred intervening at Vienna till psychological moment had passed. She had, unfortunately, been represented at St. Petersburg by an Ambassador who had reported that Russia would never fight, and at Vienna by one who was violently anti-Russian, and who had encouraged Austrian action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had worn himself out in his endeavours to avoid a conflict. He had caught at every suggestion held out—conference of four, Anglo-Italian mediation, and direct conversation between St. Petersburg and Vienna—but Germany and Austria had either negatived or returned such evasive answers as to render them ineffective. He could do no more unless a precise and plain issue were made subject of discussion. Austria's action and Germany's preparations had forced Russia to mobilise, and now that Germany was also mobilising, situation was desperate. He had forwarded to Vienna formula recorded in my telegram No. 193,<sup>(1)</sup> and he still held to it if you could get it accepted before German troops crossed frontier. Russia, in any case, would not be first to commence hostilities.

There now seems to be no chance of averting a general war unless Germany and France would agree, as Russia is ready to do, to keep their troops mobilised on their own side of frontier pending final attempt to arrive at settlement. Russia is anxiously waiting to know whether Great Britain will support her in a war which has been forced on her, as its duration and its issue depend on our co-operating with her and France from the commencement.

Roumanian Minister told me this morning that if war broke out Turkey and Bulgaria were almost certain to join forces against Greece and Servia, and that Balkans, as well as Europe, would be in a blaze. I gathered from his language that Roumania is more likely to confine her attention to the Balkans than give active assistance to Austria.

I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning the substance of your telegram No. 418 of 31st July.<sup>(3)</sup>

(Penultimate paragraph repeated to Bucharest No. 11, Sophia No. 18. Athens No. 105 and Constantinople No. 331.)

*Published in BB No. 139 (paraphrased—parts omitted).*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 393.

<sup>(3)</sup> No. 335.

(85818)

No. 460.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 301.)

D. 10.50 A.M.

Your telegram No. 116 of 1st August :<sup>(1)</sup> The war.

No action required now on my telegram No. 297 of 1st August.<sup>(2)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 453.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 419.

(35352)

No. 461.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 11.30 A.M.

R. 11 A.M.

Tel. (No. 122.)

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now as in a state of war.

*Published in BB No. 144.*

(35350)

No. 462.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*The Hague, August 2, 1914.*

D. 10.20 A.M.

R. 11.1 A.M.

Tel. (No. 22.) *En clair.*

Notice issued in "Official Gazette" to-day stating Northern Estuaries and Goeree Estuary rendered unsafe by mines and mine laying vessels ready to close all other estuaries immediately they receive the order.

(35351)

(b.)

*The Hague, August 2, 1914.*

D. 9.20 A.M.

R. 11.7 A.M.

Tel. (No. 23.) *En clair.*

Royal Decrees issued prohibiting export of horses, hay, straw, oats, coal and coke.

(35331)

No. 463.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

D. 11.25 A.M.

Tel. (No. 202.)

The war. Ask Government to give immediate order to allow a train to approach Belgrade under white flag to convey away British subjects and other non-combatants.

*Cf. No. 435.*

(35360)

No. 464.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.**Peking, August 2, 1914.*

D. 12.50 P.M.

R. 11.40 A.M.

Tel. (No. 141.)

Following from consular officer at Harbin, dated August 12th (*sic*):—

"Orders telegraphed last night for mobilisation, which has already commenced, of all Russian troops in railway area. Orders embrace all reservists and militia. Movements of trains entirely altered, expresses discontinued and no goods accepted. Whole line is being made ready for transport of troops and all military emergencies."



(35358)

No. 465.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

D. 10:50 A.M.

R. 11:45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 9.)

Belgian Government have official confirmation of news that a German force entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

*Published in BB No. 146 (paraphrased).*

(35349)

No. 466.

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

Télégraphique.

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche 2 août de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxemburg, capitale du Grand-Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxemburg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraires à la neutralité du Grande-Duché, garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxemburg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères à Berlin.

*Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement,*

EYSCHEN.

*Published with translation in BB No. 147.**Cf. F No. 131.*

(35447)

No. 467.

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)*

Télégraphique.

*Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.*

La dépêche suivante vient de parvenir du soussigné, Ministre d'État, Président du Gouvernement de Luxemburg :

“ Les mesures militaires sont devenues inévitables, à notre plus grand regret, cela par le fait que nous avons des nouvelles certaines d'après lesquelles les troupes françaises sont en marche sur Luxemburg. Nous dû [sic] prendre des mesures pour la protection de notre armée et la sûreté des voies ferrées. Il n'y a de notre part aucune intention de poser un acte hostile contre le Luxemburg ami en présence du péril imminent ; nous n'avions malheureusement plus le temps d'en aviser préalablement le Gouvernement luxembourgeois. Le Gouvernement Impérial garantit au Luxembourg une complète indemnisation pour les dommages causés.—JAGOW.”

EYSCHEN.

(35355)

No. 468.

*Consul Le Gallais to Sir Edward Grey.*Tel. *En clair.**Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

R. August 2.

German troops have entered south of Grand Duchy. Armed train arrived station of Luxemburg.

(35452)

No. 469.

*Acting British Consul (Luderitzbucht) to Sir Edward Grey.*

Tel.

*Luderitzbucht, August 2, 1914.*

Trains with commissariat supplies and coal have been forwarded continuously to interior. Bank stopped regular payments. Rise in food prices 20 per cent. Great excitement prevails throughout the country.

(35553)

No. 470.

*Communication from Netherlands Minister.**August 2, 1914.*

The Netherlands Minister called to-day and referred to a statement which, he said, had appeared two days ago in the "Evening Standard," to the effect that the paper had been authorised by both Sir E. Grey and the Prime Minister to declare that if the neutrality of either Belgium or Holland was violated, Great Britain would come to the assistance of those countries.

M. van Swinderen thought that this announcement would create a painful impression at The Hague. The Netherlands Government were very touchy on the subject of their independence and their power to look after themselves. They had not so far asked for anybody's assistance, and such an unsolicited offer of assistance would not be welcome.

I told him that I had not seen the paragraph referred to, but I felt quite certain that the alleged authorisation of such a statement by the Prime Minister or Sir E. Grey was an absolute myth. M. van Swinderen was satisfied with this.

*August 2, 1914.*

E. A. C.

(35552)

No. 471.

*Communication from German Embassy.*

Herr von Schubert called to communicate the annexed telegram<sup>(1)</sup> from his Government which he was directed to request should be brought to the notice of Sir Edward Grey at once.

I translate:—

"This morning 80 French officers in Prussian uniform attempted to cross the German frontier in 12 motor cars at Walbeck, west of Geldern. This constituted the most serious violation of neutrality on the part of France."

(Geldern is near the Dutch-German frontier, some way north of Venloo over 200 kilom. distant from the northernmost point of the Franco-German frontier).

I asked Herr von Schubert in a bantering way whether he meant me to take this statement seriously. The reference to breach of neutrality sounded to me like a joke, in view of the invasion of French territory by the German forces without a declaration of war.

He indignantly declared that the matter was most serious, as the statement emanated from his Government itself.

E. A. C.

August 2.

*For the German text see DD No. 677.*

(<sup>1</sup>) *Written in pencil on F.O. paper by Herr v. Schubert.*

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(35421)

No. 472.

*Communication from German Embassy.—(Received August 2, 1914.)*

*Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in London.*

Translation.

(Undated.)

The Imperial Government was compelled to take military measures in Luxemburg for the protection of the railways situated in that country, which by international agreement are under German control and German administration, against a threatened attack by the French. This step does not imply any hostile action against Luxemburg; full compensation for eventual damage has been promised.

*For German text see DD No. 643.*

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(35411)

No. 473.

*Communicated by French Ambassador (August 2).*

*French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.*

Télégraphique.

*Paris, le 2 août 1914.*

Le territoire français a été violé ce matin par les troupes allemandes à Cirey, près de Longwy. Elles marchent sur le fort qui porte ce nom. D'autre part, le poste douanier à Delle a été assailli par une double fusillade.

*Cf. F No. 136.*

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(35385)

No. 474.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

[By Post.]

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

*R. August 2, 1 p.m.*

Tel. (No. 106.)

My telegram No. 104 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

Following is M. Viviani's reply dictated to me by the Political Director in regard to the respecting of the neutrality of Belgium:—

“Le Gouvernement français est résolu de respecter la neutralité de la Belgique, et ce serait seulement dans le cas où une autre Puissance quelconque

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 382.

violerait cette neutralité que la France pourrait se trouver amenée, pour assurer la défense de sa propre sécurité, d'agir autrement. Cette assurance a été donnée à plusieurs reprises. Le Président en a parlé au Roi des Belges, et le Ministre de France à Bruxelles a renouvelé spontanément cette assurance à M. Davignon."

*Cf. F No. 122.*

(35375)

No. 475.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Christiania, August 2, 1914.*

D. 12.30 P.M.

R. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 26.)

My telegram No. 23.<sup>(1)</sup>

Norwegian declaration of neutrality is identic with Danish and was issued after consultation between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 434.

(35378)

No. 476.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

D. 12.15 P.M.

R. 1.25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 10.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Belgian Government have no reason whatever to suspect Germany of an intention to violate neutrality. He says that Belgian Government have not considered idea of appeal to other guarantee Powers, nor of intervention should a violation occur; they would rely upon their own armed force as sufficient to resist aggression, from whatever quarter it might come.

MINUTE.

It is impossible for the German troops to get out of Luxemburg without crossing Belgian territory except through a narrow bottle-neck into France.—*G. R. C. August 2, 1914.*

(35396)

No. 477.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 2.15 P.M.

R. 3.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 124.) Urgent. Secret.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that judging from a report which has been received from General commanding the district, it seemed probable that French had already commenced hostilities by dropping bombs from an airship in the vicinity of Nuremberg. His Excellency begged me not to mention this to any of my colleagues, but he himself had told Belgian Minister.



(35390)

No. 478.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, August 2, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 3:35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs inform me that Dutch troops on German frontier are being heavily reinforced and that they will fire on Germans the moment they cross. "Chef de cabinet" is hopeful that Germans will not do so.

(35397)

No. 479.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 12 25 P.M.

R. 3:35 P.M.

Tel. Urgent.

Russian Ambassador has begged that following message may be immediately repeated to Russian Government:—

"Have received passports. Leaving to-day, Sunday evening, for Eydtkuhnen and Wirballen. Please facilitate our journey beyond Russian frontier. Embassy and Consular staff and clergy (*sic*) 80 persons in all who accompany me. Beg that it may be found possible to take with them their luggage, which represents their entire property."

(Sent via Stockholm. Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

(35398)

No. 480.

*Mr. Sinclair to Sir Edward Grey.**Brindisi, August 2, 1914.*

D. 11:30 A.M.

R. 3:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 7.) Urgent.

German ship "Goeben" at Taranto.

(35401)

No. 481.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 2, 1914.*

D. 1:45 P.M.

R. 3:45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 118.)

Military attaché reports following War Office news:—

"German situation. Movements of large bodies of troops still continue. All telegraphic, telephonic and railway communications between neighbouring countries cut excepting those to Austria. Some troops crossed Luxemburg frontier at 6 A.M. to-day. Some Uhlans have held up a customs post near St. Die. Some shots reported near Belfort. Will telegraph this afternoon positions of German and French troops in detail.

(35419)

No. 482.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

D. 12.40 P.M.

R. 3.55 P.M.

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

Russian Ambassador told me this morning that he would not at all despair of peace if Germany would abstain from interfering. He had yesterday again "most friendly" conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and would not consider relations broken off till war was actually declared.<sup>(1)</sup> He much hoped that Russia would not herself declare war, but wait for Germany to do so if indeed she was still determined on war. Question was now unfortunately transferred to Berlin, where Russian action concerning mobilisation had been misrepresented and public mind inflamed by speeches of German Emperor and Chancellor making the prospects of peace almost hopeless. No self-respecting country could bear the provocative manner in which the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had again carried out his instructions. Russian Ambassador presumed that if Germany declares war Austria would immediately follow and France would mobilise.

I am to see Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

(<sup>1</sup>) See A III No. 99.

(35402)

No. 483.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 3.20 P.M.

R. 3.55 P.M.

Tel. (No. 125.) Urgent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that since 12.30 P.M. to-day all telegraphic communication by cable and otherwise between England and Germany has been stopped on the English side. His Excellency would like to know the meaning of this measure.

[NOTE.—See DD No. 654 where Admiral v. Tirpitz enquires whether as a consequence of the rupture of cable communications they are to consider themselves as in a state of war with England. The following answer was sent:—

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

D. 5.25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 260.) *En clair.*

Your telegram No. 125.

I am informed that delay has been due to extraordinary congestion. Even our own Government messages have been considerably delayed. I understand lines are now working satisfactorily.]

(35405)

No. 484.

*Mr. Savery to Sir Edward Grey.**Munich, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 7.50 P.M.

R. August 2, 4.22 P.M.

Tel. *En clair.*

King of Bavaria has proclaimed state of war in the whole kingdom and martial law in the Palatinate.

Telegrams in English no longer accepted.

(35420)

No. 485.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 12.50 P.M.

R. August 2, 4.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 76.)

(Delayed by storm Russia (*sic*).)

My telegram No. 73 of 30th July.<sup>(1)</sup>

Prime Minister's statement seems to have been exaggerated. British Vice-Consul telephones that although shells fell throughout afternoon no serious damage has been done to town though (group undecypherable) and theatre have been (group undecypherable). A shell exploded in British Legation damaging one of front elevations.

(1) No. 332.

(35410)

No. 486.

*Communication from French Embassy.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

R. 4.40 P.M.

The French Embassy have just telephoned to say that they have received a telegram from the Havas Agency from Liège stating that 20,000 German troops have invaded France near Nancy.

J. L.

*August 2, 1914.*

(35412)

No. 487.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 303.)

D. 4.45 P.M.

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following *aide-mémoire* :—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that the Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily, if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow, in effect whether we should declare violation of Belgium neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. I also explained how at the beginning of a great catastrophe such as this European war, of which no one could foresee the consequences where we had such enormous responsibilities in our Empire, as in India, or as regards countries in our occupation such as Egypt, when even the conditions of naval warfare and the possibility of protecting our coasts under these conditions were untried, it was impossible safely to send our military force out of the country.

M. Cambon asked whether this meant that we should never do it.

I replied that it dealt only with the present moment. He dwelt upon the moral effect of our sending only two divisions. But I said that to send so small a force as two or even four divisions abroad at the beginning of a war would entail the maximum of risk to them and produce the minimum of effect.

*Published in BB No. 148 (last twelve lines omitted).*

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No. 488.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.*

Private.

Dear M. Cambon,

10, Downing Street, August 2, 1914.

I hear Churchill told your Naval Attaché that my conversation to you this afternoon was also made to the German Ambassador. This is quite wrong: nothing has been said to any foreign representative except yourself or will be said till a public statement is made.

Yours, &c.

E. GREY.



(35414)

No. 489.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 4.40 P.M.

R. 5.5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 128.)

French naval attaché hears on good authority that second and third German battle squadrons passed through Kiel Canal last night to Elbe.

Please inform French Government.

(35441)

No. 490.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.*

D. 3.10 P.M.

R. 5.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 202.)

Your telegram No. 423 of 1st August.<sup>(1)</sup>

At audience which I had with Emperor at 11 o'clock last night His Majesty wrote following message, which he desired me to telegraph to the King:—

“I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Serbia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such a vital interest to my Empire as well as to those Powers who desire maintenance of balance of Power in Europe. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made by Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I had given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

“In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia in fighting to maintain balance of power in Europe. God bless and protect you.”

Emperor said that he had no objection to above being published with other papers.

In course of conversation His Majesty observed that mobilisation did not necessarily entail war, and that there had been frequent cases in history where it had been followed by demobilisation. German Emperor knew perfectly well that Russia wanted peace, and that her mobilisation could not be completed for another

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 384.

fortnight at least, but he had declared war with such haste as to render all further discussion impossible, and as to throw doubt on Germany's good faith throughout.

German statement entirely misrepresents case, and its evident object is to persuade His Majesty's Government that responsibility for war rests with Russia in the hope of inducing them to remain neutral. I would venture to submit with all respect that if we do not respond to Emperor's appeal for our support, we shall at end of the war, whatever be its issue, find ourselves without a friend in Europe, while our Indian Empire will no longer be secure from attack by Russia. If we defer intervention till France is in danger of being crushed, sacrifices we shall then be called upon to make will be much greater, while we may——

[Remainder of telegram not received.]

*Cf. No. 665.*

No. 491.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

*D. 5:30 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 305.)

The War. German Naval Movements.

You should immediately communicate substance of Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 128<sup>(1)</sup> to French Government.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 489.

(35435)

No. 492.

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Luxembourg, 2 août 1914.*

*D. 3:56 P.M.*

*R. 5:44 P.M.*

Tél.

Ministre d'État du Luxembourg Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'intermédiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un télégramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand, Bethmann-Hollweg, disant que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg [*sic*] recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

*Published, with translation, in BB No. 129.*

*Cf. Nos. 466, 467 and 554; also F No. 132.*

35424)

No. 493.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

*D. 2 P.M.*

*R. 5:45 P.M.*

el. (No. 144.)

German Ambassador on leaving the room of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I was about to go in this morning read me a telegram just received by him from Berlin stating that Russian troops having crossed German frontier at several points

German Government considered that state of war with Russia existed. I then saw Minister for Foreign Affairs who admitted that Austria must consider herself in same position towards Russia.

(85425)

No. 494.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Rome, August 2, 1914.*

D. 2 P.M.

R. 6.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 150.)

Following from military attaché:—

“I have reason to believe Italy making all ready to call up four classes without actually calling up men.”

(85412)

No. 495.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

D. 6.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 306.)

The war. My telegram No. 303 of 2nd August: <sup>(1)</sup> Assurances as to action of British Fleet.

You should impress on French Government that the assurance given to-day is very confidential till it has been announced in public to-morrow.

*Cf. No. 536.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 487.

(85386)

No. 496.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

D. 6.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 262.)

Your telegram No. 120 of 1st August. <sup>(1)</sup>

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship “Sappho” at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that for reasons stated in my telegram No. 249 of 1st August, <sup>(2)</sup> I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

*Published in BB No. 149.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 456 (a).

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 402.

(35432)

No. 497.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

D. 5 P.M.

R. 6.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 127.)

His Majesty's consul at Stettin reports that all British ships have left.

(35434)

No. 498.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 6.10 P.M.

R. August 2, 7.5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 77.)

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just received telephone message from Prince George at Belgrade, stating that Austrians are recommencing bombardment from Semlin positions and four monitors simultaneously.

(35445)

No. 499.

*Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.**Tokyo, August 2, 1914.*

D. 7.20 P.M.

R. 7.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 57.)

Russian Ambassador has received instructions to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs and enquire as to the probable attitude of Imperial Government and as to the views of Japanese politicians in the event of Russia being involved in war.

Japanese vernacular papers are now discussing the possibility of Japan being invited to support her ally in defence of her interests in the Far East. The view generally taken seems to be that Japan will gladly accept responsibility.

(35443)

No. 500.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, July 31, 1914.*

D. July 31, 10.30 P.M.

R. August 2, 7.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 75.)

Roumanian Minister, acting under orders from his Government, has asked Servian Government whether they had said their last word to Austria.

Prime Minister replied that no further concessions were possible. Spirit of this country is now fully aroused, and optimism has supplemented dejection first noticeable. Firm attitude of Russia and reports received as to solidarity of England with her two partners have encouraged this feeling.



(35440)

No. 501.

*Mr. Heathcote-Smith to Sir Edward Grey.**Smyrna, August 2, 1914.*

D. 8.35 P.M.

R. 8 P.M.

Tel. (No. 6.)

General mobilisation of Turkish army just ordered here.

German colonel will apparently command fourth army corps.

(35450)

No. 502.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 2, 1914.*

D. 8.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 152.) *En clair.*

German Ambassador announced at mid-day to-day to Minister for Foreign Affairs that Germany had declared war against Russia. Latter in reply announced neutrality of Italy conforming to spirit and letter of Triple Alliance. A Royal Decree has been issued forbidding exportation from Italy of cereals, coffee, sugar, horses, meat, clothing, vehicles, motors, coal, specified metals, medicines. Details follow.

(35484)

No. 503.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

D. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 261.)

Your telegram No. 123 of August 2nd.<sup>(1)</sup>

Denaby and Cadeby, Main Collieries Ltd., owners of British steamship "Winterton" fear she is being detained at Hamburg. Please take such steps as may be possible to obtain her immediate release if detained.

*Cf. No. 538.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 456 (b).

(35457)

No. 504.

*Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.**Christiania, August 2, 1914.*

D. 6.30 P.M.

R. 10 P.M.

Tel. (Unnumbered.)

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup> Norwegian Government are preparing to issue similar declaration of neutrality in war between Russia and Germany.

They have issued orders for mobilization of Norwegian fleet of two battalions to strengthen garrison of Bergen and of one battalion for Christiania in order to defend neutrality.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 475.

(35454)

No. 505.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*Tel. (No. 264.) *En clair.*

D. 10:30 P.M.

Following communicated by German Ambassador to-night :—

“This morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniforms attempted cross German frontier in twelve motor-cars at Walbeck, west of Geldern. This constitutes most serious violation neutrality on part of France.”

*Cf. Nos. 471, 541/2 and DD No. 677.*

(35459)

No. 506.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 2, 1914.*Tel. (No. 119.) *En clair.*

D. 6:30 P.M.

State of siege declared in Paris and Algeria.

R. 11:45 P.M.

Parliament convoked for to-morrow.

(35460)

No. 507.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 2, 1914.*

D. 9:40 P.M.

R. 11:50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 120.)

Military attaché reports following information from the French War Office :—

“Position of French covering troops : Second corps, Montmédy to Verdun; Sixth, Verdun to Toul with advanced line Haudiomont Vigneulles Gironville; Twentieth in front of Nancy in a semi-circle from Liverdun to Saint-Nicolas du Port; Twenty-first between Nancy and Epinal, with advanced line Blainville Rambervillers, Bruyères; fortified line between Epinal and Belfort; one division of seventh corps in the vicinity of Ferette (west of Basle). The 8 kilom. zone still maintained by the French.

“Position of German troops : general line all along the frontier from Treves to Switzerland; eleventh corps about 30 miles north-west of Treves, eighth Treves to the southern border of Luxemburg, sixteenth, seventh and second Bavarian from Thionville to south of Metz, twenty-first thence to Sarrebourg, fifteenth Donon to Colmar, fourteenth near Fribourg, thirteenth near Waldshut, twenty-eighth division of fourteen corps Maring (*sic*) north. Column from eighth corps advancing through Luxemburg on Arlon, another column from eighth corps arrived in front of Longwy and was fired on by the French at long range. In vicinity of Belfort German chasseurs penetrated the French frontier north of Delle and lost two patrols killed. Luxemburg Government protest against violation of territory.”

(85579)

No. 508.

*Consul Philip C. Sarell to Sir Edward Grey.*

(Extract.)

*British Consulate, Dunkirk, France, August 2, 1914.*

Sir,

R. August 3.

I have the honour to report that the General Mobilisation Order for the French Naval and Military Forces was received at Dunkirk yesterday the 1st instant and was received by the entire population with a spirit of determination and devotion to duty which was most impressive. I had occasion to call upon the Governor of Dunkirk this afternoon and I there had some conversation with a Staff Officer who had just arrived from Paris and he stated that the same spirit of national devotion was universal in the Capital and that even those soldiers who were proceeding to places such as Lunéville, Nancy and the probable immediate theatre of war, were animated with the same spirit of self-sacrifice and determination. I venture to dwell upon this remarkable ebullition of national feeling in France, in view of the fears that had been widely entertained and expressed that anarchical and other subversive influences had undermined patriotism in France, and would be likely to prove fatal in the event of war. The prospect of war has, on the contrary, to all appearances drawn together all classes of society, and the entire absence of excitement is no less remarkable than the spirit of determination which is being manifested.<sup>(1)</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

<sup>(1)</sup> *The despatch then proceeds to give information about British merchant shipping.*

(35495)

No. 509.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)*

(No. 308.)

Sir,

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report which I have received from Colonel the Hon. Alick Russell, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the Proclamation of a State of Imminent National Danger in Germany.

I have, &amp;c.

E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 509.

*The Hon. Alick Russell to Sir W. E. Goschen (Berlin).*

(M.A. Germany. No. XX.)

Sir,

*British Embassy, Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Proclamation of a state of imminent national danger.

As your Excellency reported in your telegram No. 111 of to-day's date, a state of imminent national danger ("drohende Kriegsgefahr") has been proclaimed by the Emperor this afternoon throughout the Empire except Bavaria, where, however, a similar ordinance has also been issued.

It appears from the official pronouncement in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," published to-night and dated 1st August, 1914, that the military measures to be taken consequent upon this proclamation are the following:—

- (1.) All the necessary steps on the frontier and for the protection of the railways.
- (2.) Limitation of postal, telegraph and railway traffic to meet military requirements.

Further consequences of the proclamation of the state of imminent national danger are :—

- (3.) Proclamation of a state of war ("Kriegszustand") throughout the Empire.
- (4.) Prohibition of publications regarding movements of troops and measures of defence. The state of war ("Kriegszustand") has the same significance as the state of siege ("Belagerungszustand") in Prussia. See article 68 of "Reichsverfassung."

The state of war having also been declared this afternoon, certain further ordinances have been issued regarding the prohibition of the export of foodstuffs and certain articles and materials, prohibition regarding publication of news of military interest, &c., &c.

I am forwarding direct to the War Office copies of two editions of the "Deutscher Reichsanzeiger" which contain the further ordinances referred to.

I have, &c.

ALICK RUSSELL, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Military Attaché.*

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No. 510.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.  
My dear Nicolson,

*British Embassy, Berlin.*  
*(Undated—August 1, 1914.)*

\* \* \* \* \*

I have had great difficulty with my telegrams since the Kriegsgefahr has been proclaimed. They are continually sent back—though the Impl. F.O. has given orders that they are to go through, on my complaint. But notwithstanding these orders ignorant employes at the Telegraph Office continue to send them back saying that they must be stamped by the I.F.O. I don't anticipate that it will happen again—as I have received so many excuses. But at any rate there is sure to be a delay. I don't think for a moment that they will answer about Belgium, but it is a rather significant fact that they are trying (*vide* my telegram on this subject)<sup>(1)</sup> to get up a case against Belgium. Both sides are continually at me to show what liars the other side are and how badly they are behaving. You will see the German case in the "Times." The correspondent of that paper was the only one to get it through and one cannot help thinking that facilities were given to him in order that British public opinion might be influenced by the very specious statement. Of course a good deal of it is true; namely, that (particularly at the end) Germany (incl. the Emperor) did try and persuade them at Vienna to continue discussions and accept Sir E. Grey's proposals. But there is even something *louche* in this—as Sverberf assures me, and indeed Sazonow telegraphed to him to that effect—that no telegram announcing that the Emperor had consented to mediate at Vienna—has ever reached the Czar! That the Emperor and Co. have worked at Vienna is certainly true—and the German case, to put it in a nutshell, is that while the Emperor at the Czar's request, *was* working at Vienna—Russia mobilized—or rather ordered mobilisation. I did my very best and hardest last night to persuade Jagow,<sup>(2)</sup> notwithstanding all mobilisations and ultimatums, not to relax his efforts to prevent

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 383.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 385.



one of the biggest catastrophes—in fact the biggest of modern times—and to work in the direction indicated by H.M.G. He was sympathetic but apparently absolutely determined that nothing more could be done until Russia said she would demobilize. The last thing I *hear* is that Russia has informed the Imperial Government that the Czar has not been told that the Emperor was working at Vienna—and they have demanded three hours more to consider the German demand. Certainly up to the time of my writing this, no mobilization order has been issued by the Emperor. Oh! how much easier things would be if the events of 1909 had not taken place. What I have written above about the three extra hours is only hearsay. A prominent German financier told a member of the French Embassy that if England was drawn in and the war lasted two months—Germany would have to give in or starve. This was of course faithfully repeated to me. But I don't think here, in official circles, that they nourish *much* hope that we shall be able to keep out of it all. I see the Germans have given the French 18 hours to say whether they will remain neutral or not, and I see that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to tell Schön when he calls for the answer that their intentions only concern their allies. There is intense enthusiasm in the streets—and considerable depression at the Foreign Office; Zimmermann said to Cambon yesterday "This is the most tragic day for 40 years—and it happens just as we were settling down to what we thought were improved relations all round." Jagow told me that the Emperor was fearfully depressed and said that his record as a "Peace Emperor" was finished with. Cambon told me an interesting thing to-day; in burning his papers he found a record of a conversation with Professor Schieman in which the latter said: "We want peace *but* if we wish to go to war with you we could always produce one by egging on Austria to attack Serbia: Russia would be bound to come to her assistance, and you, certainly—and probably England would be drawn in." This conversation took place two years ago! I must stop now as I must go and see Jagow. There is still a little time so I will keep this letter open.

I have just been to the Foreign Office. Jagow was out but I saw Zimmermann. He also told me that it was impossible to give an answer about Sir E. Grey's very last proposal until Russia's answer had been received.<sup>(3)</sup> It had not come yet—but he said nothing about Russia having demanded extra time. He only said that he had not expected an answer yet as the twelve hours would only count from the time the ultimatum was delivered. He was very angry and excited about the whole thing—expressed regret that Germany, France "and perhaps England" had been drawn in—none of whom wanted war in the least and said that it came from "this d——d system of alliances, which were the curse of modern times." I talked to him about Belgium, and he also said that it was impossible to give a categorical answer. All he could say was that Germany would do her best to avoid infringing it. "But," he added, "it is not clear that Belgium has not already committed a breach of neutrality by stopping grain consigned to Germany." He then dwelt upon Russia's iniquity in mobilising during the Emperor's efforts to mediate at Vienna. I asked him whether (1) it was quite certain that Russia was mobilizing her entire land and sea forces, (2) whether it was certain that the Czar had been informed of the Emperor's efforts as I had heard it denied.

To (1) he said we have heard it from Pourtales—from our Military Plenipotentiary, from *Stockholm*—and lastly, from Sazcnow himself. To (2) he said there is no possible doubt that the Czar was informed, both by the Emperor himself and by Pourtales. "In fact," he said, "the Czar has telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the latter's message that he was working at Vienna!" Whom are we to believe?

I have just been to see Count Szögyeni too—while I was there one of his secretaries came in to announce that orders had been given for general mobilisation

(3) *Probably No. 411.*

and that it would begin to-night: but I found it was only hearsay—so I must await confirmation before telegraphing. But I expect to see an extra *Blatt* appear every moment. Its all very terrible! All my servants will have to go I suppose and I shall remain with my English valet and Swiss *aide-cuisinier*.

I hope you're not as tired as I am.

Yours ever.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

(35461)

No. 511.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Stockholm, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 7.25 P.M.

R. August 3, 12.15 A.M.

Tel. (No. 17.) Very Confidential.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he could now give me categorical assurances regarding neutrality. His Excellency replied that Sweden was determined to maintain neutrality as long as possible. I asked if there were conditions in which Sweden might abandon neutrality. He replied that he greatly feared that if Great Britain joined Russia Sweden would be forced to take other side. If Sweden were placed in such a position as to be obliged to choose sides their Government would be forced by public opinion to go against Russia. I assured his Excellency that in any case Great Britain would not violate Swedish neutrality, and asked whether, if Germany did so, Sweden would resist. He merely repeated that if England took part in war Sweden would have to do so, he feared. There has been rumour here that Germany has been putting pressure on Sweden to join her. If Sweden believes she must choose between English or occupation of a port she will choose latter. I think if I could have message giving Sweden categorical assurances that we have no such intention it would be useful.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

*See No. 570.*

(35465)

No. 512.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 7.30 P.M.

R. August 3, 1.45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 148.)

The War. Russian Ambassador having received no information that Austria is in a state of war with Russia, His Excellency is still here at 7.30 P.M.

(35475)

No. 513.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Constantinople, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 5.28 P.M.

R. August 3, 5.45 A.M.

Tel. (No. 467.)

Following from Consul at Dardanelles received to-day:—

“I am informed that mine-laying vessel with 50 mines in readiness and mine-depot ship may leave to-night for the Bosphorus.

“I am awaiting confirmation before I inform Naval Intelligence Officers.”

(85476)

No. 514.

*Germany's Ultimatum to Belgium (Exchange Company's special Telegram).**Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

The Belgian Government has received an ultimatum from Germany offering an *entente* if Belgium is willing to facilitate the movements of German troops.

The Cabinet is now sitting to discuss the answer which had to be given at 7 o'clock this morning.

The German troops are in operation to the north of Liège in Belgium.

(35796)

No. 515.

*Communicated by Belgian Minister (August 3.)**Bruxelles, le 3 août 1914.*

Allemagne a remis hier soir, 7 heures, note proposant neutralité amicale comportant passage libre par notre territoire, promettant maintien indépendance royaume et possession à la conclusion de la paix, menaçant, en cas de refus, traitement comme ennemi. Délai réponse fixée douze heures. Nous avons répondu atteinte à neutralité serait violation flagrante droit des gens; acceptation proposition sacrifierait honneur nation, consciente de son devoir. Belgique fermement décidée repousser agression par tous les moyens possibles.

DAVIGNON.

*Cf. B No. 23 for translation.*

(35482)

No. 516.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 9.30 P.M.

R. August 3, 8.50 A.M.

Tel. (No. 469.)

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

Grand Vizier told French Ambassador this morning that Turkey intended to proclaim her neutrality. If this be so the retention of the German Mission and the mobilisation would seem to be both unwise and unnecessary. Russian Ambassador states that his Government have every reason to remain on friendly terms with Turkey, and have no intention of raising the question of the Straits. It would be useless to move the fleet from the Black Sea, even if Turkey were willing to allow the passage.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 522.

(35483)

No. 517.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 11.50 P.M.

R. August 3, 8.50 A.M.

Tel. (No. 470.)

Parliament was this afternoon prorogued indefinitely, and moratorium proclaimed by provisional law. General mobilisation has been ordered.

There is a report that additional 4 per cent. customs duty and temettu tax on foreigners will be imposed from to-morrow.

(35479)

No. 518.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 2, 1914.**D. August 2, 7:30 P.M.**R. August 3, 9:40 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 130.)

Vice-Consul at Bremerhaven reports that German coast is mined at following places, namely, Borkum, mouths of Weser, Jahde, and Elbe, Cuxhaven, and round Heligoland. Lightships on German North Sea coast have been brought in. Considerable number of torpedo craft at Geestemunde. Thirty steam trawlers from Geestemunde acquired for mining purposes equipped with two searchlights each.

Liner "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" painted black left Bremerhaven this morning for Wilhelmshafen with troops and naval reserves.

Naval attaché learns that German Admiralty are enrolling volunteers, aviators and volunteer medical officers and personnel. Gifts in money or kind for treatment of wounded are also publicly asked for.

(35519)

No. 519.

*German Secretary of State to German Embassy (London).*

Tel.

*August 3, 1914, 9:22 A.M.*

Translation.

*Received in London 8:40.**Received in Foreign Office 9:51 A.M.*

All French news respecting German troops crossing French frontier are complete fabrications.

*For German text see DD No. 713. This telegram sent "en clair" was communicated to the Foreign Office by the Post Office.*

*Cf. No. 529.*

(35512)

No. 520.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 3, 1914.**D. 10:6 A.M.**R. 10:50 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 12.)

Colonel Fairholme, who with difficulty got here from Marienbad yesterday, observed no troops and little military activity on railway between Cologne and Herbesthal. Tunnels and bridges guarded by parties of men in civilian clothes with arm-bands and rifles.

Railway communication interrupted between Herbesthal and Welkenräd, whence Belgian rolling-stock has been withdrawn.



(35497)

No. 521.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

D. 9:31 A.M.

R. 10:55 A.M.

Tel. (No. 11.)

French Minister reports that German massed force at Sittard and Trois Ponts and along the frontier prepared to invade Belgium.

Last night at 7:30 German Minister presented ultimatum to Belgium asking whether she is prepared to assume attitude of benevolent neutrality towards German military operations in Belgium. Belgium has refused categorically. German Minister will probably leave Belgium at once. French military attaché states that France has five army corps ready to enter Belgium to oppose German advance, but will not do so until Belgium gives permission.

Lights of three airships, probably dirigibles, were observed over Brussels between 2 and 4 this morning.

(35517)

No. 522.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

D. 9:30 A.M.

R. 12:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 468.)

Following from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

“Within the last forty-eight hours certain classes of recruits have been called to the colours. Classes vary according to district, but general effect is to raise battalions in first ten army corps to strength of 600 men.

“To-day it is reported on good authority that orders will be given for immediate general mobilisation. A meeting of German mission took place last night, and it has been decided that members of mission shall remain in this country, and that those officers employed in the instructional establishment shall take up forthwith active posts in the field army. I believe that efforts are being made to bring Turkey to the side of the Triple Alliance, and Minister of War and majority of officers incline to this view.”

*Cf. No. 589.*

(35522)

No. 523.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.**Antwerp, August 3, 1914.*

D. 11:25 A.M.

R. 12:30 P.M.

Tel.

Received reliable information that advanced guard of German troops crossed Belgian frontier and occupied Tongres without opposition. Dutch territory also violated.

(35529)

No. 524.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.**Antwerp, August 3, 1914.*

D. 11.31 A.M.

R. 12.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 19.)

Mayor informed me that state of siege proclaimed at Antwerp.

*Cf. No. 602.*

(35497)

No. 525.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

D. 12.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 10.)

Your telegram No. 11 of 3rd August.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should ascertain directly from Belgian Government what has passed, and let me know full facts of what has passed between them and Germany as soon as possible.

*Cf. No. 561.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 521.

No. 526.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. des Graz (Nish).**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 38.)

(Repeat Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram 149<sup>(1)</sup> and add): Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram No. 79 of 1st August.<sup>(2)</sup>

Train for British Colony at Belgrade.

You should arrange immediately with Servian authorities and report.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 528.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 435.

(35544)

No. 527.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, August 3, 1914.*

D. 10.4 A.M.

R. 1.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 27.)

Queen's Aide-de-Camp told me last night that information had been received that Germans are marching south from Wesel. Report current here that one hundred thousand men are in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg on French frontier, that they have also crossed French frontier near Longwy and been repulsed by French, and that they have also crossed the frontier to Cirey about 40 miles west of Strasbourg. As telegraphic communication with Germany and Luxembourg is cut off it is difficult to obtain confirmation.

Strong censorship here respecting movements of troops and press have agreed not to publish anything on this subject but I learn on good authority that all available troops are being moved to province of Limburg.

(35466)

No. 528.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 8.5 P.M.

R. August 3, 1.40 P.M. (*sic*) <sup>(1)</sup>.

Tel. (No. 149.)

Your telegram No. 202 of August 2nd.<sup>(2)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Austrian Military authorities are ready to give the necessary instructions to Commander-in-Chief as soon as I can inform them of the day and hour at which a train under the white flag will leave Belgrade to convey members of the British colony to Nish.

<sup>(1)</sup> 1.40 P.M. in original. This should probably be 1.40 A.M.—see No. 526.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 463.

(35519)

No. 529.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 309.)

D. 1.45 P.M.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphs to-day to German Ambassador here that all French news respecting German troops crossing French frontier are complete fabrications.

*Cf. Nos. 519 and 613.*

(35674)

No. 530.

*The Danish Minister to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*Danish Legation, London, August 3, 1914.*

By order of my Government I have the honour to inform you that in view of the troubled international situation the King's Government have considered it right to call out 18,000 men to the various garrisons as a precautionary measure to fill up the peace establishment of the army.

I beg to add that it was erroneously stated in my note of the 1st instant<sup>(1)</sup> that 27,000 men had been called out to the navy and the naval fortifications: it is up till now only 2,700 men who have been called out for these last-named purposes.

I have the honour, &c.

H. GREVENKOP CASTENSKIOLD.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 376.

(35672)

No. 531.

*Communication from German Embassy.**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

Herr von Wesendonk of the German Embassy called to confirm on behalf of the German Government the undertaking given by Prince Lichnowsky this morning that Germany would in no way menace the North Coast of France as long as England remains neutral.

He further said that they had received a despatch from Berlin confirming the statements made this morning in regard to the violation of the German frontier by France.

The French reports as to German troops having passed the French frontier are pure inventions.

French detachments yesterday passed the German frontier to the West of Colmar. The French troops were the first to open fire. Bombs have been dropped by French airships on the Kaiserbrücke at Mainz, and French airships have been sighted in other parts of Germany.

W. H. SELBY.

(35741)

No. 532.

*Communicated by Russian Embassy (August 3).*

*Télégramme de M. Sazonoff aux Ambassadeurs de Russie à Londres et à Paris du 20 juillet/2 août 1914.*

L'Allemagne s'efforce de rejeter aux yeux du monde sur la Russie la responsabilité pour la rupture. La mobilisation générale en Russie a été provoquée uniquement en vue de la responsabilité formidable qu'aurait assumée le Gouvernement russe, s'il n'avait pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution devenues absolument nécessaires pour sa sécurité au moment où le bombardement de Belgrade affectait le valeur des négociations avec l'Autriche. C'est alors seulement que la mobilisation générale a été décidée.

Pourtant l'Empereur de Russie avait engagé sa parole envers l'Empereur d'Allemagne que la Russie n'entreprendrait aucune mesure de provocation tant que dureraient les négociations avec l'Autriche. Après une pareille garantie, ajoutée à toutes les preuves que la Russie avait déjà données de ses intentions pacifiques, l'Allemagne n'avait plus le droit et ne pouvait plus douter de la sincérité de notre assurance que nous accepterions avec empressement toute solution pacifique compatible avec l'indépendance du Royaume de Serbie.

Toute autre solution était inacceptable pour la Russie et portait atteinte à sa dignité. La mobilisation générale était une mesure suprême, mais une mesure de précaution. L'Allemagne y a répondu par un ultimatum imposant sa volonté. L'Allemagne dictait sa loi, ce qui affectait l'équilibre européen. Dès lors le conflit prenait caractère de conflit européen dont l'importance dépassait incommensurablement celle du motif spécial qui l'avait fait surgir.

[NOTE.—This has been published in R No. 78 and also in R II. There are several variations in the three versions, no two of which are completely identical. The text as here printed is a precise copy of the type-written copy left by M. de Etter.]



(35794)

No. 533.

*Communication by the American Ambassador (August 3, 1914).*

Mr. Page called to ask a question to which he said he really could give a reply himself—but he would like my opinion. The question was whether it would be of any use for the United States Government to offer their good offices in any quarter.

I told him that I feared that an offer would not be entertained at this moment, when armies were marching all over Europe to meet each other in open hostilities. Mr. Page said he quite agreed, and he feared that his question might be considered a foolish one. I said that it might possibly be made at a later stage with some chance of success.

He told me a curious incident. He had heard that his Government had been approached by Austria to look after Austrian interests when diplomatic relations were broken off: and incidentally he had understood that London had been mentioned as a possible place where this step might be required. He thought he could have 18, Belgrave Square sounded discreetly, and sent one of his secretaries to interview an Austrian Secretary casually. Ct. Mensdorff heard of the visit and came in and said that possibly he would have to apply to the good offices of the United States Embassy and discussed details. They evidently anticipate a rupture.

A. N.

(35865)

No. 534.

*Note by Sir Wm. Tyrrell.*

Sir E. Grey has inquired whether the present situation in any way affects the Japanese under the 1911 Agreement and whether we have anything to ask them.

The only ways in which the Japanese could be brought in would be if hostilities spread to the *Far East*, e.g., an attack on Hong Kong by the Germans, or if a rising in *India* were to take place.

There seems no reason to say anything about India, but it might be as well to warn the Japanese Government that in the event of a war with Germany there might be a possibility of an attack upon Hong Kong or Wei-hai Wei when we should look to them for support.

The Japanese are no doubt quite alive to this possibility, but perhaps under Article 1 of the agreement we should communicate with them.

W. T.

3.8.14.

MINUTE.

Do so by telegraph without further reference to me.<sup>(1)</sup>—E. G.

<sup>(1)</sup> See Nos. 549, 637.

(35582)

No. 535.

*Communicated by War Office (August 3, 1914).*

Via Germany.

Etienne Vienna.

German High Sea Fleet is said to have passed through the Kiel Canal steaming westwards. A French fleet passed Gibraltar yesterday steaming eastwards. According to French semi-official sources German troops crossed the French frontier at four points; first, in the neighbourhood of the French fort Manonoillez (*sic* ? Manonviller)

near Lunéville whence they reached Cirey-les-forges; second, near Longwy on the Belgium frontier; third, German troops crossed frontier in direction from Muelhausen reached Delle, Petit Croix and fired on French Custom guards; fourth, two German Cavalry officers sent out on reconnaissance were killed 10 kilometres within French territory by the French troops.

(35557)

No. 536.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 124.)

D. 1.15 P.M.

R. 1.55 P.M.

Your telegram No. 306 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs fully recognise confidential character of assurance given to M. Cambon. Cabinet met last night and was not even informed of it, President of the Republic considering it advisable to observe absolute secrecy. Political Director states that the Chambers will meet to-morrow instead of to-day, in order to allow Mr. Asquith "priorité de parole."

## MINUTES.

M. de Fleuriau came to say to-day that Herr von Kühlmann has published in the "Westminster Gazette" to-day a statement from the text of which it seems quite clear that when writing it he had before him the substance if not the words of this secret communication from Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon.<sup>(2)</sup>

M. de Fleuriau said he was not making a complaint, but he thought that if his Government could have used the information yesterday, they would have been able to make a most desirable impression on the French public; they scrupulously refrained from any such indiscretion; but this made the present revelation in the "Westminster Gazette" rather unfortunate.

I told him that I knew nothing whatever about the matter. Unfortunately I was not able to get a copy of the paper at the time.—E. A. C. August 3.

I have not seen the "Westminster Gazette"—but whence did Herr v. K. derive his information?—A. N.

It arose out of something the Prime Minister said to Prince Lichnowsky.—E. G.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 495.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 487.

(35621)

No. 537.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*Tel. (No. 125.) *En clair.*

R. August 3.

Viviani has handed over Ministry Foreign Affairs to Doumergue; he remains Prime Minister without portfolio. Minister of Marine has resigned for reasons of health. Augagneur takes his place and is succeeded at Ministry Public Instruction by Sarraut.

(35585)

No. 538.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

D. 1.55 P.M.

R. 2.51 P.M.

Tel. No. 263. *En clair.*

Your telegram of August 2nd :<sup>(1)</sup> Detention of British ships at Hamburg. No information available.

*Published in BB No. 150.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 503.

(35520)

No. 539.

*German Embassy to Sir Wm. Tyrrell (Foreign Office).—(Received August 3, 1914.)*

Dear Sir William,

*London, August 3, 1914.*

I herewith beg to hand to you the translation of the two telegrams which I had the pleasure of reading to you this morning.

Believe me,

Yours faithfully,

WESENDONK.

Enclosures in No. 539.

(1.)

*German Embassy, London, August 2nd (sic).<sup>(1)</sup>*

According to absolutely certain news, France has committed the following acts against Germany :—

1. A patrol of French cavalry has passed this morning the frontier near Alt-Muensterol, in Alsatia.
2. A French aviator has been shot whilst flying over German territory.
3. Two Frenchmen have been shot whilst attempting to blow up the tunnel near Cochem on the Moselle railway.
4. French infantry have passed the Alsatian frontier and have opened fire.

These incidents have occurred although the French Prime Minister has officially assured the Imperial Ambassador in Paris, that the mobilisation of the French army had no aggressive character against Germany and the French troops had been instructed to respect a 10-kilom zone on the German boundary.

Please notify these facts to the British Government, who will surely understand, into what a perilous position Germany has been brought through such disloyal provocations and what serious decisions have been forced upon her.

Great Britain will no doubt recognise that Germany has done her utmost to preserve peace and the provocation of her enemies have forced her to take up the arms in order to maintain her existence.

<sup>(1)</sup> The telegram was however despatched from Berlin at 12.25 A.M. on August 3. (See DD No. 693.)

(2.)

*German Embassy (undated).<sup>(1)</sup>*

During the negotiations for mediation Russia has mobilised her entire forces without notifying Germany officially of this step and without adding, that this measure was not directed against us, though Germany had previously declared in a friendly but utterly serious manner, that a mobilisation would force Germany to take grave counter steps and though Russia had repeatedly and most formally assured us that she had no intention against Germany.

It was only in the afternoon of the first day of the Russian mobilisation, that His Majesty the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the German Emperor, that he personally guaranteed, that Russia would commit no hostile act against Germany. During the whole crisis the contrast between the undoubtedly sincere assurances of His Majesty the Tsar and the acts of the Government has been so clear, and the attitude taken by the Russian Government has been so openly unfriendly that notwithstanding the assurances of His Majesty the Tsar the mobilisation of the total Russian forces was bound to be a severe provocation to Germany. This appears to have been fully recognised by the germanophile surroundings of His Majesty the Tsar.

The news of the Russian mobilisation has called forth such an indignation in our public opinion, that the Russian refusal of our demand, to stop the mobilisation, had to be regarded as a hostile act involving the beginning of the state of war, if Germany did not want to abandon her national honour.

Moreover the fact that Russian troops have opened fire on German soldiers on the frontier, before Germany had made her last declarations, proves, that the so-called peaceful mobilisation is a state of affairs, which cannot be kept up.

<sup>(1)</sup> Despatched from Berlin August 3, 12.55 A.M. (see DD No. 696).

*These telegrams were communicated in English.*

(35520)

No. 540.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 310.) *En clair.*

D. 3 P.M.

German Government informed His Majesty's Government on 2nd August that, firstly, a patrol of French cavalry passed the frontier that morning near Alt Münsterol in Alsatia; secondly, a French aviator had been shot whilst flying over German territory; thirdly, two Frenchmen have been shot whilst attempting to blow up the tunnel near Cochem on the Moselle Railway; fourthly, French infantry have passed the Alsatian frontier and have opened fire.

*See Nos. 539 and 609.*



(35587)

No. 541.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. 11:40 A.M.

R. 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 122.)

Your telegram of yesterday<sup>(1)</sup> respecting alleged breach of neutrality by French officers.

French Government categorically deny statement made by German Ambassador. Political Director went on to say that until yesterday afternoon, no French soldier was within 8 kilom. of the whole length of their frontier. In the face of German incursions it has now become impossible to keep this distance from the frontier.

Political Director stated that this report was a deliberate fabrication of the German Government with a view to influencing British public opinion on the eve of declaration to be made in Parliament. Political Director stated that German Government had addressed a diplomatic note to the Government of Luxemburg stating that German army would invade Luxemburg territory, as they had certain knowledge that a large French army was about to deliver an attack through Luxemburg. This statement was quite untrue, and was another instance of prearranged misstatements having been prepared in Berlin.

## MINUTE.

M. Thierry telephoned on behalf of the French Ambassador to say that His Excellency had received a telegram from Paris instructing him to say that the story of the 80 French officers crossing the frontier in German uniform is absolutely untrue.—*H. M. August 3, 1914.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 505.

(35587)

No. 542.

*Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky.*

Sir Edward Grey presents his compliments to the German Ambassador and has the honour to state that he has received an official communication from the French Ambassador, based on telegraphic instructions addressed to his Excellency by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that there is no truth whatever in the report that eighty French officers disguised in German uniforms attempted to cross the Netherlands-German frontier, near Geldern, in motor cars.

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.**Cf. Nos. 505 and 541.*

(35580)

No. 543.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 3, 1914.*

D. 2:15 P.M.

R. 3 P.M.

Tel. (No. 156.) *En clair.*

Text of Italian declaration of neutrality issued to-day. It states that, certain European Powers being at war and Italy being at peace with all the belligerent parties, the Italian Government and citizens and subjects of Italy are bound to observe the duties of neutrality according to existing laws and to principles of international law.

(35481)

No. 544.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 249.) Immediate.

D. 3:30 P.M.

Admiralty wish to know where "Goeben" is coaling.

(35559)

No. 545.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.**Admiralty, August 3, 1914.*

The Secretary of the Admiralty presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and in reply to his letter No. 35498 of to-day's date, begs to inform him that the Lords Commissioners would be glad to have the names of vessels of British and German nationality now detained in Baltic and Finnish ports reported to them.

(35600)

No. 546.

*Mr. des Graz to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, August 2, 1914.*

D. August 2, 10:53 A.M.

R. August 3, 4:10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 83.)

Vice-Consul at Belgrade telephones that bombardment continued intermittently during the night. Several houses destroyed in vicinity of German Legation.

Shall instruct vice-consul to come here if in imminent danger after warning the few British subjects there.

Information has been given to me at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Germany has declared war against Russia.

(35592)

No. 547.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, August 3, 1914.*

D. 12:23 P.M.

R. 4:25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 28.)

German Minister has informed Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government have sent an ultimatum to Belgium stating that they wish to occupy Liège, and asking whether Belgian Government will allow them to do so peaceably or not. Answer to be returned in twelve hours.

Belgian Minister has just come from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and tells me that there is no question that Belgians will fire on Germans immediately. He also says that he believes that German troops have already crossed Meuse.

(85607)

No. 548.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

D. 9:50 A.M.

R. 4:50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 472.)

Following from Consul at Alexandretta, No. 9, of August 3:—

“The reserves born between 1297 and 1800 have been called out.

“300 ammunition carts and six steel ferry troop boats from Germany for Euphrates have been landed at Alexandretta.”

(85865)

No. 549.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Greene (Tokyo).**Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

D. 4:52 P.M.

Tel. (No. 36.)

At present moment, when war with Germany is a possibility, it might be well for you to warn Japanese Government that, if hostilities spread to Far East, and an attack on Hong Kong or Wei-hai Wei were to take place, we should rely on their support.

*Cf. Nos. 534 and 637.*

(85610)

No. 550.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

D. 9:50.

R. 5.

Tel. (No. 471.)

Consular Officer at Smyrna telegraphs that German Colonel would apparently command fourth Army Corps.

(85613)

No. 551.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

D. 4:34 P.M.

R. 5:20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 14.)

My telegram No. 11 of 3rd August.<sup>(1)</sup>

Offer of support by five French army corps was made to Belgian Government through military attaché. Following reply was given to-day by Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Minister:—

“We thank the French Government sincerely for their offer of eventual support, but in actual circumstances we are not appealing to guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will determine later on action which it may be necessary to take.”

*Published in BB No. 151 (paraphrased).**Cf. No. 562.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 521.

(35615)

No. 552.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.**Stockholm, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 18.)

D. 12:50.

R. 6:30.

Partial mobilisation of Landsturm in coast districts took place yesterday. Rumour of general mobilisation shortly. Moratorium will be declared to-morrow.

(35618)

No. 553.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 131.)

D. 4:10 P.M.

R. 6:30 P.M.

Chancellor has made the following communication to me in writing, which he begs me to bring to your immediate notice:—

“The German troops have as yet received orders scrupulously to respect French frontier, and these orders have been everywhere strictly carried out. French news to the contrary is absolutely false. Up to this morning at 10 o'clock no German soldier has been on French territory. On the other hand, in spite of French agreement to 10 kilom. zone, already yesterday French troops crossed German frontier at Altmunsterol, in Alsace, and by way of Schlucht Pass in Vosges, and are still at this moment on German territory. French aviator who must also have flown over Belgian territory was shot down yesterday during attempt to destroy railway at Wesel. It was established without doubt that several other French aviators flew over the Eifel yesterday; these aircraft also have flown over Belgian territory. French aviators yesterday threw bombs on railways in neighbourhood of Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. We must accordingly state it as an undeniable fact that yesterday there have been breaches of peace on the part of French. Latter has likewise violated Belgian neutrality.”

The official who brought me this communication informed me verbally at the request of the Chancellor that in some cases as necessary measures of precaution German patrols had crossed German frontier. He added that news of French aviators having been shot down had not been confirmed.

(35447)

No. 554.

*Sir E. Grey to Minister of State, Luxemburg.*

Tel.

D. August 3, 6:45 P.M.

Violation of Luxemburg by Germans.

I am obliged to Your Excellency for the two telegrams which you were good enough to send to me.<sup>(1)</sup> The serious matters to which they allude will engage the earnest attention of His Majesty's Government.

(<sup>1</sup>) Nos. 466/7.



(35759)

No. 555.

*Colonial Office to the Governors, &c., of all British Dominions, Colonies, &c.*

Tel. (Paraphrase.)

D. August 3, 7-7.10 P.M.

In view of the strained relations with Germany you should be on your guard against the possibility of attack in advance of any formal declaration of war. This is not the war telegram please clearly understand.

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(35629)

No. 556.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

(a.)

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. 4.45 P.M.

R. 7.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 126.)

Military attaché reports at 5.30 P.M. that the Belgian military attaché informs him that he has just had an interview with General Joffre relative to Belgian situation. Belgian military attaché stated that in the event of German troops crossing Belgian territory Belgian troops actually on the frontier would protest and retire on Meuse defences, from whence, he was convinced, Belgians would oppose German flank march.

*Cf. No. 588.*

(35619)

(b.)

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. 11.20 A.M.

R. 7.40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 121.)

French Government have learnt from French Minister at Brussels that German Government have presented ultimatum to Belgian Government to the effect that latter should permit passage of German troops through Belgian territory.

Belgian Government have replied that any incursion of German troops will be resisted by force of arms, since the Kingdom of Prussia was one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality.

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(35625)

No. 557.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir Edward Grey.**Antwerp, August 3, 1914.*

D. 6.6 P.M.

R. 7.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 22.)

Saw general officer commanding at Antwerp 4.30 this afternoon, who stated that he has no information of German invasion of Belgium territory yet.

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(85624)

No. 558.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. noon.

R. 7.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 123.)

Military attaché reports French War Office state that situation remains unchanged. Violation of frontier near Delle confirmed.<sup>(1)</sup> Crossing of French frontier by Germans opposite Longwy contradicted.

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. No. 507.

(85630)

No. 559.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. 6.50 P.M.

R. 8.18 P.M.

Tel. (No. 127.)

Naval attaché reports following information from the Ministry of Marine:—

“French Fleet sailed from Toulon at 5 A.M. this morning to watch German cruiser ‘Goeben’ and protect transport of French African troops which will commence to-morrow.”

(85628)

No. 560.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.**St. Petersburg (viâ Aden), August 3, 1914.*

D. ? ?

R. 8.26 P.M.

Tel. (No. 206.)

A special service was held in the Winter Palace yesterday to pray for success of Russian army, at which my French colleague was present. I was invited to attend, but having no information as to attitude of His Majesty's Government in war I thought it prudent not to accept. On conclusion of the service the Emperor addressed those present and declared that “I will not conclude peace until the last man of the enemy has left our land.”

(85631)

No. 561.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

D. 5.46 P.M.

R. 9 P.M.

Tel. (No. 15.)

Your telegram No. 10 of to-day:<sup>(1)</sup> Belgian neutrality.

German ultimatum states that German Government have received definite information that France intends to invade Germany through Belgium. Germany fears that Belgium will be unable to repel French attack without assistance, and she therefore is obliged to declare as follows:—

1. If Belgium will adopt attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Germany in coming war, Germany will on conclusion of peace guarantee Belgium and Belgian possessions.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 525.

2. Subject to above condition, Germany engages to evacuate Belgian territory on conclusion of peace.
3. If Belgium adopts friendly attitude, Germany will pay ready money for all necessities of war and indemnify all losses caused in Belgium.
4. If Belgium adopts hostile attitude, and especially if Belgium opposes German advance by means of the Meuse fortifications or by destruction of roads, railways, &c.. Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy country, will take no engagements towards her, and will leave relations between the two States to be settled by arms. If Belgian Government comply, relations of friendship between the two nations will become more close and durable.

Belgian Government, after expressing profound and pained surprise, have replied that intentions attributed to France in German ultimatum are in contradiction to formal declarations made to Belgium by France on 1st August. Moreover, if France were to violate Belgian neutrality, Belgium would fulfil international duty and offer most vigorous resistance.

Treaties of 1839 and 1870 ensure independence and neutrality of Belgium under guarantee of the Powers, including Prussia. Belgium has always been faithful to international obligations, and has spared no effort to maintain her neutrality. Attack on independence now threatened by Germany would be flagrant violation of international law, which could not be justified by any strategical considerations.

If German proposals were accepted, attack<sup>(2)</sup> would both sacrifice national honour and betray duty towards Europe. She refuses to believe her independence can only be preserved by violation of neutrality, and she is firmly resolved to repel by every means in her power all attacks on her rights.

Copies of the two documents, which I have just been able to obtain, will be sent by messenger to-night.<sup>(3)</sup>

(<sup>2</sup>) "*Attack*" is clearly an error—it should be "*Belgium.*" See DD No. 779.

(<sup>3</sup>) No. 658.

(35633)

No. 562.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

D. 7.2 P.M.

R. 9.40 P.M.

Tel. (No. 16.)

My telegram No. 14 of 3rd August: (<sup>1</sup>) Belgian neutrality.

Although the Belgian Government have so far declined offer of military support made by French Minister here, and although their reply contains only vague and unsatisfactory allusion to measures which might ultimately be adopted, French military attaché has been assured on authority which he considers reliable that if Germany actually invades Belgium in force Belgian Government will appeal at once not only to France but also to England for military aid. They will not do this so long as Belgian soil is not violated by formidable bodies of German troops. At present it appears that there are only German patrols on Belgian soil.

Military attaché also says that France is avoiding a premature advance in case Germans should be luring them into putting themselves in the wrong by being the first seriously to violate Belgian neutrality.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 551.

(35637)

No. 563.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 3, 1914.*

D. 8.40 P.M.

R. 10.27 P.M.

Tel. (No. 128.)

German Ambassador leaves Paris to-night. He has protested against the sacking of German shops by Paris mobs.<sup>(1)</sup>

(<sup>1</sup>) *There is no record of any such protest in the French Foreign Office, and nothing is said on the point by Herr von Schoen in his Memoirs.*

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(35641)

No. 564.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.**Sophia, August 3, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 38.)

A colleague informs me that he has heard from sure source that German Government are using all their influence to persuade Ottoman Government to join forces with Triple Alliance and attack Russia on Asiatic frontier.

German Ambassador at Constantinople informed Grand Vizier that Sweden would also be found on their side.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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(35645)

No. 565.

*Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.**Lisbon, August 3, 1914.*

R. 11 P.M.

Tel. (No. 27.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that, on Austrian Minister enquiring unofficially what attitude Portugal would adopt in the event of general war, he had replied that she hoped to remain neutral, but that she had an alliance with Great Britain which she would not ignore.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that if Great Britain was at war and did not wish Portugal to remain neutral, the former would have to supply her with seven or eight big guns, gunners, and ammunition for the defence of Lisbon. There were plenty of forts, but few guns and an inadequate supply of ammunition for them. The Portuguese could put a well-armed force of 80,000 men in the field.

*Cf. Nos. 590 and 610; also DD No. 617.*

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No. 566.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private and Confidential.

My dear Grey,

Paris, August 3, 1914.

M. Tardieu of "Le Temps" and now a Deputy told the "Times" correspondent to-day at 11 A.M. the assurances which you gave to Cambon concerning the possible action of the British Fleet, and the reasons for which our military forces must remain at our disposal. He mentioned India and Egypt.

I am not surprised at H.M. Government declining to send a military force to France. I think that it would be of advantage to us to give naval aid in the war, for it would bring it to an end sooner by starving Germany and it would give us a *locus standi* to determine the conditions of peace.

Yours sincerely,  
FRANCIS BERTIE.

{35651}

No. 567.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.*

Stockholm, August 3, 1914.

D. August 3, 7 P.M.

R. August 4, 1 A.M.

Tel. (No. 20.)

Norwegian Minister has just told me no German ultimatum has been presented here yet respecting Swedish neutrality. I understand, however, that both Swedish and Norwegian Governments have discussed possibility, and that Swedish Government is very doubtful whether it can oppose Germany successfully. He said that he was of opinion that whatever line Sweden took Norway must take also. I said that even if Sweden and Norway could not oppose a violation of territory by Germany they might continue neutral and protest against violation; that would be better for both than taking active part in war. He agreed and said he hoped that two countries would take this line.

(Repeated to Christiania.)

[NOTE.—This appears to have been a statement of the personal views held by the Norwegian Minister and not the official determination of his Government, see DD No. 692: "Herr Wallenberg (Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs) explained that his Norwegian colleague had expressed his agreement that Norway would go with Sweden as far as was possible and that if it was necessary that they should take different roads, the two countries would under no circumstances turn their arms against one another."]

{35650}

No. 568.

*Mr. Erskine to Sir Edward Grey.*

Athens, August 3, 1914.

D. August 3, 10.30 P.M.

R. August 4, 1.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 134.)

Constantinople telegram No. 464 of 31st July.<sup>(1)</sup>

Turkish Minister having assured Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs that Turkish mobilisation was merely precautionary measure and not aimed at Greece, M. Venizelos has proposed to the Grand Vizier a meeting at any Ægean island he may prefer, and that he is prepared to start on 5th August.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 391.

(35659)

No. 569.

*Mr. des Graz to Sir Edward Grey.**Nish, August 3, 1914.**D. August 3, 5:30 P.M.**R. August 4, 2:30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 84.)

I hear confidentially of a further effort being made at Bucharest by the Servian Government to win over Roumanian (? authorities) by the promise of some territorial cession.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

(35656)

No. 570.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.**Stockholm, August 3, 1914.**D. August 3, 7:45 P.M.**R. August 4, 2:30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 21.)

MY telegram No. 17 of 2nd August: <sup>(1)</sup> Swedish neutrality.

Fearing some misapprehension as to Minister for Foreign Affairs' communication of yesterday, I submitted in writing substance of it as reported in my telegram, and asked if it was correct. He has requested me to transmit it in following rather milder form:—

1. If England did not go to war, he was positive that Sweden's neutrality could be maintained.
2. If England did go to war, he feared that extreme circumstances might arise which would force Sweden to choose one side or the other, and it was his private opinion, considering public opinion here, that it was impossible for Sweden to fight on same side as Russia.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 511.

(35666)

No. 571.

*Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.**Tokyo, August 3, 1914.**D. August 3, 6 P.M.**R. August 4, 8:45 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 58.)

Your telegram No. 35 of 1st August. <sup>(1)</sup>

Minister for Foreign Affairs desires me to thank you and to say that the Imperial Government will await an intimation from His Majesty's Government as to what action they have decided to take before defining their own attitude, which will be based thereon.

Japan has no interest in a European conflict, and his Excellency notes what you say as to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but, if British interests in Eastern Asia should be placed in jeopardy—say, for instance, by a German attack on Hong Kong or by any other aggressive act—His Majesty's Government may count upon Japan at once coming to assistance of her ally with all her strength, if called on to do so, leaving it entirely to His Majesty's Government to formulate the reason for, and nature of, the assistance required.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that he has spoken in above sense to the German Ambassador, who called upon him to-day, but who repudiated any idea of aggressive action of the nature suggested. <sup>(2)</sup> His Excellency is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors to-morrow, and will hold similar language to them.

*Cf. No. 637.*<sup>(1)</sup> No. 436.<sup>(2)</sup> See DD No. 785.

(35669)

No. 572.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.**Bucharest, August 4, 1914.*

D. 10 A.M.

R. 7.30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 29.)

St. Petersburg telegram No. 195 of 1st August.<sup>(1)</sup>

Probable prospect of attack on Servia by Turkey and Bulgaria seems to me the one development which would be the most likely to bring King Charles to consent to war with Austria. Presumably Austria will make every effort to keep Turkey and Bulgaria quiet.

(Repeated to Sophia. Nish. Athens and Constantinople.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 459.

(35675)

No. 573.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(a.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 266.)

D. 9.30 A.M.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium.

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgium Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

*Published in BB No. 153 (Text of Appeal is added; cf. also B No. 25).*

(b.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 267.)

D. 9.30 A.M.

You need make no paraphrase of my immediately preceding telegram.

*This was communicated by Sir E. Goschen to Herr von Jagow as an Aide-mémoire (DD No. 825).*

*Cf. Nos. 594 and 615.*

(35735)

No. 574.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 3, 1914.**D. August 3, 9.15 P.M.**R. August 4, 9.35 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 159.)

Albania. Government earnestly hope that you will not withdraw Mr. Lamb from Durazzo. Whether Austrian ship be removed or not, Italian ship will stay there, and they trust this will suffice for you to sanction his remaining, as his removal would, they are convinced, lead to the dissolution of the whole International Commission, which would be regarded by the Albanians as a desertion of the Prince by the Powers, with the result of fresh difficulties for the Powers who have guaranteed Albania.

(Repeated to Durazzo.)

*Cf. No. 591.*

(35701)

No. 575.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 3, 1914.**D. August 3, 11.42 P.M.**R. August 4, 10.30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 132.)

Military intelligence for to-day : In eastern theatre German cruiser "Augsburg" bombarded Libau, and German troops have occupied Kalish, Czentoehen and Bendzin. In western theatre, according to German reports, French troops have crossed Vosges, occupying Gottestal, Metzeral, Markirch and Schlucht Pass. This is considered in Germany as a breach of international law, war not having been declared yet. It is officially stated here that German troops occupied Luxemburg this morning.

(35702)

No. 576.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.**D. 10.30 A.M.*

Tel. (No. 312.)

It is most urgent that French and Russian Governments should express to Sweden their willingness to join His Majesty's Government in their guarantee to respect the integrity and independence of Sweden now and hereafter if the latter remains neutral during the war.

It should be added that if Sweden takes active sides with Germany we shall be freed from all obligations towards her.

(Repeated to Stockholm (No. 13) adding : "You should make such declarations on behalf of His Majesty's Government.")

(Sent also to St. Petersburg No. 440.)



(35904)

No. 577.

*Communicated by German Embassy, August 4, 1914.*

Translation.

*Berlin, August 3, 1914 (11:50 P.M.).*

To the Imperial (German) Ambassador,

Since France has, since the 1st August, made repeated military attacks on Imperial territory, Germany is now in a state of war with France. Please inform the Government to which you are accredited.

BETHMANN HOLLWEG.

(35752)

No. 578.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.*

(a.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 313.)

D. 10:30 A.M.

His Majesty's Government are informing the Norwegian, Netherlands and Belgian Governments that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Norwegian, Netherlands, and Belgian Governments at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

(Sent also to St. Petersburg No. 441.)

(b.)

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 314.)

D. 10:30 A.M.

My immediately preceding telegram of to-day's date.

You should ask Government to which you are accredited to make similar declarations to Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium.

(Sent also to St. Petersburg No. 442.)

*Cf. No. 593.*

(35721)

No. 579.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 3, 1914.*

D. August 3, 9:5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 160.)

R. August 4, 10:35 A.M.

Having reason to believe that German Ambassador was endeavouring to induce Italy to modify her decision on the ground that France had violated the German frontier without a declaration of war, I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2nd August. He admitted that some such plea had been raised, but treated it as absurd. At such moments there would always be irregularities on frontier. It was perfectly clear on which side the provocation had been, and it was now clear that Austria had deliberately intended to redress the Balkan situation, with Germany behind her. Italy would

firmly abide by her decision, and he was unable to foresee now any combination of circumstances which would induce her to alter it. Calling out certain Italian classes was only a measure of precaution, and more yet might be called, partly for an economic reason, as masses of Italian workmen were returning from France and Germany, who needed work, and they could take the place of men with the colours. Events had made it clear to him that Italy's views and interests happened most closely to coincide with those of England, and he desired to keep in constant contact in the hope that it might be of service in the coming time. He had just heard that Turkey had ordered a general mobilisation, in which he saw the hand of Germany, who hoped for an attack on the Eastern provinces of Russia.

(Repeated to Paris and St. Petersburg.)

*Cf. Nos. 620 and 640.*

(35797)

No. 580.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 14.)

D. 10.45 A.M.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Government to which you are accredited at once an *alliance*<sup>(1)</sup> for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

(Sent also to Christiania No. 25, and The Hague No. 23.)

*Published in BB No. 155.*

*Cf. No. 625.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Corrected to "common action" by telegram, 12.30 P.M.

(36189)

No. 581.

*Communicated by the Belgian Minister (August 4, 11 A.M.)*

(Tél.)

*Bruxelles, le 4 août 1914.*

Ministre d'Allemagne notifie qu'à la suite de notre réponse, Allemagne exécutera au besoin par les armes les mesures de sécurité annoncées. Aucune décision n'a été prise en ce qui concerne appel à la prestation de garantie.

DAVIGNON.

MINUTE.

The German Minister notifies (Belgian Government) that in consequence of our reply. Germany will put into force, if necessary by arms, the measures of security already announced. (These measures refer to statement by Germany that they are undertaken only as a necessity imposed by French initiative.) No decision has been taken (by Belgian Government) in regard to an appeal (to the Powers) for acting on the guarantee.—A. N.

(35717)

No. 582.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.**Vienna, August 3, 1914.*

D. August 3, 3.50 P.M.

R. August 4, 11 A.M.

Tel. (No. 152.)

Notwithstanding news of violation of French territory at two points by German troops, French Ambassador has not heard officially that France is at war with Germany. He does not know whether Franco-German war necessarily entails a state of war between France and Austria. He fears, however, that circumstances may compel him to leave Vienna at any moment, and he proposes in that case to ask United States Ambassador to take charge of French Embassy. I have hesitated as yet to ask United States Ambassador to do us this service in case of need, as I feel in doubt as to whether possible contingency of war between England and Germany would cause me to be immediately withdrawn from Vienna, and I do not wish to give impression that this Embassy may be shortly withdrawn.

Should my withdrawal become necessary after United States Embassy have taken charge of French Embassy, I would suggest that this would not prevent my asking United States Ambassador to help us in the same way. Otherwise I could only ask representative of a smaller Power, *e.g.*, Netherlands, Belgium, or Sweden, whose representatives are all men of considerable standing here. Russian Embassy will be left in charge of Spanish Ambassador.

*Cf. No. 600.*

(35734)

No. 583.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

D. August 3, 9.30 P.M.

R. August 4, 11 A.M.

Tel. (No. 474.)

Following from Military Attaché for D.M.O. :—

“Army mobilisation proclaimed from to-day and some movement of troops has taken place to guard Bosphorus. Third division has moved from Scutari towards Riva another detachment of troops to Kilios while garrison of the Bosphorous defences has been strengthened. In interview with Minister of War this afternoon he told me that mobilisation only aimed at for the present retaining with the colours sufficient men to complete army corps round capital to full war strength and (?) remainder to partial war strength.

“Measures taken were purely precautionary in view of developments which might leave Ottoman army at a disadvantage owing to comparatively long period required for its mobilisation.

“He gave me to infer that there was no idea of holding Russian Caucasus army corps and that if latter were withdrawn to Europe Turks would then be enabled to concentrate in Thrace which might be desirable from their point of view.”

(35733)

No. 584.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 9:40 A.M.

R. 11:20 A.M.

Tel. (No. 18.)

German Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

*Published in BB No. 154.*

(35585)

No. 585.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 11:30 A.M.

Tel. (No. 268.)

I continue to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to Your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

*Published in BB No. 156.**See DD No. 824.*

(35745)

No. 586.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

R. August 4, 11:40 A.M.

Tel. (No. 473.)

St. Petersburg telegram No. 195.<sup>(1)</sup>

Russian Ambassador had a long conversation last night with Grand Vizier. He pointed out the folly of Turkish mobilisation and of the idea, evidently inspired by Triple Alliance Ambassadors, that Russia might meditate a *coup* to seize the Straits. Russian Ambassador pointed out that this would require an army of at least 200,000 men, which Russia could not possibly afford at the present juncture for such an adventure. Grand Vizier then said that public opinion required that something should be done when so many neutral countries were also mobilising, that they intended to have on foot in Thrace an army of 150,000 men to be prepared for all eventualities, and that they must have in view the possibility of recovering territory lost to Bulgaria. While very irritated at the continuance here of German military mission with executive commands, Russian Ambassador did not think Russian Government will make any rotest.

I cannot believe that apparent desire of Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 459.



to be on good terms with Greece is simply a comedy. In view, however, of the evident wish of Germany and Austria-Hungary to have Turkey on their side, it would be well to point out to Turkish Ambassador risk which Turkey will run by throwing in her lot with Triple Alliance when, in spite of delusive promises, she risks loss of Armenian vilayets.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg, Sophia and Athens.)

*Cf. No. 605.*

(35748)

No. 587.

*Communicated by German Ambassador, August 4, 12 noon.*

*Herr von Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky.*

Tel. (No. 226.) *En clair.*

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

*Published in BB No. 157.*

*See DD No 810. This telegram was apparently sent in English.*

(35787)

No. 588.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 11 A.M.

R. 12 P.M.

Tel. (No. 131.)

Military attaché wishes me to say that he considers it most important that source of information in my telegram No. 126 of yesterday<sup>(1)</sup> should not be disclosed.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 556 (a).

(35517)

No. 589.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 12.15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 334.)

Your telegram No. 468 of 3rd August.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should earnestly impress upon Grand Vizier that Turkish interest would best be served by maintaining a strict neutrality. If Turkey were to be drawn into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria the gravest consequences would follow.

You must, however, be careful to give to your communication the character of good advice from Turkey's oldest friend, and avoid anything to give rise to an impression that we are threatening.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 522.

(35645)

No. 590.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 12.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 41.)

Your telegram No. 27.<sup>(1)</sup>

Question of position of Portugal in event of Great Britain being at war is enjoying earnest attention of His Majesty's Government. In the meantime, you should urge Minister for Foreign Affairs to defer issuing any declaration of neutrality.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 565. Cf. also No. 610.

(35735)

No. 591.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

Tel. (No. 252.)

In response to Italian request, I agree to Mr. Lamb remaining at Durazzo.<sup>(1)</sup>

I do not suppose we shall declare war upon Austria unless some direct provocation is given, or she declares war upon us, but if Mr. Lamb or any British officers or men left in Albania are exposed to an Austrian attack, we must ask for the good offices and influence of the Italian Government on their behalf.

(Repeated to Durazzo No. 125.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 574.

(35813)

No. 592.

*Mr. Erskine to Sir Edward Grey.**Athens, August 2, 1914.**D. August 2, 11.30 A.M.**R. August 4, 2 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 136.)

Servian Government have asked Greek Government to co-operate in police measures against threatened action of Bulgarian bands in Servian Macedonia.

Greek Government are considering whether they can do so without infringement of neutrality.

Bulgarian Minister here has also suggested similar co-operation between Greek and Bulgarian police against Bulgarian bands. This is also under consideration. Addressed to Foreign Office.

(Repeated to Sofia, Bucharest and Nish.)

(35799)

No. 593.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.**D. 2 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 315.)

Suspend action on my telegram No. 314 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

If action already taken, inform Government to which you are accredited that you have since received instructions cancelling previous communication pending further instructions.

(Sent also to St. Petersburg No. 444, Christiania No. 26, The Hague No. 24, and Brussels No. 15. *mutatis mutandis*.)

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 578 (b).

(35798)

No. 594.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.**D. 2 P.M.*

Tel. (No. 270.)

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram No. 266 of this morning<sup>(1)</sup> be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

*Published in BB No. 159.*

*This was communicated by Sir E. Goschen as an Aide Memoire to Herr v. Jagow at 7 P.M. See DD No. 839.*

*Cf. also Nos. 615 and 671.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 573.

(35834)

No. 595.

*The Netherlands Minister to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 4.)**Légation des Pays-Bas, Londres,  
le 3 août 1914.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que le Ministre allemand à La Haye, après avoir fait, hier matin, au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères une communication relative à l'ultimatum posé à la Belgique, lui a déclaré ensuite, au nom du Gouvernement Impérial, que celui-ci respectera entièrement la neutralité des Pays-Bas, si les Pays-Bas maintiennent la neutralité envers l'Allemagne. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a répondu que telle était la décision du Gouvernement Royal, et il a pris acte de la déclaration du Ministre allemand.

En satisfaisant par la présente à ces instructions. je saisis, &amp;c.

R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

(35833)

No. 596.

*The Netherlands Minister to Sir Edward Grey.**Londres, le 4 août 1914.*

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de Votre Excellence qu'un décret vient d'être promulgué interdisant à des aviateurs étrangers de franchir les frontières du pays. Le Gouvernement Royal n'assume aucune responsabilité quant aux conséquences que pourra entraîner la non-observation de cette interdiction.

R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

(35790)

No. 597.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.--(Received August 4.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, August 4, 1914.*

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that Secretary Sir E. Grey will notify the Italian Government that the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, has been enjoined to respect rigidly the neutrality which that Government have declared.

2. Sir Berkeley Milne has been instructed not to permit any of His Majesty's ships to come within six miles of the Italian coast. If this fact is notified to the Italian Government it should be made clear that this order is inspired by a desire to meet their views to the utmost, and is not to be taken as implying an admission of their claim to territorial waters beyond the three-mile limit.

I am, &amp;c.

(For the Secretary),

J. W. S. ANDERSON.



(35844)

No. 598.

*Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)**Ambassade Impériale Ottomane à Londres.*

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et a l'honneur de communiquer à son Excellence que la mobilisation générale qui vient d'être proclamée dans tout l'Empire a en vue de garantir uniquement les territoires de l'Empire Ottoman le Gouvernement Impérial ayant décidé de garder une stricte neutralité dans les conflits actuels.

*Le 4 août 1914.**Cf. No. 605.*

(35831)

No. 599.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.**Stockholm, August 4, 1914.*

D. 11:55 A.M.

R. 2:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 22.)

Swedish mobilisation continuing gradually. Fleet and coast artillery called out yesterday.

(35717)

No. 600.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 2:30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 206.)

Your telegram No. 152 of 3rd August.<sup>(1)</sup>

If your Excellency is eventually withdrawn, you should ask American Ambassador to take charge of British interests as arranged.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 582.

(35842)

No. 601.

*Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.**Lisbon, August 4, 1914.*

D. 10:45 A.M.

R. 3:10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 30.)

Yesterday evening Prime Minister speaking in name of President of the Republic and of Government requested me to assure His Majesty's Government of Portugal's intention and desire to act in complete co-operation with Great Britain in whatever course latter may adopt.

*Cf. No. 610.*

(35846)

No. 602.

*Consul-General Sir C. Hertslet to Sir E. Grey.**Antwerp, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.4 P.M.

R. 3.10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

My telegram No. 19 of yesterday.<sup>(1)</sup>

State of siege at Antwerp raised last night but reinforced this morning.

All ships refused permission to leave port, but I have procured authority for departure of "Montrose" and other British vessels.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 524.

(35837)

No. 603.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.1 P.M.

R. 3.12 P.M.

Tel. (No. 19.)

Special Session of Chambers opened this morning by the King in person who delivered patriotic speech. His Majesty and the Queen were given a great ovation. Prime Minister read correspondence with German Minister upon which he said no comment was required. Immense enthusiasm prevailed.

(35848)

No. 604.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.30 P.M.

R. 3.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 32.)

"Chef de Cabinet" at Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that German Government had not presented an ultimatum respecting neutrality to Netherlands Government, as reported in yesterday's papers. If they do, Netherlands Government will give same reply as Belgian Government have given.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is very hopeful that neutrality of the Netherlands will not be violated by any Power, but all precautions are being taken.

(35857)

No. 605.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

D. August 3, 9.30 P.M.

R. August 4, 3.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 478.)

Grand Vizier to-day renewed assurances that Turkey intends to observe strict neutrality. Mobilisation had been decided upon only because it would take months to complete and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action

by Russia—attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Retention of German military mission meant nothing and had no political significance. He regarded them as Turkish employés who were doing good work, and, as they had offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

*Cf. Nos. 586 and 598.*

[NOTE.—An alliance between Turkey and Germany was signed on August 2 by which Turkey undertook to support Germany in the case of a war between Germany and Russia. See DD Nos. 726, 733.]

(35800)

No. 606.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie (Lisbon).*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 42.)

D. 3.30 P.M.

We learn that steamship "Admiral" lying at Delagoa Bay, is apparently acting as wireless coast station for transmission of wireless messages of German Government. Inform Portuguese Government most confidentially, and suggest that immediate instructions be sent to prevent such a possibility at the present critical moment. The proper course, which is being followed both here and in other countries at this moment, is to prevent any wireless apparatus in territorial waters being used except under Government control, and to compel all foreign vessels to dismantle their wireless apparatus.

(35856)

No. 607.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

D. 2.30 P.M.

R. 3.35 P.M.

*This telegram communicates text of telegrams exchanged between German Emperor and Emperor of Russia published in White Book at Berlin. For text of these telegrams see CDD, pp. 431, &c.*

(35744)

No. 608.

*Communication from German Embassy, August 4, 1914.*

*Foreign Office.*

Herr v. Wesendonk of the German Embassy called to say that the Ambassador had received a further telegram from his Government (dated 2.30 P.M.) saying that it is absolutely untrue that a single German soldier had crossed the French frontier.

H. M.

3.8.1914.

MINUTE.

M. de Fleuriau repeated to me an hour ago that they have actually shot a number of German officers who were over the frontier.—E. A. C. August 3, 1914.

(35870)

No. 609.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.3 P.M.

R. 3.55 P.M.

Tel. (No. 133.) *En clair.*

With reference to your telegram No. 310 of yesterday,<sup>(1)</sup> military attaché reports French War Office inform him that: Firstly, it has no information of any French patrol having crossed the frontier even a few yards. It would appear impossible by reason of the strict orders issued. Secondly, it is correct that a military aviator lost his way on 3rd August in Alsace. He landed by mistake in the suburbs of Mülhaus, and left again, arriving at Belfort without harm. Thirdly, no person, male or female, has received instructions to blow up the tunnel of Cochem or any other tunnel. It is unaware of any attempt of this nature. Fourthly, it has not received any information reporting crossing of the Alsatian frontier by French infantry.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 540.

(35864)

No. 610.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 43.)

D. 4.10 P.M.

My telegram No. 41 of to-day.<sup>(1)</sup>

Inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that in case of attack by Germany on any Portuguese possession, His Majesty's Government will consider themselves bound by the stipulations of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.

For the present His Majesty's Government would be satisfied if the Portuguese Government refrained from proclaiming neutrality.

In the event of His Majesty's Government hereafter considering it necessary to make any demand upon the Portuguese Government which would not be compatible with the latter's neutrality, they would appeal to the alliance as justification for such demand.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 590. Cf. also Nos. 565 and 601.

35872)

No. 611.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1 P.M.

R. 4.20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 22.)

Military attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have now undoubtedly entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans, who, however, were repulsed. War Office states that mobilisation has taken place without a hitch, and that army is at this moment concentrated as intended. Dutch Limburg has not been occupied by Germans. French military attaché has been informed that German troops are now concentrating at Aix-la-Chapelle.

*Published in BB No. 158 (last three sentences omitted).*



(35907)

No. 612.

*German Foreign Office to German Ambassador, London.*

D. August 4, 4:38 P.M.

R. in London at 4:17 P.M.

Tel. (No. 1545.)

Sent out for delivery at 4:25 P.M.

Declaration Bethmann Reichstag to-day. We are in self-defence and needs must. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. This is an infraction to International Law. Though the French Government have declared in Brussels to be willing to respect Belgium's neutrality as long as the adversary would respect it, we knew that France was ready for invasion. France was able to wait, we were not. A French aggression into our flank on the lower Rhine would have been disastrous. We were therefore compelled to overrule the legitimate protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. We shall repair the wrong which we are doing, as soon as our military aims have been reached. Anybody threatened as we are and fighting for his most sacred goods must only think of pulling through. As to the attitude of England, the statement made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons has clearly laid down the point of view taken by the British Government that as long as England will keep neutral our fleet would not attack the Northern Coast of France and that we would not touch the territorial integrity and the independence of Belgium. I herewith repeat this declaration publicly before the whole world and I may add that as long as England keeps neutral we would be willing in case of reciprocity not to undertake any hostile operations against the French commercial navigation.

JAGOW.

[NOTE.—This telegram was communicated to the Foreign Office by the Censor. It was sent *en clair* and in English, obviously with the intention that it should be intercepted (DD No. 829). Punctuation as in the original.]

(35863)

No. 613.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1:15.

Tel. (No. 135.)

R. 4:30.

In answer to your telegram No. 309 of August 3rd<sup>(1)</sup> Military Attaché reports that French War Office states that bodies of two Germans, one an officer and the other either an officer or under-officer are on French soil and the French authorities are in possession of their clothes and identification papers.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 529.

(35876)

No. 614.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.15 P.M.

R. 5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 132.)

Following from Military Attaché :—

“French War Office information: German dispositions: general situation much the same.

“Duchy of Luxemburg: Greater portion of 8th corps with advance parties of 16th division on the French border; also probably one division of cavalry of which 7th Uhlans and 7th Chevaux Legers form part between Luxemburg and Longwy.

“Lorraine; movements of the 21st corps signalled near Chateau Salins and of the 13th corps towards Sarrebourg.

“Vosges to the Swiss frontier: Situation unchanged. French dispositions: troops on the frontier no change; other troops in France in their garrisons and expect to move forward about August 6th.

“It is hoped to bring from Algeria a force of about 20,000; at present it is not deemed advisable to commence transportation across Mediterranean owing to presence of German warships; probable time for transportation 12 days; probable destination neighbourhood of Belfort.

“Secrecy essential as regards all movements and position of French troops which are for information of British War Office.”

(35910)

No. 615.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

D. 5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 271.)

Please acknowledge as soon as possible receipt of my telegrams Nos. 266 and 270 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

We will let you know without loss of time whether any reply, satisfactory or otherwise, has been received here by midnight. United States Government cordially agree to take charge of embassy.

(<sup>1</sup>) Nos. 573 and 594.

(35873)

No. 616.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.30 P.M.

R. 5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 134.) Secret.

Naval Attaché reports following information from Minister of Marine :—

“French fleet have been given orders to bring ‘Goeben’ to action if possible. ‘Goeben’ is at present off Algerian coast.”

(35847)

No. 617.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir Arthur Hardinge.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 49.) Urgent.

D. 5.20 P.M.

A German cable ship is lying at Vigo for the purpose of cutting the cables entering that port on the outbreak of hostilities.

On receipt of notification that war has broken out you should at once inform the Spanish Government asking that urgent instructions may be sent to Vigo to prevent that port being used as a base for any hostile action against British interests.

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(35877)

No. 618.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 207.)

D. 5.30 P.M.

We shall presumably be at war with Germany to-morrow, as the latter has violated and will apparently not engage to respect the Belgian Treaty.

But I understand Austria not at present to be at war with Russia or with France, and I do not therefore contemplate instructing you to ask for your passports or to address any communication to the Austrian Government. I have said this to Austrian Ambassador, but have added that we should of course expect Austrian Government not to commit any act of war against us without first making some communication to us in accord with diplomatic usage.

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(35879)

No. 619.

*Consul Pratt to Sir Edward Grey.**Tsinanfu, August 4, 1914.*

Tel.

R. August 4, 6.20 P.M.

Situation in Tsingtau.

August 1st martial law was proclaimed—all stocks of oil seized. Two steamers forbidden to carry cattle to Vladivostok. Attempt made to seize treasure of Russo-Chinese Bank, but it had already been transferred to Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. British Vice-Consul was notified all British subjects must be prepared to leave when ordered, but ample time and facilities will be provided; panic ensued amongst Chinese who are flying in large numbers, but British subjects remain calm.

August 2nd Army aeroplane fell seriously injuring pilot leaving one effective aeroplane and pilot. Four German merchant vessels are detained.

Since August 1st only *en clair* telegrams can be sent or received by British Vice-Consulate.

Telegraphed Foreign Office *en clair* asking whether his instructions were modified. This was passed by Governor but not yet has any answer been received.

I have telegraphed above to Peking.

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(35721)

No. 620.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.**Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 253.)

D. 6.30 P.M.

Your telegram No. 160 of August 3.<sup>(1)</sup>

I have expressed cordial appreciation to Italian Ambassador.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 579.

(35883)

No. 621.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 4.26 P.M.

Tel. (No. 23.)

R. 6.30 P.M.

French Military Attaché states that German troops have appeared this morning at Marieange. Martelange, Bastogne and along Liège, Stavelot Luxemburg railway.

German dispositions appear to be: On extreme right seventh Army Corps debouching from Aix. next 16th then 4th and an army corps number unknown (possibly 12th) on extreme left. Saxon Cavalry accompanies cavalry of 7th corps and 8th Cuirassiers.

Russian military attaché states that Germans have entered Belgium from Eupen and Aix and at Stavelot.

(35881)

No. 622.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.**Rome, August 4, 1914.*

D. 1.5 P.M.

Tel. (No. 164.)

R. 6.50 P.M.

Greek Government are sending ships of war to Brindisi to fetch German Minister at Athens who is bearer of an autograph letter from Emperor to King of Greece.

(35885)

No. 623.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 3.35 P.M.

Tel. (No. 136.)

R. 7.2 P.M.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that German ship has bombarded Philippeville and Bône.



(35887)

No. 624.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 3·25 P.M.

R. 7·10 P.M.

Tel. (No. 138.) Confidential.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Belgian Minister has communicated to him a telegram from his Government to the effect that German soldiers have crossed the Belgian frontier at Gemmenich in the region of Verviers.

(35884)

No. 625.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 6·50.

R. 7·10.

Tel. (No. 25.)

Your telegram No. 15 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>Action already taken upon your telegram No. 14.<sup>(2)</sup>

I have informed Belgian Government that my communication is cancelled pending further instructions.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 598.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 580.

(35886)

No. 626.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.**Paris, August 4, 1914.*

D. 3·25 P.M.

R. 7·20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 137.) Urgent. Confidential.

Holland Belgium Norway Sweden. I acted to-day at 1 P.M. on your urgent telegrams to Paris numbers 313,<sup>(1)</sup> 314,<sup>(2)</sup> 312<sup>(3)</sup> this morning.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will give me answers this evening.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 578 (a).<sup>(2)</sup> No. 578 (b).<sup>(3)</sup> No. 576.

(35909)

No. 627.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.**Stockholm, August 4, 1914.*

D. 4·30 P.M.

R. 7·50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 24.)

SWEDEN has this morning declared her complete neutrality during the present war between foreign Powers.

*Cf. No. 638.*

(35894)

No. 628.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.**Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

D. 5.35 P.M.

R. 7.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 135.) Urgent.

My French colleague protested against violation of French frontier by German troops, and in reply German Government communicated violations of their territory reported in my telegram of yesterday.

Presume details of events on French frontier have been communicated to you by French Government. My French colleague received his passports at 7 last night and leaves at 10 to-night for Vienna. He was first offered choice between Copenhagen and Constance and chose latter but was subsequently informed that he must go by Vienna. He protested until given a written assurance that he would be allowed to continue journey through Switzerland.

His telephone was cut off two days ago and his Vice-Consul and Embassy accountant were arrested in their beds this morning, but on protest were released after some little time. He and his staff have been warned not to show themselves in public for fear of insult.

(35913)

No. 629.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 6.29 P.M.

R. 8.50 P.M.

Tel. (No. 26.)

Minister of War. through his chief of staff, requested military attaché "officieusement" to inform His Majesty's Government that a very acceptable service would be rendered to Belgium if fleet would keep open the Scheldt and sea approaches to Antwerp for ships bringing supplies to Belgium.

(35912)

No. 630.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 6.38 P.M.

R. 9 P.M.

Tel. (No. 27.)

5 o'clock. Military Attaché just informed at War Office that firing is going on outside Liège.

No Germans have as yet crossed Meuse.

(85915)

No. 631.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.**Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

D. 6'38 P.M.

R. 9'15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 28.)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just been to see me to tell me as a "matter of historical interest" what answer of the Belgian Government would have been if my communication had not been withdrawn.

The Council held at the Palace had decided to reply that they would accept offer of common action with "lively satisfaction."

*Cf. No. 580.*

(85916)

No. 632.

*Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.**The Hague, August 4, 1914.*

R. 9'20 P.M.

Tel. (No. 95.)

Your telegram No. 24 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

I had already taken action on your telegram No. 23 of 4th August,<sup>(2)</sup> but have cancelled communication.

When I made communication, as instructed in your telegram No. 23, Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to thank you for it, and to tell you that he has received a formal assurance from the German Government that they will not violate neutrality of Netherlands if Netherlands maintain their present neutral attitude.

I was unable to see Minister for Foreign Affairs when I received your telegram No. 24, but I saw chef de cabinet, who said he regretted communication must be cancelled, as it was an agreeable one. He would tell Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as he could find him.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 593.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 580.

(85917)

No. 633.

*Mr. Howard to Sir Edward Grey.**Stockholm, August 4, 1914.*

D. 3'30 P.M.

R. 9'30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 25.)

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>(1)</sup>

A friend who saw the King this morning told me His Majesty and the Swedish Government are fully determined to maintain their neutrality to the utmost. I strongly urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in no circumstances to take active part in the war even if Sweden could not resist possible violation of territory. He said that this was the firm intention of Sweden.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 627.

(35918)

No. 634.

*Consul-General Barnham to Sir Edward Grey.**Smyrna, August 4, 1914.*

D. 8.4 P.M.

R. 9.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 12.)

General mobilisation still continuing steadily.

(35926)

No. 635.

*Mr. Erskine to Sir Edward Grey.**Athens, August 4, 1914.*

D. 7.30 P.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 135.)

Greek Government having informed Austrian Government that they will remain neutral unless Bulgaria intervenes, Austrian Government have replied that they have strongly urged Bulgaria to remain neutral, and that the latter has assured them that they will do so.

(Repeated to Sophia, Nish and Bucharest.)

(35921)

No. 636.

*Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.**Constantinople, August 4, 1914.*

D. 11 A.M.

R. 10.45 P.M.

Tel. (No. 480.)

Following from Military Attaché at Belgrade for the Director of Military Operations.

"Servian mobilization completed on July 30th. Concentration will be completed on the night of 4th and 5th August. Servians expect no decisive Austrian action for the present."

(35937)

No. 637.

*Sir C. Greene to Sir Edward Grey.**Tokyo, August 4, 1914.*

D. 6 P.M.

R. 11.30 P.M.

Tel. (No. 61.)

Your telegram No. 36 of 3rd August<sup>(1)</sup> was laid before the Cabinet this morning, and Minister for Foreign Affairs desires me to say that in the special eventualities referred to, namely:—

An attack on Hong Kong and Wei-hai Wei or a similar concrete act of aggression the Imperial Government will be ready at once to support His Majesty's Government if called upon, as explained in my telegram No. 58.<sup>(2)</sup> In the hypothetical cases, such as a capture of a British merchant ship or a case

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 549.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 571.



involving, perhaps, a question of Chinese or Russian territorial waters, the Imperial Government would wish to have the opportunity of considering it and consulting with His Majesty's Government before taking definite action.

Secret.

His Excellency tells me that 2nd battle fleet of four large cruisers, to which volunteer fleet may be added, is lying ready at Saseho for immediate action if required, while a cruiser has been stationed at each of the ports of Nagasaki, Fusan, and Chemulpo to meet possible eventualities.

The above secret paragraph for information of His Majesty's Government only.

(Repeated to St. Petersburg.)

(36530)

No. 638.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay (Manchester, Mass.).*

(No. 435.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I told Mr. Page to-day of our ultimatum to Germany as to the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. I said to him that it was, in the first place, a matter of fulfilling a treaty obligation. If, after all that was said in 1870 about our obligations under the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, we had now done nothing to preserve that neutrality, and had simply looked on at the present deliberate and flagrant violation of the treaty, we should have lost all respect. The principle of the sanctity of treaty rights was really the test of the progress of civilisation, as compared with a state of force and lawlessness; it was the foundation of all confidence between nations. There were two sets of people in Germany: people like the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, and the German Ambassador here, Prince Lichnowsky, who dealt with all these things as we dealt with them; on the other hand, there was the military party of force, who had no respect at all for these things. I had information that Germany was putting pressure on at least one of the smaller European States to join her in this war, and the issue for us was that, if Germany won, she would dominate France; the independence of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and perhaps of Norway and Sweden, would be a mere shadow: their separate existence as nations would really be a fiction; all their harbours would be at Germany's disposal; she would dominate the whole of Western Europe, and this would make our position quite impossible. We could not exist as a first-class State under such circumstances. I said that I asked nothing of the United States, except that they should comply with the ordinary rules of neutrality and that they should take charge of our Embassies in Berlin and Vienna, if need be. I should like Mr. Page to telegraph to the President what I had said to him.

Mr. Page said that he felt that what was happening in Europe would cause in the United States a grief that would be only less than if they themselves were involved in the war. He would telegraph to the President what I had said. He expressed great sympathy, and said that the United States Government would feel it a pleasure to do all in their power, consistent with the obligations of neutrality, to be of use to us.

He was authorised to say that the American Embassy at Berlin, and at Vienna, if necessary, would readily take charge of our interests there.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

*Cf. Nos. 573 and 594.*

(36527)

No. 639.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Chilton.*

(No. 97.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I had a conversation with the Netherlands Minister to-day.

He informed me that Germany had given a most satisfactory assurance as regards Dutch neutrality, and he thought that his Government would probably appeal to us and France to give a similar assurance.

I said that I had thought of making a proposal to them, in case Germany should put pressure upon them to depart from an attitude of neutrality. As this contingency had not arisen, I need say nothing more at present.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

(36528)

No. 640.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.*

(No. 226.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I expressed my most cordial appreciation to the Italian Ambassador to-day of what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to your Excellency, as described in your telegram No. 160 of the 3rd instant.<sup>(1)</sup> I said that I entirely reciprocated his feeling towards us.

The Ambassador said that he feared that Italy might be drawn into this war. Austria was almost sure to do something that would make even the stones in Italy rise up.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 579.

(36531)

No. 641.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Greene (Tokyo).*

(No. 122.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

I asked the Japanese Ambassador to-day to thank Baron Kato most cordially for his generous offer of assistance.<sup>(1)</sup>

I told the Ambassador how much I had been impressed by the way in which Japan, during the Russo-Japanese war, demanded nothing of us under our alliance with her except what was strictly in accord with the Treaty of Alliance; indeed, she had asked almost less than at one time it seemed she might have been entitled to have from us. I had thought that a fine attitude of good faith and restraint; and now we in turn should avoid, if we could, drawing Japan into any trouble. But, should a case arise in which we needed her help, we would gladly ask for it and be grateful for it.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 637.

(36529)

No. 642.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Howard (Stockholm).*

(No. 43.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

The Swedish Minister came to inform me to-day that it was Sweden's settled desire to maintain her neutrality; but he was to add that, were she forced into the impending European war, it would be impossible for her to take the side of Russia, owing to all the distrust that had been created in Sweden by Russian spying.

I expressed satisfaction at hearing that Sweden intended to maintain her neutrality; and I said that, if she did so, it would be my object to get Russia and France to join with us in a guarantee to respect the independence and integrity of Sweden.

I am, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

No. 643.

*Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

The result of the communication made at Berlin having been that His Majesty's Ambassador has had to ask for his passports, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in accordance with the terms of the notification made to the German Government to-day His Majesty's Government consider that a state of war exists between the two countries as from to-day at 11 o'clock P.M.

I have the honour to enclose passports for your Excellency, your Excellency's family and staff.

I have, &amp;c.

E. GREY.

### Supplementary.

(36026)

No. 644.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 62.)

Sir,

*Bucharest, July 28, 1914.*

I have the honour to enclose, extracted from the Government organ, "L'Indépendance Roumaine" of to-day, a communiqué defining Roumania's attitude in the Austro-Servian conflict.

I understand that it was only with great difficulty that the Prime Minister was able to obtain the King's approval for this declaration of policy which contains what amounts to a warning to Austria against interference with the Treaty of Bucharest.

The violent tone of the Austrian note of the 23rd instant and Baron Giessl's hasty rejection of the liberal satisfaction offered by the Servian Government in its reply of the 25th instant have, so far as I can gather, aroused general indignation in Bucharest though little unfavourable comment has so far appeared in the Roumanian press, only one of the leading papers, so far as I know—and that a paper which I believe to be under French influence—having really attacked Austria. The moderation

noticeable in the press is doubtless due to a *mot d'ordre* from the Roumanian Government who, in common with the Court are, as usual, evidently anxious to avoid giving offence to Austria.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 644.

*Extract from "L'Indépendance Roumaine" of July 28, 1914.*

#### LE CONFLIT AUSTRO-SERBE ET L'ATTITUDE DE LA ROUMANIE.

Contrairement à ce qui a été publié dans certains journaux, le Gouvernement roumain n'a remis aucune note aux Puissances relativement à son attitude dans le conflit austro-serbe. Il n'y a eu à ce sujet que des conversations diplomatiques entre les Ministres étrangers accrédités auprès de notre Gouvernement et M. Jean Bratiano, président du conseil, à Sinaïa, ou M. Emmanuel Porumbaro, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à Bucarest.

Le point de vue de la Roumanie peut être formulé dans les deux idées directrices suivantes :

1. La Roumanie n'a aucun motif de s'immiscer dans le conflit spécial survenu entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo et de la propagande nationaliste en Bosnie et Herzégovine.
2. La Roumanie est préoccupée d'une chose essentielle, à savoir qu'il ne soit porté atteinte en aucune façon à l'équilibre balkanique établi par le traité de Bucarest.

Sur ce point les États balkaniques sont solidaires.

Cette solidarité a été affirmée récemment à Sofia par les représentants de la Serbie et de la Roumanie à l'occasion des conflits de frontière entre la Bulgarie et notre pays qui sont à l'heure actuelle en voie d'aplanissement; elle se manifeste aujourd'hui entre la Grèce et la Roumanie à l'occasion des événements austro-serbes.

(36027)

No. 645.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 63.)

Sir,

*Bucharest, July 28, 1914.*

The Servian Chargé d'Affaires who has just visited me to inform me that Austria-Hungary has now formally declared war against Servia, expressed to me the earnest hope that Great Britain which had always been Servia's friend would not abandon her in this critical moment. Servia had always been grateful to Great Britain but she would be more than ever so for her support in the present crisis.

My Servian colleague, whom I asked whether Servia had already made a communication at London in the above sense, told me that he thought she had but he begged me to convey his words to you.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.



(36029)

No. 646.

*Sir H. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.,*

(No. 51.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Copenhagen, July 29, 1914.*

I had the honour to report by telegraph on the 27th instant<sup>(1)</sup> that the French President, who was expected at Copenhagen that day, had at the last moment cancelled his visit. It was surmised that he might think it advisable to do so in order to return at once to Paris when the news first reached Copenhagen of impending trouble, but, no intimation of the fact having been received up to the morning of the 27th instant, the city was in gala in anticipation of his arrival, and some disappointment was felt at the tardy decision to abandon the visit. This moreover created the impression that the outlook was more serious than it had been a few hours previously, which at that moment, so far as is known here, was not the case.

My French and Russian colleagues have enquired of me whether I am in receipt of any communication from His Majesty's Government which I could impart to them touching the political situation.

They on their part were equally unable to give me any information from authentic official sources.

I was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and his Excellency informed me that whatever turn events might take, the attitude of Denmark would be one of strict neutrality. His Excellency said that the attitude of Great Britain was of paramount importance to this country, and, provided that the strict neutrality of Great Britain were assured, he did not anticipate trouble for Denmark in the event of a European war.

Were the contrary the case the geographical position of Denmark would bring her within the danger zone, which caused some feeling of apprehension while the political outlook was uncertain.

I informed his Excellency that I had received no communication from His Majesty's Government on the political situation, but pointed out that your initiative in the interests of peace on a former occasion, as well as in the present crisis, was a guarantee that His Majesty's Government would do whatever might be possible to prevent untoward events.

So far as is known no orders for the mobilisation or for the strengthening of forts have been issued by the Danish Government. This has given rise to sarcastic comment by the Opposition press, who point out that Holland, Belgium and even Sweden are taking defensive precautions, and it asks if it is sufficient for the Danish Government to put up notices at Nyborg, Korsör, and Køge Bay inscribed "No admittance permitted," in Russian, German, and English, in order to protect Denmark's neutrality.

I have, &amp;c.

HENRY CROFTON LOWTHER.

(1) No. 169.

(36042)

No. 647.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 388.)

Sir,

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

The attitude of the population of Paris during the last five or six days has been admirable. Some papers, particularly the "Temps" and the Nationalist papers, began towards the middle of last week to publish very provocative articles but the population has remained calm. The assassination of M. Jaurès, the leader of Socialist party, who

was shot by a young and apparently insane "patriot," as he was dining in a café on the evening of the 31st ultimo, has been the only regrettable incident to be recorded.

The return of the President of the Republic about mid-day on the 29th was the occasion for a most enthusiastic welcome; he was received by enormous crowds who cheered lustily—the cries being chiefly "Vive la France!" "Vive l'Alliance!" "Vive la Russie!" and "Vive l'Angleterre!" and some cries of "A Berlin!"

On the afternoon of the 1st instant there was a small demonstration outside His Majesty's Embassy, when British flags were waved and cheers given for England.

The financial situation, on which I reported in my despatch No. 381 of the 31st ultimo.<sup>(1)</sup> remains in the same state. The issue of 20 fr. and 5 fr. notes which was announced, seems to have had no effect whatever and small change is still almost impossible to obtain.

The general mobilisation was ordered at 3.40 P.M. yesterday, and was responded to with alacrity; a state of siege was proclaimed to-day in France and Algeria, and the Chambers have been convoked for to-morrow.

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, copies of the proclamation which has been addressed to the French people by the President of the Republic<sup>(2)</sup> and which was published in this morning's papers.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(1) [NOTE.—Not printed. This refers to the want of small change and the demand for specie: the request for a moratorium has not been granted; difficulties of the Allard Bank: the Bank of France had refused assistance to it on account of its German connection.]

(2) Not printed.

(36020)

No. 648.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 286.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

When the Marquis di San Giuliano first expressed to me on the 22nd and 23rd instants his fears that the Austrian note to Serbia would prove quite unacceptable, I had the impression that the Italian Government must have been made aware of its contents.<sup>(1)</sup> I have now ascertained that this was not the case. His Excellency's anticipations were simply based on what he gathered from the Austrian representative here would be the general lines of the communication. He has told me, and it has also come to me from the President of the Council, that the Austrian note was only communicated to the Italian Government simultaneously with its communication to the other powers. This is from their point of view most fortunate, as, not having been asked to approve it or consent to it beforehand, they consider that they are not engaged by the action of Austria-Hungary.

Further the Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured me that he has expressed no views of any kind to Austria on the action she has taken.

His opinion at the same time, as expressed to myself, is very definite, as I gather is that of his Prime Minister. He considers that if the note was seriously meant in the sense which its text implies, it is a monument of absurdity. It might have been drawn up by a policeman. Does the Austrian Government, he asked, still seriously think that racial instincts and national movements can be extinguished by police measures? If on the other hand it was simply meant as a declaration of war then it is unnecessary to criticise it.

(1) See No. 78.

After such an admission of his views on the subject, I asked him how it was that the "Popolo Romano," a paper often used for government communications here, had this morning published a telegram, dated from Vienna, announcing that the declaration made by the Italian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Government had produced an excellent impression at Vienna and Budapest, while it had also published leading articles supporting the action of Austria. His Excellency said that there was no foundation whatever for the alleged telegram from Vienna, the origin of which he apprehended might be traced to gulden or rather kronen, which were he believed the present denomination.<sup>(2)</sup> At the same time he instructed his Secretary in my presence to let the editor of the "Popolo Romano" know that he had better put some water in his wine.

It is remarkable that the only two organs here which have given open support to the action of Austria are the "Popolo Romano" and a very trumpery paper published in French called the "Italie," both of which are well known to open their columns to those who pay for insertion. The semi-official press maintains reserve, and the independent press is growing daily stronger in its criticisms. The Milanese "Corriere della Sera" of this morning, for instance, says "it is impossible not to recognise the enormous responsibility which Austria has assumed, by a gesture of premeditated violence, by a step which indicates her determination for war at any cost, by a precipitation the consequences of which she could not ignore," and it goes on to assert that her action is opposed to the public opinion of all civilised countries.

It is significant that the opinions expressed by the "Popolo Romano" have been, as I am informed, the only ones reproduced in the German press, as representing the view held in Italy.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

<sup>(2)</sup> See DD Nos. 44, 47, 59 which refer to the provision of the money required for influencing the Italian Press.

(S6021)

No. 649.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 289.)

Sir,

Rome, July 30, 1914.

With reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 23rd instant<sup>(1)</sup> I find that the Roumanian Minister takes a very opposite view of what the attitude of Bulgaria will be to that which the Bulgarian Minister foreshadowed. He is convinced that Bulgaria has an understanding with Austria-Hungary and will avail herself of the opportunity which coming events may afford, to endeavour to recover a portion of that section of Macedonia which has fallen to Servia. She would, he said, be as ready to disregard the cause of Slavism as she has been to disregard the common interests of the Balkan States, and would probably not hesitate to bargain with Turkey in her ambition to recover Macedonia. Her action would probably not be direct. Comitadgis would be organised in the new Servian areas; the Servians would be provoked to massacres of Bulgarians, and then she would proclaim the necessity of intervention.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 163.



(36022)

No. 650.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 290.)

Sir,

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I have the honour to report that as was to be anticipated at this critical moment the parties of the Left in this country are taking a very definite line as to what the attitude of Italy must be.

The official socialist group adopted an order of the day at Milan to the effect that "the proletariat of Italy must not be compelled to take up arms in the service of her ally to crush a free people." This represents the extreme view which is also indicated by a caricature in the socialist organ the "Avanti" representing a gigantic personification of this proletariat giving orders to a diminutive figure indicating the Monarchy, that there must be no recourse to arms.

The less extreme view is ably put forward by the independent socialist deputy Signor Bissolati, who was invited to join the last Giolitti Ministry. It is summed up in the following passage. After pointing out that by Italy's abstention from accumulating troops on her eastern frontier, Austria is rendered free from all preoccupations in that quarter, he writes:—

"Everyone recognises the immense value to Austria and Germany of this loyal attitude of Italy. If Austria were compelled to mobilise a sufficient force to keep Italy under observation, at a moment when she requires her very last man to carry on the difficult war in the mountains of Servia and to face the Russian menace, she might be confronted with the possibility of a defeat. Italy, therefore, by abstaining from any movement of troops on the Austrian frontier, renders her allies the greatest possible service she could render them. We say the 'greatest' because an active participation in the conflict, or even a simple menace on the eastern frontier, in the event of France being drawn into the war, would not be sanctioned by the Italian people . . . . The neutrality of to-day may place Italy in a better position to preserve her forces intact in order to co-operate in the future in securing a happier era for the peoples of Europe."

These words of Signor Bissolati represent, in my opinion, the views of the majority at the present stage of the European crisis.

The obligations of alliance it is here contended depend upon circumstances, and the interpretation which is given will no doubt be influenced in the first instance by self-interest. From what is known of the engagements with France entered into in 1902 it should not be difficult to interpret them in a sense which would preclude that conflict on the eastern frontier of Italy to which Signor Bissolati asserts the Italian people would never consent.

I have, &amp;c.

RENNELL RODD.

(36033)

No. 651.

*Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 32.)

Sir,

Cettinje, July 23, 1914.

Early in June last the "Pravda" newspaper of Belgrade, commenting on the reply given by M. Plamenatz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to an interpellation on the subject of the abandonment of Scutari and the international loan, published a bitter attack on the authorities of this country. "We are not" said the writer 'desirous of going deep into recent events but we wish merely to lift the veil and



to show to all what sort of 'types' govern in Montenegro and whether they can be believed when they speak in Montenegro in its name. Let Minister Peter Plamenatz therefore answer: who is that wretched Serb who behind the back of the much troubled but thoroughly patriotic cabinet of General Mitar Martinovitch, went to Baron Giesl, the ex-Austro-Hungarian Minister at Cetinje on the 25th of October, 1912, and prayed, as a beggar does from a protector (and one knows in whose name!), that the Austro-Hungarian army should enter the Sanjak? On the part of Montenegro there would be no opposition: the two battalions on the Tara were only there to deceive public opinion. Otherwise Servia would become a danger to Montenegrin independence. Who was this man, Peter? Was he of the Left or of the Right ('Klubash' or 'Pravash')? Anyhow Baron Giesl must have noted the name of this hero in his papers. To think that to-day such a man is deciding, making declarations and speaking in the name of Montenegro and the Serb cause!"

A few days afterwards the same statements were repeated in the "Balkan" newspaper of Belgrade. Moreover, General Luka Gojnitch, a former prefect of Cetinje, was accused of treachery to the Servians at Brditza during the siege of Scutari, while the paper continued: "Like Pilate, Peter Plamenatz washed his hands and declared that he was innocent about Scutari. Yet, as governor of the town he sent a telegram to Martinovitch on the 17/30 April that he would not surrender the place but would defend it to the last drop of his blood. When the government fell and he was offered a post, he handed over the town to Vice-Admiral Burney!" The article concludes with the sentence: "Russia knows this well enough." A detailed contradiction of these assertions was published in the two Montenegrin newspapers on behalf of M. Plamenatz who was able to declare that he was not in Cetinje on the 25th of October, 1912. His denial may be placed side by side with the information supplied to you in the following January by the Russian Government to the effect that they were aware that negotiations with Austria on the subject of the Sanjak had been initiated by the King. No statement was made to you as to who had conducted them.

More than once it has occurred in the last three years that accusations of unpatriotic conduct and betrayal of the Serb cause, addressed from Belgrade to Cetinje, have been met not only by counter-charges and insults but also by demonstrations of Chauvinism on the part of King Nicolas in the form of a press campaign of abuse against Austria. An outburst of this kind took place in the spring two years ago when, apparently with the approval of M. Milovanovitch, the Belgrade newspapers published the text of an alleged secret agreement between King Nicolas and Austria. On the present occasion the Palace may have considered it imprudent to risk an attack on Belgrade but intemperate articles against Austria at once began to appear. Interrupted for a moment by the news of the assassination at Serajevo, which evoked a guarded expression of disapproval, the series was continued with greater violence on receipt of news respecting the anti-Serb riots in Bosnia. Austria, it was declared, was aiming at the extermination of the Serb race in her dominions while the two independent Serb States were to be attacked and crushed on the pretext that they had abetted the murder of the Archduke. The insincerity of the indignation thus expressed and the evident desire not to be left out of the controversy may be judged by the fact that though the "Reichspost," the "Neue Freie Presse," and, doubtless, other Austrian newspapers have freely attacked Belgrade for harbouring conspirators against the life of the Archduke, not a word seems to have been said in this connection against Montenegro. On the contrary, up to a short time before the formation of the Balkan League, King Nicolas was himself levelling the same accusations against the Servian Government and was even declaring that M. Pashitch had taken a direct part in a plot to murder him. On that occasion the bombs seem to have come from the Servian arsenal at Kragujevatz. Whether they were brought here by the enemies or the agents of the Palace is another matter.

Briefly, danger of disturbance in this country may be caused by the desire of

the ruling authorities to outdo Serbia in any demonstration of Serb patriotism, by the same spirit, in short, with which the King hastened to begin the Balkan war before his allies were ready.

While the Belgrade papers received here have published long enlogies on the services rendered by the late M. Hartwig and by Russian diplomacy to the Southern Slavs, not a word has been said here on the subject. It is nearly two months since the complimentary mission came from St. Petersburg but still there has been no sign of the money for the military subsidy. The Russian Government are, it is understood, favourably disposed in principle but no final decision seems to have been taken. Their hesitation may be solely due to a desire to postpone payment during the uncertainties of the present moment. Or is distrust of the King, based on past experience, leading them to withhold help from Montenegro pending a modification of the present system of government in accordance with their wishes?

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

(36034)

No. 652.

*Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 33.)

Sir,

*Cettinje, July 26, 1914.*

In my despatch No. 23 of the 11th of May reference was made to the rumours current with regard to the alleged aims or intentions of the Austrian Government in connection with the strategical positions belonging to Montenegro which dominate the Bocche di Cattaro. The matter has continued to arouse attention both in this country and elsewhere and the King's semi-official organ, the "Vjesnik," reproduces with evident satisfaction a recent article from the Italian "Messaggero." "Austria" it is stated (if the translation from the original be correct) "forgets that the question of the Lovtchen is not only a question for Austria and Montenegro but also for Italy. No Italian Government could allow the Lovtchen to fall into Austrian hands; that would mean a capitulation to Austria in the Adriatic and would put arms into the hands of Austria against Italy. It would give her the key of the Adriatic—guns which would command our position in the same way as the Austrians imagine that Montenegrin guns can at present fire down on the bay of Cattaro from the heights of Lovtchen. In Vienna they are so much in love with this Lovtchen that they have even suspended work on the new military harbour at Sebenico . . . . We repeat that Lovtchen is an Italian question, or, better still, that it is an international one. Italy cannot allow the strategical situation in the Adriatic to be altered to her disadvantage. Lovtchen must remain as it is . . . . Montenegrin."

Some military movements in the neighbourhood of Cattaro have given rise to further comment. Reinforcements of troops were moved to posts in the Bocche with the avowed object of preventing collisions between the Croats and the Serbs. In view of the recent riots in Bosnia, the explanation might seem to be well founded, but the report was spread here that the movements carried out were such as would be preliminary to an advance across the frontier. The Austrian Minister has hastened to give very positive and friendly assurances that no hostile movement is intended while an official communiqué to the same effect was published in the "Fremdenblatt" on the 21st July. In spite of the recent press campaign against them the Austrian Government are making considerable efforts to be conciliatory.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

No. 653.

*Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

Sofia, July 29, 1914.

The Ballplatz have indeed exploded a bomb, and it is impossible to foretell what the consequences will be. There is considerable evidence even here that Germany is largely responsible for the decisive action taken by the Dual Monarchy.

I gather that General Markoff, Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, wrote to King Ferdinand on *July 7th* that the Ballplatz were preparing a note of such a stiff nature for the Servian Government that no independent State could accept it: that the German Government had in no way endeavoured to persuade Count Berchtold to tone down the note, the wording of which was largely attributed in competent quarters to Count Forgach, who has a special spite against the Servians. The General further added that, in Berlin military circles, war between Austria, Servia and Montenegro was considered as a foregone conclusion; that they, the Germans, were absolutely prepared for all consequences, whereas none of the Triple *Entente* Powers were ready. This letter reached the Palace on the 10th instant; on the 11th instant Major von der Goltz, German Military Attaché here, and son of the celebrated Field-Marshal von der Goltz, was sent for to the Palace by the King's Chef de Cabinet, and he left the same evening for Berlin. Major von der Goltz's attitude had been very warlike ever since the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, and before leaving he told two of his friends that war between Austria and Servia was certain, but that he was afraid that Russia would funk Germany at the last moment.

As regards Bulgaria, whatever statement she may make officially, she will wait to see which way the cat jumps before taking any decisive action; we may look, however, to seeing komitaji bands spreading over the Servian and perhaps even the Greek frontiers as advanced guards. These bands will of course be secretly armed and supported by the Government.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

(35938)

No. 654.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

D. August 4, 4 P.M.

R. August 5, 12:50 A.M.

Tel. (No. 29.)

I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs a note of which following is a literal translation:—

“Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty. Belgian Government are firmly resolved to resist by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory.

“There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

“Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places.”



(35915)

No. 655.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers.**Foreign Office, August 5, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 16.)

D. 10.15 A.M.

Your telegram No. 28 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

You should say that His Majesty's Government regard common action to resist Germany as being now in operation and justified by treaty of 1839.

(1) No. 631.

(36100)

No. 656.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Chilton.**Foreign Office, August 5, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 27.)

D. 1.45 P.M.

The Belgian Government have appealed to Great Britain, France and Russia, to co-operate as guarantors in defence of her territory, and His Majesty's Government regard themselves as engaged in common action to uphold the treaty with Belgium and her independence, integrity, and neutrality.

His Majesty's Government believe that the issue involves in effect the separate existence in full independence, not only of Belgium, but of other neighbouring States.

In this issue His Majesty's Government would be glad to join in common action with Netherlands Government, with the object of securing the full independence, liberty, and integrity of every State that will join in common action to defend itself.

His Majesty's Government believe that on the result of this war depends the question whether Great Britain, France, and all the countries bordering on the North Sea shall maintain their existence as before this war.

To The Hague only.

It is reported from Brussels that German cavalry have broken through Dutch territory, and that Holland is engaged in some fighting.

(Repeated to Paris No. 323 and St. Petersburg No. 449.)

(Sent also to Mr. Findlay (No. 29), *mutatis mutandis*.)

(36264)

No. 657.

*Communicated by Belgian Minister (August 5).*

Légation Belgique, Londres.

*Bruxelles, 5 Août.*

La Belgique fait appel à Angleterre, France et Russie pour coopérer comme garantes à la défense de son territoire. Belgique assure défense places fortes.

DAVIGNON.

*Cf. B No. 42.*



(36017)

No. 658.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)*

(No. 119.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

With reference to my telegram No. 15 of to-day,<sup>(1)</sup> I have the honour to forward copies of the German ultimatum and of the Belgian reply.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to treat these documents as strictly confidential. Their contents have not been made public, and their full text has so far been communicated only to myself.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. VILLIERS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 658.

*Ultimatum presented to Belgium by Germany, August 2, 1914, 7.30 P.M.*

Le Gouvernement allemand a reçu des nouvelles sûres d'après lesquelles les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher par la Meuse sur Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur l'intention de la France de marcher sur l'Allemagne par territoire belge. Le Gouvernement allemand ne peut s'empêcher de craindre que la Belgique, malgré la meilleure volonté, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche en avant française d'un si grand développement. Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigée contre l'Allemagne.

C'est un devoir impérieux de conservation pour l'Allemagne de prévenir cette attaque.

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait très vivement que la Belgique regardât comme un acte d'hostilité contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemies de l'Allemagne l'oblige de violer de son côté le territoire belge.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu, le Gouvernement allemand déclare ce qui suit :

1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilité contre la Belgique, si la Belgique consent dans la guerre qui va commencer à prendre une attitude de neutralité bienveillante vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne; le Gouvernement allemand de son côté s'engage au moment de la paix à garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur étendue.

2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition énoncée à évacuer le territoire belge aussitôt la paix conclue.

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, l'Allemagne est prête, d'accord avec le Gouvernement belge, à acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui serait nécessaire à ses troupes et à indemniser tout le dommage causé en Belgique.

4. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une manière hostile contre les Allemands et particulièrement fait des difficultés à leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, chemins de fer, &c., l'Allemagne sera obligée de considérer la Belgique en ennemie; en ce cas l'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-à-vis du royaume, mais elle laissera le règlement ultérieur des rapports des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a l'espoir justifié que cette éventualité ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement belge saura prendre les mesures appropriées pour l'empêcher de se produire. Dans ce cas, les relations d'amitié qui unissent les deux États voisins deviendront plus étroites et durables.

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 561.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 658.

*Reply of Belgian Government to German Ultimatum.*

Par sa note du 2 août, le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaître que, d'après des nouvelles sûres, les forces françaises auraient l'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgré sa meilleure volonté, ne serait pas en état de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes françaises. Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans l'obligation de prévenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire belge. Dans ces conditions, l'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-à-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage, au moment de la paix, à garantir l'intégrité du royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur étendue. La note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficultés à la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, l'Allemagne sera obligée de la considérer comme ennemie et de laisser le règlement ultérieur des deux États l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre à la décision des armes.

Cette note a provoqué chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux étonnement.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue à la France sont en contradiction avec les déclarations formelles qui nous ont été faites le 1<sup>er</sup> août au nom du Gouvernement de la république.

D'ailleurs si, contrairement à notre attente, une violation de la neutralité belge venait à être commise par la France, la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armée opposerait à l'envahisseur la plus rigoureuse résistance.

Les traités de 1839, confirmés par les traités de 1870, consacrent l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique, sous la garantie des Puissances, et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

La Belgique a toujours été fidèle à ses obligations internationales; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialité; elle n'a négligé aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutralité.

L'atteinte à son indépendance dont la menace le Gouvernement allemand, constituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun intérêt stratégique ne justifie la violation du droit.

Le Gouvernement belge en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiées, sacrifierait l'honneur de la nation en même temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-à-vis de l'Europe.

Conscient du rôle que la Belgique joue depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse à croire que l'indépendance de la Belgique ne puisse être conservée qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralité.

Si cet espoir était déçu, le Gouvernement belge est fermement décidé à repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte à son droit.

*Cf. B Nos. 20 and 22 for English translation.*

(56486)

No. 659.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 389.) Confidential.

Sir,

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called on me this afternoon. He said that he might have to appeal for my intervention as Doyen to make representations to the French Government. He had been insulted in restaurants and in the streets; he found difficulty in getting tradesmen to supply him with provisions; shops occupied

by Austro-Hungarian subjects had been wrecked and pillaged; thousands of Austro-Hungarian subjects had to leave Paris under the expulsion order issued but no means of doing so towards their own country had been placed at their disposal; they were to be directed to the west of France where work was to be found for them. He had made representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who had expressed great regret at the wrecking and pillaging of shops and had stated that police precautions were being taken to prevent any further incidents of the kind, and he offered to order supplies of meat and butter to be made to the Ambassador if His Excellency found any difficulty in procuring them. Count Szecsen told M. Viviani that, France and Austria-Hungary not being in a state of war, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ought to be treated in a normal manner and even if the two countries were at war with each other he ought according to the customs of nations and international law to receive proper consideration so long as he remained in the country to which he had been accredited. I expressed great regret at the wrecking and pillaging of the shops and I told my colleague that I had not had milk with my coffee this morning as none could be procured, but I hoped to be more fortunate to-morrow.

The Spanish Ambassador, who had paid me a visit just before Count Szecsen, told me that our Austro-Hungarian colleague had continued to use the Union Club during the crisis and had had luncheon there as lately as on the first instant, when he had realised by the demeanour of some of the members that his presence was not very welcome.

Count Szecsen in further conversation stated that the German Ambassador did not, so he assured him, as had been represented, ask M. Viviani that his passports should be prepared when he had an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of inquiring what would be the attitude of France if there were war between Germany and Russia. I am inclined, however, to think that M. de Schoen's memory is at fault in this matter, for I had an interview with M. Viviani and the Political Director immediately after the German Ambassador had made his communication on the evening of Friday the 31st ultimo, and they then told me, and they expressed natural astonishment at M. de Schoen's proceeding, that after having made the inquiry as to the attitude of France and saying that he would come the next day at one P.M. for the reply, he begged that his passports might be prepared and he requested that his adieux might be conveyed to the President of the Republic.

With regard to the declaration of war by Germany against Russia, Count Szecsen's information was that it was not made until after Russian troops had made incursions into German territory. He also told me that the Russian general mobilisation order was issued before—and not after—the order for a general mobilisation was issued in Vienna.

With regard to the prolonged stay of the German Ambassador at Paris, Count Szecsen stated that M. de Schoen, not having received instructions to leave, could not do so. His telegrams to Berlin were stopped and those addressed to him by the German Government arrived mutilated.

Since I began this despatch I learn that M. de Schoen has informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he leaves Paris to-night.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.



(36437)

No. 660.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 6.)*

(No. 390.) Confidential.

Sir,

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I have the honour to report that my Spanish colleague informs me that Spanish Government have given assurances to French Government that they can denude the Franco-Spanish frontier of French troops with complete confidence in the friendly attitude of Spain in the coming conflict of France with Germany.

I have, &amp;c.

F. BERTIE.

36299)

No. 661.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

D. August 5, 7:30 P.M.

R. August 6, 9:20 A.M.

Tel. (No. 160.)

6 P.M.—Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told Russian Ambassador that owing to alliance and consequent state of war with Russia he was compelled to recall Austrian Ambassador from St. Petersburg, where telegram recalling him would probably arrive to-morrow afternoon. Russian Ambassador is arranging to leave Vienna about the same time if possible via Roumania, Austro-Hungarian Government promising all possible facilities. French Ambassador is still in doubt.

We are completely cut off here from all news except scraps which pass censorship, and no posts are arriving from England.

(36267)

No. 662.

*Foreign Office to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and has the honour, with reference to the circular note despatched from this Office on the 3rd instant, to inform His Excellency that, having regard to the position of the Dual Monarchy as the ally of the German Empire with which this country is now at war, it is no longer possible for His Majesty's Government to extend to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy the privilege of sending or receiving telegrams in code or cypher.

*Foreign Office, August 6, 1914.*

36299)

No. 663.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

Foreign Office, August 7, 1914.

D. 5:25 P.M.

Tel. (No. 211.) *En clair.*

Austrian Ambassador is still here without instructions, and I have no further instructions to send you at present.



37758)

No. 664.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 296.)

Sir,

*Rome, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to report that the following message to the Milanese "Corriere della Sera," defining the position of Italy was practically drafted by the Prime Minister himself:—

"The spirit and the letter of the Triple Alliance are such that the *casus foederis* does not arise for Italy in the war which is imminent between Austria and Germany on the one hand and France and Russia on the other.

"Italy will naturally maintain a friendly attitude towards the allies as well as to the belligerents on the other side so that she may find herself in a position, at a given moment, to render some service in the interests of peace.

"Therefore during the first period it will be right that Italy should maintain an attitude of reserve. If events should so move as to render probable a rearrangement of territory or a change of equilibrium, then the Government will take steps to protect national interests.

"Austria-Hungary not having previously informed her of the act which became the actual cause of conflict, Italy did not have the necessary time to tender advice against any portion of the Austrian demands which may have been excessive. But when these had once been presented, Italy as the friend of Austria, could not advise her to withdraw them. Italy has nevertheless taken every step to obtain from Austria a binding declaration in favour of the independence of Servia and of the principle of abstention from any territorial annexation.

"Austria however while repeating the firmness of her intentions in this respect, has never expressed them in a binding form. Italy therefore could naturally not contribute by her arms to results which might be injurious to her own interests."

This may, I think, be taken as the official view which is held to justify her separating herself from her allies.

There are of course other very cogent reasons for the course which has been adopted many of which have been suggested before in considering the case hypothetically. There are two which have had very great force in compelling this decision. The first is that the general feeling in the country would scarcely tolerate Italy taking up arms to fight on the side of Austria, if indeed the spirit which at present prevails would not actually provoke revolution. The second is that Italy has a very large part of her forces engaged in Libya, and inasmuch as these troops have still to be supplied almost entirely from Italy, the freedom of the sea between Sicily and Tripoli is absolutely necessary to prevent them from isolation and eventual starvation.

I have, &amp;c.

RENNELL RODD.

*Cf. Nos. 78 and 648.*

No. 665.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Arthur Nicolson.*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

*St. Petersburg, August 3, 1914.*

I have reported so fully in my telegrams all my conversations during the last ten eventful days that I have indeed but little to add. From the very first moment the Russian Government took up a firm attitude and made it perfectly clear that

they would not allow Austria to crush Serbia. There was no attempt at blustering or at using tall language as so often happened during the Balkan crisis. Sazonow was calm but determined: and the language held by the French Ambassador showed plainly enough that Russia could count on the support of France. Sazonow's anxiety has been what England would do, as he has always held that the British Fleet alone can inflict a mortal wound on Germany. My aim throughout has been to dissuade him from doing anything to precipitate a conflict, so as to allow time for us and the other Powers to mediate: and if our efforts to maintain peace have failed it is in no way his fault. He showed throughout the most conciliatory spirit and caught at every proposal put forward for a pacific settlement. Now that we can look back on all that has taken place since the assassination of the Archduke there is, I think: strong evidence to show that Germany really desired war, or at all events the disruption of the Triple *Entente*, which must have followed a failure on our part to support Russia. The military party in Germany who favoured the idea of a preventive war before Russia became too strong had evidently gained the upper hand and there can be little doubt that Tchirsky at Vienna encouraged the Austrians in their forward policy. Jagow was probably kept in the dark as to the terms of the Austrian ultimatum so as to be able honestly to say that the text had never been submitted to him: but Tchirsky and others were certainly in the secret. Austria never believed that Russia would face a war against her and Germany did not intend to embark on one which would involve all the Powers of Europe. In my last annual report I pointed out that one of the most unfortunate results of the two Balkan wars was the impression that had gained ground that Russia was committed to a policy of peace at any price: and I predicted that if any Power acting under this belief put Russia's patience to too severe a proof it would find that there was an intense though latent patriotism in the Russian people, with which it would have to count. From the Emperor down to the humblest moujik Russia has risen like one man to the occasion: and even the Socialist working men have proclaimed a truce to strikes now that war has been forced upon their country. The speech which the Emperor made after reading the Manifesto on the declaration of war at the Winter Palace yesterday voiced the sentiments of the whole nation and, if Russia meets with reverses in the commencement and is forced to abandon Petersburg, she will fall back on Moscow and continue fighting till not a single enemy is left on Russian soil. The words of the Emperor are the same as those used by Alexander I when Napoleon invaded Russia and the same spirit that animated the Russian people in 1812 inspires them to-day. I trust that they will not be called on to make the same sacrifices as they made after the capture of Moscow: but I believe that they are prepared to do so and that, if defeated in the first pitched battles, they will, conscious of their innate strength, offer such a protracted and stubborn resistance that Germany will slowly bleed to death and succumb to sheer exhaustion. The Minister of War told me the other day that the war might last three years and our Military Attaché tells me that when all the military preparations are completed, Russia will have between seven and eight million men under arms.

The King's telegram to the Emperor<sup>(1)</sup> reached me at 5 o'clock on Saturday afternoon (August 1) and Sazonow at once telephoned to arrange an audience. He happened to be dining with me that evening and, just before I started in my motor for Peterhof, a messenger brought a draft of the reply which he had had drawn up for the Emperor's approval. I arrived at a little villa on the shores of the Gulf where the Imperial Family always live, at 10.45, and was at once received by His Majesty. In reply to a question which He addressed to me, I told Him frankly that the draft reply in French was, in my opinion, couched in too official language and that I should personally greatly prefer if His Majesty would answer the King in His own words. The Emperor expressed His entire concurrence and we then

proceeded to discuss the whole situation. Finally His Majesty sat down at His writing table and asked me to help Him in drawing up the reply.<sup>(2)</sup> This was by no means an easy task as, though He talks English fluently, He evidently found some difficulty in putting what He wanted into words; and I virtually had to dictate the telegram to Him on the lines of the draft which Sazonow had given me and on what His Majesty had told me. I was with Him for an hour and a half and only got back at 2 o'clock.

Wilson, the American Chargé d'Affaires, told one of my staff to-night that the Germans had asked at Washington whether he might take charge of their interests here before even the order for partial Russian mobilisation had been issued. This in itself shows how false has been the rôle which they have been playing and confirms what I said above that they have all along been bent on provoking war. They have been throwing dust in our eyes all along, with the object of detaching us from France and Russia; and I have no doubt that Lichnowski foresaw a crisis was coming when he, some months ago, made a succession of speeches in the industrial centres in the North of England.

Last night it was currently reported that we had declared war on Germany and between 11 and 12 a huge crowd demonstrated before the Embassy singing the Russian National Anthem and cheering lustily for England. I fortunately was in bed and made that an excuse for declining to comply with the repeated requests sent me to appear. To-night everybody—and no one more anxiously than myself—is waiting to hear the result of the debate in the House of Commons. I only pray that England will prove true to herself and to her friends, as if she deserts them in their hour of need she will find herself isolated after the war; and the hours of our Empire will be numbered.

How many anxious days we shall have passed and how much future history may have been made before this letter reaches you.

I have written no despatches as they would all be ancient history before they arrive, and it is the future and not the past that is of interest.

Ever yours,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 490.

(38779)

No. 666.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)*

Tel. (No. 136.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

Your telegram No. 266 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regrets that he cannot give assurance demanded as German troops passed Belgian frontier this morning.

He begs me to assure you that this was military necessity and matter of life and death for Empire; every other line of attack would have taken too long and enabled Russia to concentrate. They had been ready to give, and had in fact given, assurances to Belgium that every compensation would be given to her after the war, and that her neutrality in every other way except as regards passage of troops would be respected. Belgium, he admitted, had acted quite naturally and very loyally in this matter.

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 573.



(38780)

No. 667.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)*

Tel. (No. 137.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Your telegram No. 270 of 4th August.<sup>(1)</sup>

Both Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regretted that they could give no other answer than that which they gave me this afternoon. I told them that in that case I had been instructed to ask for my passports.

My interview with the Chancellor was very painful. He said that he could not but consider it an intolerable thing that because they were taking the only course open to them to save the Empire from disaster, England should fall upon them just for the sake of the neutrality of Belgium. He looked upon England as entirely responsible for what might now happen.

I asked him whether he could not understand that we were bound in honour to do our best to preserve a neutrality which we had guaranteed. He said: "But at what price!"

## MINUTE.

This, and the immediately preceding telegram<sup>(2)</sup> never reached us from Berlin, but have been given to us now by Sir E. Goschen for our archives.—*G. R. C. August 13, 1914.*

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 594.<sup>(2)</sup> No. 666.

(38897)

No. 668.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 299.)

Sir,

Rome, August 4, 1914.

The following is the text of the declaration of neutrality issued by Italy and published in to-day's press:—

"Some of the European Powers being in a state of war and Italy being in a state of peace with all the belligerent parties, the Government of the King and the citizens and subjects of the kingdom are under the obligation to observe the duties of neutrality, in accordance with the laws in force and the principles of international war."

In commenting on this declaration, the Italian press states that at the council of Ministers held yesterday morning, no consideration could be taken of the situation created by the German "ultimata" for the simple reason that no notice had been received of them.

The council of Ministers accordingly confined itself to considering the position brought about by Austrian attack on Serbia and based her (*sic*) decision to issue the declaration of neutrality on the following grounds—

1. It is in the spirit of the Triple Alliance that no one of the Allied Powers shall compromise herself in an action entailing general consequences without first communicating and coming to an agreement with her allies.
2. This inherent intention of the treaty is further confirmed, in so far as the situation in the Balkans is concerned, by particular agreements come to between Austria and Italy.
3. As all are aware, the Austrian note to Serbia from which originates the present situation, was not communicated to Italy in any form. Wherefore Italy was unable to control this diplomatic step, by advising her ally, as she was entitled to do. On the other hand it is clear that once the Austrian



demands had been presented, Italy, the friend and ally of Austria was unable to request that she should withdraw them.

The Italian Government, nevertheless, made every endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government binding declarations to respect the independence of Servia in the sense of her territorial integrity and sovereignty. Austria-Hungary, while maintaining that such was her firm intention, has never given such a declaration any binding form.

4. The fundamental points of the Triple Alliance are : its pre-eminently defensive character and the maintenance of the *status quo*; wherefore, Italy could not consider herself bound to participate in an aggressive action on the part of one or other of her allies, still less so when the latter have not beforehand entered into the necessary understanding with her.
5. Finally, the fact that Italy was kept in the dark about everything has prevented her from taking in time measures for the protection of her vital interests which in case of war would be immediately and most seriously endangered.

The text of these points is identical in all journals and though not officially communicated to them substantially represents position of Government.

In an article which appeared in this evening's "Corriere della Sera" the reasons for Italy's neutrality are very clearly defined.

In the first place the article states that Austria wished for war and Germany did nothing to prevent her when she could have done so and now too herself appears to desire war.

As regard's Italy's attitude the following facts must be regarded as established :—

First, her alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany is a defensive and not an offensive one. But Austria attacked Servia without warning Italy in advance of the reasons which provoked this conflict. Austria began hostilities and in such a manner that Russia was obliged to mobilize in order to preserve the present balance of power in the Balkans and to safeguard the liberty of the southern Slavs. Russia showed herself disposed to negotiate and her attitude, no less than that of Germany and Austria in connection with the pacific proposals of England and Italy must be held as essential factors in influencing Italy's present neutrality.

The second point is thus the attitude of Germany and Austria towards these proposals. Servia was ready to submit but Austria was inexorable, the truth being that she wished not only the humiliation of Servia but her political and economical subservience to the dual monarchy. Germany, on the other hand, while appearing at first desirous of peace, afterwards fearing lest delay should benefit her adversaries, herself hastened the catastrophe. The various proposals for conferences and conversations were thus merely considered by Germany and Austria as means to gain time and their failure can in no way be attributed to Russia.

Thirdly the explanations demanded by Germany from Russia and France, touching as they did the internal liberty and sovereignty of the latter juridically placed Germany in the position of the aggressor. Italy is therefore confronted not with a question of defensive action but rather of voluntary aggression, initiated by two members of the Triple Alliance against two other Powers.

There is no question of a *casus foederis* but rather the contrary.

Moreover the spirit, if not the letter of the Alliance requires that there shall be a previous understanding between the allies before action is taken. Neither Austria nor Germany were loyal to this condition.

No previous warning was given by Austria as to the terms of her note to Servia, beyond a statement that the note had been presented and the Austro-Servian war began thus without any agreement being first reached with Italy.

Germany adopted similar methods in regard to the explanations demanded of

Russia and France. Germany gave Italy no warning in advance, came to no understanding with her nor consulted her. Italy was merely informed of the *fait accompli*, as if she was a mere executrix of the wishes of others and counted for nothing in the council of the Allied Powers.

Italy could thus not do otherwise than declare that the *casus foederis* does not exist for her and that she is under no obligation to intervene. Germany and Austria not having observed the engagements of the Triple Alliance, Italy's attitude is juridically correct and politically loyal.

As regards the political side of the question the "Corriere della Sera" refers to Austria's attitude in the late Turco-Italian war and the manner in which she prevented Italy from having a free hand on the Adriatic Coast.

The journal sums up by declaring that, since Germany has come into the field in the manner described above and since Austria is preparing to change either the territorial configuration, or what is more important still, the political configuration of the Balkans, no one can pretend that Italy should work against her own interests by taking up arms for Austria. It would be absurd and monstrous to expect it. Immense changes in Europe will result from the war. Italy did not desire war and she ought not to suffer the losses which it will entail.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been careful to tell me that there has not been any official communication to the press with the exception of the declaration of war (*sic* ? neutrality). On the other hand, the press has of course been unofficially instructed as to the line to be adopted.

The veteran statesman, the Marchese Visconti Venosta, has signified to the president of the council his full approval of the course which has been adopted.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

(38903)

No. 669.

*Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 14.)

(No. 305.)

Sir,

Rome, August 4, 1914.

I have just seen Signor Martini, the Minister for the Colonies, who has told me that the Government have every reason to feel that the country supports the action taken by Italy. It is of course, he admits, the end of the Triple Alliance. Germany will not forgive Italy what is regarded there as her defection and Italy will have her difficulties to face, although her decision is entirely in accordance with a just interpretation of her obligations. He added that although there was no written understanding to the effect, it was clearly laid down by the Marquis di Rudini that in no case could Italy consent to place herself in open hostility to England, and this tacit principle was quite well known to her ally.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

(38958)

No. 670.

*Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.*—(Received August 14.)

(No. 122.)

Sir,

Brussels, August 12, 1914.

I have the honour to forward copies of the record of proceedings when King Albert opened the Belgian Chambers in person on the 4th instant.<sup>(1)</sup> The King was accompanied by the Queen, and both in the Chamber and on the way from and to the Palace their Majesties were the object of an enthusiastic ovation.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

The record contains the report of a speech delivered by Baron de Broqueville, Prime Minister and Minister for War, in the course of which he read out the three notes which passed between the Belgian and German Governments. The publication of these documents naturally produced a profound impression, all party differences disappeared, a sign of this being the appointment as Ministers of State of M. Hymans and Count Goblet d'Alviella, the Liberal leaders, and M. Vandervelde, the leader of the Socialists, and the measures proposed by the Government, including a vote of 200,000,000 fr., were passed unanimously and without discussion.

During the last two years I have on various occasions stated that in official and purely Conservative circles the proclivities were decidedly German. This feeling induced confidence which proved to be wholly misplaced. As recently as the 2nd instant, the very day on which the German ultimatum was presented, M. Davignon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared to me that there was no reason whatever to suspect that Germany intended to violate the neutrality of Belgium. The Government had consequently not even considered the question of an appeal to the guaranteeing Powers, more especially as they considered themselves in a position to resist aggression from whatever quarter it might come. This attitude as to their means of resistance was maintained until the 4th when, as you were made aware by my telegram No. 29 of that day,<sup>(2)</sup> a formal appeal was made to Great Britain, France and Russia, to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of Belgian territory.

When, however, the period of deception was passed and the time for action arrived, the Belgian Government behaved with an energy and determination which formed a good prelude to the conduct of the King's troops in the field. The spirit thus shown found a ready response among the people of all classes throughout the country. The indignation caused by the German attack has been intense and has produced a movement of patriotism and self-sacrifice which spares no effort and shrinks from no cost in the cause of national integrity and independence.

I have, &c.

F. H. VILLIERS.

[NOTE.—In a private letter of the same date Sir F. Villiers writes to Sir Arthur Nicolson :—

“The Belgian authorities were really convinced that there was nothing to fear from Germany and they would not even consider the question of an appeal to the Powers. They are bitterly incensed at being so deceived. Moreover they maintained that in case of aggression they were able to defend themselves. This last attitude was not so much due to reliance on their own forces as to a desire not to commit themselves irrevocably on either side. One can easily understand this feeling in their desperately difficult position. Eventually of course the march of events forced their appeal. As I was without any indication as to whether we should take action I could do little more than listen and report the declarations made to me.

“The energy, discipline, courage, patriotism and self-sacrifice of all classes are beyond all praise.”]

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 654.

(41041)

No. 671.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 309.)

Sir,

*Berlin, August 6, 1914.*

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 266 of the 4th instant<sup>(1)</sup> I called upon the Under-Secretary<sup>(2)</sup> of State for Foreign Affairs that afternoon and enquired in the name of His Majesty's Government whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be “No” as, in consequence

(<sup>1</sup>) No. 573 (a).

(<sup>2</sup>) Should be Secretary of State.



of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step—namely that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way—so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the Fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that for the reasons he had given me it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your telegram No. 270<sup>(3)</sup> and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a paraphrase of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview would have taken place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor as it might be perhaps the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted for about 20 minutes.<sup>(4)</sup> He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree, just for a word "neutrality" a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her.

<sup>(3)</sup> No. 594.

<sup>(4)</sup> [NOTE.—The question having been raised as to the language used in this conversation and in the statement by the Chancellor, an enquiry was addressed to Sir Horace Rumbold. He writes that according to private notes which he made at the time, Sir Edward Goschen informed him on the same day that "the Chancellor made a set speech in English."]



All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office, had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable: it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen! I protested strongly against that statement and said that in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate her neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I admitted that that had been the case and said that it was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up my telegram No. 137. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office but apparently never despatched.

At about 9:30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well, or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and nevertheless war had not ensued, but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions of which I had given Herr von Jagow a paraphrase that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was in fact a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

The next morning I demanded my passports in writing.

In the meantime after Herr Zimmermann left me a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt" was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room where we were all sitting warned us that the

situation was getting unpleasant. I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued and he had replied "Certainly not until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true. (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever) and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's Aides-de-Camps to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now, at once, divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its petulant acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route *viâ* the Hook of Holland to that *viâ* Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in burning the cyphers and other confidential papers, in sealing up the archives with the help of the secretaries of the United States Embassy and in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye

on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us. But beyond the yelling of patriotic songs, and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin, I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all they worked night and day with scarcely any rest: and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which Counsellor, Naval and Military Attachés, Secretaries and the two young Attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the Embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

*Published in BB No. 160 (with slight alterations and omissions).*

(38442)

No. 672.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.*

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

Tel. (No. 213.) *En clair.*

D. 7.15 P.M.

At the request of the French Government, who have no diplomatic means of communicating with Austria direct, I have made to the Austrian Ambassador a communication that amounts to a complete rupture between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria declared war on Russia, who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria has sent troops over the German frontier under conditions that are a direct menace to France.

The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, His Majesty's Government are obliged to instruct you to ask for your passports, and I have announced to the Austrian Ambassador that a state of war exists between the two countries from midnight.



No. 673.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.*

Private.

Dear Count Mensdorff,

*Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

I cannot express the sorrow which I feel in having to make to you personally the announcement contained in my official letter of which I have telegraphed the purport to De Bunsen.<sup>(1)</sup>

I should like to see you to say good-bye, and to shake hands, and to assure you how much my personal friendship remains unaltered.

Will you come to 28, Queen Anne's Gate, where I am staying, and where our leave-taking will be quite private.

I am there at 10 o'clock every morning.

Yours very sincerely,  
EDWARD GREY.

(1) No. 672.

No. 674.

*Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey.*

Private.

Dear Sir Edward,

*Austro-Hungarian Embassy,**18, Belgrave Square, S.W.,**August 12, 1914.*

I am deeply grieved to receive the announcement you just sent me.

I highly appreciate and heartily reciprocate the friendly personal feelings expressed in your unofficial letter, and I shall call at 28, Queen Anne's Gate to-morrow morning at 9.30.

Yours very sincerely,  
ALBERT MENSENDORFF.

(41041)

No. 675.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1914.*

I have read with great interest and have laid before the King your Excellency's despatch No. 309 of the 6th ultimo,<sup>(1)</sup> reviewing events at Berlin immediately preceding, and subsequent to, the outbreak of War between Great Britain and Germany.

I take this opportunity to express to you the entire approval of His Majesty's Government not only in regard to your Excellency's attitude and language in the last stage of the diplomatic relations between the two countries but for your whole conduct of His Majesty's Embassy during an exceedingly arduous and trying time.

I have noted with satisfaction your Excellency's remarks regarding the members of your staff and have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to convey through the United States Government to Mr. Gerard the warm thanks of His Majesty's Government for his great personal devotion and energy in the cause of British interests during these trying circumstances.

I am, &c.  
E. GREY.

(1) No. 671.



(48877)

No. 676.

*Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, September 1, 1914.*

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirsky who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the Allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark, no doubt for the good reason that Italy would certainly have rejected the policy embodied in the note of July 23rd if she had been invited to endorse it. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I embodied in my telegram No. 85 of the following day.<sup>(1)</sup> It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an Ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and as I was

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 50.

informed in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense and it may even be said the determination of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegations. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. I have already reported the conviction expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question, by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Book on the European Crisis. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day<sup>(2)</sup> should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far: Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly

(<sup>2</sup>) No. 190.

artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency observed a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was however kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.<sup>(3)</sup> M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise, such as an arrangement that Austria should occupy Belgrade or even advance further into Serbia, inflicting the necessary punishment before holding her hand, provided only that Russia should have a voice in the final settlement of affairs with Serbia.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the Foreign Missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian

(3) No. 412.



Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "*Neue Freie Presse*" was violently insulting towards England. The "*Fremdenblatt*" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. Its causes have been sufficiently explained elsewhere. On August 4th Duc Avarna left suddenly for Rome where he remained for about a week. During the crisis which led to the war and after the Ambassador's return from Rome I had the advantage of frequent conversations with His Excellency, who, though a sincere supporter, during the 10 years which his mission to Vienna had lasted, of the alliance of Italy with the friendly Powers, had been justly hurt by the manner in which, as stated above, his country's interest in the Servian question had been studiously ignored by the Ballplatz.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day<sup>(4)</sup> preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th,<sup>(5)</sup> stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff at the request of the French Government that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated in conclusion that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

(4) No. 618.

(5) No. 672.



After seeing Mr. Penfield, the American Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo. Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British Consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the Embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs on the Swiss frontier early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the Embassy for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government at the request of Sir Francis Bertie for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

No. 677.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.—(Received September 5.)*

Private.

My dear Nicolson,

Berlin, July, 1914.

You can imagine that I have been pretty busy since my return here on Monday morning. I found Jagow ill and tired but nevertheless optimistic—his optimism being based, he told me, on the idea that Russia was not in a position to make war. I told him that that seemed to me to be rather a dangerous idea—particularly if it was shared by Austria! That this idea is prevalent among Austrians, at least some of them, was proved to me later in the day by Count Szögyeni, who said to me later in the day that a *general* war was out of the question as Russia neither could, nor wanted to, go to war.

Jagow practically admitted to me that the Servian reply went *very* far towards meeting the Austrian demands—but he also admitted that Austria meant business and that nothing from Berlin or anywhere else would stop her from punishing Servia, short of a complete acceptance of her demands. He also again assured me that the Austrian ultimatum was not submitted to Berlin before being sent in. The general opinion here even among pro-Austrians is that Austria made her note brutal on purpose that it should not be accepted.

I have telegraphed so fully that I will not weary you with vain repetitions. My chief diplomatic difficulty has been to satisfy Cambon's curiosity as to my repeated visits to the Chancellor without giving the latter away on points which he has made me promise to keep secret. I have a stronger conviction than Cambon that both the Chancellor and Jagow would like to avoid a general war—whatever may be the opinion of the hot-headed division and the general staff. This is not only my opinion but the opinion of most diplomatists and many Germans. Cambon won't have this at all and considers, wrongly I think, Jagow to be a Junker of the most bellicose description. This is contrary to all I have ever heard of Jagow and contrary to my own opinion of him. As for the Chancellor, if he makes war it will be because he is forced into it. Jules Cambon is continually scolding me about England keeping her intentions so dark and says that the only way by which a general war can be prevented is by Sir E. Grey's stating *carrément* that England will fight on the side of France and Russia. But I tell him that a statement to that effect at the present stage, while it might cause Germany to hesitate, might equally urge Russia on; and if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would have to cut in whether she feared the British fleet or not. That Germany is very much preoccupied by the British fleet is quite clear—both from the fall in the shares of the great shipping lines and from other symptoms. Friedländer, who is about the richest financier in Germany, is in despair at the chances of England being drawn in; (he tried to sell his Hamburg-America shares but could get no price for them) and he advised a lady of my acquaintance to clear out of Berlin as soon as she could "because" he said "a month after the declaration of war by England Berlin will be starving and not only will you get nothing to eat but—starving crowds are always dangerous." I hear in fact from all sides that the financial and industrial classes are dead against a war in any shape—but particularly against a war which in its origin does not touch German interests. Jagow told me the other day that Austria was so determined to make war on Servia and so frightened of being prevented from doing so, that any advice was likely to make her hurry up to present a *fait accompli*.<sup>(1)</sup> This may be true or not—but at any rate her declaration of war, (which as far as I can judge was not expected here so soon) following so close upon the heels of the suggestion that the Servian answer offered a basis for discussion, is rather a proof that

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. No. 281.

Jagow was not far wrong in his statement. He said yesterday that he could scarcely wonder at Austria's determined action as Serbia had practically caused her to mobilize three times, and in spite of promises had always remained a hot-bed of intrigue against the dual monarchy. This one has to admit, but I asked him whether he did not think that a good deal of Servian ill-doings and intrigues might have been avoided if Austria had treated Serbia a little more generously, and allowed her, for instance, to have access to the sea. Jagow said that during the last two years he had never let an opportunity of saying to Austria: "Either treat Serbia well and live at peace with her or 'avalez-la.'" Austria had always replied that Serbia was too impertinent a neighbour to live at peace with and that to swallow her would entail too large an addition to Austria's already too numerous Slav population.

Bethmann Hollweg's "bid" for our neutrality must have taken you by surprise; it certainly did me.<sup>(2)</sup> His Excellency sent for me about 10.30 P.M.; told me that he had just come from a Council at Potsdam, at which the Emperor, Admiral v. Tirpitz and the Minister of War had been present, that he had dined in ten minutes, and that, tired as he was, he had to have a long talk to Jagow after he had finished with me. He spoke to me from typewritten notes which, however, he would not show me. I asked him as it was a matter of such importance whether I might draft my telegram there and then read to him what I had written. So I made a draft and read it to him. He suggested one or two slight alterations and then told me that it was exactly what he meant to say. He asked me what I thought of it. I told him frankly that it did not seem to me acceptable and that in any case I thought it was unlikely that His Majesty's Government would care to bind themselves to any particular course of action at the present stage. I would, however, send the telegram in exactly the same words as he had approved. On the following morning Jagow came round to see me early and spoke of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Lichnowsky—the report of which had been received late at night after I had left the Chancellor. Had it been received earlier, Jagow said, the Chancellor would not have spoken to me in the way he had done. From what Jagow let drop in conversation I gather that Sir E. Grey had given Lichnowsky to understand that we might have to go with Russia and France—but strangely enough I have received no telegraphic account of this conversation as yet (July 30, 7 P.M.). Anyway Lichnowsky's report seemed to have depressed Jagow—though he praised the frankness and sincerity with which Sir E. Grey had spoken.<sup>(3)</sup>

July 31. Since yesterday events have marched with vertiginous rapidity—so rapidly in fact that it has been difficult to keep pace with them. First came the false news disseminated by the "Lokal Anzeiger" in flying sheets to the effect that Germany had determined to mobilise. This was at once officially contradicted by counter flying sheets. The Russian Ambassador, who had returned from the leave the day before telegraphed the false news in cypher—and then sent a message *en clair* to say that it had been contradicted. He had done this, he told me, as he thought an *en clair* telegram might go quicker and get to St. Petersburg before the cyphered one. If the *en clair* message was delayed or stopped, it might account for much.

This morning, before 10 o'clock, I went to see the Chancellor to give him the answer of Sir E. Grey to his "neutrality" proposal.<sup>(4)</sup> On my going into his room he said that I came *à point* as he was just going to ask me by telephone to come and see him. He then told me that he had just received news from the Russian frontier, which, if confirmed, would create a very grave and dangerous situation, and might oblige Germany to make a serious communication to the Russian Government. The news in question was that the Russian Government had destroyed their Customs Houses on the German frontier, had sealed their public offices in the neighbourhood of the frontier and had carried off their money chests into the interior. I said that these

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 293.

<sup>(3)</sup> Cf. Nos. 286, 305, 317.

<sup>(4)</sup> No. 303. Cf. Nos. 336, 337 and 340.



proceedings, if true, seemed to me to be not so much a menace to Germany, as measures of precaution, in a palpably grave situation, to meet all emergencies. He maintained on the contrary that, taken with other reports which had reached him both from Russia and Sweden, the above news threatened general mobilisation; he hoped not and he, and the Emperor also, at the urgent request of the Czar, were still doing their best to mediate at Vienna, but he feared the worst. At the close of our conversation on this subject I read to him Sir E. Grey's answer to the neutrality proposal. He paid but little attention to it and certainly made no comment; but I left him a full paraphrase of Sir E. Grey's telegram. Subsequently I saw Jagow who confirmed the Chancellor's views as to the gravity of the situation.

London. (Here my letter ended and I had no time to go on with it or opportunity of sending it.) Neither he nor the Chancellor ever alluded to Sir E. Grey's answer to the neutrality proposal, and I am sure they, or at all events Jagow, were dreadfully put out that it had ever been made. In the last conversation I had with Jagow I read to him Sir E. Grey's telegram to the effect that the British ships detained at Hamburg had never, in spite of his promises, been released.<sup>(5)</sup> He said that he could not understand it as orders had most certainly been sent from Berlin for their release. He said that when I had first spoken to him about the ships—at the Chancellor's—he had at once gone into the Chancellor's room, where Tirpitz happened to be, and had laid the matter before the latter. Tirpitz had *at once* written the order for release of the ships saying "This must be seen to at once, for it would never do at this moment to rub England the wrong way"—"froisser l'Angleterre" was the expression Jagow used. This, if true, and there is no reason to disbelieve it, shows how up to the last moment they thought that England might not come in.

W. E. G.

*A copy of this letter was sent by Sir E. Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 4th September, 1914. The last paragraph was added on this date.*

<sup>(5)</sup> No. 585. Cf. Nos. 402, 456.

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## APPENDIX A.

*The following is the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia as communicated to Sir Edward Grey, under instructions, by Count Mensdorff, on the 24th July:—*

“ Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s’est vu obligé d’adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l’entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie :

“ Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d’ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante :

“ ‘ La Serbie reconnaît qu’elle n’a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu’elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l’article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s’engage dès à présent à abandonner l’attitude de protestation et d’opposition qu’elle a observée à l’égard de l’annexion depuis l’automne dernier, et elle s’engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l’Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d’un bon voisinage.’ ”

“ Or, l’histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l’existence en Serbie d’un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d’attentats et par des meurtres.

“ Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n’a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a toléré l’activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage effréné de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d’attentats, la participation d’officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l’instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

“ Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n’avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

“ Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l’attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la ‘ Narodna Odbrana,’ et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

“ Les résultats mentionnés de l’instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l’attitude de longanimité expectative qu’il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie ; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

“ C’est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l’énunciation officielle qu’il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu’il s’engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

“ Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du ‘ Journal officiel ’ en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) l’énunciation suivante :

“ ‘ Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l’Autriche-Hongrie, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

“ ‘ Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s’était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

“ ‘ Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d’immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l’Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d’avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu’il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.’ ”

" Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le ' Bulletin officiel ' de l'armée.

" Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre :

" 1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale,

" 2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite ' Narodna Odbrana, ' à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

" 3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

" 4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

" 5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie,

" 6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

" des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives,

" 7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nommé Milan Ciganovic, employé de l'Etat serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo.

" 8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

" à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière,

" 9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui malgré leur position officielle n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin,

" 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

" Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois à 6 heures du soir.

" Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

#### " ANNEXE.

" L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes :

" 1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nommé Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabež avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic.

" 2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabež par le nommé Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic.

" 3° Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

" 4° Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

" 5° Pour rendre possible à Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Ciganovic.

" D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de divers particuliers."

*At the same time Count Mensdorff, under instructions, communicated the following official explanation from the Austro-Hungarian Government:—*

“ Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

“ Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

“ La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

“ Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

“ Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

“ Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

“ L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

“ En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

“ La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie. lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

“ Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

“ En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

“ Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

“ C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.<sup>(1)</sup>

“ Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

“ Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

“ Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.”

*Published, with translation, in BB. No. 4.*

<sup>(1)</sup> Cf. No. 282.



## APPENDIX B.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister July 27.)*

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gêner les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le 18 mars, 1909, ne se sent plus renouvelées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédés que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappe, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel. d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction.

*On July 28th. the Austro-Hungarian Government, in communicating to Count Mensdorff and other Ambassadors the reply of the Servian Government, attached to it for their guidance the following comments; these were not communicated officially to the Foreign Office, and they do not appear ever to have been seen there.*

The Royal Servian Government confine themselves to asserting that, since the declarations on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our *démarche* was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy.

The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations: this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware.

This proposition is incorrect: the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspicions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction



à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, de preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante :

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant, il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ei-

Our demand ran :—

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary . . ."

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us ran :—

"The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . participated . . ."

By the adoption of this wording with the addition "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government" the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future.

We had demanded of them :—

1. "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discontinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured.

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment

dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. :—

(a) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on their merits (*subjectiv*) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (*subjectiv*) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain.

(b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation—a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government to apply it; this, however, is not promised us.

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory—all the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupstchina—apart from the possible resignation of the Government—everything would be as it was before.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société "Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par la fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

The whole of the public life of Servia teems with the propaganda against the Monarchy of the Narodna Odbrana and of societies affiliated to it; it is therefore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them.

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not entirely complied with, as we further required :—

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

In this case also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it.

Moreover, here, too, the Servian Government have not complied with a portion of our

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement auraient été, mêlés au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

demand as fully as we required, inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired "both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction"—an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Monarchy in the Servian schools is to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punishable by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinterpretation. We desired:—

(1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (*enquête judiciaire*) against accessories to the plot.

(2) The collaboration of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto ("*recherches*" as opposed to "*enquête judiciaire*").

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the collection and verification of the material for the enquiry.

If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "*enquête judiciaire*" and simple "*recherches*" must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the preliminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their



refusal with an appearance of justification and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability.

This answer is disingenuous.

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganović was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganović had left the Servian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganović and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganović existed in Belgrade.

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankositch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars 1909.

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












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